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1	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  	  	  
	   “Many	  of	  the	  arguments	  that	  one	  hears	  today	  about	  the	  problems	  created	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  have	  a	  familiar	  ring	  to	  anyone	  knowledgeable	  about	  this	  earlier	  Japanese	  story.	  By	  looking	  at	  this	  historical	  Japanese	  experience,	  we	  can	  see	  these	  issues	  stripped	  of	  the	  emotions	  and	  politics	  of	  the	  present.”	  (Perkins	  2008,	  xii)	  	  	  	  
	  Since	  the	  1970s	  the	  United	  States	  has	  been	  engaged	  in	  a	  domestic	  debate	  on	  its	  growing	  bilateral	  trade	  deficit	   and	   indebtedness	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   its	  main	   economic	   competitor,	   a	   role	   that	   shifted	   from	  Japan	   to	   China	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   (cf.	   Destler	   1998,	   103).	   In	   the	   1980s	   this	   debate	   became	   a	  central	  feature	  and	  trigger	  of	  the	  discourse	  on	  the	  ‘Rise	  of	  Japan’	  as	  possible	  challenge	  to	  a	  liberal	  world	  order	  with	  the	  U.S.	  as	  its	  major	  proponent.	  What	  became	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  “Japan	  Problem”	  (cf.	  Van	  Wolferen	  1986)	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  –	  at	  that	  time	  ensuing	  in	  a	  severe	  crisis	  in	  the	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  relationship	  –	  bears	  significant	  resemblance	  to	  the	  discourse	  on	  the	  ‘Rise	  of	  China’	  and	  a	   possible	   ‘China	   threat’	   since	   the	   mid/late	   1990s.	   The	   main	   line	   of	   argument	   in	   both	   cases	  amounts	   to	   reproaching	   Japan	   and	   China	   for	   their	   ‘unfair	   practices’	   –	   in	   the	   form	   of	   ‘closed	  markets’	  and	   ‘currency	  manipulation’	  (Curtis	  2000;	  Evenett	  2010;	  Ge	  2013;	  cf.	  Hummel	  1997b,	  38;	  Keidel	  2011;	  Otte	  and	  Grimes	  1993,	  121)	  –	  allegedly	  resulting	  in	  their	  competitive	  advantage	  through	  a	  distortion	  of	   the	   ‘level	  playing	   field’	   (Congressional	  Record	  2010a,	  H597,	  e.g.	  2010b,	  H1159;	  Nanto	  1992,	  1).	  The	  most	  remarkable	  feature	  of	  the	  past	  and	  present	  discourses	  relates	  to	  the	  similarities	  in	  the	  language	  used	  to	  label	  first	  Japan,	  then	  China	  as	   ‘different’	  and	  ‘unfair’,	  and	   in	   consequence	   adversarial	   and	   threatening,	   despite	   of	   fundamental	   differences	   between	  ‘liberal’	   Japan	  and	   ‘communist’	  China	   themselves,	   as	  well	   as	   in	   their	  bilateral	   relationship	  with	  the	  U.S.	  This	  aspect	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  points	  of	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  as	  I	  will	  lay	  out	  in	  what	  follows.	  
	  Both,	   Japan	   and	   China	   were	   at	   first	   applauded	   and	   admired	   for	   their	   economic	  development,	  both	  being	  ascribed	  with	  the	  status	  of	  an	  ‘economic	  miracle’1.	  Eventually	  however,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  There	  are	  probably	  not	  too	  many	  developments	  which	  –	  while	  still	   taking	  place	  –	  were	  considered	  as	   ‘historical’	   in	  the	  way	   the	   ‘Rise	   of	   Asia’	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   ‘Rise	   of	   China’	   is	   categorized	   already.	   For	   instance,	   it	   is	   commonly	  predicted	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  significant	  transformation	  of	  the	  world	  (cf.	  Mahbubani	  2008,	  1)	  while	  already	  being	  named	  “the	  big	  story	  of	  our	  age”	  and	  equated	  to	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  Rome,	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  the	  British	  Raj	  or	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (cf.	  Leonard	  2008,	  5).	  China	  is	  called	  the	  global	  power	  of	  tomorrow	  (cf.	  Schmidt-­‐Glintzer	  2009,	  9)	  and	  the	  21st	  century	   is	   foresaid	   to	   be	   the	   ‘Chinese	   century’	   as	   we	   were	   “living	   through	   the	   biggest	   shift	   in	   wealth,	   power	   and	  prestige	   since	   the	   industrial	   revolution	   catapulted	  Western	   Europe	   to	   global	   dominance	   200	   years	   ago”	   (I.	   Morris	  2010).	  Equally,	  what	  is	  written	  on	  this	  topic	  is	  already	  termed	  to	  belong	  to	  “the	  most	  frequently	  read	  chapters	  in	  any	  future	  book	  of	  international	  politics	  and	  world	  history”	  (Zhu	  2006,	  1).	  Cf.	  Nymalm	  (2012).	  Japan	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s	  
2	  
	  
with	  Japan	  since	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  and	  China	  since	  the	  1990s,	  issues	  of	  economic	  (first	  and	  foremost	  trade	  and	  monetary)	  policies	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  among	  the	  most	  contentious	  topics	  in	  the	  bilateral	  relationship.2	  Since	  the	  1980s	  with	  respect	  to	  Japan	  and	  since	  the	  early/mid	  1990s	  with	  respect	  to	  China,	  the	  U.S.	  Congress,	  the	  media	  and	  public	  opinion	  are	  exerting	  a	  high	  pressure	  on	  the	   executive	   to	   ‘get	   tough’	   with	   Japan	   and	   China	   respectively,	   while	   the	   president	   and	   his	  cabinet	  are	  generally	  speaking	  more	  concerned	  about	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  overall	  character	  and	  consequences	   for	   the	  bilateral	   relationship	   (Curtis	  2000,	  29;	  Otte	  and	  Grimes	  1993,	  110)3,	  and	  prospects	  for	  cooperation	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  (cf.	  Sewell	  Chan	  2010,	  1;	  Morrison	  2014,	  37).4	  	  In	   this	   context,	   a	   significant	  debate	  has	   emerged	  on	  one	  of	   the	   central	   premises	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  economic	  policy:	  the	  transformative	  impact	  of	  liberal	  free	  trade	  policy	  –	  with	  the	  U.S.	  as	  its	  major	  proponent	  –	  on	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  system	  of	  the	  trading	  partner.	  With	  respect	  to	  China,	  this	  was	  a	  key	  issue	  for	  the	  supporters	  of	  China’s	  contested	  entry	  into	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	   (WTO)	   in	   2001	   (cf.	   Clinton	   in:	   New	   York	   Times	   2000).	   At	   that	   time	   President	  Clinton’s	   central	   argument,	   besides	   considering	   benefits	   for	   the	   American	   economy,	   was	   that	  opening	  China’s	  markets	  would	  undermine	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  (Sanger	  2000,	  1).	  Contrastingly,	   later	   on	   these	   premises	   and	   policies	   have	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   been	   articulated	   as	  having	  significantly	  contributed	  to	  the	  trade	  imbalance	  with	  China,	  that	  is	  widely	  considered	  “a	  symbol	  of	  American	  decline	  [that]	  poisoned	  many	  Americans’	  view	  of	  free	  trade”	  (Lightizer	  2010,	  1)	   not	   only	   in	   Congress,	   but	   also	   by	   the	  media	   and	   public	   opinion	   (cf.	   Conconi,	   Facchini,	   and	  Zanardi	  2011;	  Nymalm	  2011b).	  Whereas	  the	  most	  alarmist	  voices	  picture	  an	  economically	  more	  and	  more	  powerful	  but	  still	  ‘illiberal’	  China	  as	  an	  overall	  (economic	  and	  security)	  threat	  not	  only	  to	  the	  United	  States	  (cf.	  Congressional	  Record	  2005,	  H3104),	  but	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  whole	  ‘free	  world’,	   even	  more	  moderate	   voices	   predict	   at	   least	   a	   coming	   currency	   or	   trade	   war	   between	  China	   and	   the	   United	   States	   (N.	   C.	   Hughes	   2005;	   cf.	   Samuelson	   2010,	   1).	   The	   omnipresent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  was	  hailed	  as	   ‘economic	  superpower’	  that	  had	   ‘miraculously	  emerged’	  (cf.	  Dower	  2001,	  314,	  316),	   the	  new	  ‘Number	  One’	  (Vogel	  1979)	  and	  as	  a	  technological	  power	  that	  for	  instance	  Marie	  Thorsten	  in	  her	  study	  summarizes	  as	  image	  of	  a	  “Superhuman	  Japan”	  (Thorsten	  2012).	  	  2	  For	  the	  case	  of	  China	  even	  prior	  to	  other	  sensitive	  subjects	  during	  the	  time	  frame	  under	  research,	  such	  as	  Taiwan,	  Tibet	  or	  human	  rights	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	  the	  Chinese	  military	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  (cf.	  Bumiller	  2011,	  3	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Japan	  the	  U.S.-­‐executive	  over	  time	  was	  mostly	  concerned	  with	  trying	  to	  prevent	  the	  economic	  conflicts	  from	  spilling	  over	  into	  the	  fields	  of	  military	  and	  political	  affairs,	  but	  instead	  tried	  to	  further	  increase	  the	  U.S.	  influence	  in	   the	   latter	   ones	   (cf.	   Schoppa	  1999,	   319).	  However,	   this	   became	  different	   under	   the	  Clinton	   administration,	   see	   in	  what	  follows.	  4	  Although	   chastising	   the	   White	   House	   for	   being	   ‘soft	   on	   China’	   has	   been	   a	   recurrent	   practice	   in	   Congress	   and	   in	  presidential	  campaigns	  ever	  since	  President	  Nixon’s	  visit	  to	  Beijing	  in	  1972	  (E.	  Friedman	  and	  McCormick	  2000,	  11;	  cf.	  Xie	  2009,	  1)	  –	  especially	  since	  after	  Tiananmen	  in	  1989	  (Kolkmann	  2005,	  63;	  cf.	  Shirk	  2003,	  151)	  –	  	  the	  question	  on	  proper	  tactics	  and	  strategies	  to	  shape	  U.S.-­‐China	  economic	  relations	  became	  the	  most	  prominent	  disputed	  issue	  since	  China	  entered	  a	  phase	  of	  ongoing	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  (cf.	  Hufbauer,	  Wong,	  and	  Sheth	  2006,	  1).	  An	  example	  are	  the	  debates	  on	   the	  Chinese	  currency	  and	   trade	  policies,	   in	  which	  Congress	   is	  pushing	   for	  a	  hard	   line	  and	  aims	  at	   tough	  measures	  through	  officially	   labelling	  China	  a	  country	  that	  manipulates	  its	  currency	  (New	  York	  Times	  2010;	  Nymalm	  2010;	  Nymalm	  2013).	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discourse	  on	  China’s	  economic	  growth	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  U.S.	  faces	  domestic	  economic	  problems	  connects	   to	   the	   debate	   phrased	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘global	   power	   shifts’	   (cf.	   for	   example	   T.	   Dunne,	  Flockhart,	  and	  Koivisto	  2013,	  5)	  as	  decline	  or	  crisis	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  ‘the	  West’	  or	  the	  ‘liberal	  order’	   in	   general	   –	   alternatively	   voiced	   as	   question,	   diagnosis	   or	   prognosis	   (M.	   Cox	   2012;	   cf.	  Flockhart	  2013,	  74ff.;	  Hagström	  and	  Jerdén	  2014;	  G.	  J.	  Ikenberry	  2013;	  Kupchan	  2014;	  Schweller	  and	  Pu	  2011)	  –	  that	  has	  been	  even	  more	  prominent	   in	  politics,	   the	  media	  and	  academic	  circles	  since	  the	  global	  financial	  and	  economic	  crisis	  of	  the	  late	  2000s.5	  With	  regard	  to	  Japan,	  by	  the	  1990s	  it	  was	  not	  only	  pictured	  as	  a	  ‘threat’	  to	  the	  economic,	  but	   subsequently	   to	   the	   entire	   liberal	   world	   order	   led	   by	   the	   U.S.,	   as	   promoter	   of	   a	   ‘Pax	  Nipponica/Japonica’	   –	   understood	   as	   an	   authoritarian	   order	   –	   which	   resembles	   the	   ‘Beijing	  Consensus’	   and	   the	   debates	   on	   ‘authoritarian’,	   ‘illiberal’	   or	   ‘state‘-­‐capitalism	   articulated	   in	  relation	   to	   China	   (Etzioni	   2011;	   see	   also	   E.	   Friedman	   and	  McCormick	   2000;	   Gat	   2007;	   Halper	  2010;	   Leaver	   1989;	   N.	  Morris	   2010,	   24f.;	   Rachman	   2008;	   Vogel	   1986;	   cf.	   Van	  Wolferen	   1986;	  Wooldridge	  2012).	   In	   the	   late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	   the	  American	  public	   considered	   (liberal)	  Japan	  to	  be	  a	  greater	  threat	  than	  the	  (communist)	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  mostly	  thought	  that	   Japan	  actually	   already	   was	   a	   bigger	   economic	   power	   than	   the	   U.S.	   (Gilpin	   1989,	   331;	   Hummel	   and	  Menzel	   2001,	   62;	   see	   also	   Kennedy	   1988,	   465	   for	   this	   kind	   of	   assessment	   being	   made	   by	  observers	  already	  in	  the	  early	  and	  mid	  1980s;	  Mastanduno	  1991,	  74).6	  Like	  those	  who	  question	  the	  success	  of	  the	  ‘free	  trade	  agenda’	  with	  respect	  to	  China	  since	  the	   1990s,	   in	   the	   Japanese	   case	   the	   so-­‐called	   revisionists	   did	   not	   believe	   in	   the	   transforming	  impact	  of	  it	  (Hummel	  1997b,	  35	  f.).	  While	  having	  advocated	  their	  understanding	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  with	   the	   ‘Japan	  problem’	   since	   the	  mid	  1980s,	   they	  gained	  significant	   influence	  during	   the	   late	  Bush-­‐	  and	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Clinton-­‐administration	  (Curtis	  2000,	  30;	  Gilpin	  2003,	  299).7	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  On	  earlier	  debates	  on	  a	  possible	  drifting	  apart	  of	  ‘the	  West’	  see	  for	  example	  Hummel	  (2000).	  In	  general	  it	  is	  important	  to	   differentiate	   between	   studies	   that	   engage	   in	   the	   debate	   as	   such	   (such	   as	   for	   instance	   the	   examples	   of	   Charles	  Kupchan,	  John	  Ikenberry,	  Randall	  Schweller	  and	  Xiaoyu	  Pu	  mentioned	  here),	  and	  those	  that	  scrutinize	  the	  constitution	  and	   character	   of	   the	   debates	   themselves	   (i.e.	   some	   of	   the	   contributions	   in	   the	   edited	   volume	   by	   Tim	  Dunne,	   Trine	  Flockhart	  and	  Marjo	  Koivisto,	  as	  well	  as	  Linus	  Hagström	  and	  Björn	  Jerdén,	  and	  Michael	  Cox).	  	  	  For	   more	   recent	   debates	   spurred	   by	   9/11	   see	   for	   instance	   the	   edited	   volume	   by	   Browning	   and	   Lehti	   (2010b).	  According	  	  to	  their	  assessment,	  in	  this	  dissertation	  ‘the	  West’	  is	  not	  understood	  as	  “imbued	  with	  a	  fixed	  essence”,	  but	  as	  politically	  contested	  concept	  (Browning	  and	  Lehti	  2010a,	  1).	  See	  also	  Patrick	  T.	  Jackson	  (2010).	  	  6	  However,	  for	  instance	  Narrelle	  Morris,	  citing	  other	  polls,	  points	  out	  that	  a	  negative	  view	  of	  Japan	  among	  the	  general	  public	  was	   far	   less	   significant	   than	   among	  prominent	   governmental,	   academic	   and	  media	   commentators	   (N.	  Morris	  2010,	  32f.).	  	  7	  The	  main	  proponents	  of	  the	  revisionist	  line	  were	  James	  Fallows,	  Chalmers	  Johnson,	  Clyde	  Prestowitz	  and	  Karel	  van	  Wolferen,	   also	   known	   at	   that	   time	   as	   ‘the	   Gang	   of	   Four’.	   For	   a	   self-­‐assessment	   and	   presentation	   of	   their	   main	  arguments	   see	   (Fallows	   et	   al.	   1990).	   For	   a	   summary	   of	   their	   positions	   see	   (Hummel	   1997b,	   25	   ff.	   Otte	   and	  Grimes	  1993,	  119	   ff.)	   and	  chapter	  1.1.	  The	   label	   “revisionists”	  was	  coined	  by	  Robert	  Neff	   in	   the	  magazine	  BusinessWeek	   in	  1989	  (cf.	  Lindsey	  and	  Lukas	  1998).	  Chalmers	   Johnson	  argued	   in	  1989	   that	   the	  U.S.	   should	  recognize	   that	   Japan	  had	  “replaced	   the	   USSR	   as	   America’s	   most	   important	   foreign	   policy	   problem”	   (quoted	   in	   Mastanduno	   1991,	   77).	   For	  further	  details	  on	  revisionism	  see	  also	  chapter	  1.1.	  
4	  
	  
revisionists	  argued	  that	  Japan	  and	  its	  trade	  policies	  were	  different,	  closed	  and	  adversary	  to	  the	  U.S.	   and	   that	   in	   consequence	   Japan	   would	   not	   pursue	   the	   path	   of	   market	   liberalization	   as	  envisaged	   by	   the	   U.S.	   (Uriu	   2000,	   214),	   but	   that	   it	   even	   constituted	   a	   distinctive	   kind	   of	  capitalism	  (Gilpin	  2003,	  299).	  This	  assessment	  differed	  from	  the	  previous	  decades,	  when	  Japan	  was	   generally	   still	   regarded	   to	   have	   very	   successfully	   internalized	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   (Western)	  liberal	  international	  economic	  order,	  and	  when	  its	  success	  as	  a	  market	  economy	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  important	  example	  in	  ‘validating’	  the	  U.S.	  economic	  model	  (Campbell	  1994;	  Nanto	  1992,	  2;	  Uriu	  2000).	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  however,	  it	  was	  even	  argued	  that	  ‘Japanese	  culture’	  might	  actually	  be	   incompatible	  with	   ‘the	  West’,	   as	   Japan	   in	   this	   view	  became	   considered	  a	   “non-­‐Western	   and	  non-­‐liberal	   society”	   (i.e.	   Gilpin	   1987,	   391)	   that	   could	   not	   participate	   in	   the	   western	   liberal	  economic	   order	   without	   loosing	   its	   ‘Japanese	   character’	   (Búzás	   2012,	   241).	   The	   revisionist	  arguments	  finally	  contributed	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘results-­‐oriented’	  policy8	  in	  trade	  negotiations	  with	  Japan	  under	  President	  Clinton	  (cf.	  Curtis	  2000,	  31),	  that	  ultimately	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  unsuccessful.	  After	   the	   failure	   of	   a	   presidential	   summit	   in	   1994	   the	   U.S.	   government	   basically	   backed	   away	  again	  from	  this	  approach	  (cf.	  Hummel	  1997b,	  23;	  Schoppa	  1999,	  328f.).9	  By	  then	  revisionism	  had	  contributed	   to	  what	  was	   the	  most	  bitter	   confrontation	  between	   the	  U.S.	   and	   Japan	   in	   the	  post-­‐war	  period	  (Curtis	  2000,	  19;	  cf.	  Otte	  and	  Grimes	  1993,	  138)	  and	  it	  had	  been	  attributed	  with	  the	  potential	   of	   slowly	   undermining	   the	   conceptual	   basis	   of	   U.S.-­‐Japanese	   relations.10	  The	   ‘Japan	  problem’	   then	   seemingly	   vanished	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   ensuing	   Asian	   financial	   crisis	   and	   the	  difficulties	   of	   the	   Japanese	   stock-­‐	   and	   real	   estate	   market,	   as	   well	   as	   with	   the	   commencing	  economic	  growth	  of	  China,	  when	  U.S.	  attention	   in	   the	  mid	  1990s	  shifted	   from	  Tokyo	   to	  Beijing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  In	   a	   nutshell	   this	   meant	   that	   the	   U.S.	   demanded	   for	   concrete	   measurable	   indicators,	   like	   certain	   percentages	   for	  foreign	  imports	  to	  Japan	  in	  certain	  sectors.	  What	  mattered	  were	  the	  results,	  not	  the	  way	  they	  were	  to	  be	  achieved.	  For	  example,	   in	   1992	   a	   bill	   introduced	   in	   the	   House	   of	   Representatives	   (H.R.	   4100)	   required	   that	   Japan	   reduced	   its	  bilateral	  trade	  deficit	  by	  20	  per	  cent	  per	  year	  over	  a	  period	  of	  five	  years	  until	  it	  reached	  either	  $5	  billion	  or	  five	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  imports	  and	  exports	  of	  merchandise	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan.	  The	  decision	  on	  how	  the	  deficit	  was	  to	  be	  reduced	  was	  to	  be	  left	  to	  the	  Japanese	  government	  (Nanto	  1992,	  19).	  See	  in	  more	  details	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  ‘managed	  trade’	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  9 	  Both	   sides	   interpreted	   a	   partial	   agreement	   reached	   later	   in	   1994	   in	   different	   ways.	   In	   1995	   the	   Clinton	  administration	  issued	  an	  ultimatum	  announcing	  retaliatory	  sanctions	  unless	  the	  Japanese	  market	  was	  opened	  for	  U.S.-­‐made	  autos	  and	  auto	  parts,	   that	  was	  met	  with	  an	  announcement	  by	   Japan	  to	   file	  a	  case	  against	   the	  U.S.	  at	   the	  WTO.	  After	  reaching	  a	  last	  minute	  agreement,	  both	  sides	  claimed	  to	  have	  achieved	  their	  interests	  (Cohen,	  Paul,	  and	  Blecker	  1996,	  191–192).	  	  10	  The	   U.S.	   strategy	   provoked	   a	   strongly	   negative	   reaction	   especially	   in	   Asia,	   with	   the	   respective	   Japanese	   Prime	  ministers	  being	  credited	  for	  their	  ‘standing	  up	  for	  Japan’,	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  ‘say	  no’	  to	  the	  U.S.	  (Curtis	  2000,	  32).	  The	  revisionist	   debates	   in	   the	  U.S.	   had	   resulted	   in,	   or	   at	   least	   triggered,	   their	   counterpart	   in	   Japan,	   that	   also	   articulated	  Japan	  as	  ‘different’	  albeit	  in	  a	  positive	  sense	  (Hummel	  1997a,	  2000,	  Chapter	  7;	  Otte	  and	  Grimes	  1993,	  117ff.;	  see	  also	  Wampler	   2001,	   257f.),	   as	   well	   as	   in	   a	   heated	   domestic	   debate	   between	   those	   advocating	   a	   further-­‐reaching	  internationalization	   of	   Japan,	   versus	   those	   speaking	   for	   a	   greater	   national	   and	   regional	   independence	   (cf.	   Otte	   and	  Grimes	  1993,	  137).	  A	  report	  by	  the	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  (CRS)	  on	  trade	  policy	  toward	  Japan	  in	  1992	  states	  that	  “according	  to	  polls	  taken	  before	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  collapsed,	  young	  Japanese	  considered	  war	  with	  the	  United	  States	  more	  likely	  than	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  […]”	  (Nanto	  1992,	  13).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  albeit	  controversial	  Japanese	  responses	  became	  the	  publication	  The	  Japan	  that	  can	  say	  No	  by	  Shintaro	  Ishihara	  in	  1989.	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(Bob	  2001,	  95;	  cf.	  Curtis	  2000,	  32;	  Friedberg	  2011,	  49;	  Kirshner	  2008,	  247;	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  137f.;	  Stone	  1999,	  265;	  see	  also	  Y.	  E.	  Yang	  and	  Liu	  2012,	  707).11	  	  While	   so	   far	   there	   seems	   to	  be	  no	   ‘sorting	   itself	   out’	   of	   this	   kind	   in	   sight	   or	  predictable	   in	   the	  ongoing	   Sino-­‐American	  monetary	   and	   trade	   conflicts	   in	   the	   early	   2000s	   –	   and	   at	   least	   no	   one	  seriously	  hopes	  for	  a	  fundamental	  crisis	  of	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  –	  one	  cannot	  but	  ask	  what	  the	  historical	  case	  of	  Japan	  can	  possibly	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  China	  policies	  since	  the	  1990s,	  a	  question	  that	  is	  almost	  completely	  neglected	  in	  previous	  and	  contemporary	  research.12	  	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  contend	  that	  U.S.	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  towards	  Japan	  and	  China	  exceeds	  matters	  of	  monetary,	  trade,	  and	  economic	  policy	  in	  a	  narrow	  sense,	  but	  implicates	  processes	  of	  how	   collective	   and	   national	   identities	   in	   political	   and	   economic	   terms	   are	   constructed	   (cf.	  Nymalm	  2013).	  Hence,	  the	  past	  and	  contemporary	  debates	  in	  their	  constitution	  of	  U.S.	  economic	  policies	  towards	  Japan	  and	  China	  cannot	  be	  sufficiently	  understood	  without	  considering	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  identity	  constructions	  relying	  on	  self/other	  articulations.	  This	  assessment	  originates	  in	  poststructuralist	  theories	  that	  understand	  every	  identity	  as	  non-­‐essential	  and	  differential,	  thus	  in	  permanent	   need	   of	   an	   excluded	   outside.	   Political	   Discourse	   Theory	   (PDT)	   is	   put	   forward	   as	   a	  framework	   for	   the	   study	   of	   foreign	   (economic)	   policy,	   while	   also	   addressing	   what	   (even)	   its	  proponents	   have	   called	   the	   ‘methodological	   deficit’	   (cf.	   Howarth	   2005,	   316)13	  of	   PDT,	   and	  proposing	  a	  method	  for	  its	  application	  in	  research,	  by	  conducting	  a	  discourse	  analysis	  that	  draws	  from	   the	   ‘Logics	   of	   Critical	   Explanation’	   (LCE)	   (Glynos	   and	   Howarth	   2007)	   and	   Rhetorical	  Political	  Analysis	  (RPA)	  (cf.	  Finlayson	  2007).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Robert	  Uriu	  diagnoses	   a	   ‘Japan	   fatigue’	  within	   the	  Clinton	   administration	   –	   resulting	   in	  many	  officials	  wanting	   to	  have	  as	  little	  to	  do	  with	  Japan	  as	  possible	  –	  that	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  ‘Japan	  passing’,	  thus	  a	  shifting	  of	  the	  U.S.	  interests	  towards	  China,	  by	  Japan	  itself	  (Uriu	  2009,	  240).	  See	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  ‘emotions’	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  In	  his	  study	  on	  Congressional	  trade	  policy	  with	  respect	  to	  China,	  Michael	  Kolkmann	  notes	  that	  China	  had	  earlier	  lost	  its	  importance	  for	  political	  discussions	  in	  the	  U.S.	  under	  President	  Reagan,	  who	  registered	  potential	  conflicts	  with	  China	  and	  preferred	  not	  address	   them	  straight	  ahead	  (Kolkmann	  2005,	  62).	  However,	  Kolkmann	   is	  not	  mentioning	  that	   in	  the	  1980s	  Congress	  and	  the	  executive	  were	  full	  hands	  dealing	  with	  Japan.	  	  	  12	  In	  his	  short	  passage	  where	  he	  reflects	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  economic	  disputes	  in	  the	  1980s	  as	  a	  “precedent”	  to	  U.S.-­‐China	  economic	  issues,	  Aaron	  Friedberg	  for	  instance	  argues	  that	  in	  the	  Japanese	  case	  the	  political	  foundations	  encompassing	  “a	  sense	  of	  shared	  democratic	  values”	  prevented	  the	  relationship	  from	  collapsing	  in	  consequence	  of	  the	  trade	  disputes.	  As	   in	  the	  case	  with	  China	  he	  sees	  trade	  as	  having	  “helped	  hold	  the	  United	  States	  and	  China	  together”	   in	  the	  past,	  he	  thus	  classifies	  the	  ensuing	  trade	  disputes	  with	  China	  as	  potential	  catalyst	  for	  an	  unravelling	  of	  the	  entire	  relationship	  (Friedberg	  2011,	  49).	  13	  David	  Howarth	  and	  also	  Jacob	  Torfing	  (Torfing	  2005,	  27)	  used	  the	  term	  ‘methodological’	  deficit	  before	  Jason	  Glynos	  and	   David	   Howarth	   developed	   the	   ‘Logics	   of	   Critical	   Explanation’	   to	   deal	   with	   this	   question.	   Meanwhile,	   a	   more	  adequate	   attribution	   might	   be	   ‘methodical	   deficit’	   (I	   am	   grateful	   to	   Dirk	   Nabers	   for	   highlighting	   this	   aspect),	  methodology	  being	  understood	  as	  the	  articulation	  of	  conceptual	  linkages	  between	  theory	  and	  its	  potential	  ‘application’	  in	  a	  consistent	  way,	  while	  the	  method	  is	  the	  concrete	  ‘tool’	  or	  ‘putting	  into	  practice’	  of	  the	  methodological	  approach.	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RESEARCH	  GOALS,	  QUESTIONS	  AND	  ASSUMPTIONS	  	  In	  his	  study	  on	  Clinton’s	  Japan	  policy	  Robert	  Uriu	  speaks	  of	  having	  a	  sense	  of	  déjà-­‐vu	  in	  watching	  the	  development	  of	  U.S.	  attitudes	  and	  rhetoric	   toward	  economic	  competition	  with	  China.14	  Still,	  he	  points	  out	  that	  for	  a	  replay	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  tensions	  of	  the	  1990s	  three	  factors	  in	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  economic	  relations	  would	  have	  to	  change:	  Chinese	  investment	  in	  the	  U.S.	  would	  have	  to	  increase	  (see	  e.g.	  The	  Economist	  2013),	  China	  would	  have	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  American	  high-­‐tech	  industries,	  and	  there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  a	  unified	  ‘theory’,	  like	  revisionism	  (Uriu	  2009,	  244).15	  Writing	   at	   an	   earlier	  point	   in	   time,	   John	  Kunkel	   –	   equally	  positing	   three	  differences	   –	   sees	   the	  industry-­‐factor	   in	   the	   same	  way,	   but	   argues	   that	   there	  was	  no	  problem	  with	  market	   access	   to	  China	   as	   there	   was	   to	   Japan.	   Moreover,	   in	   his	   view	   “the	   different	   nature	   of	   the	   U.S.-­‐China	  relationship	  may	  make	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  think	  twice	  before	  embarking	  on	  an	  aggressive	  market	  access	  approach	  similar	  to	  President	  Clinton’s	  results-­‐oriented	  Japan	  policy”	  (Kunkel	  2003,	  197).	  In	  my	  view,	   ‘the	  different	  nature’	  is	  no	  guarantee	  for	  a	  more	  cautious	  approach,	  but	  instead	  the	  overall	  bilateral	  character	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  China	  and	  the	  U.S.	  –	  which	  of	  course	  does	  differ	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   from	   the	   Japanese-­‐U.S.	   relations	   in	   the	   1980s	   –	   adds	   to	   tensions	   over	  economic	  policies.	  After	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  (WWII)	  the	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  alliance	  became	  viewed	  as	  “the	  most	   important	  pillar	  of	  security	  and	  political	  order	  in	  the	  Asia	  Pacific”	  (i.e.	  G.	   J.	   Ikenberry	  and	   Inoguchi	  2003,	  1)16,	  and	   Japan	  was	  quickly	  acknowledged	  as	  country	   that	  had	  successfully	  come	   to	   terms	   with	   establishing	   and	   integrating	   into	   the	   western	   liberal	   democratic	   political	  order.	  Although	  the	  expression	  “most	  important	  bilateral	  relationship	  of	  the	  world”	  attributed	  to	  Japan	   (cf.	   Otte	   and	   Grimes	   1993,	   110	   on	   Japan)	   is	   often	   ascribed	   to	   the	   Sino-­‐American	  relationship	  as	  well	  (cf.	  for	  instance	  Xie	  2009,	  1,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapters	  four	  to	  seven),	  this	   rarely	   is	   a	   reference	   to	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   relationship,	   but	   instead	   to	   the	   global	   political	  challenges	  confronting	  the	  two	  countries,	  that	  call	  for	  cooperation	  (cf.	  i.e.	  Morrison	  2014,	  38).	  In	  the	  U.S.	  a	  general	  ‘ideological’	  mistrust	  towards	  ‘communist	  China‘	  persists	  (e.g.	  Friedberg	  2011,	  2,	  42f.;	  cf.	  H.	  S.	  Yee	  and	  Storey	  2002,	  2–6),	  above	  all	  –	  in	  the	  political	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  academic	  community	  –	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  China’s	  economic	  strength	  ultimately	  serves	  and	  contributes	  to	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  An	  interesting	  question,	  that	  cannot	  be	  addressed	  in	  this	  project,	  would	  also	  be	  in	  how	  far	  this	  is	  also	  considered	  as	  a	  déjà-­‐vu	  in	  China	  itself,	  as	  at	  least	  the	  consequences	  for	  Japan	  –	  after	  giving	  in	  to	  U.S.	  pressure	  and	  revaluing	  the	  Yen	  in	  1985	  –	  are	  very	  present	  in	  China	  as	  a	  negative	  example	  (cf.	  Kirshner	  2008,	  248).	  Robert	  Wampler	  for	  instance	  points	  to	  observers	  tracing	  the	  roots	  of	  Japan’s	  ‘economic	  bubble’	  that	  burst	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  to	  the	  Plaza	  Accords	  in	  1985	  (see	  introduction	   to	   the	   analysis)	   and	   the	   subsequent	   ‘easy	   credit’	   policies	   of	   the	   Japanese	   government	   (Wampler	  2001,	  260f.).	  15	  Whether	  what	  is	  often	  termed	  “China	  Threat	  Theory”	  could	  account	  for	  this	  remains	  questionable,	  see	  chapter	  1.2.	  and	  conclusion.	  16	  The	   Japanese	  Prime	  Minister	  Yasuhiro	  Nakasone	  once	  referred	  to	   Japan	  as	  “unsinkable	  aircraft	  carrier	   in	   the	  Asia	  Pacific”	  (cf.	  Sanger	  1995).	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military	   buildup.	   And	   last	   but	   not	   least,	   looking	   at	   ‘brute	   material	   factors’,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  China’s	  size,	  number	  of	  population	  and	  its	  weight	  and	  role	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region,	  China	  in	  the	  2000s	   is	   commonly	   regarded	   as	   playing	   on	   a	   different	   level	   –	   economically	   as	   well	   as	  strategically	  –	  than	  Japan	  ever	  did	  (Nymalm	  2011a).17	  	  Thus,	   it	   should	   be	   clear	   that	   I	   am	   not	   anticipating	   the	   ‘cases’	   of	   Japan	   and	   China	   to	   be	  similar.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   similarities	   in	   the	   public	   discourses	   on	   Japan	   and	   China,	   the	  differences	   in	   the	   bilateral	   relationships	   with	   the	   U.S.	   notwithstanding,	   are	   one	   aspect	   that	  renders	  the	  whole	  issue	  worthwhile	  studying.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  my	  objective	  is	  not	  to	  do	  a	  comparison	  in	  a	  classical	  sense,	  but	  rather	  to	  take	  a	  historical	  view	  by	  deciphering	  the	  meaning	  of	  and	  the	  approach	  to	  the	  economic	  rise	  of	  China	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  through	  taking	  into	  account	  that	  in	  the	  past	  the	  articulation	  of	  and	  dealing	  with	  the	  economic	  rise	  of	   Japan	  –	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  major	  economic	  competitor	  –	  bore	  tendencies	  of	  rendering	  an	  issue	  of	  economic	  competition	  into	  an	  ‘ideological	  struggle’.	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  the	  possible	   similarities	   and	   differences	   –	   or	   potential	   continuities	   and	   changes	   (cf.	   Hansen	   2006,	  79)–	  of	   the	   ‘logics’	   that	  drive	  different	  discourses	   (cf.	  Doty	  1993,	  309).18	  Albeit,	   the	  aim	  behind	  my	  inquiry	  is	  neither	  to	  predict	  the	  future,	  nor	  to	  judge	  the	  past	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  present	  or	  vice	  versa,	  but	   to	   consider	   it	   as	   ‘history	  of	   the	  present’	   (cf.	   Foucault	  1977a,	  31,	  1977b,	  152),	  which	  means	  not	  trying	  to	  capture	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  past,	  nor	  to	  try	  to	  get	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  it,	  but	  to	  look	  at	  “how	  certain	  concepts	  have	  historically	  functioned	  within	  discourse”	  (Campbell	  1998,	  5;	  Flockhart	  2013,	  78f.).	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Quentin	  Skinner	  I	  do	  hope	  that:	  	  	  “An	  understanding	  of	  the	  past	  can	  help	  us	  to	  appreciate	  how	  far	  the	  values	  embodied	  in	  our	  present	  way	  of	   life,	  and	  our	  present	  ways	  of	   thinking	  about	   those	  values,	   reflect	  a	   series	  of	  choices	  made	  at	  different	  times	  between	  different	  possible	  worlds.	  This	  awareness	  can	  help	  to	   liberate	   us	   from	   the	   grip	   of	   any	   one	   hegemonal	   account	   of	   those	   values	   and	   how	   they	  should	  be	  interpreted	  and	  understood.	  Equipped	  with	  a	  broader	  sense	  of	  possibility,	  we	  can	  stand	  back	  from	  the	  intellectual	  commitments	  we	  have	  inherited	  and	  ask	  ourselves	  in	  a	  new	  spirit	  of	  enquiry	  what	  we	  should	  think	  of	  them”	  (Skinner	  2002,	  6).	  	  This	   leads	  me	   to	   set	   out	   a	   research	  agenda	   that	  departs	   from	   the	  more	   common	  view	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	   economic	   relations	   considering	   the	   economic	   perspective	   only	   in	   a	   narrow	   sense.	   I	  assume	  that	   the	  preponderance	  and	   intensity	  of	   the	  past	  and	  contemporary	  economic	   tensions	  are	  neither	  sufficiently	  taken	  account	  of,	  nor	  could	  they	  be	  sufficiently	  understood	  and	  explained	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  However,	  as	  will	  become	  clear	  in	  the	  course	  of	  this	  study,	  a	  crucial	  argument	  is	  that	  so	  called	  ‘brute	  material	  factors’	  alone	  do	  not	  determine	  what	   this	  means	   for	   the	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	   relationship,	   but	   instead	  one	  has	   to	   take	   the	  meaning	  attributed	  to	  these	  factors,	  and	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  render	  them	  ‘significant’,	  into	  account.	  	  18	  See	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  logics	  in	  chapter	  3.2.	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by	  the	  dominant	  rationalist,	  (neo-­‐)positivist	  and	  policy	  focused	  approaches	  in	  the	  study	  of	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  economic	  relations	  (the	  research	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  relations	  being	  more	  pluralistic)	  that	  posit	  an	   “inherent	  and	  unproblematic	   ‘reality’	  of	   the	  situation”	   (cf.	  Campbell	  1994,	  157)	  where	  the	  facts	  would	  ‘speak	  for	  themselves’	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘objective	  threat	  indicators’	  (Blanchard	  2012;	  and	  Steve	  Chan	  2014	  on	  the	   ’power	  shift	  narrative;	  see	  also	  Hagström	  and	  Jerdén	  2014;	  cf.	  Pan	  2004,	  2014;	  Turner	  2013;	  in	  contrast	  to	  e.g.	  Y.	  E.	  Yang	  and	  Liu	  2012,	  710).	  	  With	   my	   analysis	   I	   want	   to	   add	   to	   the	   picture	   by	   considering	   the	   topic	   from	   a	  poststructuralist	   and	   post-­‐foundationalist	   perspective,	   as	   reflecting	   a	   challenge	   to	   concepts	   of	  political	  and	  economic	  order	  central	  to	  the	  U.S.’	  own	  understanding	  of	  itself	  as	  “the	  global	  motor	  for	  democracy	  and	  progress”	  (ZEIT-­‐	  Stiftung	  Ebelin	  und	  Gerd	  Bucerius	  2010,	  1),	  thus	  in	  terms	  of	  “the	   entailments	   of	   U.S.-­‐identity”	   (cf.	   Campbell	   1994,	   157).19	  In	   particular	   I	   consider	   these	  entailments	   to	   figure	   in	   the	   concepts	   of	   American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	  history20	  (cf.	  Nymalm	  2013).	  The	  latter	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  thought	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  liberal	  market	  economy	  will	  inevitably	  be	  followed	  by	  political	  liberalization,	  thus	  free	  trade	  and	  free	  markets	  leading	  to	  democracy	  and	  to	  peaceful	  relations	  (cf.	  Mandelbaum	  2002,	  6).	  With	  the	  special	   role	  American	  exceptionalism	  assigns	   to	   the	  U.S.,	   they	  are	   to	   serve	  as	  a	   role	  model	  and	  promoter	   of	   this	   development	   (Krause	   2008;	   McEvoy-­‐Levy	   2001,	   23ff.;	   Nabers	   and	   Patman	  2008).	   Japan	  and	  China	  were/are	   to	  different	  extents	  countering	  or	   taken	   to	  be	  countering	   the	  envisaged	   ‘universal	   path	   to	  progress’,	   and	   thus	  not	   only	   challenging	   the	   concepts	   themselves,	  but	   also	  U.S.	   identity	   as	   a	   vanguard	   and	   role	  model	   for	   the	  whole	   ‘liberal	  world	   order’	   (Layne	  2014;	   cf.	   N.	  Morris	   2010,	   2).	   This	   challenge	   is	  met	  with	   by	  what	   David	   Campbell	   has	   called	   a	  central	  feature	  of	  states	  and	  their	  foreign	  policies,	  the	  externalization	  of	  an	  internal	  problematic	  and	  its	  attribution	  to	  an	  external	  cause	  or	  ‘enemy’,	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  the	  inner	  deficiencies,	  mostly	  ensuing	  in	  a	  discourse	  on	  the	  threatening	  ‘adversarial’	  other	  (cf.	  Campbell	  1998,	  62).21	  	  In	  this	  context,	  in	  this	  dissertation-­‐project	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  articulations	  of	  U.S.-­‐identity	  in	  terms	  of	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  towards	  Japan	  and	  China22,	  and	  on	  what	  possible	  commonalities	  and/or	  differences	  between	  the	  Japanese	  and	  the	  Chinese	  case	  can	  reveal	  considering	  my	  assumptions	  of	  a	   challenge	   to	  U.S.	   identity.	  The	  main	  question	   to	  be	  addressed	   is	   if	   and	  how	   in	  both	  cases	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  In	   terms	   of	   my	   theoretical	   framework	   and	   approach	   that	   I	   expand	   on	   in	   what	   follows:	   as	   manifestation	   of	   the	  dislocation	  of	  a	  meaning	  system	  conceived	  as	  a	  hegemonic	  discourse.	  20	  Except	  by	  Michael	  Mandelbaum	  (2002)	  the	  term	  ‘liberal	  theory	  of	  history’	  is	  not	  frequently	  used	  in	  the	  literature,	  see	  chapter	  1.3.	  21	  While	  not	  being	  able	  to	  extensively	  address	  the	  arguments	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  ‘identity’	  requires	  ‘enmity’	  here,	  I	  come	  back	   to	   it	   in	   the	   chapters	  1.3	  and	  2.	   See	   for	   instance	  Berenskoetter	   (2007).	  Many	   thanks	   to	  Astrid	  Nordin	   for	  pointing	  this	  aspect	  out	  to	  me	  at	  this	  point.	  22	  For	   an	   emphasis	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   ‘identity-­‐questions’	  when	   dealing	  with	   the	   ‘power	   shift	   discourse’	   see	   for	  instance	  Hagström	  and	  Jerdén	  (2014)	  and	  the	  other	  contributions	  in	  their	  special	  issue.	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discourses	   on	   economic	   issues	   converged	   in	   articulating	   Japan	   and	   China	   not	   only	   as	   main	  economic	   competitors	   but	   as	   threats	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘excluded	   others’23,	  what	   this	   in	   turn	   tells	   us	  about	  U.S.	  identity,	  and	  how	  it	  connects	  to	  the	  debate	  of	  the	  possible	  crisis	  or	  decline	  of	  the	  U.S.	  or	  ‘the	  West’.	  	  The	  focus	  on	  economic	  policies	  is	  chosen	  for	  mainly	  three	  reasons:	  first,	  the	  whole	  ‘rise-­‐debate’	   is	  mainly	  premised	  on	   the	   economic	  performances	  of	   Japan	   and	  China24	  (cf.	   e.g.	  Khong	  2014,	   157,	   162;	  Nabers	   2010,	   932),	   especially	   on	   their	   growing	   share	   of	   global	   trade	   volumes	  (Gilpin	   1989,	   329f.;	   cf.	   e.g.	   Hilpert	   2013).	   Second,	   economic	   issues	   connected	   to	   trade	   and	  monetary	   politics	   are	   among	   the	  most	   prevalent	   and	   disputed	   ones	   in	   the	   respective	   bilateral	  relationship.	   And	   last	   but	   not	   least,	   economic	   performance	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   success	   of	   liberal	  democratic	  capitalism	  has	  been	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  understanding	  as	  preeminent	  economic	  and	  political	   role	  model,	  with	  respect	   to	  China	  especially	  since	   the	  1990s.25	  	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  U.S.’	  self-­‐attribution	  as	  ‘economic	  power’	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  ‘challenge’	  or	  competition	  attributed	  to	  Japan	  and	  China	  (for	  a	  similar	  argument	  about	  Japan	  and	  its	   ‘identity’	  in	  relation	  to	  China	  and	  South	  Korea	  see	  Gustafsson	  and	  Hagström	  2015,	  14).	  What	  role	  ‘identity’	  plays	  in	  the	  debates	  on	  the	  economic	  rise	  is	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  	  An	  inquiry	  into	  U.S.-­‐China	  policies	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Japanese	  case	  as	  envisaged	  in	  this	  project	  has	  so	  far	  not	  been	  undertaken	  in	  previous	  research,	  except	  for	  a	  few	  articles	  and	  commentaries	  briefly	  alluding	   to	   certain	   similarities	   (Bhagwati	   2002;	   Friedberg	   2011,	   49;	   see	   also	   Hagström	   and	  Jerdén	   2014;	   Hale	   and	   Hale	   2003;	   Hanke	   2005,	   2008;	   Layne	   2012;	   N.	   Morris	   2010,	   141;	   e.g.	  Prestowitz	   2010;	   Rachman	   2011;	   Tsuchiyama	   2010),	   as	   for	   instance	   treatments	   of	   specific	  economic	  aspects	  like	  the	  trade	  imbalances	  in	  light	  of	  the	  GATT/WTO	  trading	  system	  (Bown	  and	  McCulloch	  2009),	  or	  Chinese	  investment	  in	  the	  U.S.	  (Milhaupt	  2012).	  Furthermore,	  there	  are	  only	  few	  studies	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations	  in	  general,	  or	  economic	  relations	  in	  particular,	  that	  would	  explicitly	  adopt	  a	  post-­‐positivist	  (on	  this	  terminology	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  overview	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  For	  the	  PDT	  terminology	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  chapter	  two.	  	  24	  On	   the	  problematic	  aspects	  of	   this	  premise	   in	   the	  Chinese	  case	  see	  Pan	  (2014,	  395ff.).	  See	  also	   in	  what	   follows	   in	  chapter	  one	  on	  the	  critique	  of	  	  (economic)	  determinism	  in	  prevalent	  IR-­‐theories.	  Many	  thanks	  also	  to	  Eric	  Blanchard	  for	  highlighting	  this	  aspect.	  25	  In	  their	  study	  on	  the	  “China	  threat“	  argument	  in	  U.S.	  printmedia	  Yang	  and	  Liu	  (2012,	  706)	  for	  instance	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  over	  their	  time	  period	  studied	  (1992-­‐2006)	  the	  economic/trade	  threat	  issue	  was	  the	  most	  persistent	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  two	  fields	  identified	  by	  them,	  i.e.	  military/strategic	  and	  political/ideological.	  	  For	   studies	   on	   the	   print	  media	   and	   the	   U.S.-­‐Japanese	   trade	   issues	   see	   for	   example	   Luther	   (2001)	   and	   Budner	   and	  Krauss	  (1995).	  See	  also	  Benjamin	  et	  al.	  for	  a	  content	  analysis	  of	  U.S.	  and	  Japanese	  media	  as	  part	  of	  a	  study	  on	  the	  issue	  of	   ‘the	   fairness	   debate’	   in	   their	   trade	   relations	   (Benjamin	   et	   al.	   1991).	   On	   the	   media	   in	   U.S.-­‐Japan	   relations	   more	  generally	  see	  also	  Masayuki	  (2000).	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chapters),	  or	  even	  a	  discourse	  focused	  and/or	  –analytical	  perspective.26	  	  This	  seems	  even	  more	  surprising,	   as	  within	   the	   field	   of	   studies	   on	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	   (economic)	   relations,	   a	   few	   scholars	  have	  taken	  approaches	  that	  one	  could	  refer	  to	  and	  build	  on	  in	  this	  respect.	  I	  discuss	  them	  in	  the	  first	  chapter.	  	  Whereas	   the	   topic	   relates	   to	   the	   fields	  of	   International	  Relations	   (IR)	  and	   International	  Political	  Economy	  (IPE),	  my	  questions,	  focus	  and	  approach	  depart	  from	  their	  mainstream,	  as	  they	  are	  premised	  on	  Poststructuralist/Political	  Discourse	  Theory	   (PDT)	  –	  broadly	   speaking	  a	  post-­‐positivist	   approach	   –	   that	   has	   implications	   for	   conceptualizing	   the	   whole	   ‘research-­‐design’	   in	  general,	   and	   methodological	   and	   practical	   aspects	   in	   particular.	   I	   expand	   on	   these	   issues	   in	  chapters	  one	  to	  three.	  While	  PDT	  has	  become	  more	  present	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE	  over	  the	  recent	  years,	  it	  is	  still	  far	  from	  having	  been	  credited	  with	  its	  full	  potential	  for	  the	  study	  of	  global	  politics,	  and	  it	  has	  so	  far	  not	  been	  taken	  into	  account	   in	  the	  analysis	  of	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations.	  Moreover,	  most	  scholars	  confine	  themselves	  to	  drawing	  from	  certain	  concepts	  of	  PDT,	  but	  seldom	  take	  the	  ‘whole	  approach’	   as	   social	   and	   political	   theory	   and	   its	   connections	   to	   other	   poststructuralist	   or	  discourse-­‐oriented	  work	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE	  into	  account	  (but	  see	  Nabers	  2015,	  forthcoming).	  I	  argue	  that	   in	  addition	   to	   contributing	   to	  existing	   research	  on	   the	   topic	   addressed,	   a	  PDT	  perspective	  augments	  the	  view	  by	  not	  just	  providing	  new	  insights	  on	  something	  considered	  as	  ‘pre-­‐existing	  cases	   per	   se’	   (cf.	   Doty	   1993,	   316),	   but	   by	   asking	   about	   and	   inquiring	   into	   what	   actually	  constitutes	  these	  ‘cases’	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (Blanchard	  2012;	  P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2010;	  see	  also	  Ling	  2013;	  cf.	  Pan	  2004,	  2012;	  Turner	  2013,	  2014).	  Hence,	  a	  (historical)	  PDT-­‐approach	  towards	  a	  topic	  as	  politically	  overloaded	  as	  the	  ‘Rise	  of	  China’	  also	  allows	  for	  an	  all	  too	  often	  neglected	  inquiry	  into	  our	  articulations	  and	  theorizing	  of	  ‘the	  Rise’	  of	  China.	  Furthermore,	  the	  discursive	  understanding	  of	   the	   concepts	   of	   ‘identity’	   and	   ‘ideas’	   enables	   a	   critique	   of	   their	   treatment	   in	   most	   of	   the	  (constructivist)	   IR-­‐	   and	   IPE-­‐literature,	   where	   the	   attempt	   to	   find	   a	   ‘middle	   ground’	   between	  rationalist	  and	  ‘postmodern’27	  approaches	  in	  most	  cases	  ultimately	  leads	  back	  into	  essentializing	  these	  phenomena	  in	  theory	  and	  practice.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  See	  for	  example	  the	  historical	  study	  by	  Evelyn	  Goh	  on	  the	  rapprochement	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  China	  from	  1961	  to	  1974	  (Goh	  2005),	  an	  article	  and	  book	  by	  Chengxin	  Pan	  on	  The	  "China	  Threat"	  in	  American	  self-­‐imagination	  (Pan	  2004)	  and	  on	  Western	  Representations	  of	  China’s	  Rise	  (Pan	  2012),	  two	  articles	  by	  Blanchard	  (et	  al.)	  on	  the	  role	  of	  metaphor	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  Sino-­‐American	  relations	  (Blanchard	  2012;	  Slingerland,	  Blanchard,	  and	  Boyd-­‐Judson	  2007),	  and	  an	  article	  and	  book	  by	  Oliver	  Turner	  on	  “threatening”	  China	  and	  U.S.	  security	  (Turner	  2013)	  and,	  more	  broadly	  American	  
Images	  of	  China	  (Turner	  2014).	  Whereas	  the	  small	  number	  of	  post-­‐positivist	  approaches	  in	  this	  field	  is	  of	  course	  not	  ‘problematic’	  per	  se,	  I	  still	  see	  a	  lack	   of	   diversity	   in	   approaches	   towards	   this	   widely	   studied	   and	  meaningful	   topic	   as	   disadvantage	   not	   only	   to	   the	  academic	  field,	  but	  also	  for	  policymaking.	  The	  dominance	  of	  rather	  rationalist	  and	  policy	  oriented	  approaches	  appears	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  tendency	  to	  view	  China	  as	  an	  ‘objective	  threat’	  that	  then	  calls	  for	  certain	  ‘concrete’	  responses	  on	  the	  ground.	  See	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  chapter	  one,	  and	  also	  for	  example	  Jerdén	  (2014).	  27	  On	  differentiating	  between	  ‘postmodernism’	  and	  poststructuralism	  see	  chapter	  one.	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RESEARCH	  MATERIALS	  AND	  TIME	  FRAME	  	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  that	  I	  consider	  as	  first	  part	  of	  an	  extended	  future	  project,	  I	  focus	  my	  analysis	  on	   the	   elite	   official/public	   discourse28	  on	   Japan	   and	   China,	   exemplified	   through	   a	   rhetorical	  analysis	  of	  congressional	  debates	  (i.e.	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  including	  testimonies,	  hearings,	  voting	  etc.	   in	   the	  Senate	  and	   the	  House,	  see	   the	   introduction	   to	   the	  analysis)	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  and	  U.S.-­‐China	  economic	  policies	  from	  1985	  until	  2008.	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  as	  (first)	  example	  of	   elite	   public	   discourse	   on	   Japan	   and	   China	   for	   several	   reasons:	  Congress	   played	   and	   plays	   a	  central	   role	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   economic	  policies	   towards	   Japan	  and	  China,	   both	   in	   terms	  of	   its	  high	   public	   visibility/audibility,	  as	   well	   as	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   role	   and	   impact	   in	   economic	   policy	  making	  (N.	  Morris	  2010,	  56–63;	  cf.	  i.e.	  Xie	  2009,	  58).	  The	  U.S.	  constitution	  in	  Article	  I,	  Section	  8	  guarantees	  Congress	  the	  right	  and	  duty	  “to	  lay	  and	  collect	  taxes,	  duties,	  imposts	  and	  excises	  […];	  to	  borrow	  money	  on	  the	  credit	  of	  the	  United	  States;	  to	  regulate	  Commerce	  with	  Foreign	  Nations	  […]”.29	  However,	  since	  the	  1930s	  (i.e.	   first	  and	  foremost	  since	  the	  Reciprocal	  Trade	  Agreements	  Act,	  RTAA,	  of	  1934)	  it	  has	  repeatedly	  delegated	  certain	  rights	  to	  the	  president,	  especially	  when	  it	  comes	   to	   trade	  agreements,	   as	   for	   example	   through	   the	   so-­‐called	  Trade	  Promotion	  Authority30	  (Kunkel	  2003,	  28f.;	  cf.	  Scherrer	  1999,	  53).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  president	  has	  always	  had	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  congressional	  attitudes	   in	  order	  not	  to	  drive	   it	   to	  claim	  its	  constitutional	  primacy	  over	  trade	  issues,	  especially	  as	  broadly	  speaking	  the	  positions	  on	  trade	  liberalization	  and	   ‘free	  trade’	  have	  always	  been	  more	  ‘reserved’	  in	  Congress	  compared	  to	  the	  generally	  pro	  free	  trade	  orientation	  of	  the	  president	  (Schoppa	  1997,	  62f.).31	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  trade	  relations	  with	  Japan,	  for	  instance	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  Due	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  this	  dissertation	  I	  do	  not	  include	  for	  example	  public	  opinion	  or	  popular	  culture,	  but	  leave	  this	  for	  an	  expansion	  of	  this	  project	  in	  the	  future,	  while	  bearing	  in	  mind	  that	  “it	  cannot	  be	  naturally	  assumed	  that	  a	  “discursive	  fit”	  between	  the	  elite	  discourse	  and	  people’s	  traditional	  conception	  of	  the	  world	  exists	  all	  the	  time.	  Although	  the	  ruling	  group	  pursues	  the	  establishment	  of	  hegemony,	  there	  is	  always	  a	  possibility	  that	  common	  sense	  in	  civil	  society	  would	  resist	  and	  defeat	   the	  elite	  hegemonic	  project”	   (Cha	  2015,	  4).	  For	  example,	  as	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  a	  negative	  view	  of	  Japan	   was	   apparently	   far	   more	   consistent	   among	   the	   elite	   than	   among	   the	   general	   public	   (N.	   Morris	   2010,	   32f.;	  Scherrer	  1999,	  244f.).	  	  	  See	  also	  Hansen	  (2006)	  on	  different	  research	  designs	  that	  correspond	  to	  different	  analytical	  research	  goals.	  29	  The	   authenticated	   text	   of	   the	   Constitution	   can	   be	   found	   on	   the	   website	   of	   the	   Government	   Printing	   Office:	  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-­‐110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-­‐110hdoc50.pdf	  (last	  accessed	  March	  28,	  2015).	  30	  TPA,	  or	  “fast-­‐track”,	  according	  to	  the	  Trade	  Act	  of	  1974,	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  analysis	  and	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis.	  31	  The	  executive’s	  free	  trade	  policy	  orientation	  or	  the	  ‘hegemonic’	  status	  of	  free	  trade	  within	  the	  (foreign)	  policy	  elites	  more	   generally	   (cf.	   i.e.	   Kunkel	   2003,	   24),	   is	   mostly	   attributed	   to	   the	   experiences	   with	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   the	  protectionist	  legislation	  (i.e.	  the	  Smoot-­‐Hawley	  Tariff	  Act,	  see	  analysis)	  before	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  the	  reversal	  to	  the	  promotion	  and	  implementation	  of	  free	  trade	  policies	  since	  then,	  especially	  after	  WWII	  and	  until	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1970s	   (see	   for	   instance	   J.	  Goldstein	  1993,	  247).	  Most	  authors	  classify	   the	   ‘free	   trade’	  view	  as	  ‘hegemonic’	  (i.e.	  Hummel	  2000,	  190)	  in	  guiding	  American	  trade	  policy	  since	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  i.e.	  in	  terms	  of	  	  being	  “orthodox”	  (Schoppa	  1997,	  70),	  a	  “shared	  belief	  system”	  (Kunkel	  2003,	  24),	  a	  “consensus”	  (J.	  Goldstein	  1993,	  247).	  It	  became	  contested	  however	  through	  revisionism,	  see	  in	  what	  follows.	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Gerald	  Curtis	  characterized	  them	  as	  “to	  a	  considerable	  extent	  more	  a	  matter	  of	  relations	  between	  the	  administration	  and	  Congress	  than	  between	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  Japan”	  (Curtis	  2000,	  20).	  Considering	   the	   time	   frame	   of	   the	   period	   under	   research,	   I	   take	   the	   1980s	   as	   starting	  point,	   these	  years	  being	  generally	  considered	  a	  turning	  point	   in	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  relations,	  as	  they	  were	  marked	  by	  the	  most	  heated	  disputes	  in	  economic,	  namely	  trade	  and	  monetary	  issues	  (cf.	  i.e.	  Hummel	  2000,	  142,	  188,	  219;	  Mastanduno	  1992,	  240),	  with	  trade	  becoming	  a	  partisan	  issue	  in	  Congress	  (cf.	  Kunkel	  2003,	  52),	  disputed	  between	  Congress	  and	  the	  executive	  (Mastanduno	  1992,	  263),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  prominent	  topic	  in	  elections	  (cf.	  Hummel	  2000,	  140).32	  Moreover,	  the	  1980s	  are	  considered	  as	  the	  period	  when	  negative	  views	  and	  harsh	  rhetoric	  concerning	  Japan	  entered	  into	  public	  discourse	  especially	  in	  the	  U.S.	  (cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  23).	  Around	  the	  mid	  1990s,	  the	  political	  attention	   started	   to	   shift	   from	   Japan	   to	   China,	   and	   this	   trend	  was	   also	   observable	   in	   scholarly	  interest	  in	  ‘the	  Rise	  of	  China’	  (for	  an	  overview	  cf.	  i.e.	  A.	  Goldstein	  1997,	  3),	  while	  Congress	  came	  to	  play	  a	  central	  role	  regarding	  trade	  policy	  towards	  China	  mainly	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  question	  of	  granting	  Permanent	  Normal	  Trade	  Relations	  (PNTR)	  to	  China	  prior	  to	  its	  accession	  to	  the	  WTO,	  as	  will	  be	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis.	  	  Whereas	   there	   seems	   to	   exist	   hardly	   any	   literature	   explicitly	   focusing	   on	   U.S.-­‐Japan	  congressional	  policy	  making	  (an	  exception	   is	  Bob	  2001),	  except	   for	   the	  specific	  CRS-­‐reports	  on	  these	  issues	  (cf.	  i.e.	  J.K.	  Jackson	  1990	  and	  Nanto	  1992),	  but	  it	  is	  usually	  at	  least	  addressed	  in	  the	  cited	  works	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  (trade)	  relations,	   this	   is	  different	   in	  the	  Chinese	  case,	  where	  scholars	  emphasize	   the	   role	   and	   impact	   of	   Congress,	   especially	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   trade	   issues	   and	  legislation	  (cf.	  Gagliano	  2014,	  1f.,	  135ff.;	  Xie	  2009,	  1ff.,	  58,	  60ff.;	  Yang	  2000,	  11f.,	  75ff.,	   see	  also	  chapter	  one).	  Finally,	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Joseph	  Gagliano,	  Congress	  presents	  	  	  “two	  faces	  […],	  first,	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  single	  deliberative	  body	  that	  considers	  policy	  issues	  that	  face	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  where	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  legislature	  is	  to	  pursue	  policies	  that	  maximize	  interests	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  Second,	  Congress	  represents	  an	  assembly	  of	  ambassadors	  from	  each	  of	  the	  50	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  For	   instance,	   in	   the	   year	   1985	   over	   300	   ‘protectionist’	   bills	   were	   debated	   in	   Congress	   (cf.	   Kolkmann	   2005,	   41;	  Schoppa	   1997,	   66).	   During	   the	   same	   year	   the	   U.S.	   started	   to	   shift	   its	   focus	   from	   ‘protecting’	   the	   U.S.	   market	   from	  Japanese	  imports	  towards	  the	  goal	  of	  opening	  the	  Japanese	  market	  for	  U.S.	  companies	  and	  products	  (cf.	  Hummel	  2000,	  219).	   When	   it	   comes	   to	   Congress’	   impact	   on	   the	   trade	   policy	   agenda,	   for	   instance	   the	   Reagan	   administration	  repeatedly	  acted	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  harsh	  legislation	  from	  Congress.	  Leonard	  Schoppa	  gives	  the	  negotiations	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	  Voluntary	  Export	  Restraints	  (VER)	  in	  1981,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Market-­‐Oriented	  Sector	  Specific	  (MOSS)	  talks	  and	  the	   Plaza	   Accords	   in	   1985,	   and	   several	   unfair	   trade	   and	   dumping	   cases	   in	   the	   following	   years	   as	   examples.	   The	  incoming	  Bush	  administration	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  continuation	  of	  these	  issues,	  for	  instance	  the	  Super	  301	  provision	  of	   the	   Omnibus	   Trade	   and	   Competitiveness	   Act	   of	   1988	   (see	   the	   analysis	   itself	   for	   details	   on	   these	   agreements).	  Moreover,	   the	   revisionist	   views	   had	   already	   gained	  momentum	   in	   Congress	   and	   also	   in	   business	   circles	   (Schoppa	  1997,	  65ff.).	  According	  to	  Michael	  Mastanduno	  for	  instance,	  preventing	  congressional	  action	  that	  would	  have	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  even	  hinder	  multilateral	  trade	  negotiations	  under	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Trade	  and	  Tariffs	  (GATT)	  was	  one	  of	  the	  major	  reasons	  of	  the	  Bush	  administration	  to	  engage	  itself	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  Structural	  Impediments	  Initiative	  (SII)	  with	  Japan	  in	  1989	  (Mastanduno	  1992,	  238;	  see	  also	  Schoppa	  1997,	  71).	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states	  and	  435	  districts,	  where	  each	  member	  pursues	  policies	   that	   tend	   to	   the	   interests	  of	   their	  constituents	  at	  the	  national	  level”	  (Gagliano	  2014,	  6).	  	  	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  congressional	  debates	  on	  U.S.	  economic	  Japan	  and	  China	  policies	  to	  pursue	  the	  question	  of	  how	  U.S.	  identity	  as	  global	  economic	  and	  political	  leader	  and	  role	  model	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  potential	  competitors,	  these	  sources	  thus	  allow	  for	  taking	  into	  account	  broader	  global	  (‘first	   face’),	  as	  well	  as	  domestic	   (‘second	   face’)	   issues	   that	  were	  brought	  up	  and	  considered	  as	  significant	  in	  the	  discussions	  during	  the	  time	  period	  analyzed	  in	  this	  study.	  Furthermore,	  while	  Congress	  as	  legislating	  body	  clearly	  forms	  part	  of	  the	  elite	  public	  discourse,	  its	  ‘second	  face’	  not	  only	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  accounts	  for	  its	  U.S.	  wide	  representativity,	  but	  it	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  link	  to	  the	   constituents	   and	   voters,	   hence	   to	   public	   opinion	   that	   cannot	   be	   treated	   within	   this	  dissertation.	  While	  the	  debates	  in	  form	  of	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  are	  publicly	  accessible	  (and	  most	  sessions	  are	  open	  to	  the	  public),	  they	  are	  not	  directed	  to	  an	  ‘outside’	  audience	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  addressing	  it,	  like	  for	  example	  press	  statements	  by	  the	  executive,	  or	  the	  media	  more	  generally	  speaking.	  As	   I	   understand	   ‘discourse’	   in	   terms	   of	   meaning-­‐structures	   and	   the	   ‘horizon’	   that	  constitutes	  our	   ‘reality’	  and	  that	  we	  cannot	  get	  outside	  of	  (see	  chapter	  two),	   I	  consider	  and	  am	  interested	   in	   the	  elite	  public	  discourse	  on	  the	  rise	  of	   Japan	  and	  China	  as	  one	  part	  of	   the	  bigger	  picture	  of	  how	  a	   ‘normal’	  or	   ‘hegemonic’	  perspective	  becomes	  challenged	  (or	  dislocated,	  see	   in	  what	  follows)	  by	  ‘events’	  that	  can	  not	  be	  reconciled	  with	  it	  or	  integrated	  into	  it.33	  While	  looking	  at	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  as	  an	  example,	  in	  this	  thesis	  I	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  specific	  legislation	  pursuing	  the	  question	  of	  how	  it	  came	  about	  or	  whether	  it	  was	  passed	  or	  not,	  but	  take	  the	  debates	  in	  Congress	  as	  example	  of	  the	  overall	  discourse	  on	  Japan’s	  and	  China’s	  economic	  rise.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Jacob	  Torfing,	  the	  central	  question	  is	  “how	  the	  text	  argues,	  not	  what	  it	  says”,	  or	  in	  this	  case	  also	  not	  who	  says	  something	  but	  how	   it	   is	  said34	  (cf.	  also	  Hagström	  and	  Gustafsson	  2015,	  13f.;	  Torfing	  2005,	  41).	  Importantly,	  as	  I	  will	  make	  clear	  chapters	  two	  and	  three,	  the	  decision	  to	  focus	  on	  (written)	  speech	  in	  the	  form	  of	  documents	  contained	  in	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  simply	  refers	  to	  the	  form	  and	  character	  of	  the	  sources,	  it	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  ‘reduction	  of	  everything	  to	  language’	  as	  opposed	  to	   ‘real	  action’,	  which	  would	  make	  no	  sense	  within	  the	  concept	  of	  discourse	  I	  am	  endorsing	  (cf.	  Nonhoff	   2011,	   96).	   Furthermore,	   the	   distinction	   between	   and	   spotlight	   on	   one	   field	   of	   elite	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  As	  will	  be	  addressed	  further	  in	  chapter	  two	  and	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis	  (and	  the	  analysis	  itself),	  the	  notion	  ‘event’	  in	  this	  study	  is	  not	  understood	  as	  something	  exogenous	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  existing	  outside	  of	  meaning-­‐making	  and	  meaning-­‐giving	   activities	   and	   structures	   (i.e.	   outside	   of	   discourse),	   but	   it	   is	   precisely	   the	   question	   of	  meaning-­‐	   and	  sense-­‐making	  of	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  ‘events’	  that	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  	  dislocation	  (cf.	  Nabers	  2015,	  forthcoming).	  For	  a	  distinction	  between	  ‘pure	  events’	  and	  ‘historical	  events’	  in	  this	  sense	  see	  Lundborg	  (2009,	  2012).	  34	  While	  keeping	  in	  mind	  that	  ultimately	  these	  aspects	  can	  of	  course	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  strictly	  separate	  matters.	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discourse	  and	  on	  economic	  matters	  is	  a	  purely	  pragmatic	  and	  analytical	  device	  that	  is	  internal	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  discourse	  (cf.	  Howarth	  and	  Stavrakakis	  2000,	  4).	  	  In	   this	   dissertation,	   I	   focus	   on	   the	   discourses	   evolving	   during	   the	   years	   of	   major	   key	  events	   in	   the	   field	   of	   economic,	   especially	   trade	   policy	   (for	   more	   details	   see	   chapter	   3.4	   and	  introduction	  and	  overviews	  to	  the	  analysis):	  1985	  (Plaza	  Accords,	  first	  year	  since	  WWII	  that	  U.S.	  is	  a	  debtor	  country),	  1989	  (Structural	  Impediments	  Initiative,	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War),	  1994/1995	  (trade	  summits	  with	  Japan,	  debates	  on	  China’s	  Most	  Favored	  Nation	  (MFN)	  status),	  1997	  (Asian	  financial	   crisis),	   2000/2001	   (China’s	   accession	   to	   the	   WTO),	   2005	   (China	   announces	   end	   of	  exclusive	  dollar	  peg	  of	  its	  currency,	  debates	  on	  acquisition	  of	  a	  Californian	  oil	  company	  (Unocal)	  by	   a	   Chinese	   company	   (CNOOC),	   and	   finally	   2008	   (the	   ‘outbreak’	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   China	  becomes	   the	   U.S.’	   largest	   creditor).	   While	   the	   1985,	   1989,	   1994/1995,	   2000/2001	   and	   2005	  events	  are	  more	  Japan	  and	  China	  specific	  (although	  with	  global	  implications),	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	   the	   Asian	   financial	   crisis	   and	   the	   financial	   crisis	   account	   for	   global	   (economic)	  developments	  that	  however	  still	  allow	  for	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	   the	   respective	   number	   two	   economy.	   My	   aim	   is	   thus	   not	   to	   study	   these	   ‘events’	   (see	  introduction	   to	   the	  analysis)	   in	  particular,	  but	   taking	   them	  as	   reference	  points	  while	  aiming	  at	  identifying	  continuities	  and	  changes	  in	  U.S.	  identity-­‐articulation	  over	  a	  longer	  time	  period.35	  	  	  
OVERVIEW	  OF	  THE	  CHAPTERS	  	  The	  first	  chapter	  expands	  on	  the	  topic	  by	  providing	  a	  state	  of	  the	  art	  on	  the	  fields	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE	  that	   are	   touched	  upon	  by	   the	  questions	  posed	   in	   this	  dissertation.	  Thematically	   these	  are	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	   and	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	   relations	  with	   a	   focus	   on	   economic	   relations	   in	   particular.	   For	   their	  post-­‐positivist	  approaches	  towards	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  relations,	  particularly	  important	  works	  for	  my	  study	   are	   for	   instance	   those	   by	   Hartwig	   Hummel	   (1997a,	   1997b,	   2000),	   Gearoíd	   Ó	   Tuathail	  (1993),	  David	  Campbell	  (1994),	  Narrelle	  Morris	  (2010)	  and	  Masao	  Miyoshi	  (1991),	  as	  well	  as	  for	  their	   broad	   historical	   accounts	   especially	   the	   seminal	   ‘classical’	   ones	   by	   Robert	   Uriu	   (2000,	  2009),	  Gerald	  Curtis	  (2000)	  and	  Leonard	  Schoppa	  (1997,	  1999).	  Whereas	  these	  examples	  of	  not	  only	   discourse	   focused	   approaches	   towards	   the	   study	   of	   U.S.-­‐Japanese	   (economic)	   relations	  provide	   connecting	  points	   to	  my	  approach,	   this	   can	  only	  partly	  be	   said	  about	   the	   literature	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  A	  second	  step	  –	  which	  however	  cannot	  be	  pursued	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  this	  dissertation-­‐project	  –	  would	  be	  to	  focus	  more	  closely	  on	  what	  role	  identity	  constructions	  played	  in	  particular	  policies	  towards	  Japan	  and	  China,	  i.e.	  in	  how	  far	  one	  mode	  of	  articulation	  constituted	  or	  enabled	  the	  policy	  changes	  of	  the	  U.S.	  administration	   in	  the	  Japanese	  case.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  since	  the	  1990s	  a	  viable	  part	  of	  Congress,	  the	  media	  and	  the	  academic	  community	  keeps	  pushing	  for	  a	  tougher	  China	  policy,	  the	  question	  then	  would	  be	  on	  the	  role	  of	  identity	  in	  the	  discursive	  strategies	  by	  which	  policy	  
changes	  towards	  China	  might	  be	  aimed	  at.	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U.S.-­‐Chinese	   (economic)	   relations.	   For	   the	   latter	   I	   briefly	   address	   the	   prevalent	   (mostly	  rationalist	   and/or	   policy	   focused)	   literature,	   that	   is	   first	   and	   foremost	   inspired	   by	   power-­‐transition	   theory	   (PTT).	   I	   then	   deal	  with	   the	   few	  discourse-­‐oriented	   approaches	   (i.e.	   Goh,	   Pan	  and	  Turner,	  see	  earlier	  footnote)	  in	  more	  detail,	  while	  connecting	  them	  to	  the	  conceptualizations	  of	   ‘discourse’,	   ‘identity’	  and	   ‘ideas’	   in	   IR	  and	  IPE	  more	  broadly	   in	  chapter	  1.4.	   In	  the	  section	  on	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	   the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history	   (1.3)	   I	  address	   the	  central	   literature	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  relating	  it	  to	  the	  study	  of	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  and	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations,	  concluding	  on	  a	  question	  that	  links	  up	  to	  a	  central	  problematic	  in	  PDT:	  how	  does/can	  liberal	  thinking	  deal	  with	  ‘difference’	  without	  converting	  it	  into	  a	  potentially	  threatening	  otherness?	  	  The	  second	  chapter	  on	  theory	  deals	  more	  explicitly	  with	  PDT,	  by	  first	  tracing	  its	  central	  premises	   to	   similar	   concerns	   voiced	   by	   scholars	   in	   IR	   and	   IPE	   (for	   instance	   by	   Jim	   George,	  Richard	  Ashley,	  James	  Der	  Derian,	  David	  Campbell,	  Roxanne	  Lynn	  Doty,	  Jutta	  Weldes	  and	  Diana	  Saco,	   Marieke	   de	   Goede),	   and	   by	   secondly	   expanding	   on	   the	   core	   theoretical	   concepts	   as	  developed	  by	  Ernesto	  Laclau	  and	  Chantal	  Mouffe	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001),	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  how	  their	  approach	  departs	  from	  and	  could	  take	  the	  IR	  agenda	  further.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  third	  chapter	  on	  methodology	  and	  methods	  connects	  to	  the	  debates	  on	  discourse	   analysis	   as	  method	   (in	   IR	   and	   IPE)	  more	   generally,	   and	   then	  picks	  up	   the	   trajectory	  opened	   up	   with	   the	   state	   of	   the	   art	   in	   the	   first	   chapter,	   and	   introduces	   the	   Logics	   of	   Critical	  Explanation	   (LCE)	   and	   Rhetorical	   Political	   Analysis	   (RPA)	   as	   ways	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   questions	  raised	   and	   the	   criticisms	   advanced	   (chapters	   3.2	   and	   3.3).	   In	   the	  method	   section	   I	   lay	   out	   the	  analytic	   categories	   for	   the	  analysis	  of	  my	   textual	  material	  based	  on	   the	  concepts	  of	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe,	  and	  how	  to	  put	  them	  into	  practice	  through	  drawing	  from	  the	  politico-­‐linguistic	  approach	  by	  Martin	  Reisigl	  (2007,	  2008).	  Furthermore	  I	  address	  the	  gathering,	  selection	  and	  organization	  of	  the	  sources	  in	  more	  detail	  (chapter	  3.4).	  	  To	   briefly	   sum	   up	  my	  main	   trajectory	   of	   the	   first	   three	   chapters:	   the	   majority	   of	   approaches	  towards	  the	  topic	  (this	  is	  true	  above	  all	  for	  the	  literature	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations)	  largely	  come	  down	   to	   a	   (conscious	   or	   unconscious)	   ‘dualism’	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   ‘material’/’ideational’	   split.	   Its	  implications	  for	  the	  study	  of	  discourse,	   ideas	  and	  identity	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE	  in	  my	  eyes	  can	  in	  most	  cases	   be	   pinned	   down	   to	   two	   crucial	   misapprehensions	   leading	   to	   some	   kind	   of	   ‘lost	   in	  translation’	  in	  these	  discussions,	  and	  they	  are	  both	  connected	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  ontological	  as	  well	  as	  methodological	  issues	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  a	  certain	  method-­‐drivenness	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  recently	  problematized	   for	   instance	  by	   Jackson	   (2011)	  and	  Herborth	   (2011)	   for	   the	   field	  of	   IR	  (Chernoff	  2013,	  353,	  361;	  Howarth	  2013,	  Chapter	  3;	  cf.	  also	  Michel	  2013;	  Wight	  2013,	  328)	  and	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already	  earlier	  for	  example	  by	  Samuels	  and	  Caldwell	  for	  economic	  methodology	  (Caldwell	  1982;	  see	  also	  Krasner	  1996,	  109;	  Samuels	  1996).	  In	  short,	  I	  would	  summarize	  their	  argument	  as	  that	  we	  think	  too	  little	  or	  not	  at	  all	  about	  why	  we	  study	  certain	  issues	  and	  ask	  certain	  questions	  and	  not	  others,	  and	  why	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  and	  not	  in	  another	  (cf.	  also	  Suganami	  2013,	  268).	  For	  the	  field	  of	  studies	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  (economic)	  relations	  this	  means	  that	  the	  realms	  of	  the	  ‘material’	  versus	   the	   ‘non-­‐material’/’ideational’	   and	   their	   meanings	   remain	   largely	   unquestioned	   or	  undefined.	  In	  my	  view	  this	  is	  the	  case	  mainly	  because	  of	  three	  reasons:	  their	  meaning	  is	  taken	  for	  granted,	   these	   kind	  of	  methodological	   considerations	   are	  dismissed	   as	   negligible	   ‘meta-­‐theory’	  too	  remote	  from	  ‘empirical	  research’36,	  and/or	  the	  scholars	  simply	  (want	  to)	  stay	  committed	  to	  methods	   ‘established’	   by	   the	   neo-­‐positivist	   majority	   in	   the	   field	   (cf.	   Hülsse	   2003,	   214;	   P.	   T.	  Jackson	   2011,	   203).37	  ‘Ideas’,	   ‘identities’	   and	   ‘discourses’	   are	   thus	   commonly	   considered	   to	  pertain	   to	  an	   ‘ideational	   realm’,	  while	  still	  being	   treated	  as	   fixed	   ‘variables’	  and	   ‘causal	   factors’	  that	  potentially	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  material	  (cf.	  Gofas	  and	  Hay	  2010,	  4ff.;	  P.	  H.	  Gries	  2006,	  311;	  Alastair	   Ian	   Johnston	  2006,	  349ff.;	  e.g.	  Kang	  2007,	  8f.,	  80ff.;	  Rousseau	  2006;	  Wang	  2000,	  29ff.).	  This	  is	  of	  course	  not	  problematic	  per	  se,	  but	  it	  tends	  to	  become	  problematic	  on	  a	  broader	  scale	  in	  terms	  of	  consistency	  if	  –	  and	  this	  is	  more	  true	  for	  IR	  constructivism	  in	  general	  than	  for	  work	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations	  that	  is	  seldom	  constructivist	  –	  	  one	  does	  not	  realize	  that	  the	  methods	  one	  uses	  might	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  key	  premises	  of	   (self-­‐ascribed)	   social	   constructivism	  (cf.	  Gofas	  and	  Hay	  2010,	  47;	  Herschinger	  2011,	  25;	  Hynek	  and	  Teti	  2010;	  cf.	  P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2011,	  203f.;	  Zehfuss	  2006).38	  Thus	  one	  problem	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  ‘ideas’	  related	  research	  is	  that	  it,	  because	  of	  its	  by	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  As	   problematized	   for	   instance	   by	  Dirk	  Nabers	   (2015,	   forthcoming),	   and	   in	   accordance	  with	   his	   position	   I	   do	   not	  subscribe	  to	  a	  rigid	  separation	  between	  an	  ‘empirical’	  and	  a	  ‘non-­‐empirical’	  realm,	  where	  ‘empirical’	  is	  understood	  as	  an	  ‘unmediated’	  or	  directly	  detectable	  ‘objective	  reality’	  (see	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  the	  so	  called	  ‘Cartesian	  anxiety’),	  as	  I	  do	  concur	  with	  post-­‐foundationalist	  thinking	  that	  argues	  against	  conceiving	  the	  ‘empirical’	  as	  situated	  outside	  of	  historically	  contingent	  concepts	  we	  use	   to	  make	  sense	  of	   it.	   In	   this	  sense,	  and	   in	  a	  poststructuralist	  understanding	   I	  also	   eschew	   a	   rigid	   separation	   between	   theory	   and	  practice,	   but	   rather	   conceive	   of	   theory	  as	   practice	   (see	   chapter	  two).	  In	  accordance	  with	  PDT	  scholars	  (for	  instance	  Jason	  Glynos	  and	  David	  Howarth)	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  ‘empirical	  research’	  in	  this	  thesis	  thus	  simply	  refers	  to	  an	  inquiry	  into	  social	  practices,	  without	  establishing	  or	  treating	  them	  as	  ‘objective	  facts’.	  	  37	  By	  neo-­‐positivism	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  term	  as	  ‘wager’	  used	  by	  Patrick	  Jackson,	  briefly	  and	  generally	  put	  as	  understanding	  of	  all	  knowledge-­‐claims	  as	   inferences	  about	   the	  world	   ‘out	   there	  as	   it	   is’,	   aiming	  at	  but	  never	  perfectly	  mirroring	   it,	  resulting	   in	   research	   designs	   in	   which	   those	   inferences	   are	   articulated	   as	   hypotheses	   (statements	   positing	   causal	  relationships	  between	  independent	  and	  dependent	  variables)	  that	  are	  tested	  (comparatively	  across	  cases)	  in	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  findings	  on	  causal	  relationships	  (cf.	  Howard	  2010,	  400;	  cf.	  P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2011,	  42ff.,	  198f.).	  	  	  38	  To	  briefly	  summarize	  Patrick	  Jackson’s	  argument	  on	  ‘constructivism’:	  the	  potential	  of	  social	  constructivism	  as	  what	  he	  terms	  “philosophical	  ontology”	  concerned	  with	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  researcher	  and	  the	  object	  of	  research	  has	  been	  reduced	  to	   ‘IR-­‐constructivism’	  as	  what	  he	  correspondingly	  calls	  a	  “scientific	  ontology”	  about	  what	  kinds	  of	  things	   exist	   and	   should	   be	   studied	   (e.g.	   ideas,	   norms,	   culture),	  which	   in	   turn	   opened	   the	   door	   for	   constructivism’s’	  ‘application’	   through	  neo-­‐positivist	  methods	  at	   odds	  with	   the	   (omitted)	  philosophical	  premises	   (P.	  T.	   Jackson	  2011,	  141f.,	   202–204).	   Some	   scholars,	   for	   instance	   Hidemi	   Suganami,	   propose	   the	   term	   ‘social	   constructionism’	   as	   to	  differentiate	  it	  from	  IR-­‐constructivism	  (Suganami	  2013,	  260,	  FN	  37).	  For	  differentiating	  between	  social	  constructivism	  as	  position	   in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  and	  IR-­‐constructivism	  as	  a	   theoretical	   tradition	  see	  also	  Monteiro	  and	  Ruby	  (2009,	  17,	  FN	  4).	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large	   instrumental	   treatment	   of	   these	   topics,	   always	   risks	   falling	   short	   of	   dealing	   with	   –	   or	  providing	   a	   substantial	   answer	   –	  when	   confronted	  with	   the	   typical	   question	   on	   the	   impact	   or	  influence	   of	   these	   ‘non-­‐material’	   factors	   on	   actual	   policy	   or	   ‘reality’,	   as	   it	   often	   stays	   silent,	  maintains	  or	  does	  nothing	  to	  counter	  the	  alleged	  dichotomy	  between	  ‘material	  reality’	  and	  ‘ideas’	  (cf.	  Adcock	  2006,	  60;	  cf.	  Wæver	  2005,	  35;	  e.g.	  Wang	  2000).	  	  To	  just	  briefly	  address	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  this	  dichotomy,	  ultimately,	   it	  goes	  back	  at	  least	   to	  René	  Descartes	  and	  his	  “mind-­‐body-­‐dualism”,	   that	   in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  became	  transformed	   into,	  or	  was	   treated	  as	  what	  Richard	  Bernstein	  has	   called	   “Cartesian	  anxiety”:	   the	  understanding	  that	  ‘mind’	  and	  ‘matter’	  are	  separate	  realms,	  and	  that	  there	  has	  to	  be	  an	  (mind)-­‐external	  and	  secure	  (i.e.	  ‘objective’)	  foundation	  of	  knowledge39,	  as	  its	  absence	  would	  lead	  into	  an	  abyss	  of	   “intellectual	   and	  moral	   chaos”	   (R.	   J.	   Bernstein	  1983,	   16;	   cf.	   also	  George	   and	  Campbell	  1990,	   289).40	  Without	   always	   referring	   to	   –	   or	   in	   some	   cases	   even	  without	   awareness	   of	   –	   the	  philosophical	  underpinnings,	   in	  IR	  (and	  IPE)	  these	  debates	   figure	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   ‘either/or’	  (cf.	  R.	   J.	  Bernstein	  1976,	  235)	  cleavages	  between	  (so	  called)	  positivists	  and	  post-­‐positivists	  (i.e.	  but	   not	   only	   in	   the	   “great	   debates”)41,	   and	   the	   common	   dichotomies	   such	   as	   material	   vs.	  ideational,	   non-­‐discursive	   vs.	   discursive,	   ideas	   vs.	   discourses,	   explaining	   vs.	   understanding,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	  I	  find	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘philosophical’	  and	  ‘scientific’	  ontologies	  problematic	  (see	  also	  in	  what	  follows),	  I	  agree	   with	   Jackson’s	   critique	   that	   IR-­‐constructivism	   in	   many	   cases	   can	   be	   differentiated	   from	   neo-­‐positivist	  approaches	  only	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  ‘objects’	  of	  research.	  39	  On	  problematic	  connotations	  of	  the	  term	  ‘knowledge’	  from	  a	  postsructuralist	  perspective	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  footnote	  on	  Suganami	  and	  Jackson.	  	  40	  For	  a	  critical	  philosophical	  discussion	  of	  this	  ‘problem’	  see	  first	  and	  foremost	  Richard	  Rorty	  and	  his	  Philosophy	  and	  
the	  mirror	  of	  nature	  (1979).	  On	  how	  this	  ‘problem	  field’	  was	  conceived	  and	  dealt	  with	  by	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	  John	  Locke,	  David	  Hume,	  Immanuel	  Kant	  (i.e.	  his	  noumena	  and	  phenomena)	  and	  Max	  Weber,	  and	  the	  ‘consequences’	  for	  IR	  see	  for	  instance	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight	  (Patomäki	  and	  Wight	  2002,	  219ff.)	  and	  Jackson	  (P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2011,	  44ff.).	  41	  While	  the	  distinction	  between	  positivists	  and	  post-­‐positivists	  has	  become	  common	  in	  the	  discipline,	  it	  is	  actually	  not	  always	  used	  consistently,	  and	  not	  very	   ‘accurately’	  either.	  To	  give	  a	   few	  examples	  here,	  Patrick	   Jackson	   for	  example	  distinguishes	   between	   positivism,	   logical	   positivism	   (i.e.	   the	   Vienna	   Circle)	   and	   neo-­‐positivism,	   and	   argues	   for	   the	  post-­‐logical	  positivists	  (i.e.	  Karl	  Popper,	  Imre	  Lakatos,	  Thomas	  Kuhn)	  to	  be	  called	  ‘post-­‐positivists’	  (P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2008,	  134f.,	   2011,	   57).	  While	   for	   instance	   Ruby	   and	  Monteiro	   also	   point	   to	   the	   problem	   in	   terminology,	   they	   distinguish	  between	   positivism,	   anti-­‐positivism	   and	   post-­‐positivism	  with	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   latter	   retaining	   “some	   of	   the	  core	   tenets	   of	   positivism,	  while	   encompassing	   some	   anti-­‐positivist	   critiques”,	   giving	   scientific/critical	   realism	   as	   an	  example	   (and	   characterizing	   social	   constructivism	   as	   philosophy	   of	   science	   as	   anti-­‐positivist).	   As	   positivism	   they	  characterize	  the	  commitment	  to	  a	  unified	  scientific	  method,	  a	  distinction	  between	  facts	  and	  values	  and	  the	  centrality	  of	  observation	   (Monteiro	   and	   Ruby	   2009,	   16f.).	   For	   yet	   different	   understandings	   and	   distinctions	   see	   for	   instance	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight	  and	   the	   references	   in	  Ruby	  and	  Monteiro	   (Monteiro	  and	  Ruby	  2009,	  16f.;	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight	  2002).	  	  The	   notion	   positivism	   according	   to	   PDT	   for	   Glynos	   and	   Howarth	   stands	   for	   ‘unity	   of	   method’	   (especially	   the	  hypothetico-­‐deductive),	  ‘value	  neutrality’,	  and	  ‘fact	  neutrality’,	  while	  for	  them	  post-­‐positivism	  stands	  for	  “a	  somewhat	  disparate	   set	   of	   approaches”,	   that	   i.e.	   subscribe	   to	   the	   hermeneutical	   insight	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   self-­‐interpretation	   of	   actors	   for	   social-­‐scientific	   explanation,	   but	   also	   for	   approaches	   drawing	   from	   poststructuralism,	  critical	   theory	   and	   critical	   realism.	   They	   also	   include	   what	   they	   call	   “certain	   reformed	   or	   sophisticated	   positivist	  approaches”,	  such	  as	  those	  focusing	  on	  causal	  mechanisms	  as	  central	  unit	  of	  analysis	  (Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  2007,	  216,	  220,	   2008,	   7).	   In	   this	   dissertation	   thesis	   I	   continue	   to	   use	   the	   term	   ‘post-­‐positivism’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   Glynos	   and	  Howarth.	   For	   differentiating	   between	   ‘anti’-­‐	   and	   ‘post’-­‐positivism	   (and	   -­‐foundationalism,	   and	   -­‐essentialism)	   see	  chapter	  two.	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causal	  vs.	  constitutive,	  objectivist	  vs.	  relativist,	  rationalist	  vs.	  interpretivist,	  Kant’s	  noumena	  and	  phenomena	  etc.	  (cf.	  also	  Landman	  2008	  and	  see	  chapter	  three).	  This	  kind	  of	  binary	  thinking	  as	  central	  line	  in	  Western	  philosophy	  was	  criticized	  as	  stemming	  from	  ‘logocentrism’	  (i.e.	  assuming	  a	   fundamental	   essence,	   that	   can	   be	   mediated	   through	   linguistic	   representations,	   as	   ultimate	  foundation	  of	   truth)	  by	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  and	  problematized	  for	  the	  discipline	  of	   IR	  for	   instance	  by	  R.B.J.	  Walker	  (1995).	  What	  often	   lies	  behind	  the	  provision	  of	  these	  dichotomies	   is	  the	  strive	  for	   demarcating	   ‘science’	   as	   ‘founded	   knowledge’	   from	   ‘non-­‐science’,	   and	   ‘scientific	   methods’	  from	  ‘non-­‐(scientific)	  methods’	  as	  valid	  way	  to	  the	  ‘founded	  knowledge’	  (cf.	  Monteiro	  and	  Ruby	  2009).	   Although	   these	   cleavages	   and	   to	   some	   extent	   also	   their	   philosophical	   origins	   have	   not	  remained	  unaddressed	   in	   the	  wider	   IR-­‐literature	   (see	   chapter	   two),	   an	   important	   contribution	  focusing	   on	   these	   issues	   and	   their	   significance	   and	   consequences	   for	   IR	   scholarship	   and	   the	  discipline	  –especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  ‘science’	  and	  ‘scientific	  methods’	  question	  –	  was	  made	  by	   Patrick	   T.	   Jackson	   in	   his	  Conduct	   of	   Inquiry	   in	   International	  Relations.42	  In	   a	   discussion	   and	  critique	   of	   Jackson’s	   book,	   Hidemi	   Suganami	   relocates	   the	   major	   cleavage	   from	   what	   Jackson	  calls	  mind-­‐world-­‐dualism	  versus	  mind-­‐world	  monism	  as	  ‘philosophical	  ontologies’	  (P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2011,	   35–36;	   115–141)43	  to	   ‘representational	   versus	   constructionist	   views	   on	   knowledge’	   (cf.	  also	  Humphreys	  2013,	  299;	  Suganami	  2013,	  258).44	  The	  latter	  characterization	  brings	  it	  back	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  For	   criticisms	   of	   why	   this	   is	   not	   only	   a	   question	   about	   the	   ‘bounderies’	   of	   science,	   but	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	  discipline	  see	  for	  instance	  Michel	  (2013,	  282)	  and	  Sylvester	  (2013,	  310).	  For	  a	  broader	  critique	  see	  also	  Nabers	  (2015,	  forthcoming).	  43	  Jackson	   addresses	   ‘Cartesian	   anxiety’	   under	   what	   he	   calls	   ‘mind-­‐world	   dualism	   and	   mind-­‐world	   monism’	   as	  ‘philosophical	  ontologies’.	  In	  his	  definition,	  philosophical	  ontologies	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  researcher	  and	  his	  research	  objects	  and	  the	  question	  how	  to	  produce	  knowledge	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (in	  Jackson’s	  terms	  the	  relationship	  between	  “the	  knower	  and	  the	  known”	  or	  the	  “hook-­‐up”	  to	  the	  world	  vs.	  “what	  is	  there	  to	  be	  known”).	  Another	   understanding	   of	   ontology	   he	   terms	   “scientific	   ontology”,	   that	   is	   concerned	  with	  what	   exists	   and	   how	   the	  existence	  might	  be	  determined.43	  Jackson	  refers	  to	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight	  (2002,	  215)	  for	  the	  designation	  of	  these	  two	  types	   (P.	  T.	   Jackson	  2011,	  28),	  who	   in	   turn	  refer	   to	  Bunge	   (1996).	   	  As	   ‘philosophical	  ontology’	  according	   to	   Jackson	  dualism	  presumes	  a	  “separation	  between	  researcher	  and	  world	  such	  that	  research	  has	  to	  be	  directed	  toward	  properly	  crossing	  that	  gap,	  and	  valid	  knowledge	  must	  in	  the	  end	  be	  related	  to	  some	  sort	  of	  accurate	  correspondence	  between	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  propositions	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  actual	  character	  of	  a	  mind-­‐independent	  world	  on	  the	  other”.	  Monism	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  conceives	  of	  the	  “researcher	  ...	  [as]	  part	  of	  the	  world	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  speaking	  of	  ‘the	  world’	  as	  divorced	  from	  the	  activities	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  is	  literally	  nonsensical:	  ‘world’	  is	  endogenous	  to	   social	   practices	   of	   knowledge-­‐production,	   including	   (but	   not	   limited	   to)	   scholarly	   practices,	   and	   hence	   scholarly	  knowledge-­‐production	  is	  in	  no	  sense	  a	  simple	  description	  or	  recording	  of	  already-­‐existing	  stable	  worldly	  objects”	  (P.	  T.	  Jackson	   2011,	   35–36;	   115–141).	   From	   a	   PDT	   perspective	   however,	   the	   separation	   in	   philosophical	   and	   scientific	  ontologies	  is	  not	  feasible,	  see	  chapter	  two.	  44	  For	   a	   criticism	  of	   Jackson’s	   terms	   and	   typology	   see	   for	   instance	  Michel	   (Michel	   2013,	   283f.),	  who	  points	   out	   that	  ‘mind’	  and	  ‘world’	  already	  have	  different	  meanings	  for	  those	  ascribed	  as	  dualists	  and	  monists.	  	  While	   Suganami	   himself	   points	   to	   a	   certain	   uneasiness	   when	   using	   the	   term	   ‘to	   know’,	   from	   a	   poststructuralist	  perspective	  the	  term	  ‘knowledge’	  (that	   is	  not	  discussed	  or	  problematized	  by	  Jackson)	  is	  problematic	  as	   it	  commonly	  rests	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  “a	  relationship	  between	  a	  given	  subject	  (the	  person	  that	  knows)	  and	  a	  given	  object	  (that	  which	  is	  known)”	  (Campbell	  2010,	  218).	  However,	  a	  post-­‐positivist	  and	  post-­‐empiricist	  understanding	  conceives	  of	  the	  subject/object	  relationship	  not	  as	  pre-­‐given	  entities,	  but	  as	  mutually	  constitutive	  through	  discourse,	  and	  emphasizes	  that	  all	  knowledge	  claims	  involve	  a	  relationship	  with	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  structuring	  of	  what	  we	  take	  as	   ‘reality’	  (cf.	  Campbell	  2010,	  219).	  See	  also	  Nabers	  2015	  (forthcoming),	  who	  –	  in	  accordance	  with	  and	  referring	  to	  Bernstein	  but	  also	  Richard	  Rorty	   –	   argues	   that	   this	   goes	  hand	   in	  hand	  with	   a	   critique	  of	   ‘epistemology’	   understood	   as	   separation	  between	  ‘knowledge’	  and	  ‘reality’.	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what	   Bernstein	   termed	   as	   ‘Cartesian	   anxiety’	   and	   in	   my	   view	   speaks	   slightly	   better	   to	  poststructuralist	   understandings	   of	   this	   issue	   in	   IR	   (see	   for	   instance	   Campbell	   who	   positions	  himself	   against	   what	   he	   criticizes	   as	   ‘the	   correspondence	   theory	   of	   truth’	   (2010,	   218)),	   that	  furthermore	  posit	  themselves	  against	  the	  foundationalist	  premises	  of	  a	  representational	  view,	  as	  I	   will	   lay	   out	   in	   chapter	   two.45	  While	   I	   agree	   with	   the	   assertion	   that	   the	   distinction	   between	  ‘dualism’	  and	  ‘monism’	  (and	  ‘the	  material’	  and	  ‘the	  ideational’)	  is	  actually	  only	  possible	  if	  at	  least	  taking	   a	   dualist	   perspective	   –	   	   that	   separates	   between	   the	   two	   –	   into	   account	   (Michel	   2013;	  Suganami	  2013,	  253;	  Wight	  2013),	  and	  while	  I	  also	  maintain	  that	  this	  distinction	  does	  not	  make	  sense	   from	  a	  PDT-­‐view46,	   in	   this	   thesis	   I	   occasionally	  use	   these	   terms	  when	   characterizing	   the	  (dualist)	  IR	  and	  IPE	  debates	  in	  their	  difference	  from	  most	  poststructuralist	  understandings.47	  	  	  The	  problem,	  and	  this	  is	  where	  the	  second	  misunderstanding	  emerges,	  is	  that	  the	  differences	  in	  ontological	  or	  theoretical	  premises	  that	  lead	  to	  different	  ways	  of	  asking	  and	  answering	  questions	  are	   mostly	   not	   taken	   into	   account	   or	   even	   not	   realized	   to	   exist	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   leading	   to	  “paradigmatic	   clashes”	   between	   scholars,	  who	   aim	   at	   positing	   a	   specific	   analytical	   perspective	  (and	  specific	  methods	  ‘fitting’	  that	  perspective)	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  all	  others	  (Friedberg	  2005,	  10;	  cf.	  P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2011,	  30).	  Thus,	  in	  the	  debates	  on	  ‘the	  ideational	  versus	  the	  material’,	  the	  crucial	  argument	   that	   for	   instance	   poststructuralists	   problematize	   the	   dichotomy	   between	   ‘ideational	  and	  material	  factors’	  (and	  also:	  ideational	  versus	  discursive)	  as	  it	  is	  commonly	  understood,	  and	  hence	  do	  not	  engage	  in	  debates	  on	  which	  realm	  to	  privilege,	  goes	  largely	  unheard.48	  	  Eschewing	   this	   dichotomy,	   as	   PDT	   does	   as	   I	   will	   lay	   out	   in	   what	   follows,	   means	   to	   go	  ‘beyond’	  this	  divide	  (cf.	  R.	  J.	  Bernstein	  1983).	  In	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe’s	  words:	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  of	  epistemology	  as	  post-­‐Cartesian	  endeavor	  see	  however	  also	  Jackson	  (2011,	  31).	  	  45	  Poststructuralism	  seems	  to	  fall	  out	  of	  Jackson’s	  typology,	  see	  for	  instance	  Sylvester	  (2013,	  312f.).	  46	  As	  argued	  by	  Dirk	  Nabers	  (2015,	  forthcoming),	  from	  a	  poststructuralist	  perspective	  the	  distinction	  between	  monism	  and	  dualism	  can	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  third	  alternative	  ‘beyond	  the	  mind’.	  	  While	   in	   my	   understanding	   Jackson’s	   view	   of	   ‘monism’	   (that	   does	   not	   equal	   ‘idealism’!,	   see	   Jackson	   2011,	   115ff.)	  actually	  points	  to	  the	  same	  direction,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  his	  argument	  that	  for	  ‘monists’	  the	  very	  distinction	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  I	  agree	  with	  Nabers	  on	  the	  point	  that	  Jackson	  seems	  to	  remain	  attached	  to	  an	  emphasis	  on	  ‘the	  mind’	  as	  rational	  capacity	  of	  an	  autonomous	  subject.	  	  	  47	  Another	  problem	  with	  the	  debates	  on	  ‘monism‘	  and	  ‘dualism’	  relates	  to	  apparently	  different	  understandings	  of	  these	  terms:	  while	  Jackson	  for	  instance	  maintains	  that	  ‘monism’	  does	  not	  equal	  ‘idealism’,	  this	  allegation	  is	  frequently	  made	  by	   critical	   realists	   (cf.	   for	   instance	   Suganami	   2013,	   253),	   but	   in	   my	   reading	   for	   instance	   also	   by	   Nabers	   (2015,	  forthcoming).	  	  48	  This	  is	  an	  important	  point	  that	  is	  constantly	  overlooked	  by	  those	  criticizing	  not	  only	  poststructuralists,	  but	  mostly	  post-­‐positivists	   in	   general	   for	   their	   alleged	   ‘idealism’	   and	   their	   ‘failure’	   to	   subject	   their	   research	   to	  procedures	   that	  stem	   from	   thinking	   in	   different,	   i.e.	   positivist	   philosophical	   and	   theoretical	   traditions.	   I	   will	   expand	   on	   this	  misunderstanding	   in	   the	   following	   chapters,	   in	   a	   related	   way	   see	   also	   Jackson	   (Jackson	   2011,	   S.31,	   35f.,	   46)	   and	  Bernstein	  (1983,	  19).	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  “The	   main	   consequence	   of	   a	   break	   with	   the	   discursive/extra-­‐discursive	   dichotomy	   is	   the	  abandonment	   of	   the	   thought/reality	   opposition	   […].	   Rejection	   of	   the	   thought/reality	  dichotomy	  must	   go	   together	   with	   a	   rethinking	   and	   interpretation	   of	   the	   categories	   which	  have	  […]	  been	  considered	  exclusive	  of	  one	  or	  the	  other”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  110).	  	  Going	  beyond	  the	  dichotomy	  has	  important	  consequences	  not	  only	  for	  questions	  of	  methodology	  and	  methods,	  but	  one	  step	  beforehand	  also	  for	  ‘the	  object’	  of	  research	  itself,	  as	  –	  as	  simple	  it	  may	  sound	  –	  post-­‐positivists	  usually	  tend	  to	  ask	  different	  questions	  and	  subsequently	  seek	  to	  answer	  them	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   coherent	   with	   their	   philosophical	   premises	   (Chernoff	   2013,	   361;	   P.	   T.	  Jackson	  2013,	  373;	  cf.	  Michel	  2013,	  277).	  In	  the	  terms	  of	  PDT	  I	  illustrate	  this	  way,	  that	  could	  also	  be	   characterized	   as	   logics	   of	   reconstruction	   instead	   of	   a	   logics	   of	   subsumption	   (cf.	   Herborth	  2011),	   in	   the	  chapters	   two	  and	  three	  on	  theory,	  methodology	  and	  method.49	  In	   this	  context	  my	  aim	   is	   to	   show	   that	   instead	   of	   bridging	   the	   displayed	   gap	   between	   ‘topic’	   and	   ‘ideas’	   related	  research	   by	   invoking	   (neo-­‐positivist	   inspired)	  methods	   as	   a	   ‘middle	   ground’,	   one	   can	   actually	  ‘dissolve’	  it.	  Thus	  I	  problematize	  the	  question	  of	  ‘reality’	  versus	  ‘ideas’	  –	  in	  my	  terms	  ‘discourse’	  –	  respectively	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   PDT	   and	   RPA,	   to	   deal	   with	   what	   Jaqueline	   Best	   and	  Matthew	  Patterson	  summarize	  as	  legacy	  of	  “disembedding”	  economy	  and	  culture50:	  locating	  the	  economy	   on	   the	   ‘reality-­‐side’	   and	   culture	   on	   the	   ‘ideas-­‐side’	   of	   the	   presumed	   divide.	  Consequently	  there	   is	  “	   […]	  a	   lack	  of	  politics	   in	  cultural	  economy	  debates,	  a	   lack	  of	  economy	  in	  culturally	   inflected	   international/political	   theory	  and	  a	   lack	  of	   culture	   in	   international	  political	  economy”	  (Best	  and	  Patterson	  2010,	  3).	  	  
	  Chapters	   four	   to	   seven	   encompass	   the	   discourse	   analysis	   conducted	   on	   the	   years	   around	   the	  selected	  events,	  addressing	  the	  major	  topics	  of	  the	  economic	  discourses	  on	  Japan	  and	  China,	  and	  structured	   along	   the	   analytical	   categories	   derived	   from	   RPA	   (i.e.	   nominations,	   predications,	  argumentations,	  perspectivations,	   intensifications	  and	  mitigations)	  read	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  theoretical	   framework	   and	   connecting	   them	   to	   the	   key	   concepts	   of	   PDT.	   The	   two	  main	   topics	  discerned	   from	   the	   textual	   material	   are	   the	   trade	   deficits	   with	   Japan	   and	   China,	   and	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  To	  put	   it	   in	  a	   simple	  way	  one	  can	  point	   to	   the	  distinction	   that	   is	   commonly	  drawn	  between	   ‘positivist’	   and	   ‘post-­‐positivist’	   research:	   positivists	   engage	   themselves	   in	   answering	   ‘why’-­‐questions,	   whereas	   post-­‐positivists	   are	  interested	  in	  ‘how	  possible’-­‐questions	  (cf.	  Doty	  1993,	  298).	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  how	  these	  terms	  are	  used	  in	  the	  field	  of	  IR	  see	  (P.	  T.	   Jackson	  2011,	  36;	  Wight	  2007,	  24ff.).	  On	   ‘what’	  and	  ‘how’-­‐	  questions	  see	  also	  Ashley	  (1989,	  281)	  and	  Doty	  (1996,	  4).	  Furthermore	  and	  importantly,	  for	  instance	  Sylvester	  and	  Suganami	  point	  out	  that	  the	  ‘choice’	  of	  question	  is	  not	  only	   linked	   to	  ones	  philosophical	  or	   theoretical	  view	  (which	   Jackson	  calls	  a	  matter	  of	   faith),	  but	   that	   it	   is	  also	  a	  matter	  of	  (political,	  ethical	  etc.)	  judgement	  and	  purpose	  (Humphreys	  2013,	  307f.;	  Suganami	  2013,	  268;	  Sylvester	  2013,	  314),	  which	   is	  a	  point	   Jackson	  misses	  or	   tends	   to	  bracket	   in	   line	  with	  his	  (Weberian)	  understanding	  of	  a	  separation	  between	  ‘facts’	  and	  ‘values’	  (cf.	  Jackson	  2011,	  145).	  50	  “Culture”	  referring	  to	  the	  ‘cultural	  turn’,	  thus	  focusing	  on	  topics	  such	  as	  identity	  and	  difference,	  meaning,	  language	  etc.	  and	  questioning	  or	  problematizing	  dualism	  (cf.	  Best	  and	  Patterson	  2010,	  10).	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potential	  consequences	  for	  the	  U.S.	  role	  as	  global	  political	  and	  economic	  leader	  and	  role	  model.	  	  The	  summary	  of	  the	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  main	  findings	  from	  the	  chapters	  four	  to	  seven,	  while	  the	   conclusion	  brings	   them	   together	  with	   the	  approach	   situated	   in	   the	   field	  of	   IR	  and	   IPE,	   and	  picking	   up	   what	   was	   laid	   out	   in	   chapters	   one	   to	   three.	   Furthermore,	   the	   conclusion	   also	  addresses	  limitations	  of	  the	  present	  study	  and	  proposes	  trajectories	  for	  future	  research.	  Finally	  it	  provides	  an	  outlook	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  (economic)	  relations	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  major	  findings	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  
1.	  STATE	  OF	  THE	  ART	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   my	   aim	   is	   to	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   existing	   scholarship	   on	   U.S.-­‐Japanese	  economic	  relations	  (1.1),	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  economic	  relations	  (1.2),	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  (1.3),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  study	  of	  identity,	  ideas	  and	  discourse	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE	  (1.4),	  in	  connection	  to	  the	  main	  questions	  in	  this	  dissertation	  pertaining	  to	  U.S.	  identity	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  Japan	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  China.	  As	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  while	  some	  literature	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  economic	  relations	  provides	  connecting	  points	  to	  my	  research	  interests,	  questions	  and	  approach,	  for	  the	  case	  of	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations,	  if	  at	  all,	  this	  is	  rather	  the	  case	  with	  works	  laying	  their	  focus	  beyond	  the	  economic	  realm.	  When	  it	  comes	   in	  turn	  to	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	   liberal	  theory	   of	   history,	   their	   role	   has	   been	   more	   directly	   addressed	   for	   U.S.-­‐China	   policies	   (again,	  beyond	   the	   economic	   field),	   than	   for	   U.S.-­‐Japan	   policies.	   In	   the	   last	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   I	  discuss	  the	  concepts	  of	  identity,	  ideas	  and	  discourses	  in	  connection	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  and	  U.S.-­‐China	  (economic)	  policies,	  but	  also	  going	  beyond	  those	  fields,	  as	  these	  concepts	  are	  then	  picked	  up	  from	  a	  PDT	  perspective	  in	  chapter	  two.	  	  	  
1.1.	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  Economic	  Relations	  	  Scholarship	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  economic	  relations,	  especially	  concerning	   trade,	  during	   the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  is	  plentiful	  (for	  an	  overview	  see	  for	  example	  Uriu	  2009,	  35).	  In	  this	  context,	  there	  also	  exists	  a	  body	  of	  work	  dealing	  with	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  trade	  frictions	  would	  evolve	  into	  a	  security/military	   competition	   (for	   overviews	   see	   for	   example	   Berger	   1993;	   Gilpin	   1989;	  Mastanduno	   1991).	   In	   this	   sense	   Thomas	   Berger	   (1993,	   122)	   for	   example	   criticizes	   the	  ‘inevitability’	   ascribed	   to	   Japan	   seeking	   a	   greater	   military	   role	   following	   from	   its	   economic	  growth	  (see	  also	  the	  footnote	  on	  power-­‐transition	  theory	  and	  China	  in	  chapter	  1.2,	  as	  well	  as	  the	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analysis	   in	  chapters	   four	   to	  seven).	  While	  however	   in	  general	  quite	  many,	   if	  not	  most	  scholars,	  take	  a	  rather	  ‘topic-­‐oriented’	  or	  policy-­‐focused	  approach,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  studies	  already	  pointing	  towards	  the	  direction	  aimed	  at	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  	  The	   central	   works	   in	   this	   respect	   are	   Hardtwig	   Hummel’s	   studies	   on	   what	   he	   calls	   a	  “revisionist	  discourse”	  on	  Japan	  in	  terms	  of	  ethnicity	  and	  identity	  in	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  trade	  relations	  (Hummel	  1997b)51,	  and	  his	  study	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  trade	  conflicts	  and	  their	  meaning	  for	  and	  impact	  on	  understandings	   and	   conceptualizations	  of	   ‘the	  West’	   and	  a	   liberal	  world	  order	   from	  the	   mid	   1980s	   onwards	   (Hummel	   2000).	   Hummel	   locates	   his	   study	   within	   critical	   IR-­‐theory	  specifically	  referring	  to	  the	  works	  of	  Robert	  Cox	  and	  Stephen	  Gill,	  his	  stated	  aim	  being	  to	  relate	  their	   theory	   to	   discourse	   analysis	   (Hummel	   2000,	   70).	   While	   Hummel	   points	   out	   that	   Cox	  explicitly	  distanced	  himself	  from	  “postmodern	  deconstruction”,	  he	  himself	  does	  not	  take	  a	  crystal	  clear	   position	   in	   this	   respect,	   while	   referring	   to	   Michael	   Foucault’s	   archeological	   discourse	  analysis	  in	  what	  he	  calls	  his	  “interpretation	  according	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  hermeneutic	  circle”	  (2000,	   67–72).	  52	  Hummel	   conducts	   a	   discourse	   analysis	   on	   the	   theoretical	   debates	   in	   the	  discipline	   of	   IR	   on	   the	   topic	   of	   “the	  Western	   (OECD)	   community”,	   as	  well	   as	   on	   U.S.-­‐Japanese	  trade	  conflicts,	  by	  analyzing	  the	  influence	  of	  revisionist	  thinking	  on	  the	  elite-­‐discourses	  in	  both	  countries,	   as	   they	   figured	   in	   the	   journals	   Foreign	  Affairs	   and	  Kokusai	  Mondai	   (2000,	   27f.).	   His	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  For	  a	  concise	  review	  of	  the	  central	   literature	  (until	  1997)	  see	  Hummel	  1997a:	  6ff.	  He	  also	  points	  out,	  that	  most	  of	  these	   studies	   lack	  a	   systematic	   treatment	  and	  contextualization	  of	   revisionism,	  as	  well	   as	  an	  analysis	  of	   its	  political	  significance.	  	  	  52	  To	  briefly	  at	  this	  point	  clarify	  the	  central	  differences	  in	  the	  terms	   ‘postmodernism’	  and	   ‘poststructuralism’	  as	  they	  are	   understood	   in	   this	   dissertation	   (I	   will	   further	   engage	   with	   poststructuralism	   in	   chapter	   two,	   see	   also	   in	   what	  follows	  on	  differentiating	  poststructuralism	  from	  ‘constructivism’	  in	  chapter	  1.4)	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  their	  conflation	  as	  often	  happens	  in	  the	  literature:	  When	  discussing	  different	  approaches	  in	  IR	  literature,	  very	  often	  ‘poststructuralism’	  is	  subsumed	   under	   ‘postmodern	   approaches’	   and	   this	   is	   mostly	   accompanied	   by	   criticisms	   of	   the	   alleged	   ‘fluidity’	   of	  	  poststructuralism	   leading	   to	   an	   ‘anything	   goes’	   (cf.	   Howarth	   2013,	   57,	   62),	   that	   ultimately	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	  ‘science’	  (see	  these	  allegations	  for	  instance	  by	  Peter	  Katzenstein,	  Robert	  Keohane	  and	  Stephen	  Krasner	  cited	  in	  Hansen	  (2006,	   4)	   and	  Milliken	   (1999),	   see	   also	   Fierke	   (2003,	   69f.)	  On	   the	   ‘science-­‐question’	  more	   broadly	   see	  P.T.	   Jackson	  (2011,	   128,	   135ff.,	   196,	   3–23).	   In	   this	   understanding	   postmodernism	   is	   taken	   to	   assume	   a	   temporal	   break	   with	  ‘modernity’	  and	  its	  ‘achievements’	  such	  as	  technological	  and	  scientific	  innovation,	  in	  terms	  of	  constituting	  a	  new	  epoch.	  However,	   this	   was	   not	   the	   case	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   its	   proponents	   (Der	   Derian	   1988,	   189;	   cf.	   Der	   Derian	   and	  Shapiro	  1989,	   x).	  Rather,	   postmodernism	   in	   literature,	   art,	   architecture	   and	  music	  was	   an	   approach	   trying	   to	  make	  sense	  of	  and	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	   ‘modernism’	  or	  modernist	  culture	  after	  the	  experiences	  of	  WWII,	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  globalization.	  Postsructuralism	  in	  turn	  could	  be	  specified	  in	  relation	  to	  postmodernism	  as	  an	  ‘interpretive	   analytic’	   that	   seeks	   to	   critically	   engage	   with	   the	   production	   and	   implications	   of	   these	   ‘postmodern’	  cultural,	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  transformations	  of	  modernity,	  by	  neither	  taking	  a	  clear	  stance	  within	  or	  external	  
to	  modernity,	  as	  it	  attempts	  to	  comprehend	  modernity	  in	  its	  historicity,	  as	  a	  “historical	  attitude”	  (cf.	  Ashley	  1989,	  260,	  271	   emphasis	   added).	   Thus	   poststructuralism	   is	   no	   ‘anti-­‐science’	   (cf.	   Der	   Derian	   1989,	   7),	   but	   it	   questions	   the	  positivist	  account	  of	  science	  based	  on	  epistemic	  realism,	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  universal	  scientific	  language	  and	  method,	  and	  the	  correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth	  (meaning	  that	  statements	  on	  the	  ‘facts	  of	  the	  world’	  are	  true	  if	  they	  correspond	  to	  these	  ‘facts’).	  For	  poststructuralism	  in	  turn	  all	  inquiry	  “has	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  social	  constitution	  of	  meaning,	  the	  linguistic	  construction	  of	  reality,	  and	  the	  historicity	  of	  knowledge”	  (cf.	  Campbell	  2010,	  219–222	  emphases	  added;	  see	  also	  Hansen	  2006,	  3–5).	  In	  this	  sense	  David	  Howarth	  “rejects	  the	  view	  that	  [postsructuralism]	  constitutes	  a	  specific	  paradigm	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   […]”,	   but	  he	  understands	   it	   as	   “a	  particular	   style	  of	  theorizing,	   and	   a	   specific	  way	   of	  doing	   social	   and	   political	   theory,	   which	   is	   informed	   by	   a	   distinctive	   ethos	   […	   that]	   is	   rooted	   in	   a	   particular	   set	   of	  ontological	  presuppositions	  […]	  as	  well	  as	  a	  particular	  methodological	  orientation”(Howarth	  2013,	  6,	  64).	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main	   findings	   are	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   an	   “OECD-­‐peace”	   and	   the	   West	   as	   community	   of	   liberal,	  capitalist,	  industrialized	  countries	  –	  the	  “hegemony	  of	  the	  liberal	  world	  order”	  –	  was	  destabilized	  above	  all	   through	  the	  debates	  on	  regionalism	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s.	   In	   line	  with	  the	  (historical	   materialist)	   premises	   of	   Cox	   and	   Gill,	   Hummel	   inquires	   into	   the	   question	   whether	  there	  were	   attempts	   at	   reconstructing	   this	   hegemony	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   “neoliberal	   globalization”	  (2000,	  305–307).	  From	  his	  examples	  of	  IR-­‐debates	  and	  of	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  trade	  conflicts	  –	  that	  he	  considers	  as	  an	   indicator	   for	   frictions	  at	   the	  “predetermined	  braking	  point	   [Sollbruchstelle]”	  of	  the	  Western	  community	  –	  he	  concludes	  that:	  “the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  liberal	  world	  order	  has	  been	  restored	   with	   no	   fragmentation	   of	   the	   OECD-­‐region	   (as	   a	   region	   of	   peace)	   in	   sight”.	   Hummel	  argues	  that	  this	  was	  due	  to	  the	  “discursive	  construction	  of	  reality”	  in	  terms	  of	  making	  “neoliberal	  globalization	  a	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  point	  of	  reference	  in	  the	  debates	  on	  world	  order”.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  discourse	  on	  “open	  regionalism”,	  as	  developed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  APEC-­‐process,	  revisionist	  and	  geo-­‐economic	  arguments	  were	  reinterpreted	  –	  and	  thus	  alleviated	  –	  through	  and	  in	  line	  with	  this	  modified	  liberal	  perspective	  (2000,	  308–310).	  	  	  	  Contrary	   to	   Hummel,	   Gearóid	   Ó	   Tuathail	   (writing	   on	   and	   at	   an	   earlier	   point	   in	   time	  though)	  argues	  that	  geo-­‐economic	  discourses	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  with	  their	  “declinist	  view	  of	  the	  American	   system,	   [the]	   revisionist	   view	   of	   Japan	   and	   [the]	   neo-­‐mercantilist	   view	   of	   economic	  activity”	  appear	  “to	  threaten	  the	  continued	  ideological	  hegemony	  of	  transnational	  liberalism	  into	  the	  1990s”,	  as	  they	  already	  shaped	  trade	  policy	  with	  Japan	  at	  that	  time.	  However,	  he	  leaves	  the	  question	  open	  as	   to	  whether	  geo-­‐economics	  would	  amount	   to	  a	  new	  “social	  philosophy”	   in	   the	  future	   (Tuathail	   1993,	   203–204).	   Tuathail,	   as	   well	   in	   line	   with	   critical	   theory53,	   considers	  revisionism	  in	  this	  context	  as	  potential	  challenge	  to	  “transnational	  liberalism	  in	  American	  policy	  formulation”,	   by	   studying	   “arguments	   made	   by	   public	   intellectuals	   in	   American	   civil	   society	  between	  1987	  and	  1991	  on	  the	  USA-­‐Japan	  relationship;	  in	  policy	  journals,	  […]	  business	  books,	  […]	  affairs	   magazines”	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   this	   set	   of	   discourses	   (1993,	   182).	   He	  defines	  geo-­‐economics	  “empirically	  as	  specific	  historical	  discourses	  about	  commerce,	  technology,	  capital,	  markets,	  resources	  and	  competitiveness	  in	  political	  and	  civil	  society	  that	  seek	  to	  provide	  a	   normative	   philosophy	   for	   state	   action”	   (1993,	   183).	   Tuathail	   explicitly	   does	   not	   study	   “[t]he	  politics	  of	  writing	  identity	  in	  the	  public	  discourse	  of	  political	  economy”,	  although	  he	  considers	  it	  an	  important	  aspect	  (1993,	  205	  FN	  3).	  	  David	  Campbell	  in	  turn	  addresses	  the	  ‘politics	  of	  identity’	  by	  examining	  “the	  discourse	  of	  danger	  surrounding	  Japan”	  by	  the	  1990s,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  “what	  the	  problematization	  of	  Japan	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  For	  disagreements	  between	  proponents	  of	  critical	  theory,	  critical	  geography	  and	  poststructuralism	  in	  IR	  see	  e.g.	  the	  exchange	  around	  Tuathail’s	  review	  essay	  on	  David	  Campbell	  (Dalby	  1996;	  Tuathail	  1996a,	  1996b),	  see	  also	  Hummel	  (2000,	  67).	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a	   national	   security	   threat	   says	   about	   the	   United	   States”.	   For	   that	   purpose	   he	   aims	   at	  reconceptualizing	  foreign	  policy	  in	  terms	  of	  meaning	  and	  identity,	  in	  other	  words	  shedding	  light	  on	   the	   “discursive	  economy	  of	   identity/difference	   to	   the	   formulation	  and	   interpretation	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	   policy”	   (Campbell	   1994,	   148).	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Japan,	   Campbell	   points	   to	   the	   central	  arguments	  pertaining	  to	  a	  ‘Japanese	  threat’:	  the	  bilateral	  trade	  deficit	  as	  result	  of	  unfair	  practices	  and	  closed	   Japanese	  markets,	   Japanese	   foreign	   investment	   in	   the	  U.S.	   as	  a	   ‘buyout’	  while	  again	  keeping	  the	  Japanese	  markets	  closed,	  leading	  to	  the	  overall	  revisionist	  argument	  of	  Japan	  being	  ‘different’	   (1994,	  151ff.).	  Campbell	   takes	  these	  arguments	  not	   to	  be	  descriptions	  of	  an	   inherent	  and	   unproblematic	   “reality	   of	   the	   situation”,	   but	   rather	   as	   driven	   by	   “the	   entailments	   of	   [U.S.]	  identity”	   (1994,	   157).	   In	   general,	   he	   considers	   the	   major	   political	   challenge	   to	   reside	   not	   in	  addressing	   the	   specifics	   of	   the	   ‘single	   case’	   of	   Japan	   as	   a	   threat,	   but	   “to	   address	   the	   process	  whereby	   the	   subjectivity	   of	   the	  United	   States	   is	   continually	   in	  hock	   to	   strategies	   of	   otherness”	  (1994,	   166).54	  I	   come	   back	   to	   his	   work	   in	   what	   follows,	   and	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   analysis	   in	  chapter	  four	  to	  seven.	  In	  a	  more	  extensive	  study	  Narrelle	  Morris	  inquires	  into	  what	  she	  calls	  the	  term	  or	  label,	  as	   well	   as	   practice	   of	   “Japan-­‐bashing”	   and	   its	   connection	   to	   historical	   images	   of	   Japan	   within	  specific	   discourses	   in	   the	  West	   (i.e.	   in	   her	   study	   the	   U.S.	   and	   Australia)	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   the	  1990s	  –	  among	  others	  the	  revisionist	  one.	  Referring	  to	  Campbell’s	  article	  she	  also	  points	  out,	  that	  “contemporary	  anti-­‐Japanese	  views	  were	  often	  shaped	  far	  more	  by	  Western	  thinking	  about	  the	  world	  than	  by	  developments	  in	  contemporary	  Japan	  itself”,	  as	  well	  as	  (in	  the	  U.S.)	  by	  an	  attempt	  to	  preserve	  ‘the	  self’	  as	  ‘universal’	  (see	  chapter	  1.4,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  analysis	  on	  the	  ‘universality’	  of	  the	   self).	   In	   her	   view	   it	  were	   the	   Japanese	   responses	   to	   ‘Japan	   bashing’	   though,	  which	   helped	  transform	   it	   into	   an	   international	   discourse	   (e.g.	   the	   Japanese	   ‘America	   bashing’	   that	   in	   turn	  reinforced	  ‘Japan	  bashing’).	  In	  line	  with	  Hummel	  she	  diagnoses	  a	  decline	  in	  ‘Japan	  bashing’	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1990ies,	  due	  to	  Japan’s	  economic	  problems	  but	  also	  to	  the	  shifting	  of	  the	  focus	  to	  China	  (N.	  Morris	   2010,	   137f.).	   Furthermore,	   Morris	   emphasizes	   the	   proliferation	   of	   the	   concept	   (and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54I	  also	  come	  back	  to	  this	  assessment	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  discourse	  analysis,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  conclusion,	  while	   also	   dealing	   with	   the	   question	   of	   ‘necessary	   strategies	   of	   otherness’	   in	   the	   chapters	   1.3,	   1.4	   and	   2	   (cf.	   also	  Herschinger	   2011,	   29ff.).	   On	   the	   U.S.	   and	   ‘otherness’	   and	   implications	   for	   foreign	   policy	   see	   the	   edited	   volume	   by	  Cullinane	  and	  Ryan	  and	  their	  introduction	  to	  it	  (2015),	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  chapters	  cited	  in	  what	  follows.	  	  Furthermore,	  for	  instance	  Benjamin	  Herborth	  (at	  a	  Master	  Class	  given	  at	  the	  GIGA	  German	  Institute	  of	  Global	  and	  Area	  Studies	   in	  November	  2012)	  has	  criticized	  Campbell’s	  work	   for	  what	  he	  termed	  “postmodern	  empiricism”	  of	  a	  single	  case	  study,	  as	  he	  is	  basically	  engaging	  in	  what	  could	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  structuralist	  argument	  about	  the	  seemingly	  sedimented	  identity	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  which	  does	  not	  change	  while	  it	  is	  encountering	  different	  ‘others’	  (cf.	  also	  Milliken	  1999,	  246ff.).	   For	   these	   reasons	   it	   is	   important	   to	   also	   focus	   on	   the	   ‘inner	   differences’	   within	   the	   U.S.,	   as	   well	   as	   their	  evolution	  over	  time,	  as	  I	  will	  expand	  on	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  congressional	  debates.	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practice)	  of	  ‘bashing’	  beyond	  Japan,	  for	  instance	  ‘France-­‐bashing’	  in	  the	  U.S.	  during	  the	  Iraq	  war	  2003/04,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ongoing	  ‘China-­‐bashing’	  (2010,	  140).	  	  Finally,	  Masao	  Miyoshi	   in	   turn	  examines	   ‘bashing’	   in	   the	  U.S.	  and	   in	   Japan	  “as	  a	   form	  of	  cultural	   criticism”	   by	   attempting	   “to	   link	   specific	   trade	   and	   industrial	   policy	   and	   development	  directly	   with	   cultural	   imaginaries”	   and	   “cross	   over,	   if	   not	   clear	   away,	   the	   boundaries	   that	  apparently	   lie	  between	   the	  economical	  and	   the	  cultural	   in	  many	  critics’	  minds”	   (Miyoshi	  1991,	  64).	   He	   argues	   for	   inscribing	   trade	   negotiations	   with	   a	   historical	   understanding	   of	   societal	  differences	  and	  how	  they	  came	  about	  (1991,	  80),	  for	  instance	  the	  connection	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  open	  markets	  to	  the	  Enlightenment	  notions	  of	  universal	  citizenship,	  civil	  society	  “and	  the	  modernist	  ideology	  of	  democracy”	  (I	  come	  back	  to	  these	  aspects	  in	  the	  chapter	  1.4),	  while	  in	  practice	  trade	  on	  behalf	  of	  ‘the	  West’	  has	  actually	  never	  been	  totally	  ‘fair	  and	  open’	  (1991,	  94).	  	  	  Furthermore,	   revisionism	   is	   treated	   in	   several	   works	   on	   U.S.	   economic	   policy	   towards	  Japan,	  Robert	  Uriu’s	  one	  –	  in	  which	  he	  also	  reflects	  briefly	  on	  the	  shifting	  of	  the	  focus	  from	  Japan	  to	  China	   (Uriu	  2009,	   243f.)	   –	   probably	  providing	   one	  of	   the	  most	   detailed	   and	   comprehensive	  accounts	   of	   the	   ‘revisionist	   turn’	   in	   U.S.	   Japan	   policy.	   He	   summarizes	   revisionism55	  into	   the	  following	   three	   major	   assumptions:	   (1)	   that	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   was	   inherently	   closed,	  meaning	   being	   protected	   by	   tariff-­‐,	   and	   more	   importantly,	   non-­‐tariff-­‐barriers	   like	   state	  regulations	  and	  economic	  practices;	  (2)	  that	  the	  Japanese	  economy	  exemplified	  a	  unique	  form	  of	  capitalism,	  so	  that	  liberalizing	  market	  rules	  and	  processes	  would	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  increased	  imports	  to	  Japan;	  (3)	  that	  the	  Japanese	  economic	  system	  was	  adversarial	  and	  a	  threat,	  as	  it	  was	  planned	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  industrial	  dominance	  by	  undermining	  its	  foreign	  competitors,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  maximize	  economic	  power	  as	  general	   ‘source’	  of	  power.	  The	  revisionist	  policy	  prescriptions	  for	  the	  U.S.	   following	  from	  these	  assumptions	  were	  to	   first	  recognize	  Japan	  as	   ‘different,	  closed	  and	   threatening’,	   to	   meet	   the	   economic	   challenge	   by	   emulating	   Japanese	   institutions	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  The	  ‘beginning’	  of	  the	  revisionist	  discourse	  in	  the	  U.S.	  is	  commonly	  attributed	  to	  the	  article	  The	  Danger	  from	  Japan	  by	  Theodore	  H.	  White	  (cf.	  Hummel	  and	  Menzel	  2001,	  58;	  T.	  H.	  White	  1985),	  in	  which	  he	  recalls	  the	  defeat	  of	  Japan	  in	  WWII,	  but	  argues	  that	  because	  of	  Japan’s	  “most	  brilliant	  commercial	  offensives”	  the	  U.S.	  could	  not	  know	  whether	  it	  had	  actually	   really	  won	   the	  war.	  The	  whole	   article	   is	  written	   in	   ‘war	   rhetoric’,	   as	   for	   example:	   “The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  provides	  the	  launching	  pad	  from	  which	  MITI	  directs	  the	  guided	  missiles	  of	  the	  trade	  offensive”.	  Furthermore,	  Japan	  is	  called	   a	   “locked	   and	   closed	   civilization”.	   The	   article	   closes	  with	   calling	   on	   Japan	   to	   remember	  what	   followed	   Pearl	  Harbor:	  their	  defeat	  in	  WWII.	  For	   revisionist	   thinking	  outside	  of	   the	  U.S.	   see	  Gilpin	   (2003,	  299).	   It	   should	  be	  noted,	  however,	   that	  although	   in	  his	  book-­‐chapter	   Gilpin	   sets	   out	   to	   assess	   the	   “conflicting	   explanations	   of	   the	   American-­‐Japanese	   trade	   conflict”	   –	   the	  explanations	  by	  the	  revisionists	  and	  those	  by	  neoclassical	  economists	  –	  he	  himself	  seems	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  revisionist	  arguments	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  essentializing	  view	  about	  Japan	  as	  a	  people,	  a	  society	  and	  its	  economy.	  See	  for	  example	  the	  passage	  on	  “The	  Japanese	  System	  of	  Collective	  Capitalism”	  which	  ends	  with	  the	  sentences:	  “These	  fundamental	  goals	  undoubtedly	   reflect	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Japanese	   are	   as	   much	   a	   race	   as	   a	   nation.	   However,	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   Japan	  increases	   the	   difficulties	   of	   integrating	   that	   dynamic	   and	   important	   nation	   into	   the	   larger	   world	   economy”	   (Gilpin	  2003,	  300,	  306–308).	  See	  also	  Gilpin’s	  assessment	  of	  Japan	  in	  his	  earlier	  writings,	  such	  as	  Gilpin	  (1987,	  i.e.	  377ff.).	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practices,	  and	  finally	  and	  more	  concretely,	  to	  pursue	  numerical	  targets	  for	  gaining	  access	  to	  the	  Japanese	  market	  (Uriu	  2009,	  17).56	  	  Uriu	  stresses	  his	  aim	   to	  analyze	   revisionism	  within	  a	   framework	  of	   conceptualizing	   the	  impact	  of	  “nonmaterial	  variables	  –	  new	  policy	  ideas	  –	  to	  explain	  changes	  in	  interests	  and	  policy	  choices”,	  and	  he	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  the	  “revisionist	  idea”	  of	  Japan	  being	  different,	  adversarial	  and	  closed	   that	   led	   to	   the	   significant	   change	   in	   Japan	   policy	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   Clinton	  administration	  (Uriu	  2000,	  214,	  221,	  2009).	  Uriu’s	  approach	  is	  quite	  characteristic	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  ‘ideas’	  are	  most	  commonly	  treated	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE,	  I	  address	  this	  issue	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  what	  follows	   in	   this	   chapter	   under	   1.4.	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   from	   a	   discourse	   theoretical	   perspective	   Uriu	  stops	  short	  of	  where	  it	  becomes	  ‘edgy’:	  in	  his	  treatment	  of	  revisionism	  as	  “policy	  assumption”	  –	  a	  ‘non-­‐material	   variable’	   –	   he	   traces	   its	   influence	   through	   attributing	   this	   policy	   assumption	   to	  certain	   actors	   whose	   central	   or	   crucial	   role	   then	   explains	   or	   accounts	   for	   the	   impact	   of	  revisionism	   within	   the	   Clinton-­‐administration	   (Uriu	   2009,	   10).57	  Apart	   from	   regarding	   the	  treatment	  of	  ideas	  as	  ‘variable’	  as	  conceptually	  too	  narrow	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  my	  approach	  (cf.	   Howarth	   2013,	   233),	   in	   my	   eyes	   this	   explanation	   does	   not	   go	   far	   enough,	   as	   it	   lacks	   the	  component	   of	   how	   this	   assumption	   was	   actually	   brought	   forward/articulated	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  being	  articulated/practiced	  by	  its	  proponents	  in	  a	  way	  that	  rendered	  other	  ‘ideas’	  less	  plausible	  and	   ultimately	   unthinkable,	   in	   other	   words	   how	   the	   ‘idea’	   of	   revisionism	   became	   hegemonic	  in/through	  concrete	  practice.	  This	  is	  where	  a	  discourse	  analysis	  can	  shed	  light	  on.58	  	  Considering	   further	   seminal	   works	   on	   U.S.-­‐Japanese	   (economic)	   relations,	   whereas	  Leonard	  Schoppa	   treats	   the	  question	  of	   the	  effect	  of	  U.S.	  negotiation	  strategies	  with	   Japan,	  and	  Gerald	  Curtis	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Japan	  from	  Nixon	  to	  Clinton,	  they	  both	  come	  close	  to	  Uriu’s	  assessments	  with	  respect	   to	  the	  role	  of	  revisionist	   influence	  on	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	   Japan	   (Curtis	   2000,	   1–39;	   Schoppa	   1997,	   69f.).	   In	   his	   study	   on	   “the	   rise	   and	   fall	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  For	   tracing	   the	   roots	   of	   revisionism	   into	   earlier	   periods	   see	   i.e.	   Uriu	   (2009,	   24–59),	   N.	   Morris	   (2010,	   35–45),	  Hummel	   (2000,	   161–172).	   The	   ‘Gang	   of	   Four’	   themselves,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   clarify	   their	   stance	   against	   what	   they	  perceived	  as	  a	  distorted	  view	  of	  their	  positions,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  “visceral	  antagonism	  toward	  Japan”,	  pointed	  to	  six	   essential	   elements	  of	   revisionism:	   (1)	   the	  view	  of	   the	  unbalanced	  economic	  and	   industrial	   relationship	  between	  Japan	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  world	  trading	  system	  and	  the	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  political	  relationship;	  (2)	  the	  Western	  misperception	  of	  Japan	  ultimately	  evolving	  toward	  a	  consumer-­‐driven,	  individualist	  system	  like	  the	  U.S.;	  (3)	  the	   view	   of	   Japan	   being	   different	   from	   the	  Western	  model	   of	   democratic	   capitalism,	  without	   necessarily	   signifying	  unfairness;	   (4)	   this	   difference	   would	   not	   mean	   that	   Japan	   would	   never	   change,	   but	   most	   probably	   slower	   than	  generally	   expected	   by	   the	   U.S.;	   (5)	   against	   a	   U.S.	   ‘aversion’	   towards	   “industrial	   policy”	   or	   “managed	   trade”,	   as	  technically	   all	   major	   countries	   engaged	   in	   these	   practices;	   (6)	   the	   U.S.	   bears	   itself	   the	   major	   responsibility	   for	  correcting	  these	  trends	  (Fallows	  et	  al.	  1990).	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Uriu	   defines	   policy	   assumptions	   as	   “prior	   accepted	   beliefs	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   a	   policy	   issue	   and	   the	   interests	  involved	  in	  that	  issue”,	  thus	  “a	  more	  concrete,	  tangible,	  and	  visible	  manifestation	  of	  ideas	  or	  beliefs”	  (Uriu	  2009,	  10).	  58	  Importantly,	  if	  speaking	  of	  ideas	  from	  a	  poststructralist	  perspective	  (while	  in	  what	  follows	  it	  will	  become	  clear	  why	  I	  speak	  of	  discourse	  instead	  of	  ideas)	  they	  are	  not	  understood	  as	   ‘causing’	  or	  forming	  behavior,	  but	  as	  “product	  of	  the	  discursive	  structure	  in	  which	  ‘agents’	  are	  embedded”	  (Nabers	  2015,	  forthcoming).	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America’s	  results-­‐oriented	  market	  access	  policy	  towards	  Japan”,	  John	  Kunkel	  in	  turn	  argues	  that	  its	  roots	  could	  be	  found	  in	  a	  crisis	  in	  “the	  institutions,	  laws	  and	  norms	  of	  American	  trade	  policy	  in	  the	   first	  half	  of	   the	  1980ies”,	  which	  was	   then	   leading	   to	  an	  aggressive	  policy	  after	  1985	  and	   in	  turn	  paving	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  revisionist	  arguments	  (Kunkel	  2003,	  4–7).	  Still,	   in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  study	  of	  revisionism	  there	  remain	  open	  questions,	  as	  for	  example	  on	  the	  differences	  between	  the	   economic	   arguments	   of	   the	   revisionists	   and	   the	  more	   general	   ones	   concerning	   the	   future	  ‘world	   order’,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   question	   since	   when	   economic	   relations	   were	   considered	   as	   an	  aspect	   relevant	   to	   national	   security	   issues	   (cf.	   Curtis	   2000,	   21),	   or	   in	   how	   far	   there	   was	   a	  convergence	  between	  economic	  and	  security	  matters	  (Otte	  and	  Grimes	  1993,	  131).59	  The	  shift	  of	  U.S.	  attention	  from	  Japan	  to	  China	  is	  commonly	  attributed	  to	  the	  rising	  Chinese	  and	  the	  declining	  Japanese	   economy	   (Bob	  2001,	   95;	   cf.	   Curtis	   2000,	   32;	  Kunkel	   2003,	   197f.)	   –	   	   only	  Uriu	  briefly	  considers	   other	   factors	   such	   as	   a	   ‘Japan	   fatigue’	  within	   the	   Clinton	   administration	  (Uriu	   2009,	  240)	  –	  however	  without	  any	  attempt	  of	  a	  more	  thoroughgoing	  inquiry	  into	  this	  issue.60	  	  Whereas	  these	  examples	  of	  not	  only	  discourse	  analytical	  approaches	  towards	  the	  study	  of	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	   (economic)	   relations	   provide	   connecting	   points	   to	   my	   approach	   –	   while	   remaining	  focused	   on	   their	   ‘single	   cases’	   –	   this,	  with	   a	   few	   exceptions,	   can	   only	   partly	   be	   said	   about	   the	  literature	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  (economic)	  relations	  themselves.	  Apparently	  at	  least	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  scholars	  have	  not	  gotten	  from	  analyzing	  ‘the	  Rise	  of	  China’	  to	  taking	  a	  step	  back	  and	  inquiring	  into	  the/their	  ways	  of	  articulating	  and	  analyzing	  ‘the	  Rise’	  of	  China	  (see	  also	  Khong	  2014;	  cf.	  Pan	  2012	  and	  to	  some	  extent;	  Turner	  2014	  as	  a	  notable	  exceptions),61	  let	  alone	  taking	  into	  account	  a	  broader	  historical	  perspective	  yet,62	  although	  the	  ‘phenomenon’	  itself	  is	  already	  credited	  as	  being	  ‘historical’	   (Kristof	   1993)	   and	   “one	   of	   the	   greatest	   economic	   success	   stories	   in	  modern	   times”	  (Morrison	  2014,	  1),	  which	  was	  also	  said	  about	  Japan	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  (see	  introduction).	  In	   what	   follows,	   I	   first	   briefly	   discuss	   the	   prevalent	   approaches	   and	   then	   proceed	   to	   the	  discourse-­‐oriented	  ones,	  while	   linking	   them	  to	   the	  study	  of	  discourses,	   ideas	  and	   identity	   in	   IR	  and	  IPE	  more	  broadly,	  and	  then	  picking	  up	  these	  issues	  in	  chapter	  1.4.	  




1.2.	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  Economic	  Relations	  	  The	  majority	  of	  IR-­‐research	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations	  since	  the	  1990s	  is	  focusing	  on	  the	  question	  of	   a	   potential	   ‘power	   shift’	   from	   the	   U.S.	   to	   China,	   and	   –	   as	   it	   is	   mostly	   taken	   for	   granted	   –	  whether	  in	  consequence	  there	  will	  be	  conflict	  or	  cooperation	  between	  the	  two,	  relating	  to	  issues	  of	   global	   and	   regional	   scale	   impact	  (R.	  Bernstein	  and	  Munro	  1997;	  Betts	  2010;	  Buzan	  and	  Cox	  2013;	  Glaser	  2011;	  J.	  G.	  Ikenberry	  and	  Moon	  2008;	  Ross	  1997;	  e.g.	  Shambaugh	  2010;	  Yan	  and	  Qi	  2012;	   Zhao	   2008),	   and	  mostly	  premised	   on	   the	   evolvements	   of	   converging	   and/or	   conflicting	  interests	   and	   material	   capacities	   (e.g.	   Economy	   and	   Segal	   2009;	   Zhu	   2006).63	  The	   prevailing	  framework	  im-­‐	  or	  explicitly	  underlying	  most	  scholars	  work	  is	  power-­‐transition	  theory	  (PTT)	  (cf.	  Steve	   Chan	   2008;	   Friedberg	   2005;	   E.	   Friedman	   2011;	   Jeffery	   2009;	   Jerdén	   2014;	   Alastair	   I	  Johnston	  and	  Ross	  1999;	  Khong	  2014,	  158;	  Lemke	  and	  Tammen	  2003;	  Levy	  2008;	  Ross	  and	  Zhu	  2008).64	  Whereas	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  role	  of	  economic	  growth,	   it	   is	  of	  course	  considered	  by	  power-­‐transition	   theory	   as	   the	   basic	   factor	   enabling	   a	   challenge	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   but	   it	   is	   partly	  assigned	  different	  implications	  and	  consequences.65	  Steve	  Chan	  for	  example	  claimed	  in	  2008	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  For	   a	   critical	   assessment	   of	   the	   power	   shift	   narrative	   see	   the	   recent	   special	   issue	   and	   contributions	   of	   Linus	  Hagström	  and	  Björn	  Jerdén	  (2014),	  Chengxin	  Pan	  (2014)	  and	  Steve	  Chan	  (2014).	  64	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  PTT	  presumes	  that	  conflict	  in	  the	  form	  of	  war	  is	  most	  likely	  when	  a	  dissatisfied	  challenger	  enters	  into	  approximate	  parity	  with	   the	  dominant	  power	   (cf.	  Organski	   and	  Kugler	  1980).The	  other	  dominant	   strand	  of	   power-­‐transition	  theory	  focuses	  less	  on	  the	  rising,	  but	  more	  on	  the	  declining	  power,	  that	  might	  engage	  in	  a	  preventive	  war	  to	  eliminate	  a	  possible	  threat	  by	  the	  challenger	  (cf.	  Gilpin	  1981).	  Meanwhile,	  PTT	  is	  as	  contested	  as	  widely	  used,	  authors	  criticize	   it	   for	   instance	   for	   its	  empirical	   invalidity	  (Richrad	   	  Ned	  Lebow	  and	  Valentino	  2009),	   its	  misuse	  of	  historical	  analogies	   (Jeffery	   2009,	   311),	   its	   theoretical	   limitations	   (Levy	   2008)	   and	   the	   danger	   of	   becoming	   a	   self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy	   (Steve	   Chan	   2008,	   123).	   This	   connects	   also	   to	   criticisms	   of	   PTT’s	   limitations,	   that	   usually	   point	   to	   its	  shortcomings	  on	  defining	  and	  measuring	  the	  term	  ‘power’	  beyond	  its	  reference	  to	  material	  capabilities,	  and	  argue	  for	  the	   inclusion	  of	   factors	  such	  as	   ‘perceptions’	  of	  (Richrad	   	  Ned	  Lebow	  and	  Valentino	  2009,	  406)	  and	  perspectives	  on	  power	  (Steve	  Chan	  2008,	  123).	  	  For	  PTT	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	   Japan	  see	  Gilpin	  (1989),	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  rare	  examples	  of	   trying	  to	   fit	   the	  Japanese	  case	  within	  this	  ‘framework’.	  A	  possible	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  given	  by	  Gilpin	  himself,	  as	  he	  states	  that	  	  “the	  Japanese	  challenge”	  was	  confined	   ‘only’	   to	   the	  economic	  dimension	  and	  did	  not	  constitute	   “a	  wholesale	  attack	  on	   the	   foundations	  of	   the	  international	  economic	  and	  political	  order	  such	  as	  which	  occurred	  in	  Wilhelmian/Nazi	  Germany	  and	  pre-­‐war	  Japan”.	  He	   compares	   the	   Japanese	   case	   to	   the	   rise	   of	   Great	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	   to	   trading	   and	   financial	   powers,	   as	   he	  characterizes	   Japan’s	   challenge	   as	   stemming	   from	   its	   position	   in	   international	   trade	   as	   well	   as	   having	   become	   the	  world’s	   largest	  creditor	  (Gilpin	  1989,	  329f.).	  Although	  he	  asserts	  that	   Japan	  so	   far	  has	  not	   followed	  the	  same	  course	  (ibid.,	  335),	  he	  does	  not	  problematize	  PTT	  itself,	  but	  leaves	  the	  question	  where	  Japan	  might	  ‘fit	  in’	  open	  on	  these	  terms.	  65	  Thies	  and	  Nieman	  point	   to	   the	  rather	  deterministic	  general	  underlying	  assumption	  of	  structural	   theories	   like	  PTT	  and	   Hegemonic	   Stability	   Theory	   (HST),	   that	   changes	   in	   economic	   growth	   will	   inexorably	   lead	   to	   (domestic	   and	  international)	   political	   revisionism	   (cf.	   Thies	   and	   Nieman	   2013,	   4).	   In	   the	   context	   of	   Japan’s	   rise	   Richard	   Leaver	  criticizes	  HST	  and	  its	  use	  in	  IPE	  literature	  as	  “backward	  looking”	  theory	  (Leaver	  1989,	  430,	  439).	  For	  criticisms	  of	  both	  PTT	   and	   interdependence	   theory	   for	   their	   “linear	   projection	   of	   the	   future”	   see	   Legro	   (2007,	   515,	   518ff.).	   On	   the	  “power-­‐transition	  version	  of	  realism”	  in	  U.S.-­‐China	  relations	  see	  Johnston	  (Alastair	  Iain	  Johnston	  2003,	  6)	  and	  Jerdén	  (2014,	  81–82).	  See	  also	  Lampton	  for	  a	  criticism	  of	  viewing	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  offensive	  realism	  (Lampton	  2013,	  55f.).	  For	  a	  differentiation	  between	  the	  views	  of	  offensive	  and	  classical	  realism	  in	  this	  context,	  as	  well	  as	  another	  criticism	  of	  the	  former	  in	  particular	  and	  structuralism	  in	  general	  see	  Kirshner	  (2012).	  On	  what	  he	  classifies	  as	   five	   perspectives	   on	   China’s	   rise	   (power	   relations,	   regime	   type,	   international	   institutions,	   economic	  interdependence,	  nuclear	  strategies)	  see	  Avery	  Goldstein	  (1997,	  29ff.).	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the	  U.S.	  economy	  was	  not	   in	  any	   imminent	  danger	  of	  being	  overtaken	  by	   the	  Chinese	  economy	  (Steve	   Chan	   2008,	   3),	   whereas	   most	   other	   studies	   adhere	   to	   the	   forecasting	   that	   China	   will	  overtake	  the	  U.S.	  in	  terms	  of	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP)	  measured	  in	  purchasing	  power	  parity	  (PPP)	  in	  the	  near	  future	  (Art	  2008,	  260;	  Friedberg	  2005,	  17	  f.).	  Regarding	  different	  assessments	  of	   economic	   factors	   according	   to	   the	   classical	   schools	   or	   paradigms	   of	   realist,	   liberal	   and	  constructivist	   scholars	   and	   their	   take	   on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	   relations	   in	   IR	   (cf.	   Rousseau	   2006,	   3–4),	  according	  to	  the	  realist	  paradigm	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  overtaking	  the	  U.S.	  fits	  into	  the	  challenger	  versus	  dominant	  power	  opposition	  of	  PTT	   (cf.	  Kirshner	  2008),	  while	   liberal	   and	   constructivist	  scholars	   focus	   on	   the	   economy	   mostly	   as	   potentially	   pacifying	   effect	   in	   terms	   of	   economic	  interdependence,	   international	   institutions	   and	   cooperation	   (cf.	   Friedberg	   2005,	   12	   ff.	   A.	  Goldstein	  2008,	  40;	  Kang	  2007,	  8;	  see	  also	  Khong	  2014,	  155;	  Rousseau	  2006,	  30f.;	  Weede	  2010),	  although	  some	  studies	  also	  point	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  conflict	  through	  the	  U.S.	  acting	  like	  a	  ‘liberal	  crusader’	  (cf.	  Friedberg	  2005,	  31	  ff.).66	  The	  quite	  prominent	  literature	  on	  a	  ‘China	  threat’	  or	  what	  is	  also	  called	  “China	  threat	  theory”	  is	  linked	  to	  both,	  assumptions	  of	  PTT,	  and	  to	  the	  centrality	  of	  economic	  growth	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  assessing	  ‘power’	  (as	  well	  as	  Pan	  2012;	  see	  also	  Turner	  2014,	  20,	  134	  on	  “China	  threat”	  and	  “China	  rising”	  literatures;	  cf.	  H.	  S.	  Yee	  and	  Storey	  2002).67	  Herbert	  Yee	   and	   Ian	   Storey	  map	   the	   theoretical	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   ‘China	   threat’-­‐literature	   as	   to	   be	  found	  in	  “the	  historical	  interpretation	  of	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  great	  powers,	  realist	  power	  transition	  theory,	   and	   the	   strategist’s	   cultural	   explanation	   of	   Chinese	   strategic	   behavior”. 68 	  In	   their	  assessment,	  due	  to	  nuclear	  capabilities,	  launching	  a	  war	  to	  challenge	  the	  dominant	  great	  power	  has	  given	  way	  to	  “political	  or	  economic	  means”	  (H.	  S.	  Yee	  and	  Storey	  2002,	  9).	  Furthermore	  they	  summarize	   the	   factors	   taken	   into	   account	   when	   assessing	   a	   ‘China	   threat’	   to	   be	   in	   the	   first	  instance	  China’s	   rapid	  economic	  growth,	   followed	  by	   its	  authoritarian	  socialist	  political	   system	  (coupled	  with	  disappointment	  about	  the	  missing/slow	  political	  liberalization	  in	  China	  over	  time),	  its	  increasing	  military	  capabilities	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  regional	  security,	  the	  fear	  of	  political	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Aaron	   Friedberg’s	   article	   in	   International	   Security	   provides	   a	   good	   overview	   of	   this	   literature.	   However,	   in	   his	  classifications	   considering	   e.g.	   “realist	   optimists”	   and	   “liberal	   pessimists”	   he	   does	   not	   always	   clearly	   distinguish	  between	  policymakers	  –	  or	  analysts	   involved	  in	  policymaking	  –	  and	  academic	  scholars.	  For	  example,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  ‘liberal	  crusader’,	  the	  possible	  distinction	  between	  economic	  and	  political	  liberalism	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and/or	  their	  connection	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  is	  not	  problematized.	  Furthermore,	  Friedberg’s	  characterization	  of	  IR-­‐constructivism	  is	  rather	  superficial	   if	  not	  even	  misleading.	  He	  states	  that	  “constructivists	  tend	  to	  be	  optimists”	  […]	  as	  “there	   is	  always	  the	  possibility	  that	  people	  can	  change	  the	  world	  by	  changing	  how	  they	  think”	  (Friedberg	  2005,	  35),	  which	  is	  a	  common	  misunderstanding	  or	  oversimplification	  of	  the	  ‘ideas’	  vs.	  ‘materiality’	  (i.e.	  here	  ‘thought’	  vs.	  ‘action’)	  debate	  that	  I	  will	  expand	   on	   in	   what	   follows	   (for	   the	   same	   kind	   of	   misunderstanding	   see	   e.g.	  Wight	   (2013,	   338)).	   Cf.	   also	   Campbell	  (1998,	  219).	  On	  “realist	  pessimism”	  see	  also	  Kirshner	  (2012,	  59ff.).	  	  For	  different	  theories	  and	  paradigms	  and	  their	  view	  on	  Japan’s	  rise	  see	  for	  example	  Berger	  (1993),	  and	  Gustafsson	  and	  Hagström	  (2015,	  3).	  67	  For	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  ‘China	  threat’	  argument	  in	  U.S.	  print	  media	  see	  Yang	  and	  Liu	  (2012).	  68	  See	  also	  Johnston	  (Alastair	  Iain	  Johnston	  2003,	  25–26,	  28–29).	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economic	   collapse	   in	   China,	   and	   finally,	   rising	   Chinese	   nationalism	   (Jerdén	   2014,	   82;	   see	   also	  Alastair	  Iain	  Johnston	  2003,	  5;	  Khong	  2014,	  157;	  H.	  S.	  Yee	  and	  Storey	  2002,	  2–6).	  The	  majority	   of	   studies	   explicitly	   focusing	   on	   economic	   questions	   related	   to	   trade	   and	  currency	   issues	   remain	   what	   I	   would	   call	   ‘topic-­‐centered’,	   without	   explicit	   alignment	   to	   any	  particular	  (IR-­‐)	   theory,	  but	  still	   focusing	  on	  the	  question	  of	  a	  power-­‐transition	   in	   the	  economic	  realm	  (cf.	  Nymalm	  2013).	  Arvind	  Subramanian	  for	  example	  speaks	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  currency	  dominance	  of	  China,	  which	  he	  defines	  according	  to	  the	  three	  determinants	  of	  overall	  resources	  in	  terms	  of	  GDP,	  trade	  and	  finance	  in	  the	  economic	  realm	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  reserve	  currency	   status	   for	   currency	   dominance	   in	   particular	   (Subramanian	   2011,	   36–38).	   The	   most	  prominent	   scholars/experts	   on	   economic	   issues	   stay	   with	   the	   realm	   of	   policy	   analysis	   (e.g.	  Bergsten	   et	   al.	   2008;	   Bergsten	   and	   Gagnon	   2012;	   Hufbauer,	  Wong,	   and	   Sheth	   2006;	  Morrison	  2006,	  2014).	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  literature	  systematically	  addressing	  questions	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	   the	   trade	   and	   currency	   imbalances	   between	   China	   and	   the	  U.S.	   in	   terms	   that	   go	   beyond	   an	  economic	   perspective	   in	   a	   classical	   sense.	  Although	   there	   exists	   a	   growing	   strand	   of	   literature	  that	  advocates	  a	  different	  perspective	  on	   the	  economy	  –	   that	  could	  be	  summarized	  as	   ‘cultural	  (political)	  economy’	  approach	  –	  it	  seems	  that	  in	  general	  the	  so	  called	  “cultural	  turn”	  in	  IR	  with	  its	  focus	   on	   identity	   and	   ‘ideas’	   (cf.	   Best	   and	   Patterson	   2010,	   4–5)	   has	   not	   really	   affected	   the	  mainstream	  of	  IPE	  (Abdelal,	  Blyth,	  and	  Parsons	  2010,	  3	  f.	  De	  Goede	  2006,	  1	  ff.),	  at	  least	  the	  realm	  of	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  I	  focus	  on	  remains	  under	  theorized	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  aspects	  (cf.	  Christensen,	   Johnston,	   and	   Ross	   2006,	   390;	   cf.	   Hummel	   1997b,	   9).	  Within	   the	   vast	   amount	   of	  literature	  on	  U.S.	   (foreign)	   trade	  policy	   in	   a	  broader	   international	   context	   (cf.	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  29–32)	   there	  are	  only	   few	  exceptions	   (Paulsen	  1999;	  e.g.	  Scherrer	  1999).69	  More	  specific	  work	  on	   U.S.	   congressional	   China	   (trade)	   policy	   –	   while	   very	   detailed	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   issues	  treated	  –	  is	  largely	  topic	  and	  procedure	  oriented	  (Gagliano	  2014;	  Kolkmann	  2005;	  e.g.	  Xie	  2009;	  J.	  Yang	  2000),	  thus,	  in	  other	  words,	  focusing	  on	  ‘what	  is	  being	  said	  and	  done’,	  but	  not	  on	  ‘how’	  and	  what	  this	  might	  tell	  us	  beyond	  the	  economic	  issues	  at	  stake.70	  All	  of	  them	  treat	  trade	  as	  (one	  of)	  the	   most	   important	   topics	   in	   congressional	   policymaking,	   however,	   the	   questions	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Christoph	  Scherrer	  conducts	  an	  analysis	  on	  the	   implementation	  of	   liberal	   foreign	  economic	  policy	   in	  the	  U.S.	  after	  1945,	   in	   spite	   of	   a	   widely	   disseminated	   domestic	   negative	   attitude	   towards	   it.	   His	   framework	   is	   based	   on	   neo-­‐Gramscian	   theories	   of	   hegemony.	   Thomas	   Paulsen	   in	   turn	   focuses	   on	   the	   ‘economization’	   of	   foreign	   policy	   under	  President	  Clinton.	  	  70	  For	  overviews	  on	  earlier	  literature	  on	  Congress	  and	  U.S.-­‐China	  policy	  see	  Gagliano	  (2014,	  32–37),	  Xie	  (2009,	  7–9),	  Yang	   (2000,	   11–12,	   46–73),	   for	   Congress	   and	   trade	   policy	   more	   generally	   see	   Kolkmann	   (2005,	   28–32).	   Joseph	  Gagliano	  focuses	  on	  congressional	   interests	  in	  the	  Sino-­‐U.S.	  relationship,	  Tao	  Xie	  on	  what	  influences	  Congress’	  China	  policy	  (exogenous	  and	  endogenous	  structures)	  and	  how	  this	  happens,	  and	  Jian	  Yang	  looks	  at	  the	  influence	  of	  domestic	  politics	   on	   congressional	   intervention	   in	   U.S.	   policy	   towards	   China.	   Miachel	   Kolkmann	   in	   turn	   focuses	   on	   the	   U.S.	  Congress	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  with	  regard	  to	  trade	  policy	  in	  the	  U.S.	  for	  the	  case	  of	  granting	  Permanent	  Normal	  Trade	  Relations	  (PNTR)	  to	  China	  in	  2000.	  I	  come	  back	  to	  their	  findings	  in	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapters	  four	  to	  seven.	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discussed	  potential	  consequences	  for	  U.S.	  global	  leadership,	  or	  a	  possible	  U.S.	  decline	  through	  the	  rise	   of	   China,	   are	   not	   addressed	   by	   these	   accounts.	   I	   come	   back	   to	   their	  major	   findings	   in	   the	  analysis	  itself.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   literature	   addressing	   American	   exceptionalism	   (Holsti	   2010;	  Nayak	   and	   Malone	   2009;	   e.g.	   Onuf	   2012;	   Patman	   2006)	   or	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	  (Mandelbaum	  2002)	  seldom	  more	  thoroughly	  examines	  these	  phenomena	  with	  reference	  to	  U.S.	  economic	  or	  U.S.	  China	  policy	   (for	   a	  notable	   exception	   see	   for	   instance	  Blanchard	  2012	  on	   the	  “Open	   Door	   Policy”;	   Dorogi	   2001;	   cf.	   also	   Madsen	   1995).	   They	   are	   addressed	   –	   though	   not	  systematically	  analyzed,	  as	   in	  most	  cases	   the	   focus	   lies	  on	  other	  questions	  –	   in	   this	  context	   for	  instance	   by	  David	   Lampton	   (2001),	  Michael	  Mandelbaum	   (2002),	   Stefan	  Halper	   (2010),	  Aaron	  Friedberg	   (2012)	   and	   L.	   J.	   Morris	   (2012),	   while	   Jie	   Chen	   (1992)	   deals	   with	   what	   he	   calls	  ‘democratic	   capitalism’	  as	  an	   ‘ideological’	   aspect	  of	  U.S.	   foreign	  policy.	  The	  gap	  between	   ‘topic-­‐related’	   research	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	  what	   for	   the	  moment	   I	   term	   ‘ideas-­‐related’	   research	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  (cf.	  Hummel	  1997b,	  6;	  Miyoshi	  1991,	  62;	  Pan	  2012,	  86f.;	   see	  also	  Turner	  2014,	  16f.,	  32	  on	  what	  he	  calls	   “imagery”	  and	   “policy”	   literature)	   is	   thus	  not	  often	  crossed.71	  Another	  interesting	  exception	  –	  that	  I	  come	  back	  to	  in	  what	  follows	  –	  is	  an	  article	  by	  Yuen	  Foong	  Khong	  on	  The	  American	  Tributary	  System	  in	  which	  he	  seeks	  to	  “introduce	  a	  new	  vocabulary	  to	  view	  the	  way	   the	  United	  States	   relates	   to	   the	  ROW	  [rest	  of	   the	  world]	   […	  by]	   introducing	   the	   (Chinese)	  tributary	  idea	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  analyzing	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  […]”	  (Khong	  2013,	  42).	  With	  this	  exercise	  Khong	  claims	  to	  be	  able	  to	  better	  asses	  that	  “U.S.	  claims	  to	  hegemony	  are	  based	  in	  part	  on	   its	  overwhelming	  material	  power	  and	   in	  part	  on	   its	   identity	  as	  a	   liberal	  democracy”	  (Khong	  2013,	  8).	  Also,	  the	  recent	  work	  by	  Pan	  (2012)	  and	  Turner	  (2014)	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  on	  ideas	  and	  identity.	  	  What	  I	  am	  particularly	  focusing	  on	  in	  my	  analysis	  are	  three	  aspects	  of	  reasoning	  with	  respect	  to	  U.S.	   economic	   Japan-­‐	   and	   China-­‐policy:	   the	   taken	   for	   granted	   interconnectedness	   between	  economic	   and	   political	   order,	   liberal	   trade	   policy	   as	   a	   means	   for	   achieving	   (political)	  liberalization	   with	   the	   trading	   partner,	   and	   the	   special	   role	   of	   the	   U.S.	   in	   its	   promotion	   (cf.	  Nymalm	   2013).	   Especially	   the	   first	   and	   the	   third	   aspect	   are	   generally	   addressed	   by	   the	  approaches	   of	   hegemonic	   stability	   theory	   (HST),	   world	   systems	   theory	   (WST),	   neo-­‐Gramscian	  (historical-­‐materialist)	   approaches	   (Krause	   2008;	   Latham	  1997;	   for	   concise	   overviews	   see	   e.g.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  In	  this	  sense	  Jacob	  Torfing	  points	  out,	  that	  discourse	  approaches	  should	  not	  confine	  themselves	  to	  topics	  treated	  as	  “soft”	  by	  the	  discipline,	  like	  identity,	  culture	  etc.,	  but	  also	  address	  “core	  topics”,	  such	  as	  security	  and	  economy	  (Torfing	  2005,	  25f.).	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Saull	   2010)	   72 	  and	   modernization/development	   theory	   (see	   also	   Jahn	   2013,	   108f.;	   for	   an	  overview	   e.g.	   Li	   and	  Reuveny	   2003;	   López-­‐Córdova	   and	  Meissner	   2011),73	  albeit	   in	   a	   different	  sense	   and	   pursuing	   different	   questions	   that	   rest	   on	   quite	   different	   theoretical	   approaches,	   i.e.	  positivist	   versus	   post-­‐positivist	   understandings	   (cf.	   also	  Krasner	   1996,	   108,	   122ff.;	   Lake	   1993,	  461;	  Suganami	  2013,	  268).	  As	  I	  do	  expand	  on	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  while	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  also	  refer	   to	  Antonio	  Gramsci’s	  notion	  of	  hegemony,	   they	  take	   it	   further	  and	   in	  consequence	  clearly	  depart	  from	  what	  they	  call	  “the	  inner	  essentialist	  core	  […]in	  Gramsci’s	  thought”	  (Barrett	  1991,	  63;	  De	  Goede	  2003,	  90;	  cf.	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  69f.;	  Scherrer	  1999,	  28f.).74	  	  The	  most	  prominent	   literature	  explicitly	  dealing	  with	  U.S.	   trade	  policy	  and	   ‘ideas’	  sticks	  to	   the	   notion	   liberal	   as	   opposed	   to	   protectionist	   trade	   policy,	   thus	   focusing	   on	   economic	  liberalism	  and	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  theory,	  relating	  to	  the	  question	  of	  its	  institutionalization	  and	   the	   role	   of	   institutions	   in	   the	   U.S.	   (Bailey,	   Goldstein,	   and	  Weingast	   1997;	   Friman	   1993;	   J.	  Goldstein	   1988,	   1993;	   Irwin	   and	   Kroszner	   1999).	   I	   will	   touch	   upon	   the	   conceptualization	   of	  ‘ideas‘	  by	   Judith	  Goldstein	   (and	  Robert	  Keohane)	   in	  what	   follows.	  Put	  briefly	  –	   and	   this	   is	   also	  true	   for	   the	   other	   authors	   mentioned	   here	   –	   it	   takes	   the	   same	   turn	   as	   in	   Uriu’s	   work,	   thus	  becoming	  a	  “political	  sponsorship	  argument”	  (Jacobsen	  2003,	  48).75	  	   	  As	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  liberal	  argument	  about	  trade	  interdependence	  leading	  to	  peace	  (e.g.	   Barbieri	   2005)	   –	   that	   connects	   to	   democratic	   and/or	   liberal	   peace	   theory	   (examples	   and	  overviews	   in	  Owen	   (1997),	   Owen	   (2005),	   Friedman	   and	  McCormick	   (2000,	   relating	   to	   China),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  In	  a	  nutshell	  (based	  on	  Saull’s	  overview,	   in	  Saull	  2010),	  on	  the	  background	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  world	  economy	  with	  the	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  after	  1945,	  HST	  debates	  the	  dependency	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  a	  liberal	  international	  economic	  order	  on	  a	  hegemonic	  state.	  The	  neo-­‐realist	  version	  of	  HST,	  through	  scholars	  such	  as	  Robert	  Gilpin,	  Stephen	  Krasner	  and	  Charles	  Kindleberger,	  assumes	  that	  in	  absence	  of	  the	  hegemon	  using	  its	  power	  to	  enforce	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  economic	  order	   the	   system	  breaks	  down	  or	   degenerates	   into	  mercantilist/protectionist	   trading	  blocs.	   Proponents	   of	   the	  neo-­‐liberal	   (for	   instance	   Robert	   Keohane	   and	   Jospeh	   Nye)	   and	   the	   liberal-­‐institutionalist	   (for	   instance	   John	   Ikenberry)	  strands	   of	   HST	   in	   turn	   point	   out	   that	   a	   hegemonic	   state	   is	   not	   sufficient,	   but	   that	   the	   maintenance	   of	   the	   system	  depends	   on	   the	   provision	   and	   maintenance	   of	   global	   public	   goods/international	   regimes	   that	   might	   become	  autonomous	  of	  the	  hegemon’s	  material	  power	  (cf.	  Guzzini	  1998).	  Critical	  approaches	  to	  HST	  in	  turn	  are	  often	  related	  to	  WST	   (for	   instance	   Immanuel	  Wallerstein	   and	  Giovanni	   Arrighi)	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   question	   of	   the	   interrelation	   of	  structures	  of	  production	  and	  the	  geopolitical	  ordering.	  The	  neo-­‐Gramscian	  approaches,	   like	  Robert	  Cox	  and	  Stephen	  Gill,	  focus	  on	  analyzing	  and	  locating	  hegemony	  within	  historically	  evolving	  social	  structures	  not	  only	  relating	  to	  state	  power	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   factors	   but	   also	   on	   civil	   society.	   On	   HST	   and	   critical,	   Gramscian	   and	   Neo-­‐Gramscian	  approaches,	  especially	  on	  differentiating	  between	  critical	  theory	  based	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Robert	  Cox	  and	  Neo-­‐Gramscian	  approaches,	  see	  also	  Hummel	  (2000).	  73 Modernization/development	   theory	   in	   turn	   centers	   on	   the	   question	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   economic	  development/modernization	  (always	  understood	  as	  according	  to	   the	   liberal	  capitalist	  order)	  on	  the	  evolvement	  and	  sustainability	  of	  democratic	  political	  systems,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  of	  free	  trade	  as	  promoter	  of	  a	  beneficiary	  economic	  order.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   focus	   is	   rarely	   explicitly	   laid	   on	   the	   question	   on	   how	   the	   line	   of	   thinking	   that	   free	   trade	  promotes	  political	   liberalization	   is	  articulated	   through	   foreign	  economic	  policy	   in	  practice.	   If	  mentioned	   it	   is	  mostly	  just	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   taken	   for	   granted	   “common	   perception	   among	   policymakers”	   (cf.	   Friedberg	   2012,	   1;	   López-­‐Córdova	  and	  Meissner	  2011,	  540).	  74	  For	  an	  engagement	  with	  the	  ‘historical	  materialist’/poststructuralist	  divide	  in	  IPE	  see	  also	  Jessop	  and	  Sum,	  Ryner	  an	  (Jessop	  and	  Sum	  2006;	  Ryner	  2006)	  and	  Laffey	  (Laffey	  2000)	  for	  IR.	  75	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  Goldstein	  and	  Keohane	  see	  also:	  (Finlayson	  2004,	  533;	  Gofas	  and	  Hay	  2010,	  19–21,	  23–28;	  Jacobsen	  2003,	  48;	  Laffey	  and	  Weldes	  1997,	  198f.).	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Sjoberg	  (2013),	  Copeland	  (2014))	  and	  in	  newer	  versions	  to	  ‘capitalist’	  peace	  theory	  (e.g.	  Gartzke	  and	  Hewitt	   2010;	  McDonald	   2009;	  Mueller	   2010;	   Schneider	   and	  Gleditsch	   2010;	  Weede	   2005,	  2010)76 	  –	   it	   rarely	   focuses	   explicitly	   on	   trade	   policy	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   advocating	   of	   and	  implementation	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  (see	  in	  what	  follows).	  This	  is	  also	  the	  case	  for	  the	  extensive	   literature	   dealing	   with	   ‘liberalism’	   in	   its	   broader	   meaning77,	   thus	   going	   beyond	   the	  economic	   sphere,	   or	   linking	   it	   to	   the	   philosophical	   tradition	   (for	   a	   comprehensive	   assessment	  and	  overview	  see	  i.e.	  Jahn	  2013):	  the	  ‘transformation’	  or	  articulation	  of	  what	  are	  treated	  as	  ‘ideas’	  into	   ‘policymaking’	  by	  taking	  the	  example	  of	  trade	  policy	  is	  not	  an	  extensive	  point	  of	  focus	  (e.g.	  Boucoyannis	   2007,	   704ff.,	   708;	  Deudney	   and	   Ikenberry	  1993;	  Doyle	   1983b,	   342;	   for	   a	   notable	  exception	   see	   Jahn	   2013,	   Chapter	   5).	   	   In	   this	   sense,	   Beate	   Jahn	   for	   instance	   criticizes	   the	  disciplinary	  distinction	  of	  liberal	  theories	  in	  IR,	  that	  “tend	  to	  focus	  either	  on	  the	  political	  or	  the	  economic	  or	  the	  normative	  issue	  areas”	  (2013,	  22).	  	  	  
1.3.	  American	  Exceptionalism,	   the	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  History	  and	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  
and	  China	  Policies	  	  While	  there	  exists	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  scholarship	  on	  American	  exceptionalism	  (AE),	  this	  is	  less	  the	  case	   for	   what	   I	   call	   the	   ‘liberal	   theory	   of	   history’	   (LTH,	   at	   least	   under	   this	   term,	   see	   in	   what	  follows)	  and	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  concepts	  are	  rather	  seldom	  explicitly	  connected	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  or	  U.S.-­‐China	  (economic)	  policy.	  This	  subchapter	  starts	  out	  with	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  the	  scholarship	  on	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	   the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history	  more	  generally,	   then	  looks	  at	  their	  role	  in	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  and	  China	  policies	  and,	  as	  dealing	  with	  the	  existing	  scholarship	  on	  these	   issues,	   linking	   it	   up	   to	   literature	   on	   the	   role	   of	   ‘the	   other’	   and	   ‘crises’	   in	   liberal	   thinking	  more	  broadly.	  	  
American	  Exceptionalism	  
	  As	  a	  line	  of	  thought	  American	  exceptionalism	  is	  commonly	  traced	  back	  until	  the	  colonial	  period	  (referring	  to	  the	  puritan	  settler	  John	  Winthrop’s	  pronunciation	  of	  a	  ‘City	  upon	  a	  hill’	  in	  1630)	  and	  the	  American	  revolution	  (committed	  to	  ‘freedom,	  morality	  and	  the	  betterment	  of	  humankind’	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  For	  a	  concise	  overview	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace	  literature	  see	  e.g.	  Sjoberg	  (2013,	  22–25)	  and	  more	  extensively	  McDonald	  (2009,	  4–76).	  McDonald	  argues	   that	   the	   ‘capitalist	  peace’	   could	  account	   for	  China’s	   role	   in	   the	   international	   system,	  whereas	  the	  ‘democratic	  peace’	  could	  not	  (2009,	  287).	  For	  a	  call	  to	  differentiate	  between	  ‘liberalism’	  and	  ‘capitalism’	  more	  generally	  speaking,	  see	  Jahn	  (2013,	  12).	  For	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘OECD-­‐peace’	  see	  Hummel	  (2000,	  117).	  77	  For	   an	   intriguing	   assessment	   of	   Liberalism	   as	   an	   “analytical	   construction	   that	   has	   masqueraded	   as	   a	   historical	  datum”	  see	  Gunnell	  (Gunnell	  2001).	  
34	  
	  
contrast	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Europe	  at	  that	  time),	  with	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  first	  one	   to	  use	   the	   term	  as	   such	   in	  his	  Democracy	  in	  America	   (1835-­‐40)	   (cf.	  Holsti	  2010,	  397,	  402;	  Lipset	  1997,	  18;	  McCrisken	  2003,	  1,	  9;	  McEvoy-­‐Levy	  2001,	  24;	  Nayak	  and	  Malone	  2009,	  264).	  As	  pointed	  out	  for	  instance	  by	  Meghana	  Nayak	  and	  Christopher	  Malone,	  American	  exceptionalism	  is	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  “unified	  body	  of	  thought”.	  However	  its	   ‘core’	  could	  be	  described	  as	  “an	  unwavering	   belief	   in	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   the	  United	   States	   and	   a	   commitment	   to	   a	   providential	  mission	  to	  transform	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  in	  the	  image	  of	  the	  United	  States”	  (Nayak	  and	  Malone	  2009,	  260).	  	  In	  his	  account	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  dealing	  with	  its	  history,	  assessment	  of	  the	  literature	   on	   it,	   and	   finally,	   its	   role	   in	   policy	   making,	   Trevor	   McCrisken	   in	   his	   	   American	  
Exceptionalism	  and	  the	  Legacy	  of	  Vietnam	  (McCrisken	  2003),78	  focuses	  on	  what	  he	  calls	  “the	  belief	  in	   American	   exceptionalism	   and	   its	   influence	   on	   U.S.	   foreign	   policy”	   from	   the	   period	   after	   the	  Vietnam	   War	   until	   the	   Clinton	   administration. 79 	  Importantly,	   in	   this	   sense	   McCrisken	  distinguishes	  between	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  belief	  in	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  is	  truly	  exceptional	  and	  whether	  this	  could	  be	  ‘measured’	  (Mandelbaum	  1997;	  as	  well	  as	  the	  references	   in	   McCrisken	   2003,	   5;	   see	   also	   Monten	   2005,	   119).	   In	   this	   respect	   he	   argues	   that	  regardless	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  ‘true’	  or	  not,	  “the	  idea	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  central	  element	  of	  American	  identity”80	  and	  has	  thus	  informed	  and	  continues	  to	  inform	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  making	  (McCrisken	  2003,	   2,	   4,	   17f.;	   see	   also	   Patman	   2006,	   965).81	  In	   this	   sense	   Peter	   Onuf	   maintains	   that	   “what	  makes	  Americans	  exceptional	   is	  […]	  their	  self-­‐conscious	  and	  self-­‐defining	  embrace	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  throughout	   their	  history”	  (Onuf	  2012,	  79),	  and	  according	  to	  Robert	  Patman	  not	  only	  the	  thought	  of	  being	  unique	  but,	  of	  being	  exemplary	  (Patman	  2006,	  965).82	  McCrisken	  bases	  this	   assessment	   on	   a	   study	   of	   how	   exceptionalism	   figures	   in	   public	   and	  non-­‐public	   rhetoric	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  But	  see	  for	  example	  also	  Monten	  (2005),	  and	  McEvoy-­‐Levy	  (2001).	  	  79	  For	   tracing	   exceptionalism	   in	   U.S.	   policy	   from	   after	   that	   time	   until	   the	   2000s	   see	   e.g.	   Pan	   (2004,	   311),	   Monten	  (2005),	  Widmaier	  (2007),	  Nayak	  and	  Malone	  (2009),	  Holsti	  (2010).	  	  80	  According	  to	  polling	  results	  in	  2011,	  the	  belief	  of	  America	  being	  greater	  (38%)	  or	  greatest	  along	  some	  others	  (53%)	  is	  held	  by	  nine	  in	  ten	  U.S.-­‐Americans,	  see	  Onuf	  (2012,	  1).	  81	  From	   a	   poststructuralist	   perspective	   I	   would	   not	   speak	   of	   the	   ‘belief’	   or	   ‘idea’,	   but	   of	   the	   discourse	   of	   American	  exceptionalism.	  	  82	  Kalevi	  Holsti	  in	  turn	  claims	  that	  exceptionalism	  as	  a	  “type	  of	  foreign	  policy”	  is	  not	  exclusive	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  he	   compares	   it	   to	   historical	   cases	   including	   post-­‐Revolutionary	   France	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	  What	   he	   concedes	   as	  unique	   to	   the	   American	   case	   is	   the	   persistence	   of	   exceptionalism	   (Holsti	   2010).	   McCrsiken	   as	   well	   concedes	   that	  Americans	  are	  not	  unique	  in	  their	  belief	  of	  their	  exceptional	  nation,	  or	  in	  pursuing	  foreign	  policies	  informed	  by	  those	  beliefs.	  Nevertheless,	  he	  argues	  that	   it	   is	   important	  to	  recognize	  the	  consequences	  of	   the	  belief	   in	  exceptionalism	  on	  U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   making,	   “as	   the	   U.S.	   remains	   the	   most	   powerful	   nation	   in	   the	   world”	   (McCrisken	   2003,	   16).	   In	  addition,	  I	  maintain	  that	   it	   is	  as	   important	  to	   look	  at	   ‘the	  consequences	  of	  the	  belief’	   in	  times	  where	   ‘the	  power’	  and	  ‘the	  belief’	  (to	  stay	  with	  McCrisken’s	  terminology	  here)	  itself	  might	  both	  be	  contested.	  Seymour	  Lipset	  in	  turn	  focuses	  on	  ‘Japanese	  uniqueness’	  as	  counterpart	  to	  American	  exceptionalism	  in	  a	  chapter	  of	  his	  book,	  where	  he	  references	  the	  U.S.-­‐literature	  on	  ‘Japanese	  uniqueness’	  (p.	  325)	  and	  points	  out	  that	  “these	  analyses	  not	  only	   tell	   us	   about	   Japan;	   they	   give	   insights	   into	   Western,	   particularly	   American	   culture	   […]”(Lipset	   1997,	   212).	  However,	  it	  seems	  that	  Lipset	  buys	  into	  an	  essentializing	  characterization	  of	  Japan,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  ‘collective	  society’,	  that	  speaks	  to	  the	  revisionists	  (he	  cites	  them	  throughout	  the	  chapter,	  but	  without	  referring	  to	  revisionism,	  or	  even	  mentioning	  it	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  book).	  On	  ‘Japanese	  uniqueness’	  see	  also	  Berger	  (1993,	  124).	  
35	  
	  
policy-­‐making	   circles,	   and	   in	   connection	   to	   the	   actual	   policies	   pursued.	   He	   speaks	   out	   against	  treating	  it	  as	  either	  “mere	  rhetoric”	  or	  as	  just	  a	  “manipulative	  tool	  employed	  by	  policy	  makers”	  (see	  also	  Holsti	  2010,	  382f.;	  Hunt	  1987,	  15;	  Widmaier	  2007,	  782,	  785).	  Meanwhile,	  he	  does	  not	  conceive	   of	   exceptionalism	   as	   ‘causing’	   foreign	   policy	   as	   such,	   but	   argues	   that	   “exceptionalist	  beliefs	   have	   framed	   the	   discourse	   of	   foreign	   policy	   making	   by	   providing	   the	   underlying	  assumptions	  and	  terms	  of	  reference	  for	  foreign	  policy	  debate	  and	  conduct”	  (see	  also	  Khong	  2013,	  41;	  McCrisken	  2003,	  6,	  17f.).83	  	  McCrisken	  identifies	  two	  main	  strands	  of	  exceptionalist	  thought,	  the	  exemplary	  strand	  –	  that	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  ‘city	  upon	  a	  hill’,	  and	  became	  widespread	  since	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  republic	  and	   further	  enhanced	  by	  Enlightenment	   ideals	  –	   and	   the	  missionary	   strand,	   in	   turn	   relating	   to	  the	  belief	   in	   the	   ‘manifest	  destiny’	  and	  becoming	   influential	   since	   the	  1840s	  and	   the	  westward	  expansion	  (McEvoy-­‐Levy	  2001,	  24f.;	  Monten	  2005,	  129ff.;	  Nayak	  and	  Malone	  2009,	  266;	  see	  also	  Wheeler	  2003,	  206).	  Furthermore,	  he	  discerns	  three	  main	  elements:	  (1)	  that	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  special	  nation	  has	  a	  special	  destiny,	   (2)	   that	   it	   is	  different	   from	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  World	  (historically	   first	  and	   foremost	   from	  Europe)	  and	  (3)	   that	  contrary	   to	  other	   (great)	  nations	   the	  U.S.	  will	  not	  rise	  and	   fall.84	  Onuf	   in	   turn	   distinguishes	   between	   ‘liberal’	   and	   ‘conservative’	   exceptionalism,	   the	  former	  one	  envisioning	  ‘the	  end	  of	  history’	  in	  terms	  of	  “the	  ultimate	  Americanization	  of	  the	  world”	  (hence,	   corresponding	   to	   the	   missionary	   strand),	   whereas	   conservative	   exceptionalism	  (corresponding	  to	  the	  exemplary	  strand)	  insists	  on	  the	  U.S.	  always	  being	  different	  and	  superior	  to	   all	   others	   (Onuf	   2012,	   81).	   In	   this	   context	   McCrisken	   notes	   that	   American	   exceptionalism	  perseveres	   to	   a	   greater	   extent	   due	   to	   what	   it	   promises,	   than	   to	   what	   it	   actually	   ‘delivers’.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  On	  whether	  American	  exceptionalism	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  ‘ideology’	  see	  for	  example	  Robert	  Patman,	  who	  calls	  it	  an	  “informal	  ideology”	  (2006,	  946),	  Hunt	  (1987,	  Chapter	  1	  and	  2),	  Chen	  (1992,	  Introduction)	  and	  the	  discussion	  in	  McCrisken	  (2003,	  5).	  See	  also	  McEvoy-­‐Levy	  (2001,	  Chapter	  1),	  who	  calls	  it	  a	  “para-­‐ideology”,	  and	  Hodgson	  (2009,	  1),	  and	  their	  reference	  to	  Richard	  Hofstadter’s	  expression	  about	  the	  U.S.:	  “It	  has	  been	  our	  fate	  as	  a	  nation	  not	  to	  have	  an	  ideology,	   but	   to	   be	   one”.	   Jonathan	  Monten	   speaks	   of	   “the	   doctrine	   of	   liberal	   exceptionalism”	   (2005,	   116),	   see	   also	  Agnew	  (1983).	  On	   ‘liberalism’	  as	  a	  worldview,	   ideology	  and/or	   foreign	  policy	  doctrine	  see	   i.e.	   John	  Owen	  (1997,	  19,	  22ff.),	  and	  in	  more	  general	  terms	  Jackson	  and	  Stears	  (2012).	  Christopher	  Layne	  in	  turn	  maintains	  that	  “liberal	  ideology	  shapes	  both	  the	  way	  policymakers	  define	  U.S.	  interests	  and	  their	  perception	  of	  threats	  to	  those	  interests”	  (Layne	  2007,	  118).	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  democratic	  peace	  theory	  and	  U.S.-­‐China	  relations	  see	  Friedman	  and	  McCormick	  (2000).	  On	  “American	  Political	  Science	  as	  Ideology”	  see	  Oren	  (2003,	  Chapter	  1),	  and	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  “liberal	  absolutism	  on	  the	  study	  of	  political	  science	  in	  the	  United	  States”	  see	  also	  Layne’s	  brief	  reference	  (Layne	  2007,	  257,	  FN	  12).	  	  	  On	  ‘ideology’	  in	  general	  from	  Laclau’s	  perspective	  see	  i.e.	  Laclau	  (2014,	  Chapter	  1).	  	  84	  Nayak	   and	   Malone	   differentiate	   between	   American	   Orientalism,	   directed	   towards	   non-­‐western	   countries,	   and	  American	  exceptionalism,	  directed	   towards	  Western	  –	  particularly	  European	  –	   countries	   (Nayak	  and	  Malone	  2009).	  Referring	  to	  Thomas	  Dietz	  they	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  different	  kinds	  of	  difference	  (2009,	  262),	  and	  this	  –	  albeit	  again	  to	  a	  different	  extent	  –	  is	  also	  true	  for	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan	  and	  the	  U.S.	  and	  China,	  as	  I	  expand	  on	  in	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapters	  four	   to	   seven.	   Siobhan	   McEvoy-­‐Levy	   argues	   that	   during	   the	   Cold	   War	   American	   exceptionalism	   was	   extended	   to	  include	  Western-­‐Europe	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  Transatlantic	  Exceptionalism	  (2001,	  29).	  Wesley	  Widmaier	  in	  turn	  speaks	  of	  exceptionalist,	  pragmatic	  and	  crusading	  liberalism	  (2007,	  783	  see	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  the	  LTH),	  while	  Taesuh	  Cha	  differentiates	  between	  “Jeffersonian	  liberal	  internationalism”	  and	  “Jacksonian	  populist	  imperialism”	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  “the	  formation	  of	  American	  exceptionalist	   identities”	  through	  interaction	  with	  the	  European	  Empires	  and	  the	  Native	  Americans	  (Cha	  2015).	  Surprisingly,	  he	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  Nayak	  and	  Malone’s	  article.	  	  
36	  
	  
Advocates	   of	   the	   exemplary	   strand	   maintain	   that	   the	   U.S.	   must	   lead	   by	   example	   and	   have	  peaceful	   trade	   relations,	  but	   stay	  out	  of	  others’	   affairs.	  Proponents	  of	   the	  missionary	   strand	   in	  turn	   contend	   that	   the	   U.S.	   must	   actively	   ‘help’	   others	   to	   become	   like	   them.	   Accordingly,	  exceptionalism	  lends	   itself	   to	  both,	  an	   ‘isolationalist’	  and	   ‘internationalist’	   (or	   ‘exemplarist’	  and	  ‘vindicationalist’)	  foreign	  policy	  (see	  also	  Chen	  1992,	  13;	  cf.	  McEvoy-­‐Levy	  2001,	  23;	  Monten	  2005,	  113f.;	  124f.).85	  	  While	  both	  strands	  converge	  in	  American	  political	  values	  being	  universal	  in	  their	  nature	  (McCrisken	  2003,	  5,	  8ff.;	  see	  for	  example	  Rice	  2000,	  49),86	  they	  also	  point	  to	  a	  tension	  between	  universality	  (in	  terms	  of	  its	  universal,	  missionary	  claims)	  and	  particularity/exclusivity	  (in	  terms	  of	   the	   U.S.	   being	   exemplary	   and	   always	   different)	   within	   American	   exceptionalism	   (cf.	   also	  Mariano	  2015,	  61),	  and	  more	  concretely	  also	  within	  ‘Wilsonianism’	  (see	  in	  what	  follows),	  that	  in	  my	  view	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  relating	  to	  ‘the	  other’.	  It	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  what	  follows,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  chapter	  2.2.	  	  	  	  When	  it	  came	  to	  policy	  making,	  while	  the	  proponents	  of	   the	  two	  main	  strands	  were	  for	  instance	  disagreeing	   on	  whether	   the	   former	   Spanish	   colonies	   should	   be	   annexed	  or	  not	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Spanish-­‐American	  War	  in	  1898	  (McCrisken	  2003,	  12),	  the	  ‘opening’	  of	  Japan	  and	  China	   to	   foreign	  trade	   in	   the	  19th	  century	   in	  order	   to	  advance	   ‘Western	  civilization’	  was	   in	   line	  with	   the	  missionary	   theme	   (Holsti	   2010,	   394;	   see	   also	   Shih	   and	   Huang	   2015,	   8f.).	   	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  is	  regarded	  as	  clear	  proponent	  of	  the	  missionary	  strand	  (although	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Senate	  at	  his	  time,	  when	  it	  declined	  to	  support	  membership	  in	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  in	  1919,	  cf.	  Patman	  (2006,	  965))	  –	  and	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  as	  explained	  in	  what	  follows	  –	  that	  became	  dominant	  after	  the	  U.S.	  entry	  into	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  war	  and	  the	  ensuing	  Cold	  War	  (McCrisken	  2003,	  14;	  Monten	  2005,	  114;	  Patman	  2006,	  966).	  	  Regarding	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  and	  -­‐China	  policies,	  Holsti	  argues	  that	  one	  characteristic	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  is	  the	  need	  to	  have	  an	  enemy	  (Huntington	  1997;	  cf.	  also	  Khong	  2013,	  30),	  and	  that	   Japan	   ‘replaced’	   the	  receding	  Soviet	   threat	   in	   the	   late	  1980s,	  as	  the	  “dangerous	  other”	  to	  which	  U.S.	  exceptionalist	   identity	  was	  contrasted	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  (cf.	  McEvoy-­‐Levy	  2001,	  27,	  35;	  see	  also	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  27).	  In	  this	  vein	  Khong	  argues	  that	  Japan	  was	   then	   in	   turn	   replaced	   by	   China	   by	   the	   mid	   1990s	   (Khong	   2013,	   31).	   The	   other	   four	  characteristics	   according	   to	   Holsti	   are	   a	   mission	   to	   liberate	   others,	   being	   free	   from	   external	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  The	  missionary	   strand	   to	  my	  understanding	   includes	   the	   reasoning	   of	   the	  U.S.	   occasionally	   ‘having	   to’	   transgress	  prevailing	  norms	  in	  order	  to	  fulfill	  its	  ‘exceptionalist’	  duties	  (cf.	  Holsti	  2010,	  382).	  86	  Most	   scholars	   attribute	   this	   to	   what	   Jonathan	  Monten	   calls	   the	   ‘ideational’	   (or	   civic)	   as	   opposed	   to	   ‘organic’	   (or	  ethnic)	  origins	  of	  U.S.	  political	   identity	  (cf.	  Monten	  2005,	  120,	  122).	   In	  this	  respect	  Campbell	   in	  a	  sense	  refers	  to	  the	  U.S.	  as	  imagined	  community	  par	  excellence	  (Campbell	  1998,	  91;	  see	  also	  Mariano	  2015,	  61).	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constraints,	   existing	   in	   a	   hostile	   world	   (cf.	   also	   Layne	   2007,	   119)	   and	   perceiving	   oneself	   as	  innocent	  victim	  (cf.	  Holsti	  2010,	  384f.,	  394).	  The	  mission	  to	  liberate	  in	  turn	  is	  based	  on	  “the	  twin	  pillars	   of	   political	   and	   economic	   freedom”	   as	   foundation	   of	   ‘the	   American	  Way	   of	   life’	   (Holsti	  2010,	  399),	  a	  thought	  that	  figures	  also	  within	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  what	  follows.	  	  Economic	  expansion,	  i.e.	  the	  world’s	  openness	  to	  the	  ‘American	  system’	  and	  to	  its	  goods	  is	  thus	  intertwined	  with	  “the	  security	  of	  America’s	  core	  values”,	  which	  is	  also	  why	  “ideological	  or	  economic	  closure	  abroad”	  is	  taken	  to	  constitute	  a	  threat	  to	  liberalism	  ‘at	  home’	  (cf.	  Khong	  2013,	  34;	  Layne	  2007,	  33,	  119;	  see	  also	  Tuathail	  and	  Agnew	  1992,	  196).	  	  	  
The	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  History87	  	  As	  laid	  out	  at	  the	  end	  of	  chapter	  1.2,	  there	  is	  almost	  no	  literature	  that	  specifically	  addresses	  the	  question	  of	  how	  what	  I	  call	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  played	  a	  role	  in	  foreign	  economic/trade	  policy.88	  With	   respect	   to	   China	   it	   is	   often	   mentioned	   in	   more	   general	   works	   on	   U.S.-­‐China	  relations,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  works	  on	  ‘liberalism’	  and	  U.S.	  China	  policy	  in	  a	  broader	  sense	  (see	  in	  what	  follows,	  also	  for	  literature	  on	  Japan	  in	  this	  regard).	  	  Probably	  one	  of	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  accounts	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  (also	  using	  this	  notion)	   is	   the	  one	  by	  Michael	  Mandelbaum	  (2002),	   in	  which	  he	   lays	  out	  how	  the	  (universalist)	  idea	  of	  economic	  policy	  leading	  to	  political	  liberalization	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  at	  least	  to	  President	  Wilson	  and	   the	  Wilsonian	   triad	  as	   the	  set	  of	  peace,	  democracy,	  and	   free	  markets.	  What	  Wilson	  expressed	   in	   his	   “14	  points	   speech”	   to	   Congress	   in	   January	   1918	   –	   that	   free	   trade	   along	  with	  disarmament	  and	  democracy	  were	  pillars	  of	  a	  peaceful	  world	  –	  has	  since	  then	  become	  a	  major	  line	   of	   U.S.	   (foreign	   economic)	   policy,	   that	  became	   firmly	   rooted	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Second	  World	  War	   and	   during	   the	   Cold	  War	   (Bachman	   2000,	   197;	   T.	   Dunne,	   Flockhart,	   and	   Koivisto	  2013,	  3,	  23;	  cf.	  also	  Jahn	  2013,	  20;	  cf.	  Latham	  1997,	  34,	  43;	  Mandelbaum	  2002,	  6,	  Chapters	  1	  and	  2;	   cf.	   Scherrer	  1999,	  153).89	  In	   this	   sense	  Wilson	   is	  quite	   commonly	   regarded	  as	   ‘father’	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  This	  and	  the	  following	  subchapters	  draw	  from	  and	  expand	  on	  earlier	  work	  in	  Nymalm	  (2010)	  and	  Nymalm	  (2013).	  	  While	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  could	  indeed	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  nuance	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  (as	  pointed	  out	  to	  me	  by	  Dirk	  Nabers),	  I	  am	  partly	  focusing	  on	  it	  as	  distinction	  because	  of	  its	  special	  emphasis	  on,	  and	  role	  in	  economic	  policy	  making.	   On	   the	   interplay	   between	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   see	   also	   the	   subsequent	  passage.	  	  88	  If	  addressed	  for	  U.S.-­‐China	  policy	  in	  general,	  it	  is	  mostly	  briefly	  mentioned,	  like	  for	  example	  by	  David	  Bachman,	  who	  questions	   the	   idea.	   Furthermore,	   he	   calls	   it	   dangerous	   to	   argue	   for	   economic	   engagement	   as	   forbearer	   of	  democratization,	   as	   if	   the	   outcome	   does	   not	   show,	   containment	  might	   be	   viewed	   as	   the	   only	   alternative	   (Bachman	  2000,	  226f.)	  89	  The	   thought	   of	   the	   central	   role	   and	   transformative	   power	   of	   economic	   policy	   originated	  18th/19th	   century	   Great	  Britain	   –	   articulated	   by	   Jeremy	   Bentham	   among	   others	   –	   from	   where	   it	   spread	   to	   the	   U.S.	   (Buzan	   1984,	   598;	   M.	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universalist	  ‘liberal	  international	  project’,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  after	  the	  Cold	  War	  as	  “owner	  and	  operator”	  of	   the	   “liberal	   capitalist	   political	   system”	   (cf.	   G.	   J.	   Ikenberry	   2013,	   23,	   24).90	  	  While	   going	  back	  into	  the	  1960s	  as	  response	  to	  Keynesian	  theories,	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘monetary	  economics’	  and	  ‘the	  invisible	  hand’	  of	  the	  free	  market	  established	  themselves	  in	  the	  1970s	  as	  basis	  for	  the	  political-­‐economic	   philosophy	   of	   a	   “market	   society”,	   hence	   of	   the	   necessary	   interconnectedness	   of	  economic	  and	  political	  freedoms.	  The	  core	  idea	  was	  that	  the	  power	  of	  the	  market	  lay	  in	  economic	  freedom,	  but	  that	  it	  could	  only	  exist	  in	  the	  context	  of	  political	  freedom	  where	  the	  individual	  was	  free	  to	  choose	  how	  to	  live,	  what	  to	  buy,	  and	  what	  to	  produce	  (Halper	  2010,	  53ff.).91	  In	  the	  words	  of	  the	  major	  proponent,	  Milton	  Friedman:	  “On	  the	  one	  hand,	  freedom	  in	  economic	  arrangements	  is	  itself	  a	  component	  of	  freedom	  broadly	  understood,	  so	  economic	  freedom	  is	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  In	  the	  second	  place,	  economic	  freedom	  is	  also	  an	  indispensable	  means	  toward	  the	  achievement	  of	  political	   freedom”	   (M.	   Friedman	  2002,	   8).92	  In	   this	   context,	   capitalism	   became	   regarded	   as	   the	  only	  type	  of	  social	  organization	  that	  respected	  the	  principle	  of	  individual	  liberty,	  as	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  the	   only	   economic	   system	   capable	   of	   coordinating	   the	   activities	   of	   a	   great	   number	   of	   people	  without	  recourse	  to	  coercion	  (see	  also	  Khong	  2013,	  34;	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  172).93	  With	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  period	  after	  the	  Cold	  War,	  when	  the	  Japanese	  economy	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Friedman	  2002,	  10;	   cf.	   Latham	  1997,	  21).	  At	   that	   time	   it	  was	   reasoned	   that	   international	   economic	   relations	  would	  lead	  to	  closer	  ties	  and	  familiarity	  between	  the	  trading	  partners,	  what	  in	  turn	  would	  foster	  peace.	  As	  the	  participants	  benefited	   from	   the	   peaceful	   trade	   relations,	  war	  was	   expected	   to	   become	   regarded	   as	   irrational	   and	   therefore	   less	  likely	   (P.	   Dunne	   and	   Coulomb	   2008,	   3;	  Mandelbaum	   2002,	   29,	   266).	   This	   thought	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   Baron	   de	  Montesquieu’s,	  Adam	  Smith’s	  and	  John	  Stuart	  Mill’s	  writings,	  cf.	  Ashley	  (1983,	  466).	  The	  idea	  of	  ‘free	  trade’	  leading	  to	  peaceful	  relations	  was	  also	  one	  of	  the	  convictions	  of	  Cordell	  Hull,	  secretary	  of	  state	  during	  the	  Roosevelt	  presidency	  and	  architect	  of	   the	  Reciprocal	  Trade	  Agreements	  Act	  (RTAA)	  of	  1934,	   that	  ended	  the	  protectionist	  measures	  of	   the	  Smoot-­‐Hawley	  Act	  of	  1930	  (cf.	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  37).	  	  For	   a	   critique	   of	   this	   line	   of	   reasoning	   behind	  more	   recent	   U.S.	   foreign	   policy,	   and	   an	   endorsement	   of	   the	   counter	  argument	  of	  “hard	  power”	  having	  to	  come	  first	  to	  create	  the	  pre-­‐conditions	  for	  the	  spread	  of	  economic	  openness	  and	  democracy,	  see	  for	  instance	  Layne	  (2007,	  124,	  132).	  90	  In	   line	  with	   the	   tension	  between	  universality	  and	  particularity	  within	  American	  exceptionalism,	  Wilsonianism	  too	  was	  and	  can	  be	  characterized	  by	  “a	   fundamental	  paradox	  of	  apparent	  universality	  and	  actual	  exclusivity”.	  While	   the	  principles	  of	  his	  14	  points	  speech	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  universally	  applicable,	  real	  or	  potential	  ‘enemies’	  at	  home	  (i.e.	  African-­‐Americans,	  Asians)	  or	  abroad	  (i.e.	   Imperial	  Germany,	   the	  Bolsheviks)	  were	  practically	   ‘excluded’	  unless	  they	  conformed	  to	  his	  vision,	  if	  they	  ever	  could.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Wilson	  viewed	  the	  history	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  nation	  as	  process	  of	  liberal	  assimilation,	  that	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  prospect	  also	  for	  the	  new	  world	  order	  envisioned	  after	  WWI	  (Ambrosius	  2015).	  See	  also	  Doyle	  (1983a,	  327).	  	  	  91	  These	  developments	  were	   first	  and	   foremost	  connected	   to	   the	  oil-­‐crisis	  and	   the	  global	  economic	  downturn	  of	   the	  early	   1970s,	  with	   alternatives	   to	   Keynesian	   ‘statist’	   approaches	   finding	   a	   fertile	   ground	  with	  Margaret	   Thatcher	   in	  Britain	  and	  Ronald	  Reagan	  in	  the	  U.S.	  92	  Going	  back	  and	  according	  to	  the	  theories	  of	  John	  Locke	  and	  Adam	  Smith,	  private	  property	  constitutes	  a	  natural	  right	  of	  all	  individuals,	  who	  then	  exchange	  their	  products	  and	  subsequently	  establish	  a	  market.	  The	  market,	  as	  it	  proves	  to	  be	  the	  most	  efficient	  mechanism	  of	  balancing	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  material	  goods,	  leads	  to	  increased	  productivity	  and	  production,	  and	  in	  consequence	  to	  increased	  incomes.	  In	  this	  line	  of	  thinking,	  “this	  prosperity	  in	  turn	  constitutes	  liberal	  individuals,	  a	  liberal	  political	  culture,	  and	  hence	  also	  democracy”	  (Jahn	  2013,	  109).	  	  However,	  Friedman	  conceded	  that	  capitalism	  was	  a	  necessary,	  but	  not	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  political	  freedom,	  as	  the	  examples	  of	  fascism	  in	  Italy,	  Spain,	  Germany	  and	  Japan	  showed	  (M.	  Friedman	  2002,	  10).	  	  	  93	  However,	  as	  for	  example	  Gilpin	  points	  out	  referring	  to	  Karl	  Polanyi,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  ‘the	  rest	  of	  society’,	  many	  societies	  throughout	  history	  have	  given	  and	  continue	  to	  give	  high	  priority	  to	  communal	  and	  collective	  purposes,	  as	  example	  he	  cites	  Germany	  and	  Japan.	  In	  Polanyi’s	  sense,	  “the	  Western	  notion	  of	  individualism	  and	  of	  the	  market	  as	  an	  autonomous	  entity	  is	  unique	  and	  historically	  recent”	  (Gilpin	  2003,	  301).	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declining	  and	  China	  not	  yet	  ‘rising’,	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  seemed	  to	  have	  been	  accurate	  in	  its	  predictions	  (cf.	  Patman	  2006,	  966f.).94	  It	  acquired	  what	  most	  scholars	  call	  a	  hegemonic	  status	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  either	  not	  being	  questioned,	  or	  being	  permanently	  referred	  to	  in	  opposition	  to	  it:	  it	  provided	  the	  most	  widely	  adopted	  set	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  principles	  and	  was	  practiced	  by	  the	  most	  influential	  countries	  worldwide.	  What	  has	  also	  been	  called	  the	  “economic	  transition	  paradigm”	  established	  a	  direct	  connection	  between	  liberal	  economic	  principles,	  democratization	  and	  peaceful	   international	   relations:	   the	  spread	  of	   liberal	  market	  economies	   leads	   to	  economic	  growth	   and	   rising	   incomes,	   constituting	   the	   liberal	   individual	   who	   then	   demands	   the	   right	   to	  political	  participation	  (cf.	  Jahn	  2013,	  109).95	  Accordingly,	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  liberal	  world	  order	  was	   considered	   a	   necessary	   and	   inevitable	   process	   (cf.	   i.e.	   G.	   J.	   Ikenberry	   2010;	   see	   also	  Mandelbaum	   2002,	   26,326)).96	  This	   conviction	   was	   represented	   most	   prominently	   by	   Francis	  Fukuyama’s	  notion	  of	   “the	   end	  of	   history,”	   by	  which	  he	  meant	   the	   end	  of	   ideological	   struggles	  after	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   main	   communist	   opponent,	   leading	   to	   “an	   unabashed	   victory	   of	  economic	  and	  political	  liberalism”	  (Browning	  and	  Lehti	  2010a;	  T.	  Dunne,	  Flockhart,	  and	  Koivisto	  2013,	  1;	  Fukuyama	  1989,	  3;	  see	  also	  Hobson	  2008,	  87;	  Jahn	  2013,	  1;	  Marchart	  1998,	  14;	  McEvoy-­‐Levy	  2001,	  41–43;	  Wight	  2013,	  327),	  and	  even	   in	  2009	  for	   instance	   John	  Ikenberry	  stated	  that	  “the	   leading	   states	  of	   the	  world	   system	  are	   travelling	   along	   a	   common	  pathway	   to	  modernity”	  (cited	  in	  T.	  Dunne,	  Flockhart,	  and	  Koivisto	  2013,	  18).97	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  The	  view	  that	  the	  liberal	  agenda	  of	  peace,	  free	  trade,	  and	  democracy	  could	  only	  be	  achieved	  and	  –	  in	  the	  post	  Cold	  War	  era	  (cf.	  Khong	  2013,	  20)–	  maintained	  through	  the	  special	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  (cf.	   Krause	   2008,	   80ff.	   on	   “hegemonic	   liberalism”	   according	   to	   HST,	   see	   also	   for	   instance	  Ikenberry	  (2013),	  Jahn	  (2013,	  29)	  Layne	  (2007,	  128))	  is	  embedded	  not	  only	  in	  the	  central	  role	  of	  free	   trade	   in	   the	  Wilsonian	   triad,	   but	   this	   is	  where	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   and	  American	  exceptionalism	  come	  together	  (see	  Layne	  2007,	  33	  for	  what	  he	  terms	  “Open	  Door”	  as	  marrying	  a	  heritage	   of	   expansionism	   and	   a	   conviction	   of	  mission;	   cf.	   also	   Nabers	   and	   Patman	   2008,	   170;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  By	  the	  year	  2000	  the	  U.S.	  had	  signed	  over	  300	  new	  trade	  agreements	  (Jahn	  2013,	  111).	  95	  However,	   revisionist	   thinking	   was	   countering	   this	   ‘hegemonic	   status’	   of	   the	   ‘free	   trade	   paradigm’,	   see	   in	   what	  follows.	   For	   instance	   Hummel	   and	   Schoppa	   point	   out,	   that	   ‘liberal	   thought’	   only	   became	   contested	   through	   the	  revisionist’s	  increasing	  influence	  (Hummel	  2000,	  190;	  Schoppa	  1997,	  261).	  96	  On	  contestation	  of	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  in	  connection	  to	  Japan	  before	  and	  after	  1989	  see	  in	  what	  follows.	  97	  For	   comprehensive	   criticisms	   of	   Fukuyama	   see	   for	   example	   Burns	   (1994)	   and	   Hughes	   (2012).	   For	   a	   ‘reply’	   to	  Fukuyama	   relating	   to	   the	   Rise	   of	   Japan	   see	   Chalmers	   Johnson’s	   paper	  History	   restarted	   (Johnson	   1992),	   as	  well	   as	  Huntington	  (1993).	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McEvoy-­‐Levy	   2001,	   23;	   Halper	   2010,	   195).	  98	  In	   this	   sense	   Christopher	   Layne	   for	   instance	  maintains	  that	  Wilsonianism	  –	  that	  he	  understands	  as	  projection	  of	  American	  liberal	  ideology	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  economic	  and	  political	  “Open	  Door”	  abroad	  (cf.	  also	  Ambrosius	  2015,	  125)	  –	  “did	  not	  need	   to	  make	   a	   comeback	   after	   the	   Soviet	   Union’s	   demise,	   because	  with	   respect	   to	  U.S.	   grand	  strategy	  it	  had	  never	  gone	  away”	  (Layne	  2007,	  118).99	  In	  line	  with	  this	  view,	  the	  U.S.	  sees	  itself	  as	  the	  guarantor	  of	  “global	  public	  goods”	  (Parchami	  2009,	  182;	  Scherrer	  1999,	  155)	  in	  terms	  of	  –	  as	  expressed	   by	   Anthony	   Lake,	   the	   National	   Security	   Advisor	   in	   1994	   –	   having	   a	   special	  responsibility	  to	  nurture	  and	  promote	  the	  “core	  values	  of	  the	  pursuit	  of	  democratic	  institutions,	  the	  expansion	  of	  free	  markets,	  the	  peaceful	  settlement	  of	  conflict,	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  collective	  security	  […]	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  both	  its	  interests	  and	  its	  ideals”	  (Lampton	  2001,	  249).	  When	  asked	  to	  characterize	   the	   foreign	   policy	   of	   the	   Clinton	   administration,	   Lake	   called	   it	   “pragmatic	   neo-­‐Wilsonian”	  (Hodgson	  1993;	  see	  also	  Mandelbaum	  1997).	  The	  promotion	  of	   free	   trade	  as	  a	   first	  step	  to	  political	  liberalization	  quickly	  became	  an	  objective	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  not	  only	  Russia,	  but	  also	  China	  (Mandelbaum	  2002,	  267;	  see	  also	  McDonald	  2009,	  301;	  Uriu	  2009,	  12).	  	  
	  In	  this	  sense	  Khong	  speaks	  of	  the	  articulation	  of	  ‘liberty’	  as	  standing	  for	  the	  rationale	  connecting	  the	  ideas	  of	  ‘the	  city	  on	  the	  hill’	  and	  ‘national	  greatness’,	  leading	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  liberty	  at	  home	  and	   abroad	   (Khong	   2013,	   16f.).	   In	   Pan’s	   words	   “the	   United	   States	   places	   other	   nations	   on	   a	  common	  evolutionary	  slope	  and	  sees	  them	  as	  inevitably	  travelling	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  history	  that	  is	   the	  United	  States”	   (cf.	   also	  Onuf’s	   “liberal	  exceptionalism”	  Onuf	  2012,	  82;	  Pan	  2004,	  312),100	  which	   is	  why	   Japan	  since	   the	  1970s/1980s	  and	  China	  since	   the	  1990s	  were/are	  partly	  seen	  as	  countering	  that	  development	  (cf.	  Shih	  and	  Huang	  2015,	  8).	  	  
American	  Exceptionalism,	  the	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  History,	  and	  U.S.	  Japan	  and	  China	  policies	  	  While	   mostly	   not	   specifically	   addressing	   American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	  history,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  studies	  on	  the	  role	  of	  ‘liberalism’	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  ‘liberal	  democratic	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  An	  ‘open	  door	  world’	  in	  this	  sense	  rests	  on	  the	  two	  pillars	  of	  an	  open,	  i.e.	  liberal	  international	  economic	  system	  and	  the	   spread	   of	   democracy	   and	   liberalism	   abroad,	   leading	   to	   the	   belief	   or	   perception	   (to	   use	   Layne’s	   terms)	   that	  “closure”	  abroad	  threatens	  “the	  American	  way	  of	  life”	  at	  home,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  open	  door	  “blurs	  the	  line	  demarcating	  domestic	  politics	  from	  foreign	  policy”	  (cf.	  Layne	  2007,	  31f.).	  	  	  In	  line	  with	  this	  would	  be	  for	  example	  the	  9/11	  Commission	  Report	  in	  its	  conclusion	  “that	  terrorism	  against	  American	  interests	   ‘over	   there’	   should	  be	   regarded	   just	   as	  we	   regard	   terrorism	  against	  America	   ‘over	  here.’	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  American	  homeland	  is	  the	  planet”	  (cited	  in	  Nayak	  and	  Malone	  2009,	  271).	  99	  See	  also	  Cha,	  who	  traces	  “so-­‐called	  Wilsonianism“	  back	  to	  the	  Unionist	  paradigm	  of	  the	  early	  U.S.	  (Cha	  2015,	  16).	  100	  The	  thought	  that	  China	  would	  necessarily	  democratize	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  economic	  liberalization	  has	  even	  led	  to	  predictions	  about	  when	  this	  might	  happen,	  based	  on	  GDP-­‐growth	  rates	  (cf.	  Friedberg	  2011,	  50).	  	  An	  exemplary	  statement	  on	  the	   ‘common	  evolutionary	  slope’	  was	  for	  instance	  made	  by	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  in	  his	   speech	   at	  West	   Point	   on	   June	   1,	   2012:	   “The	   twentieth	   century	   ended	   with	   a	   single	   surviving	  model	   of	   human	  progress	  […]”,	  cited	  in	  Nabers	  2015	  (forthcoming).	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philosophy’	   in	   U.S.	   China	   policy.	   While	   in	   general	   one	   can	   hardly	   speak	   of	   one	   coherent	  ‘liberalism’	  in	  a	  singular,	  but	  rather	  of	  many	  liberalisms	  (Ryan	  2007),	  its	  core	  can	  be	  discerned	  as	  focus	   on	   the	   individual	   as	   ‘ultimate	   unit	   of	   concern’101,	   in	   other	   words	   on	   the	   centrality	   of	  individual	  autonomy/self	  legislation/self	  government	  (see	  also	  Gilpin	  2003,	  301;	  C.	  Hughes	  2012,	  8;	  Jahn	  2013,	  28;	  Owen	  1997,	  16,	  22,	  32;	  Stears	  2012,	  77;	  Widmaier	  2007,	  780).102	  For	  instance,	  in	  China	  and	  the	  American	  Dream	   Richard	  Madsen	   argues	   that	   in	   the	  U.S.	   the	   developments	   in	  China	   since	   WWII	   have	   been	   viewed	   and	   interpreted	   through	   their	   liberal	   democratic	  assumptions	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  political	  and	  social	  developments	  (cf.	  also	  Bachman	  2000,	  195;	  cf.	  Dorogi	   2001,	   2).	  While	   the	   1980s	  with	   their	   economic	   reforms	   seemed	   very	   promising	   in	   this	  regard,	  what	  Madsen	  calls	  the	  “liberal	  myth”	  was	  shaken	  by	  the	  events	  on	  Tiananmen	  Square	  in	  1989,	   but	   has	   made	   its	   comeback	   since	   then	   (Madsen	   1995,	   preface).103	  The	   three	   ‘China	  narratives’	   emerging	   from	   this	   perspective	   according	   to	   Madsen	   were	   “China	   as	   a	   troubled	  modernizer”	   (in	  need	  of	  U.S.	   support,	  which	   is	   in	   line	  with	   the	  discourses	   involving	   the	   liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  see	  analysis	   in	  chapters	   four	  to	  seven),	   “China	  as	  Red	  menace”	  and	  “China	  as	  revolutionary	   redeemer”,	   with	   the	   first	   one	   finally	   becoming	   ‘hegemonic’	   (see	   also	   Goh	   2005;	  Madsen	   1995,	   28ff.).	   These	   ‘narratives’	   or	   articulations	   actually	   still	   do	   figure	   in	   the	  Congressional	  debates.	  Thomas	  Dorogi	  looks	  at	  “popular	  images/perceptions”	  of	  China	  in	  the	  U.S.	  (Dorogi	   2001,	   Chapter	   1)	   and	   largely	   agrees	   with	  Madsen	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   ‘liberal	   lens’,	  especially	   on	   what	   I	   call	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   capitalism	   would	  ultimately	   and	   inevitably	   lead	   to	   greater	   political	   freedoms	   in	   China	   (Dorogi	   2001,	   21).104	  In	  Chengxin	  Pan’s	  study	   this	   line	  of	   thinking	   is	  captured	  by	  what	  he	  calls	   the	   “China	  opportunity”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Many	  thanks	  to	  Johannes	  Plagemann	  for	  pointing	  me	  to	  this	  phrasing.	  102	  Here	  also	  the	  linkage	  with	  capitalism	  as	  laid	  out	  earlier	  fits	  in	  (cf.	  also	  T.	  Dunne,	  Flockhart,	  and	  Koivisto	  2013,	  20;	  and	  Jahn	  2013,	  43,	  103	  going	  back	  to	  John	  Locke,	  on	  the	  signification	  of	  personal	  property	  for	  liberalism.	  The	  “property	  owning	  individual”	  is	  also	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  liberal	  economic	  theory;	  see	  also	  Owen	  1997,	  34).	  I	  come	  back	  to	  this	  aspect	  and	  ‘definition’	  in	  what	  follows.	  In	  Locke’s	  thinking,	  private	  property	  (of	  ‘the	  own	  person,	  labor	  of	  the	  body	  and	  work	  of	  the	  hands’)	  is	  constitutive	  of	  individual	  freedom	  that	  in	  turn	  requires	  government	  by	  consent,	  which	  protects	  private	  property	  and	  thus	  individual	  freedom.	   Importantly,	   Locke	   articulated	   the	   division	   of	   the	   original	   common	   to	   private	   property	   as	   having	   already	  taken	  place	  in	  ‘the	  state	  of	  nature’	  (Jahn	  2013,	  43,	  103).	  Furthermore,	  crucial	  to	  remember	  is	  that	  originally	  ‘liberal’	  did	  not	  mean	  ‘democratic’,	  but	  this	  connection	  became	  only	  established	  later	  (T.	  Dunne,	  Flockhart,	  and	  Koivisto	  2013,	  19;	  see	  also	  C.	  Hughes	  2012,	  7f.;	  cf.	  Jahn	  2013,	  24,	  73,	  94)	  103	  In	  line	  with	  his	  assessment	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  Kolkmann	  who	  maintains	  that	  Tiananmen	  destroyed	  “the	  illusion”	  that	   economic	   development	  would	   lead	   to	   political	   liberalization	   (Kolkmann	   2005,	   63).	  While	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	  history	   was	   severely	   challenged,	   it	   was	   not	   completely	   discarded,	   as	   my	   following	   discourse	   analysis	   of	   the	  congressional	  debates	  also	  shows.	  	  And	  as	  Kolkmann	  himself	  writes,	  for	  the	  U.S.	  China’s	  membership	  in	  the	  WTO	  was	  significant	   not	   least	   because	   it	   hoped	   for	   the	   required	   economic	   reforms	   spilling	   over	   into	   the	   political	   realm	   and	  leading	  to	  meaningful	  and	  comprehensive	  development	  towards	  democratization	  and	  human	  rights	  (Kolkmann	  2005,	  89).	  104	  This	   was	   termed	   the	   “fallacy	   of	   modernization	   theory”	   by	   Paul	   A.	   Cohen	   in	   his	   Discovering	   History	   in	   China:	  
American	  Historical	  Writing	  on	  the	  Recent	  Chinese	  Past	   (1984,	   Chapter	  2),	   cited	   in	  Dorogi	   (2001,	   24).	   See	   also	   Jones	  (2001,	  Chapter	  5).	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paradigm	   (Pan	   2012,	   108ff.). 105 	  Dorogi	   claims	   that	   it	   “has	   caused	   a	   misrepresentation	   of	  developments	  in	  Chinese	  society”	  (Dorogi	  2001,	  7;	  see	  also	  Turner	  2014,	  127ff.),106	  putting	  China	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  a	  thought	  that	  has	  been	  explicitly	  and	  recently	  formulated	  by	  Christopher	  Layne,	  who	  argues	  that	  “America’s	  political	  culture	  –	  based	  on	  exceptionalism,	   liberal	   ideology,	  and	  openness	  –	   is	   a	  big	  obstacle	   to	   coming	   to	   terms	  with	  a	   resurgent	  China”	   (see	  also	   Jacques	  2014;	  Layne	  2014;	  Pan	  2004,	  and	  from	  a	  different	  perspective	  2012,	  45ff.).	  Aaron	  Friedberg	  too	  points	   to	   the	   “ideological	   divide”	   between	   the	   U.S.	   and	   China,	   which	   makes	   “issues	   such	   as	  censorship	  and	  religious	  freedom	  […]	  not	  just	  superficial	  irritants	  that	  can	  be	  dissolved	  […]”,	  but	  in	  his	  view	  the	  ideological	  divide	  will	  persist	  unless	  China	  democratizes,	  as	  “ideology	  inclines	  the	  United	  States	  to	  be	  more	  hostile	  toward	  China	  than	  it	  would	  be	  for	  other	  strategic	  reasons	  alone”.	  In	  this	  sense	  Friedberg	  further	  argues	  that,	  	  “for	  Americans	  the	  success	  of	  a	  mainland	  regime	  that	  blends	  authoritarian	  rule	  with	  market-­‐driven	   economics	   is	   a	   puzzle	   and	   an	   affront.	   Such	   a	   combination	   is	   not	   supposed	   to	   be	  possible,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  long	  run”	  	  	  as	  it	  causes	  “philosophical	  discomfort”	  but	  also	  might	  hinder	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	  spread	  their	  model	  of	  liberal	   political	   institutions	   (Friedberg	   2011,	   42–44	   emphasis	   added).	   Hence,	   these	  developments	  counter	   the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history	  and	  American	  exceptionalism.	   In	  his	  review	  article	   on	   Friedberg’s	   book,	   Khong	   however	   draws	   the	   conclusion	   that	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  assessing	  whether	  relations	  between	  China	  and	  the	  U.S.	  will	  be	  peaceful,	  it	  is	  the	  different	  weight	  given	   to	  what	   he	   calls	   “democracy-­‐legitimacy”	   and	   “economic	   interdependence”	   variables,	   that	  leads	  scholars	  to	  different	  scenarios	  (Khong	  2014,	  155,	  169).	  This	  points	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  my	  argument	   on	   the	   potential	   ‘flexibility’	   or	   question	   of	   the	   exclusiveness	   versus	   inclusiveness	   of	  liberal	  thinking,	  as	  I	  elaborate	  on	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  next	  subchapter,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  analysis.	  	  With	   respect	   to	   China	   (but	   not	   only)	   and	   its	   trade	   relations	   with	   the	   U.S.,	   the	   liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  was	  especially	  prominent	  in	  the	  debates	  and	  the	  campaign	  –	  organized	  by	  the	  White	  House	   under	   President	   Clinton	   –	   on	   granting	   China	   Permanent	  Normal	   Trade	  Relations	  (PNTR)	   prior	   to	   its	   accession	   to	   the	   WTO.	   Clinton’s	   central	   argument	   besides	   considering	  benefits	   for	   the	   American	   economy	   was	   that	   opening	   China’s	   markets	   would	   undermine	   the	  control	  of	  the	  communist	  party	  (Hormats	  and	  Economy	  2001,	  8;	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  164,	  177,	  189;	  New	  York	  Times	  2000;	  Sanger	  2000):	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Slightly	  different	  is	  the	  “image”	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  “opportunity	  China”	  in	  Turner	  (2014,	  44f.).	  106	  For	  a	  similar	  argument	  about	  Western	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  protests	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  in	  2014/15	  see	  Lee	  (2015).	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  “By	  joining	  the	  W.T.O.,	  China	  is	  not	  simply	  agreeing	  to	  import	  more	  of	  our	  products.	  It	  is	  agreeing	  to	   import	   one	   of	   democracy's	   most	   cherished	   values,	   economic	   freedom.	   The	   more	   China	  liberalizes	   its	   economy,	   the	  more	   fully	   it	  will	   liberate	   the	   potential	   of	   its	   people	   […].	   And	  when	  individuals	   have	   the	   power,	   not	   just	   to	   dream,	   but	   to	   realize	   their	   dreams,	   they	  will	   demand	   a	  greater	  say”	  (President	  Clinton	  in:	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  2000).	  	  	  This	   thought	   was	   expressed	   in	   almost	   the	   same	   way	   by	   Condoleeza	   Rice,	   then	   foreign	   policy	  adviser	   to	   the	   republican	  presidential	   candidate	  G.W.	  Bush,	  during	  his	   campaign:	   “But	   trade	   in	  general	  can	  open	  up	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  and,	  ultimately,	   its	  politics	  too.	  This	  requires	  faith	  in	  the	  power	  of	  markets	  and	  economic	  freedom	  to	  drive	  political	  change,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  faith	  confirmed	  by	  experiences	  around	  the	  globe”	  (Rice	  2000).	  And	  as	  president,	  George	  W.	  Bush	  took	  a	  similar	  view	  that	  globalization	  and	  free	  trade	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  the	  export	  of	  American	  values.	  In	   1999,	   two	   years	   before	   China's	   accession	   to	   the	   World	   Trade	   Organization,	   Bush	   argued,	  "Economic	   freedom	   creates	   habits	   of	   liberty.	   And	   habits	   of	   liberty	   create	   expectations	   of	  democracy…	  Trade	  freely	  with	  China,	  and	  time	  is	  on	  our	  side."	  (Rachman	  2011).	  As	  the	  analysis	  shows,	   especially	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   continues	   to	   play	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	  congressional	  debates	  on	  economic	  policies	  towards	  China.	  	  When	   it	   comes	   to	  U.S.	   Japan	  policies,	  American	  exceptionalism,	   the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history	  or	  liberalism	  in	  a	  broader	  sense	  (see	  in	  what	  follows)	   is	  not	  extensively	  addressed	  by	  the	  seminal	  works	   in	   this	   field.	  As	   already	  discussed	   in	   the	   chapter	  1.1.	   however,	   these	   issues	   are	   touched	  upon,	  as	  the	  authors	  concerning	  themselves	  with	  the	  discourse	  on	  Japan	  read	  it	  mostly	  either	  as	  reflecting	  a	   challenge	   to	   the	   ‘western	   liberal	  world	  order’	   (see	   the	  discussion	  of	   the	   respective	  authors	  in	  chapter	  1.1,	  i.e.	  Scherrer,	  Hummel,	  	  Tuathail),	  or	  as	  ‘orientalism’	  more	  generally	  (i.e.	  in	  N.	  Morris’	   “Japan-­‐Bashing”).107	  While	  Campbell	   focuses	  on	  the	  articulation	  of	  U.S.-­‐identity	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   Japan,	   his	   analysis	   centers	   on	   ‘American	   individualism’	   (which	   of	   course	   can	   be	   linked	   to	  economic	   liberalism	   and	   the	   rational	   individual’s	   pursuit	   of	   self-­‐interest	   that	   is	   taken	   to	  ultimately	   also	   serve	   the	   collective	   interest)	   as	   ‘modern	   and	   civilized’	   versus	   ‘Japanese	  collectivism’	   as	   ‘archaic	   and	   tribal’,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   the	   ‘frontier	   experience’	   (Campbell	   1994,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  With	  respect	  to	  Nayak	  and	  Malone’s	  (2009)	  distinction	  between	  ‘Exceptionalism’	  (towards	  Europe/the	  ‘West’)	  and	  ‘Orientalism’	   (towards	   non-­‐Western	   others)	   the	   question	   arises,	   whether	   Japan,	   as	   part	   of	   the	   OECD-­‐World,	   was	  regarded	   as	   ‘Western	   Other’.	   However,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   congressional	   debates	   from	   1985	   onwards	   (and	   also	   in	   the	  literature	  of	  that	  time),	  Japan	  was	  clearly	  articulated	  as	   ‘non-­‐Western	  Other’,	  see	  for	  example	  Gilpin	  and	  Cohen	  et	  al.	  cited	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  introduction	  and	  conclusion,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  analysis	  itself.	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156ff.).108	  In	  this	  sense	  Japan	  stands	  against	  what	  is	  commonly	  defined	  as	  ‘core’	  of	  liberalism,	  to	  repeat,	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  individual	  as	  ‘ultimate	  unit	  of	  concern’	  (see	  beginning	  of	  this	  passage).	  In	  this	  respect	  one	  of	  Chantal	  Mouffe’s	  criticisms	  of	  the	  dominant	  tendency	  in	  liberal	  thought	  is	  that	  it	   does	   not	   allow	   for	   acknowledging	   the	   nature	   of	   collective	   identities,	   as	   it	   is	   premised	   on	   a	  rationalist	  and	  individualist	  approach	  (Mouffe	  2005,	  10).109	  	  	  	  While	  Masao	  Miyoshi	  briefly	  brings	  up	  the	  connection	  of	  the	  demands	  for	  free	  trade	  and	  open	  markets	  to	  “Enlightenment	  notions	  of	  universal	  citizenship,	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  modernist	  ideology	  of	  democracy”	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  universalist	  understanding	  of	  the	  ‘market	  society’	  or	  the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   (Miyoshi	   1991,	   93f.),	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   ‘idea’	   of	   free	   trade	   in	  relation	  to	  Japan	  in	  a	  more	  narrow	  economic	  sense,	  importantly,	  Hummel	  points	  out	  that	  in	  spite	  of	   the	   preeminence	   of	   liberal	   thinking	   within	   the	   political	   elite,	   there	   were	   always	   counter	  discourses,	  that	  i.e.	   in	  case	  of	  the	  revisionists	  argued	  against	  the	  universalist	  idea	  of	   ‘free	  trade’	  and	  a	  liberal	  trade	  regime	  for	  everyone	  (Hummel	  2000,	  164ff.).	  In	  this	  sense,	  Scherrer	  focuses	  on	  the	   discrepancy	   between	   the	   push	   for	   trade	   liberalization	   by	   consecutive	   U.S.-­‐administrations	  since	  WWII	  and	   the	  skepticism	  or	  negative	  attitudes	  among	   the	  population	  (i.e.	  Scherrer	  1999,	  12).	  Kunkel	  speaks	  of	  “the	  Free	  Trade	  –	  Good	  Relations	  coalition	  (free	  traders)	  and	  the	  Hardline	  –	  Japan	  is	  Different	  coalition	  (hardliners)”	  with	  the	  free	  traders	  as	  “synonymous	  with	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	   internationalism	   and	   the	   ascendancy	   of	   the	   United	   States	   as	   a	   global	   superpower”.	  Importantly,	   he	   characterizes	   free	   trade	   in	   this	   sense	   as	   a	   “shared	   belief	   system”	   within	   the	  foreign	   policy	   elite	   that	   was	   fundamentally	   challenged	   by	   the	   ‘Japan	   problem’	   (Kunkel	   2003,	  24f.).110	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  The	   frontier	   experience	   or	   frontier	   thesis	   refers	   to	   Fredrick	   Jackson	   Turner’s	   formulation	  made	   in	   1893,	   that	   a	  distinctly	  American	  character	  –	  forged	  around	  the	  core	  values	  of	  individualism,	  equality,	  self-­‐reliance,	  democracy	  and	  independence	  –	  developed	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  meeting	  point	  between	  savagery	  and	  civilization	  (Ambrosius	  2015,	  132;	  cf.	  Nayak	  and	  Malone	  2009,	  266).	  109	  On	  ‘the	  individual’	  and	  liberalism	  see	  also	  William	  Connolly	  (2002,	  Chapter	  3	  on	  “Liberalism	  and	  Difference”)	  and	  Stephen	  White	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  liberalism	  and	  George	  Kateb’s	  “Democratic	  individuality”	  (S.	  K.	  White	  2000,	  Chapter	  2).	  	  110	  See	   also	   on	   what	   was	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   introduction	   on	   ‘the	   hegemonic	   status	   of	   free	   trade’.	   When	   it	   comes	   to	  differences	   between	   Congress	   and	   the	   executive,	   Scherrer	   characterizes	   them	   partly	   as	   “fair	   trade/free	   trade”	   and	  “good/cop/bad	  cop”	  role	  plays,	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  explains	  them	  with	  Congress	  members	  being	  more	  exposed	  to	  special	   interests	   (i.e.	   calls	   for	  protection	   from	  certain	   industries,	   for	   instance	  with	   the	  argument	  of	  preserving	   jobs)	  from	  their	  constituencies.	  With	  having	  delegated	  certain	  authorities	  to	  the	  executive,	  members	  of	  Congress	  could	  call	  for	   protectionist	   measures,	   pleasing	   their	   constituents	   without	   having	   to	   worry	   about	   them	   actually	   being	  implemented,	  given	  the	  generally	  liberal	  trade	  agenda	  of	  the	  president.	  However,	  this	  may	  have	  increased	  the	  visibility	  of	  protectionist	  claims	  and	  in	  consequence	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  legitimizing	  counter	  positions	  to	  the	  otherwise	  dominant	  free	  trade	  agenda.	  Furthermore,	  although	  the	  president	  himself	  sometimes	  used	  the	  “good	  cop/bad	  cop”	  play	  (cf.	  also	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  36;	  Scherrer	  1999,	  109),	  for	  instance	  when	  trying	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  Japan	  by	  arguing	  that	  ‘otherwise	  Congress	  would	  impose	  even	  more	  severe	  measures’,	  this	  was	  first	  and	  foremost	  the	  case	  during	  the	  1980s	  when	  the	  executive	  was	  actually	  acting	  to	  prevent	  Congress	  from	  invoking	  (more)	  protectionist	  measures	  and	  triggering	  a	  major	  crisis	   with	   Japan	   (see	   also	   Kunkel	   2003,	   69;	   Mastanduno	   1992,	   246,	   261).	   However,	   this	   ‘play’	   did	   not	   really	  characterize	  the	  situation	  under	  Clinton	  anymore,	  as	  he	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  in	  line	  with	  Congress	  when	  calling	  for	  more	  assertive	  policies	  towards	  Japan	  (Paulsen	  1999,	  142).	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  In	  my	  understanding,	  with	  Japan,	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  was	  different	  than	  it	   is	  with	  China,	   as	   the	  question	  of	   ‘liberalizing’	   Japan	   lay	  obviously	   on	   a	  different	   level.	   In	   the	  context	  of	  economic	  policies	   towards	   Japan	  the	   issue	  was	  rather	  about	   ‘free	   trade’	  as	  universal	  principle	  (see	  in	  what	  follows)	  that	  was	  expected	  to	  be	  practiced	  for	  everyone’s	  benefit	  and	  good	  according	  to	  the	  example	  of	  the	   ‘exceptionalist’,	   i.e.	  exemplary	  United	  States.	  Implementing	  and	  conducting	   free	   trade	   policies	  was	   articulated	   as	   linked	   to	   political,	   societal	   but	   also	   personal	  characteristics.	  While	   the	   ‘difference’	  of	   Japan	   in	   this	   respect	  became	   to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	   ‘problem’	  already	   in	   the	   1980s,	   it	  was	   only	   in	   the	   1990s	   that	   the	   revisionists	   (temporarily)	  managed	   to	  articulate	   their	   view	   on	   Japan	   as	   ‘hegemonic’.	   The	   common	   view	   on	   this	   timing	   is	   that	   the	  persistence	  of	  the	  trade	  deficit	  as	  well	  as	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  shift	  to	  the	  confrontational	  ‘results-­‐oriented	  approach’	  favored	  by	  the	  revisionists,	  as	  economic	  interests	  did	  not	   have	   to	   be	   ranked	   behind	   security	   questions	   anymore	   (Nye	   1992;	   cf.	   i.e.	   Schoppa	   1997,	  261).111	  	  However,	   according	   to	  my	   analysis	   I	   argue	   that	   it	   was	   not	   only	   the	   persistence	   of	   the	  trade	  deficit,	  but	  the	  way	  the	  trade	  deficit	  was	  articulated	  as	  challenge	  to	  U.S.	  identity	  not	  only	  in	  economic	   terms,	   but	   to	   its	   identity	   as	   ‘world	   power’	   not	   only	   in	   a	   ‘material’	   but	   also	   in	   an	  ‘ideational’	  sense	  (here,	  using	  the	  common	  IR/IPE-­‐terminology,	  see	  in	  what	  follows).	  This	  made	  it	  more	  acute	  to	  deal	  with	  the	   ‘Japan	  problem’,	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  persistent	  articulation	  of	  Japan	  being	  ‘different’	  and	  thus	  not	   ‘compatible’	  with	  or	  responsive	  to	  free	  trade	  principles	  and	  policies.	   The	   identity	   challenge	   in	   turn	   had	   to	   do	   with	   Japan	   contradicting	   the	   universalist	  features	  of	  U.S.	   identity	  according	   to	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history	  (see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  this	  and	  the	  next	  subchapter).	  	  	  
The	  ‘inclusiveness/exclusiveness’	  of	  	  Liberalism?	  
	  A	   central	   question	   for	   this	   project	   that	   follows	   from	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   role	   of	   American	  exceptionalism,	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  or	  liberalism	  in	  a	  broader	  sense	  (see	  in	  what	  follows)	  for	   U.S.	   (economic)	   Japan	   and	   China	   policies	   is,	   whether	   the	   ‘liberal	   lens’	   necessarily	   leads	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	  report	  from	  the	  Congressional	  research	  Service	  (CRS)	  from	  1992	  pointed	  out	  that	  Congressional	  pressures	  could	  be	  both,	  a	  help	  and	  a	  hindrance	  for	  the	  administration,	  depending	  also	  on	  the	  perceptions	  of	  who	  was	  setting	  the	  tone	  in	  the	  U.S.	  on	  the	  Japanese	  side	  	  (Nanto	  1992,	  17).	  111	  For	  a	  similar	  argument	  about	  China,	   i.e.	   that	  China’s	  strategic	   importance	  as	  a	  counterweight	   to	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  disappeared	  with	   the	   latters	   collapse,	   resulting	   in	   a	   reassessment	   of	  U.S.	   China	  policies,	   see	  Dumbaugh	   (Dumbaugh	  1998,	  4).	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hostility	  or	  confrontational	  attitudes	   towards	   Japan	  and	  China.112	  This	   issue	   in	   turn	   is	   linked	  to	  the	   question	   of	   the	   ability	   of	   liberalism	   to	   deal	   with	   challenges	   or	   ‘crises’	   (understood	   as	  dislocations	  in	  terms	  of	  PDT,	  see	  in	  what	  follows),113	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  are	  attributed	  to	  or	  taken	  to	  be	  initiated	  by	  an	  ‘outsider’	  (that	  can	  in	  turn	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  it),	  as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  economic	  competition	  with	  Japan	  and	  China.	  	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  PDT	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  ‘inherent	  logic’	  of	  antagonisms	  (for	  the	  precise	  understanding	  of	  antagonism	  according	  to	  PDT	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  chapter	  two),	  or	  of	  any	  other	  kind	  intrinsic	   in	  liberalism	  (or	  American	  exceptionalism	  or	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history),	   but	   that	   it	   depends	   on	   the	   success	   or	   failure	   of	   the	   different	   types	   of	   (hegemonic)	  articulations	  which	  kinds	  of	  boundaries	  between	  an	  ‘inside’	  and	  an	  ‘outside’	  are	  or	  are	  not	  drawn,	  hence	  whether	  an	  antagonism	  is	  rendered	  into	  practice	  or	  not.	  The	  role	  of	  ‘the	  other’	  is	  thus	  not	  a	  necessarily	  predetermined,	  but	  a	  political	  process	  (on	  the	  understanding(s)	  of	  (the)	  political	  see	  chapter	   two).114	  In	   this	   sense	   Wesley	   Widmaier	   argues	   that	   “an	   unstable	   American	   liberal	  tradition	  has	  been	  constitutive	  of	  […]	  shifting	  definitions	  of	  “the	  national	  interest”,	  encompassing:	  (1)	   an	  exceptionalist	   isolationism	   […]	   (2)	   a	  pragmatic	   realism/internationalism	   […]	   and	   (3)	   an	  absolutist	   or	   crusading	   internationalism	   […]”. 115 	  He	   characterizes	   the	   ‘liberal	   tradition’	   as	  unstable,	   because	   it	   allows	   for	   all	   three	   variants	   and	   the	   tensions	   between	   them	   (i.e.	   “insular	  pride	   in	   liberalism	  can	  yield	  to	  crusading	  on	  behalf	  of	   liberalism”)	  (see	  also	  McEvoy-­‐Levy	  2001,	  24;	  Widmaier	  2007,	  780,	  783).116	  	  Trine	  Flockhart	  however	  argues	  that	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  In	  the	  wider	  literature	  on	  liberalism	  in	  its	  different	  meanings	  –	  i.e.	  as	  an	  explanatory	  theory,	  as	  an	  ontology,	  as	  an	  economic	  system	  and	  as	  a	  set	  of	  normative	  values	  (R.	  Friedman,	  Oskanian,	  and	  Ramon	  Pacheco-­‐Pardo	  2010,	  506f.;	  see	  also	  Jahn	  2013,	  36)	  –	  the	  question	  of	  what	  I	  for	  the	  moment	  call	  the	  ‘intolerance’	  or	  exclusiveness	  of	  liberalism	  itself	  has	   been	   and	   is	   brought	   up	   –	   the	   earliest	   probably	   being	   Toqueville	   himself	   –	   by	   scholars	   such	   as	   Hartz	   (1991),	  Hirschman	   (1982,	   1478ff.),	   Doyle	   (1983a,	   1983b),	   Owen	   (1997,	   25,	   37),	   Latham	   (1995),	   Prozorov	   (2006),	   Dunne	  (2010),	  Koivisto	  and	  Dunne	  (2010),	  Weber	  (2010),	  Williams	  (2011).	  	  113 	  On	   the	   understanding	   of	   ‘crisis’	   from	   a	   poststructuralist	   perspective	   in	   broader	   terms	   see	   Nabers	   2015	  (forthcoming).	  	  114	  On	  what	  they	  consider	  as	  liberalism’s	  eurocentrism	  and	  possible	  consequences	  for	  ‘self-­‐identification’	  and	  subjects	  see	  Dunne	  et	  al.	  and	  the	  respective	  chapters	  discussed	  in	  their	  introduction	  (2013,	  18,	  19).	  	  115	  One	  of	  Widmaier’s	  main	  points	  in	  the	  article	  on	  “Constructing	  Foreign	  Policy	  Crises”	  is	  his	  criticism	  of	  “materialist	  analyses”	  that	  focus	  only	  on	  capabilities	  of	  states	  and	  societal	  agents	  and	  do	  not	  take	  the	  role	  of	  agents	  in	  interpreting	  crises	   into	   account.	   He	   offers	   a	   “constructivist	   analysis”	   that	   draws	   on	   presidential	   rhetoric	   in	   the	   construction	   of	  crises	   “as	   events	   which	   legitimate	   shifts	   between	   variants	   of	   the	   American	   liberal	   tradition	   and	   definitions	   of	   the	  national	   interest”.	   Importantly,	   he	   argues	   that	   “crisis-­‐constructions	   can	   themselves	   be	   (re)constitutive	   of	   state	   and	  societal	  interests”,	  so	  that	  “narrative	  choice”	  does	  not	  only	  and	  directly	  follow	  from	  “exogenous	  incentives”,	  and	  that	  his	  approach	  does	  not	  deny	  material	  changes,	  but	  highlights	  the	  discourses	  which	  frame	  material	  changes	  (Widmaier	  2007,	  779,	  785).	  	  116	  The	   ‘instability’	   of	   liberalism	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   its	   historical	   evolvement	   and	   internal	   contradictions	   is	   for	   example	  addressed	  by	  Jahn	  (2013),	  Flockhart	  (2013),	  and	  Rae	  and	  Reus-­‐Smit	  (2013).	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“by	   invoking	  crisis	  as	  a	   threat	  (rather	  than	  a	  natural	  condition)	  and	  by	  consistently	  employing	  a	  linear	  and	  progressive	  form	  of	  history,	  liberal	  thinking	  has	  not	  only	  lacked	  a	  transformative	  logic,	  but	   has	   also	   paradoxically	   seen	   crisis	   as	   a	   negative	   and	   avoidable	   condition	   but	   progress	   as	   a	  necessary	   and	  positive	   condition.	   This	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   serious	   problem	   for	   liberalism,	   as	   it	  must	  explain	  (positive	  and	  desired)	  progress	  through	  (negative	  and	  unwanted)	  crisis”	  (Flockhart	  2013,	  75;	  see	  also	  Levine	  and	  Barder	  2014,	  872).	  	  	  In	  this	  sense	  Chantal	  Mouffe	  maintains	  that	  although	  there	  are	  many	  ‘liberalisms’,	  the	  dominant	  tendency	   (premised	   on	   the	   rational	   individual)	   must	   negate	   the	   political	   and	   its	   antagonistic	  dimension(see	  also	   chapter	   two),	   as	   “what	  antagonism	  reveals	   is	   the	  very	   limit	  of	   any	   rational	  consensus”	   (Mouffe	   2005,	   10,	   12).117	  However,	   as	   already	   stated,	   I	   maintain	   that	   in	   general	  neither	   liberalism	  nor	   –	   as	   in	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   study	   –	  American	   exceptionalism	   or	   the	   liberal	  theory	   of	   history	   are	   necessarily	   unable	   to	   deal	   with	   ‘crises’,	   but	   that	   it	   depends	   on	   what	   is	  termed	   to	   constitute	   or	   figure	   as	   a	   crisis,	   hence	   the	   articulation	   as	   ‘crisis’,	   or	   not	   (see	   what	  follows	  in	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapters	  four	  to	  seven).	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  liberalism	  and	  ‘the	  other’	  –	  in	  this	  case	  another	  state	  or	  country	  –	  that	  can	  be	  made	  responsible	  for	  the	  ‘crisis’	  (again,	  what	  PDT	  calls	  dislocation,	  see	  chapter	  two),	  John	  Owen	  for	  instance	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  no	  specific	  characteristic	  of	  liberalism,	  that	  people	  in	  general	  “strongly	  tend	  to	  favor	  a	  foreign	  state	  if	  it	  has	  their	  preferred	  system	  of	  government”,	  regardless	  of	  what	   type	  of	  government	   it	   is,	   and	   that	   they	   “identify	   their	  own	  (and	   their	   state’s)	   interests	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  like	  states,	  and	  against	  those	  of	  unlike	  states”	  (Owen	  1997,	  22ff.).	  In	  the	  case	  of	   liberalism,	   the	   core	   ideal	   of	   individual	   autonomy	   coupled	  with	   the	   believe	   in	   the	   universal	  character	  of	  the	  human	  nature,	  which	  is	  endowed	  with	  reason	  and	  rationality,	  leads	  for	  instance	  to	  the	  believe	  that	   institutions	  or	  the	  form	  of	  government	  of	  ones	  own	  country	  are	  desired	  and	  would	  work	  in	  the	  same	  way	  in	  other	  places	  (cf.	  Owen	  1997,	  36).	  This	  line	  of	  thinking	  speaks	  to	  the	  universalist	  features	  of	  American	  exceptionalism.	  Owen	  however	  attributes	  this	  to	  a	  general	  tendency	  of	  what	  he	  calls	   “favoritism”,	   i.e.	   to	   favor	   the	  own	  type	  of	  whatever	   it	  may	  be.	  (Owen	  1997,	  22ff.,	  28).	  In	  a	  nutshell	  this	  means	  that	  actions	  of	  countries	  considered	  as	  ‘same’,	  i.e.	  in	  this	  case	  liberal,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  friendly,	  than	  actions	  of	  a	  country	  considered	  as	  ‘different’,	   i.e.	   illiberal,	   in	   other	   words	   ‘perceptions’	   of	   the	   other	   depend	   on	   the	   self-­‐understanding.118	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   U.S.,	   “long-­‐standing	   American	   ideology	   says	   that	   liberal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Connolly	   argues,	   that	   “the	   liberal	   glorification	   of	   self-­‐responsibility	   […]	   contains	   resentment	   within	   its	   very	  formation”,	  as	  it	  comes	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  must	  be	  someone	  responsible	  for	  everything,	  thus	  also	  for	  “every	  evil”	  (Connolly	  2002,	  94	  see	  also	  Chapter	  4).	  118	  If	  one	  takes	  a	  liberal	  state	  to	  have	  at	  least	  free	  discussion	  and	  regular	  competitive	  elections,	  then	  every	  state	  lacking	  one	  or	  both	  characteristics	  would	  be	  considered	  as	  illiberal	  (cf.	  Owen	  1997,	  49,	  52).	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democracies	   […]	   have	   similar	   values	   and	   interests,	   and	   implies	   that	   such	   states	   are	   natural	  friends	   of	   America.	   Authoritarian	   countries,	   by	   contrast,	   are	   supposed	   to	   be	   unfriendly.	   Their	  rulers	   hate	   freedom	   and	   fear	   freedom,	   and	   so	   will	   be	   hostile	   to	   America,	   freedom’s	   paladin”	  (Doyle	  1983b,	  325;	  cf.	  also	  Khong	  2014,	  165	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  Friedberg;	  Owen	  and	  Poznansky	  2014,	  4;	  see	  also	  Shih	  and	  Huang	  2015,	  11).119	  Owen’s	  discussion	  of	  what	  he	  terms	  “sociology”	  to	  explain	   favoritism	   actually	   to	   a	   limited	   extent	   bears	   resemblance	   to	   a	   PDT-­‐understanding.	  Referring	   to	  Georg	  Wilhelm	  Hegel’s	   reasoning	   that	   something	   is	   defined	  by	  what	   it	   is	   not,	   and	  that	  “for	  a	  person	  to	  have	  a	  determinate	  self,	  he	  or	  she	  must	  have	  qualities,	  and	  thus	  must	  have	  (or	   find,	   or	   create)	   an	   “other”	   against	   which	   to	   contrast	   those	   qualities”,	   group	   identity	  accordingly	   may	   originate	   in	   two	   ways:	   “innovators	   or	   entrepreneurs”	   formulate	   a	   common	  interest	  that	  should	  unite	  disparate	  individuals	  (cf.	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  ‘hegemony’	  in	  chapter	  2.3).	  When	  forming	  a	  group,	  an	  opponent	  against	  which	  to	  define	  it	  is	  created.	  If	  the	  opponent	  has	  the	  ability	   to	   hurt	   the	   group’s	   interests,	   the	   group	   can	   identify	   against	   it.	   Thus,	   “like	   any	   group,	  liberals	  see	  themselves	  in	  opposition	  to	  an	  ‘out-­‐group’.	  They	  cannot	  escape	  the	  negative	  dynamic	  of	   identity	   formation”	   (Owen	   1997,	   25f.,	   37).120	  In	   this	   sense,	   William	   Connolly	   as	   well	   in	   his	  chapter	  on	  “Liberalism	  and	  Difference”	  notes	  that	  “identity	  requires	  difference	  in	  order	  to	  be,	  and	  it	   converts	  difference	   into	  otherness	   in	  order	   to	   secure	   its	   own	   self-­‐certainty”	   (Connolly	  2002,	  64).121	  In	   the	   view	   of	   PDT	   however	   –	   and	   also	   in	   the	   view	   of	   other	   scholars,	   see	   for	   example	  Lebow	   (2008),	   Rumelili	   (2004),122	  Gustafsson	   and	   Hagström	   (2015,	   7),	   Berenskoetter	   (2007),	  Guillaume	  (2010)	  Abizadeh	  (2005)	  –	  ‘negativity’	  is	  not	  predetermined	  (while	  it	  can	  be	  the	  result)	  as	   ‘difference’	   needs	   not	   to	   be	   necessarily	   articulated	   into	   ‘otherness’	   (see	   in	  what	   follows	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   term	   ‘self-­‐understanding’	   in	   this	   study	   does	   not	   allude	   to	   a	   rational,	   fully	   self-­‐conscious	   subject,	   see	   in	   what	  follows	  in	  chapter	  2.2.	  119	  Layne	   in	   turn	   maintains	   that	   “America’s	   crusader	   mentality	   springs	   directly	   from	   liberalism’s	   intolerance	   of	  competing	  ideologies	  and	  the	  concomitant	  belief	  that	  –	  merely	  by	  existing	  –	  nondemocratic	  states	  threaten	  America’s	  security	  and	  the	  safety	  of	  liberalism	  at	  home”	  (Layne	  2007,	  121).	  	  120	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  themselves	  as	  well	  refer	  to	  Hegel	  in	  his	  understanding	  of	  ‘identity’	  not	  as	  something	  positive	  and	  closed	  in	  itself,	  but	  as	  “constituted	  as	  transition,	  relation,	  difference”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  95).	  	  However,	  Owen	  characterizes	  it	  as	  ironic,	  that	  liberalism’s	  stress	  on	  autonomy	  brings	  conformity	  with	  it,	  as	  those	  who	  do	  not	  value	  it,	  do	  not	  fit	  in	  (ibid.,	  34,	  FN	  35).	  In	  my	  view	  this	  is	  actually	  not	  ironic	  at	  all,	  but	  fits	  with	  what	  was	  said	  before,	   and	   later	  on	  Owen	  as	  well	   speaks	  of	   “the	   liberal	  doctrines	  of	   individualism	  and	   consent”	   (41).	   For	  how	   this	  plays	  out	  in	  the	  international	  realm	  see	  i.e.	  Jahn	  (2013,	  80,	  94),	  and	  Rae	  and	  Reus-­‐Smit	  (2013,	  96–99)	  on	  “toleration	  versus	   liberal	   absolutism”.	   See	   also	   Stears	   (2012,	   78,	   82f.),	   referring	   to	   Louis	   Hartz's	   characterization	   of	   American	  liberalism	  as	  "paradoxical	  threat	  to	  individual	  freedom",	  and	  as	  a	  "dogmatic	  creed,	  imposed	  on	  all	  Americans".	  	  For	  Richard	  Rorty’s	  treatment	  of	  foundationalism	  (as	  rationalism)	  versus	  or	  in	  liberalism	  see	  Laclau	  (1996,	  109).	  121	  Connolly	  calls	  this	  the	  paradox	  of	  difference,	  as	  while	  identity	  is	  constituted	  in	  relation	  to	  difference	  (by	  what	  it	  is	  not)	  and	  by	  its	  ability	  to	  ‘define’	  difference,	  it	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  resistance	  of	  these	  ‘definitions’	  by	  those	  attributed	  with	  ‘difference’,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  potential	  of	  difference	  being	  turned	  into	   ‘threatening	  otherness’	  (cf.	  also	  Rumelili	  2004,	  34).	  I	  will	  expand	  on	  identity	  and	  difference	  from	  a	  PDT	  point	  of	  view	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  	  122	  For	  the	  ‘flexibility’	  of	  liberalism	  see	  also	  Stears	  (2012,	  94)	  and	  Jahn	  (2013,	  14).	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identity	  in	  chapters	  1.4	  and	  2.2).123	  In	  this	  sense,	  “Self–Other	  relationships	  do	  not	  always	  signify	  difference	  as	  fear	  or	  as	  danger	  but	  rather	  as	  distinction	  or	  rivalry”	  (Nayak	  and	  Malone	  2009,	  262;	  cf.	  also	  Opratko	  2012,	  74).	  	  	  
	  Nonetheless,	   I	   contend	   that	   the	   universalist	   claim	   within	   liberalism	   and	   also	   American	  exceptionalism,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  tension,	  combined	  with	  the	  view	  of	  superiority/exclusivity	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  bears	   the	   significant	  potential	   for	  articulating	  others	   in	  an	  antagonistic	  way.124	  As	  Pan	  has	  argued,	  	  	   “rather	  than	  questioning	  the	  validity	  of	  their	  own	  universalist	  assumptions,	  the	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States	  believe	  that	  those	  who	  are	  different	  should	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  universal	  sameness.	  Indeed,	  because	  “we”	  are	  universal,	  those	  who	  refuse	  or	  who	  are	  unable	  to	   become	   like	   “us”	   are	   no	   longer	   just	   “others”,	   but	   are	   by	   definition	   the	   negation	   of	  universality,	  or	  the	  other”	  (Pan	  2004,	  312	  emphasis	  added).125	  	  As	  it	  is	  laid	  out	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  two,	  according	  to	  PDT	  the	  other	  is	  rendered	  into	  an	  antagonist	  when	  it	  is	  articulated	  as	  challenging	  or	  blocking	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  self.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  China,	  this	  challenge	  figures	  in	  	  	   “the	   potential	   that	   Beijing	   will	   become	   an	   example,	   source,	   or	   model	   that	   contradicts	  Western	  liberalism	  as	  the	  reigning	  paradigm	  […]	  and	  embodies	  an	  alternative	  to	  Western	  and	  especially	  U.S.	  conceptions	  of	  democracy	  and	  capitalism.	  China	  is	  a	  reminder	  that	  history	  is	  not	  so	  close	  to	  an	  end”	  (Chan,	  1999,	  179,	  quoted	  in	  Pan	  2004,	  313).	  	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   Japan,	   one	   aspect	   figured	   in	   “the	   inscription	   of	   Japan	   as	   rigid,	   hierarchical,	   and	  organized	  around	  groups	  […]	  [that]	  suggest[s]	  the	  ‘tribal’	  nature	  of	  Japan,	  and	  –	  as	  a	  consequence	  –	  its	  place	  outside	  of	  the	  ‘civilized’	  community	  of	  trading	  nations”	  (Campbell	  1994,	  162).	  In	  this	  reading,	   it	   was	   Japan’s	   success	   in	   spite	   of	   being	   ‘uncivilized’	   that	   accounted	   for	   the	   major	  challenge.	  In	  this	  sense	  ‘Japan	  bashing’	  was	  about	  preserving	  ‘the	  self’	  as	  universal	  despite	  of	  the	  challenge	   (N.	   Morris	   2010,	   137).	   More	   concretely,	   when	   it	   came	   to	   advocating	   a	   ‘get	   tough’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  As	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  chapter	  two,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  misunderstandings	  of	  PDT	  in	  chapter	  three:	  even	  if	  ontologically/theoretically	  speaking	  identity	  is	  always	  constituted	  through	  difference,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  result	  in	  an	  antagonistic	  relationship	  on	  the	  ontical	  level.	  See	  also	  Rumelili	  (2004,	  29).	  124	  In	  this	  sense	  for	  instance	  Layne	  argues	  that	  “the	  inclination	  to	  universalize	  liberal	  democracy	  puts	  the	  United	  States	  on	   a	   collision	   course	   with	   others	   whose	   ideologies,	   institutions,	   and	   values	   differ	   from	   America’s,	   and	   it	   causes	  Washington	  to	  regard	  world	  politics	  as	  a	  Manichean	  struggle	  between	  good	  and	  evil,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  contest	  between	  rival	  powers	  with	  conflicting	  national	  interests”	  (Layne	  2007,	  122).	  	  125	  Pan’s	  attribution,	  however,	  of	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  to	  “the	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States”	  in	  my	  eyes	  is	  a	  bit	  too	  general.	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approach	  towards	  Japan,	  Tetsuya	  Kataoka	  at	  the	  time	  summarized	  the	  revisionist	  arguments	  as	  follows:	  	  	   “…	  they	  maintain	  that	  Japan	  is	  an	  anomaly	  to	  the	  democracy	  and	  capitalism	  that	  prevail	  among	  the	  advanced	  industrial	  nations,	  being	  rather	  a	  bureaucratically	  controlled	  socialist	  state	  dedicated	  to	  economic	   development	   but	   immune	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   supply	   and	   demand.	   To	   prevent	   this	   system	  from	   menacing	   U.S.	   economic	   interests,	   its	   markets	   must	   be	   opened	   with	   politically	   coercive	  measures”	  (Kataoka	  1995,	  1).	  	  	  Accordingly,	   Michael	   Hunt	   for	   instance	   maintains	   that	   in	   general	   it	   is	   the	   sense	   of	   “national	  superiority”	   central	   to	   “U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   ideology”	   that	   gives	   rise	   to	   diminishing	   stereotypes	  about	   other	   people,	  which	   in	   turn	   raise	   the	   false	   expectations	   that	   it	  would	   be	   easy	   to	   change	  their	  political	  and	  economic	  course	  for	  the	   ‘better’,	  and	  leading	  to	  frustration	  when	  it	  turns	  out	  that	   change	   does	   not	   happen	   as	   presumed	   (see	   also	   Dalby	   1988,	   436;	   cf.	   also	   Hagström	   and	  Gustafsson	  2015,	  12;	  Hunt	  1987,	  176).	  	  Consequently,	  in	  my	  view	  the	  ‘expectations	  of	  change’	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  whether	  the	  liberal	   theory	  of	  history	  and	  American	  exceptionalism	  feed	   into	  an	  engaging	  or	  confrontational	  relating	   to	   the	   other.	   In	   other	   words,	   both	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   and	   American	  Exceptionalism	   bear	   the	   potential	   of	   articulating	   U.S.-­‐identity	   as	   ‘inclusive’	   or	   ‘exclusive’	   (cf.	  Rumelili	  2004,	  37),	  according	   to	   the	  expectations	  pertaining	   to	   the	  potential	  of	   change	   in	  or	  of	  the	   other.	   An	   inclusive	   identity	   allows	   for	   the	   accommodation	   of	   difference,	   as	   it	   is	   based	   on	  characteristics	  that	   the	  other	  can	  potentially	  acquire,	   like	   for	   instance	   liberalism,	  democracy	  or	  capitalism.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  as	  well	  as	  what	  Onuf	  has	  termed	  the	  ‘liberal	  strand’	   of	   American	   exceptionalism,	   that	   relies	   on	   ‘the	   end	   of	   history’	   as	   ultimate	  ‘Americanization’	  of	  the	  world	  (cf.	  Onuf	  2012,	  81),	  allows	  for	  an	  inclusive	  articulation	  of	  identity,	  as	  the	  other	  can	  be	  transformed	  according	  to	  the	  self.	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  an	  exclusive	  articulation	  of	   identity	  is	  based	  on	   ‘inherent	  characteristics’	  (or	  in	  my	  reading,	  essentialized	  characteristics,	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  analysis),	  like	  according	  to	  the	  ‘conservative	  strand’	  of	  exceptionalism	  that	   sees	   the	  U.S.	   as	   always	   different	   and	   superior,	   and	   in	   consequence	   prone	   to	   threats	   from	  ‘others’.	  	  The	  crucial	  point	  then	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  ‘limits’	  of	  inclusiveness	  or	  to	  the	  question	  what	  happens,	   if	   the	  other	  does	  not	   change	   to	  become	  more	   like	   the	   self.	  U.S.	   identity	  as	  articulated	  through	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history,	   as	   well	   as	   through	   the	   liberal	   or	   inclusive	   strand	   of	  American	  exceptionalism,	  is	  ‘secured’	  or	  sustained	  by	  others	  who	  aspire	  to	  become	  like	  the	  self,	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while	  potential	  resistance	  or	  refusal	  by	  the	  other	  challenges	  the	  identity	  or	  self-­‐understanding.126	  The	  exclusive	  articulations	  of	  exceptionalism	  in	  terms	  of	  superiority	  in	  turn	  rely	  on	  distinction	  or	  dissociation.	  Hence,	  the	  response	  of	  the	  other	  to	  the	  self	  becomes	  crucial	  to	  the	  evolvement	  of	  the	  relationship	   (cf.	  Rumelili	  2004,	  37f.).	  Yet,	   as	  my	  analysis	   shows,	   the	  essential	  point	  here	   is	  not	  simply	  how	  the	  other	  ‘responds’,	  but	  how	  the	  acts	  or	  responses	  of	  the	  other	  are	  understood	  and	  articulated,	  i.e.	  rendered	  meaningful	  by	  the	  self	  –	  as	  they	  do	  not	  stand	  for	  themselves	  as	  ‘neutral	  facts’.	  Being	  (mostly)	  seen	  through	  the	  ‘liberal’	   lens	  encompassing	  an	  inherent	  tension	  between	  universality/inclusiveness	   and	   particularity/exclusiveness	   –	   in	   my	   view	   the	   inclusiveness	  reaches	  its	  limit	  of	  potentially	  accommodating	  the	  other	  when	  there	  seems	  to	  remain	  no	  chance	  for	   change	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   other	   adhering	   to	   the	   purportedly	   universalist	   principles,	   and	   in	  consequence	  becoming	  more	  like	  the	  self.	  	  	  Once	  this	  ‘limit’	  is	  reached	  (which	  again	  is	  not	  a	  predetermined,	  but	  an	  entirely	  political	  process)	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Connolly,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  line	  with	  the	  arguments	  by	  Pan	  and	  Campbell	  in	  this	  passage,	  the	  other	  might	  not	  only	  become	  articulated	  into	  a	  threat	  because	  of	  what	  it	  does,	  but	  “by	  the	  very	  visibility	  of	  its	  mode	  of	  being	  as	  other”	  (Connolly	  2002,	  66).	  	  I	  expand	  on	  these	  points	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  identity,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  chapter	  two	  and	  in	  the	  analysis	  itself.	  	  
	  
1.4.	   The	   Study	   of	   Identity,	   Ideas	   and	   Discourse	   in	   IR	   and	   IPE	   –	   Lost	   in	  
Translation?	  	  	  Outside	   the	   topic	   of	   economic	   relations	   a	   growing	   amount	   of	   not	   only	   constructivist	   literature	  addresses	   what	   they	   mostly	   call	   ‘non-­‐material	   factors’	   in	   U.S.-­‐Chinese	   relations,	   like	   ‘ideas’,	  ‘mutual	  perceptions	  and	  images’,	   ‘attitudes’,	   ‘beliefs’,	   ‘identities’,	   ‘public	  opinion’	  etc.	  (Fewsmith	  and	  Rosen	  2001;	  P.	  H.	  Gries	  2006;	  Alastair	  Ian	  Johnston	  2006;	  Lampton	  2001;	  e.g.	  Wang	  2000).127	  There	  are	  (in	  my	  eyes	  surprisingly)	  only	  few	  studies	  explicitly	  focusing	  on	  discourses	  (Blanchard	  2012;	   Goh	   2005;	   e.g.	   Pan	   2004)	   or	   ‘identity’	   (e.g.	   L.	   J.	   Morris	   2012)	   in	   U.S.-­‐Chinese	   relations.	  Mostly	   –	   and	  especially	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   studying	   economic	  policy	   –	   the	   focus	   is	   on	  what	   are	  called	  ‘ideas’	  or	  ‘ideational	  aspects’	  that	  then	  in	  these	  understandings	  encompass	  discourse	  and	  identity	   (Rousseau	  2006,	   3,	   4;	   cf.	   also	   Schmidt	   2008,	   306;	   cf.	   Turner	   2013,	   3,	   2014).	   A	   central	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  See	   in	  what	   follows	  on	   ‘identity’	   and	   ‘the	   subject’	   in	   chapter	  2.2.	   To	   repeat,	   the	   term	   ‘self-­‐understanding’	   in	   this	  study	  does	  not	  allude	  to	  a	  rational,	  fully	  self-­‐conscious	  subject,	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  chapter	  2.2.	  127	  Klotz	  and	  Lynch	  point	  out	  the	  problematic	  –	  and	  often	  misplaced	  –	  tendency	  to	  associate	  all	  work	  on	   ‘ideas’	  with	  constructivism	   (cf.	   Gofas	   and	  Hay	  2010,	   14;	  Klotz	   and	  Lynch	  2007,	   4).	   As	  André	  Broome	   also	  notes,	   “constructivist	  scholars	  don’t	  own	  the	  field	  of	  ideas,	  identity	  and	  norms”(Broome	  2013,	  197f.).	  	  Jianwei	  Wang	   (2000)	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   cognitive	   and	   perceptual-­‐psychological	   studies	   in	   American	   foreign	  policy	  not	  only	  towards	  China	  (cf.	  Wang	  2000,	  1–19).	  On	  social	  identity	  theory	  and	  related	  approaches	  see	  Gries	  (2006,	  310ff.).	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characteristic	   of	   this	   literature	   –	   with	   few	   exceptions	   –	   is	   its	   commitment	   to	   the	  ideational/material	  divide,	  with	  discourses	  or	  identities	  or	  ideas	  located	  in	  the	  ‘ideational’	  realm,	  subsequently	  leading	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  and	  how	  there	  can	  be	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  ‘material’	  (cf.	   also	   Howarth	   2013,	   254).	   This	   question	   in	   turn	   is	   mostly	   treated	   within	   the	   standard	  mechanistic	  causality-­‐framework	   that	  underlies	  and	  sustains	   the	  dualist	   conceptualization	  (see	  in	  what	  follows),	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  goes	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  neo-­‐positivist	  methodologies.	  	  	  Among	   the	   few	   explicitly	   discourse	   focused	   approaches	   for	   instance	   Evelyn	  Goh	   in	   her	  own	  words	  aligns	  herself	  with	  what	  she	  calls	  “the	  constructivist	  understanding	  of	  ‘reality’	  [that]	  centers	  upon	  the	   interaction	  of	  the	  material	  and	  the	   ideational”,	  and	  she	  sets	  out	  to	   investigate	  their	   “constitutive	   relationship”.	   Although	   she	   does	   not	   want	   to	   advance	   discourses	   as	  “alternative	   explanatory	   variables”,	   but	   to	   investigate	   them	   as	   processes	   of	   change,	   ultimately	  she	  maintains	  the	  very	  common	  division	  between	  ‘discourse’	  and	  ‘policy’/’action’	  (Goh	  2005,	  7,	  9,	  11,	   266).	   	   As	   for	   the	   causality-­‐question	   she	   states	   that	   “[i]n	   this	   view,	   there	   is	   no	   one	   causal	  variable;	  instead	  there	  are	  constitutive	  relationships	  between	  ideational	  and	  material	  factors	  that	  shape	  policy	  outcomes	  […]	  and	  mak[e]	  possible	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  causality”	  (Goh	  2005,	  261,	  emphasis	  in	  original).128	  	  Pan	   Chengxin	   in	   turn	   makes	   an	   in	   my	   eyes	   very	   important	   contribution	   by	   setting	   out	   to	  investigate	   the	   ‘China	   threat’	   argument	   in	   U.S.	   IR-­‐literature,	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   argument	   as	  “discursive	  construction	  of	  other”	  and	  its	  practical	  consequences	  for	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations	  (Pan	  2004,	  306f.).	  He	  criticizes	  the	  dominant	  “positivist	  epistemology”	  that	  lacks	  self-­‐awareness	  of	  its	  own	  character	  as	  discursive	  practice	  and	  thus	  risks	  becoming	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy	  (Pan	  2004,	  306,	  310,	  326).	  Pan	  links	  the	  ‘China	  threat’	  to	  the	  “American	  Self-­‐Imagination”	  and	  its	  aspiration	  to	  “hegemonic	   leadership	   […]	   in	   the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world”	  (Pan	  2004,	  310–318).129	  In	  his	  book	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  While	   Goh	   unfortunately	   does	   not	   elaborate	   on	  what	   these	   understandings	   of	   causality	  might	   be,	   she	   contrasts	  “constructivist	   approaches”	   to	   “rationalist	   political	   science”	   and	   points	   out	   the	   former’s	   closeness	   to	   those	   of	  historians.	  And	  indeed,	  compared	  to	   ‘rationalist	  political	  science’,	  historians’	  take	  on	  causality	  is	  more	  differentiated,	  see	  e.g.	  Ringer	  (1989).	  Moreover,	  an	  affinity	  by	  historians	  to	  study	  ‘discourses’	  might	  be	  explained	  by	  their	  approach	  towards	   the	   ‘objects’	   of	   analysis,	   which	   they	   tend	   to	   see	   as	   “vehicles	   or	   signifiers	   [or]	   as	   opportunities	   to	   explain	  something	  else”,	  while	  being	  very	  aware	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  ‘sources’	  and	  ‘literature’	  (cf.	  Ingram	  1997,	  54).	  On	  history	  and	  IR	  more	  generally	  see	  for	  example	  Lawson	  (2012).	  	  The	  ‘constitutive’	  versus	  ‘causal’	  argument	  in	  turn	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  ‘understanding	  vs.	  ’explaining’	  (cf.	  Hollis	  and	   Smith	   1990)	   classification	   (cf.	   e.g.	   Abdelal,	   Blyth,	   and	   Parsons	   2010,	   16),	   a	   differentiation	   that	   I	   do	   not	   really	  regard	  as	  helpful,	   as	   I	  will	   explain	   in	   chapter	   three,	   as	  well	   as	   touching	  upon	   it	  when	  addressing	   ‘causality’	   in	  what	  follows.	  As	  Fritz	  Ringer	  argues,	  “interpretation	  and	  explanation	  are	  simultaneous	  and	  almost	  interactive	  approaches	  to	  […]	  actions	  and	  texts”	  (1989,	  167	  emphasis	  added)	  –	  in	  my	  view	  not	  only	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  present.	  See	  also	  what	  follows	  in	  chapter	  three.	  For	  her	  (critical	  realist)	  account	  and	  criticism	  of	  the	  (non-­‐)	  use	  of	  causal	  language	  in	  IR	  see	  also	  Milja	  Kurki	  (2008,	  130ff.).	  129	  See	  also	  Zhang	  Longxi’s	  article	  on	  China	  as	  “The	  Myth	  of	  the	  Other”	  (Zhang	  1988).	  Lily	  Ling	  takes	  the	  argument	  even	  one	   step	   further	   and	   argues	   that	   the	   ‘China	   threat’	   is	   more	   or	   less	   an	   inevitable	   production	   of	   what	   she	   calls	  ‘Westphalian	  IR’	  (Ling	  2013).	  In	  his	  criticism	  of	  offensive	  realism	  David	  Lampton	  points	  out	  that	  mistrust	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  China	  is	  also	  embedded	  “deeply	  in	  intellectual	  theories”	  (Lampton	  2013,	  57).	  Cf.	  also	  Jim	  George’s	  arguments	  about	  “theory	  as	  practice	  of	  IR”	  (George	  1994).	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on	  Western	  Representations	  of	  China’s	  Rise	   he	   concerns	  himself	  with	   “a	   sociology	  of	   knowledge	  and	  politics	  of	  representation	  in	  relation	  to	  China	  watching”,	  of	  which	  he	  discerns	  the	  two	  main	  themes,	   assumptions	   or	   ‘paradigms’	   on	   China’s	   rise	   to	   be	   the	   “China	   threat”	   and	   the	   “China	  opportunity”	  (Pan	  2012,	  7f.,	  23ff.,31ff.).130	  	  Oliver	  Turner	   as	  well	   argues	   that	   “throughout	  history	   ‘threats’	   from	  China	   towards	   the	  United	   States,	   rather	   than	   objectively	   verifiable	   phenomena,	   have	   always	   been	   social	  constructions	  of	  American	  design	  and	  thus	  more	  than	  calculations	  of	  material	  forces”.	  	  He	  wants	  to	   “expose	   the	  centrality	  of	   ideas	   to	   […]	  understandings	  of	  China	   ‘threats’,	  and	   to	   the	  American	  foreign	   policies	   formulated	   in	   response”	   (Turner	   2013,	   1,	   emphasis	   added).	   In	   his	   book	   on	  
American	   Images	   of	   China	   he	   advances	   three	   principal	   arguments,	   premised	   on	   the	  understanding	   that	   “China	  (just	   like	   the	  United	  States)	  exists	  not	  as	  a	  pre-­‐given,	  pre-­‐discursive	  sovereign	  presence,	  but	  as	  what	  Edward	  Said	  called	  an	   ‘imaginative	  geography’”	  (Turner	  2014,	  1):	  	   “[…]	  societal	  images	  of	  China	  have	  always	  provided	  truths	  and	  realities	  about	  that	  country	  and	  its	  people	  within	   the	  United	   States	   […],	  American	   images	  of	  China	  have	   always	  been	   central	   to	   the	  formulation,	  enactment	  and	  justification	  of	  U.S.	  China	  policy	  in	  Washington	  […],	  U.S.	  China	  policy	  has	  always	  been	  active	  in	  the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  imagery	  and	  in	  the	  reaffirmation	  of	  the	  identities	  of	  both	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States”	  (Turner	  2014,	  5–8).	  	  	  More	  specifically,	  he	  argues	  that	  “American	  representations	  of	  China	  have	  been	  […]	  responsible	  for	   creating	  a	   threatening	   identity”,	   and	   that	   “these	   representations	  have	  enabled	  and	   justified	  U.S.	  China	  policies	  which	  themselves	  have	  reaffirmed	  the	  identities	  of	  both	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States,	   protecting	   the	   latter	   when	   seemingly	   threatened	   by	   the	   former”131	  (Turner	   2013,	   1).	  Turner	  emphasizes	  that	  he	  is	  not	  claiming	  causal	  linkages	  or	  cause-­‐effect	  relationships	  between	  “representation	  and	  foreign	  policy”	  (Turner	  2013,	  6,	  7)	  or	  “imagery	  and	  action”	  (Turner	  2014,	  7,	  21).	   Akin	   to	   Goh,	   he	   implicitly	   points	   towards	   the	   ‘causal	   versus	   constitutive’	   understanding,	  when	   claiming	   to	   shift	   from	   ‘why’	   to	   ‘how’-­‐questions	   with	   his	   analysis	   (Turner	   2013,	   6),	   and	  linking	  ‘why’	  questions	  to	  ‘material’	  terms	  and	  ‘how’	  questions	  to	  ‘ideas’	  (Turner	  2014,	  3),	  while	  emphasizing	   the	   “co-­‐constitution	   of	   the	   ideational	   and	   material	   worlds”	   (ibid.,	   23).	   However,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  in	  his	  article	  to	  treat	  discourses	  as	  instrumental	  (cf.	  Turner	  2013,	  5,	  11,	  15,	  17,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  For	  a	  related	  argument	  on	  Japan	  as	  threat	  and	  opportunity	  in	  the	  1980s	  see	  Thorsten	  (2012,	  2).	  	  131	  These	   images/identities	   according	   to	   Turner	   are	   “Idealised,	   Opportunity,	   Uncivilised	   and	   Threatening	   China”	  (Turner	  2014,	  6).	  See	  also	  Björn	  Jerdén	  on	  assessing	   ‘China’s	  new	  assertiveness’	   in	  his	  words	  as	  “a	  social	  fact	  within	  the	   bounds	   of	   the	   intersubjective	   knowledge	   of	   a	   particular	   discourse,	   and	   not	   as	   an	   objectively	   true	   phenomenon	  external	  to	  this	  discourse”	  (Jerdén	  2014,	  87).	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20,	   21,	   for	   a	   more	   nuanced	   reading	   see	   2014,	   27f.),132	  which	   in	   my	   view	  might	   result	   from	   a	  missing	  more	   thorough	   theorization	   of	   ‘identity’	   in	   his	   article	   (as	  well	   as	   on	   ‘discourse’	   in	   his	  book),	  that	  would	  go	  beyond	  references	  to	  Campbell,	  Ashley	  and	  Doty	  (cf.	  Turner	  2013,	  5–6),	  as	  well	  as	   from	  a	  separation	  between	  the	   ‘discursive’	  and	   the	   ‘non-­‐discursive’	   relying	  on	  Foucault	  (cf.	   Turner	   2013,	   4).133 	  In	   his	   book	   he	   seems	   to	   maintain	   this	   separation	   in	   addition	   to	  understanding	   discourse	   ‘only’	   as	   language	   (Turner	   2014,	   24,	   28),	   while	   emphasizing	   that	  material	  power	  is	  constituted	  by	  “understandings	  of	  identity”.	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  As	  I	  will	  lay	  out	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  two,	  my	  argument	  is	  not	  about	  a	  clear-­‐cut-­‐definition	  of	  what	  ‘identity’	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  certain	  characteristics	  that	  for	  instance	  states	  might	  have	  (as	  e.g.	  L.	  J.	  Morris	  2012,	  137–139;	  Nau	  2002,	  4–7,	  2003).	   I	  maintain	   that	   the	  understanding	  of	   identity	  as	  
discourse	  in	  practice	  makes	  the	  central	  difference	  regarding	  my	  questions,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  terms	  of	  methods.134	  Identity	   does	   not	   exist	   ‘in	   itself’,	   but	   only	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   being	   articulated	   in	  discourses,	   or	   in	   other	   words,	   by	   being	   practiced	   (in	   a	   related	   way	   see	   Jan	   Assmann	   cited	   in	  Gustafsson	  and	  Hagström	  2015,	  10).135	  As	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  by	  scholars	  advocating	  a	  discursive	  understanding	  of	  identity	  in	  the	  field	  of	  IR,	  it	  offers	  a	  way	  of	  studying	  identities	  and	  their	  ‘effects’	  without	   presupposing	   a	   certain	   account	   of	   identity	   as	   a	   pre-­‐fixed	   category,	   attributing	   it	   to	  certain	   ‘levels	   of	   analysis’,	   or	   essentializing	   it	   through	   the	   ‘results’	   of	   an	   analysis	   (Doty	   1993,	  298f.,	   302,	   305;	   cf.	   Epstein	   2010b,	   1f.;	   Hansen	   2006,	   1;	   Howarth	   2013,	   233)136,	   as	   ultimately	  happening	  in	  most	  of	  the	  constructivist	  work	  on	  identity	  that	  aims	  to	  carve	  out	  a	  ‘middle	  ground’	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  Campbell	  suggests	  this	  tendency	  e.g.	  also	  in	  Weldes	  (Campbell	  1998,	  224	  and	  FN	  78).	  With	  respect	  to	  narratives	  e.g.	  Jerdén	  rightly	  points	   to	   the	   ‘structural	  power’	   (i.e.	  non-­‐intentional	  and	   impersonal)	  of	  narratives,	  regardless	  of	   their	  origin	  and	  intentions	  (Jerdén	  2014,	  86).	  133	  However,	  Foucault	  in	  his	  writings	  was	  not	  unambiguous	  on	  this	  issue,	  see	  in	  what	  follows.	  	  134	  Thus	  my	  intention	  is	  not	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  certain	  (poststructuralist	  or	  other)	  ‘definition’	  of	  ‘identity’,	  but	  I	  rather	  understand	   the	   focus	  on	   identity	  as	  one	   (among	  others)	   “eye	  opener”	   (cf.	  Berenskoetter	  2010,	  3607),	   that	   can	  shed	  light	  on	  aspects	  neglected	  by	  the	  predominant	  neo-­‐positivist	  accounts.	  135	  Importantly,	  and	  as	  I	   lay	  out	   in	  more	  detail	   in	  chapter	  two,	  by	  the	  term	  ‘articulation’	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  understanding	  according	  to	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  and	  PDT,	  which	  encompasses	  linguistic	  and	  non-­‐linguistic	  elements,	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	   ‘discourse’	   in	   this	  understanding	   is	  not	   restricted	   to	   speech,	  but	   encompasses	  practice	   (or	   could	  even	  be	   termed	  practice),	  see	  in	  what	  follows.	  	  136	  For	  the	  same	  reasons	  I	  argue	  for	  the	  understanding	  and	  study	  of	  ‘ideas’	  as	  discourse,	  not	  as	  “substantive	  content	  of	  discourse”,	  nor	  of	  	   ‘discourse’	  as	  “a	  term	  that	  refers	  to	  talking	  about	  one’s	  ideas”	  respectively	  (cf.	  Schmidt	  2008,	  303,	  305	   emphasis	   added).	   In	   this	   sense	   I	   would	   for	   instance	   also	   not	   speak	   about	   the	   U.S.	   ‘invoking	   American	  Exceptionalism’	  (as	  i.e.	  Nayak	  and	  Malone	  2009,	  272),	  as	  this	  could	  be	  understood	  in	  an	  instrumental	  way,	  	  but	  rather	  of	  them	  ‘practicing’	  or	  ‘living’	  it	  through	  the	  articulation	  of	  their	  identity	  in	  difference	  to	  ‘others’.	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between	  ‘rationalist’	  and	  what	  is	  in	  turn	  called	  post-­‐modern,	  radical	  or	  critical	  constructivism	  (cf.	  Zehfuss	  2002,	  5).137	  	  	  A	  whole	  lot	  has	  been	  written	  on	  constructivism138	  and	  identity	  and	  their	  connectedness	  in	  IR,	  and	  much	  of	  it	  is	  related	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Alexander	  Wendt,	  his	  proclaimed	  “via	  media”	  (Wendt	  1999,	  40)	  and	  reactions	  to	   it139,	   that	  shall	  not	  be	  repeated	  in	   its	  extensiveness	  here.	   In	  a	  nutshell	  and	  relating	  to	  the	  ‘ideas/materiality’	  divide	  as	  well	  as	  the	  understanding	  of	  causality,	  the	  problem	  in	  my	  eyes	  is	  that	  although	  constructivists	  might	  argue	  against	  reading	  identity	  “as	  a	  variable	  in	  a	  causal	   chain	   […	   because]	   culture,	   identities	   and	   interests	   are	   mutually	   constituted”	   (cf.	  Berenskoetter	   2010,	   3599;	   e.g.	   Risse	   et	   al.	   1999,	   149),	   they	   often	   ultimately	   fall	   back	   on	  essentializing	  identity140	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  im-­‐	  or	  explicitly	  preserve	  identity	  as	  a	  concept	  from	  the	  alleged	  ‘fluidity’	  of	  post-­‐positivist	  approaches	  (cf.	  also	  Howarth	  2013,	  226;	  cf.	  Zehfuss	  2002,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  On	   the	   problematic	   of	   these	   kinds	   of	   ‘classifications’	   see	   (Gofas	   and	   Hay	   2010,	   30;	   P.	   T.	   Jackson	   2011,	   202ff.;	  Jacobsen	  2003,	  51–54).	  On	  what	  Ole	  Waever	  called	   ‘post-­‐radical	  reflectivism’	  –	  “reflectivists	  not	  sticking	  to	  the	  post-­‐structuralist	   guerilla	   war	   against	   the	   ‘system’,	   but	   also	   conducting	   concrete	   analysis	   in	   dialogue	   with	   the	  establishment”	  –	  see	  Waever	  (1997,	  167,	  169).	  On	  IR-­‐constructivism	  as	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  “scientific	  ontology”	  see	  Jackson	  (2011,	  141–142).	  138	  Linking	  up	  to	  the	  clarification	  of	  the	  terms	  postmodernism	  and	  poststructuralism	  in	  chapter	  1.1,	  ‘constructivism’	  in	  turn	  is	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  sometimes	  criticized	  for	  the	  same	  reasons	  as	  poststructuralism	  (cf.	  Abdelal,	  Blyth,	  and	  Parsons	  2010,	  8;	  cf.	  also	  P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2011,	  122),	  or	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  claimed	  to	  be	  more	  ‘down	  to	  earth’	  than	  postmodernism,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  methods	  (cf.	  Price	  and	  Smit	  1998).	  Mostly	  the	  critique	  is	  only	  leveled	  at	  what	  is	  called	  ‘critical’	  or	  ‘radical’	   constructivism	   that	   in	   these	   cases	   is	   often	   taken	   to	   include	   poststructuralism	   (cf.	   Zehfuss	   2002,	   6f.).	   For	  instance	   Price	   and	   Smit	   use	   the	   term	   ‘critical	   international	   theory’	   very	   broadly	   to	   refer	   to	   what	   they	   call	   	   ‘post-­‐positivist’	  and	  ‘post-­‐rationalist’	  works	  including	  post-­‐Marxist,	  Frankfurt	  School	  influenced,	  and	  ‘postmodern’	  authors.	  Furthermore	   they	   distinguish	   ‘modern’	   and	   ‘postmodern’	   forms	   of	   critical	   international	   theory,	   and	  make	   the	   same	  distinction	   within	   constructivism,	   while	   acknowledging	   that	   there	   are	   no	   clear	   lines	   of	   separation	   (Price	   and	   Smit	  1998,	   267,	   289).	   Sometimes	   scholars	   themselves	   adopt	   the	   characterization	   ‘critical’	   or	   ‘social’	   constructivist,	   see	  examples	   in	  Campbell	  (1998,	  281	  FN	  71).	   In	  general,	   the	  central	  difference	  to	  constructivism	  in	  IR	  in	  (almost)	  all	   its	  variants	   is	   that	   the	   latter	   “agree[s]	   on	   the	   assumption	   of	   limited	  construction	  […],	  when	   [its]	   constructivist	   analysis	  starts,	  some	  reality	  has	  already	  been	  made	  and	  is	  taken	  as	  given”	  (Zehfuss	  2002,	  10	  emphases	  added).	  In	  other	  words:	  constructivism’s	   dualism	   is	   what	   enables	   it	   being	   invoked	   as	   a	   ‘middle	   ground’	   between	   rationalism	   and	  poststructuralism,	  thus	  as	  “a	  critical	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  scientifically	  sound	  alternative	  to	  the	  mainstream	  (cf.	  Zehfuss	  2002,	   252,	   253	   emphasis	   added).	   Price	   and	   Smit	   call	   this	   “minimal	   foundationalism”	   (with	   reference	   to	   Mark	  Hoffmann)	  or	   “small-­‐t	   truth	  claims”	   (Price	  and	  Smit	  1998,	  262,	  272).	  David	  Howarth	  differentiates	  poststructuralist	  theories	   from	   constructivism	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   poststructuralism	   goes	   further	   in	   terms	   of	   adhering	   to	   a	   “radical	  materialism”,	   that	   “is	   not	   just	   an	   epistemological	   and	   methodological	   orientation,	   which	   accepts	   the	   existence	   of	  multiple	   perspectives	   about	   reality”.	   ‘Radical	   materialism’	   is	   understood	   as	   foregrounding	   the	   contingency	   and	  contestability	  of	  social	  and	  natural	  reality	  on	  an	  ontological	  level	  (Howarth	  2013,	  12,	  239f.).	  François	  Debrix	  argues	  for	  a	  distinction	  between	  poststructuralism	  and	  constructivism,	  although	  he	  reads	  them	  both	  as	  ‘nonfoundationalist’	  (see	  chapter	   two),	   for	   what	   he	   terms	   an	   epistemological	   motivation.	   This	   refers	   to	   differences	   in	   constructivists’	   and	  poststructuralists’	   treatment	   of	   language.	   While	   both	   refer	   to	   language	   as	   performative,	   constructivists	   take	   the	  speaker	   as	   performer	   and	   language	   as	   his	   tool,	  while	   poststructuralists	   see	   language	   itself	   as	   performative	   and	  not	  only	  dependent	  on	  the	  speakers	  intentions	  (Debrix	  2003,	  6f.;	  see	  also	  Fierke	  2003,	  68ff.).	  139	  For	   overviews	   with	   different	   emphases	   see	   e.g.	   Lapid	   (1996),	   Berenskoetter	   (2010),	   Zehfuss	   (2002),	   Zehfuss	  (2006),	   	   Hynek	   and	   Teti	   (2010),	   Cooper	   and	   Brubaker	   (2000),	   Neumann	   (1999,	   chap.	   1).	   On	   the	   ‘middle	   ground’	  question	  more	  generally	  and	  from	  a	  critical	  realist	  perspective	  see	  Patomäki	  and	  Wight	  (2002).	  140	  See	   the	   exemplary	   criticisms	   of	   Wendt	   by	   Zehfuss	   (2006),	   Epstein	   (2010b),	   Hansen	   (Hansen	   2006,	   17ff.),	  Inayatullah	   and	   Blaney	   (1996)	   and	   Chakrabarti	   Pasic	   (1996),	   as	   well	   as	   the	   more	   general	   account	   on	   the	  ‘normalization’	  of	  constructivism	  by	  Hynek	  and	  Teti	  (2010)	  and	  the	  criticism	  by	  Campbell	   (1998,	  217ff.)	  on	  treating	  identity	  as	  a	  ‘variable’.	  See	  also	  Hagström	  (2014,	  5),	  and	  Rumelili	  (2004,	  31–32).	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259f.).141	  In	   Maja	   Zehfuss’	   words:	   “[…]	   in	   Wendt’s	   work	   taking	   the	   via	   media	   depends	   on	  proposing	   a	   conception	   of	   identity	   based	   on	   social	   construction	   which	   nevertheless	   remains	  unitary	  so	  as	  to	  function	  as	  a	  variable	  in	  an	  explanatory	  process”	  (Zehfuss	  2002,	  253).142	  	  As	  Fredrick	  Cooper	  and	  Rogers	  Brubaker	  in	  turn	  point	  out,	  within	  scholarship	  on	  ‘identity’,	  one	  often	   finds	   an	   “uneasy	   amalgam	   of	   constructivist	   language	   and	   essentialist	   argumentation”	  (Cooper	  and	  Brubaker	  2000,	  6,	  27f.).143	  For	   instance	  David	  Kang144	  in	  his	  China	  Rising	  claims	  to	  place	   a	   “central	   causal	   emphasis	   on	   the	   role	   of	   national	   identities	   in	   shaping	   how	   states	  determine	  and	  respond	  to	  threats	  in	  international	  relations”.	  He	  understands	  identity	  as	  “how	  a	  nation	  defines	  itself	  in	  the	  world,	  what	  it	  thinks	  is	  an	  appropriate	  role	  and	  actions	  for	  itself	  and	  others,	  and	  as	  a	  ‘relatively	  stable	  understanding	  and	  expectation	  about	  self	  and	  others	  …[that	  is]	  socially	  constructed’”	  (Kang	  2007,	  18,	  20	  quoting	  Wendt).	  Kang	  wants	  to	  “measure	  identity”	  by	  using	   “widely	   accepted	   social	   science	   approaches”,	   such	   as	   opinion	   polls,	   statements	   and	  speeches,	  as	  well	  as	  “what	  a	  country	  actually	  does”	  (Kang	  2007,	  21).145	  Another	  example	  from	  the	  field	  of	  U.S.-­‐China	  related	  studies	  –	  although	  still	  slightly	  exceptional	  because	  of	   its	  explicitness	  and	   extensiveness	   regarding	   theoretical	   and	   methodological	   considerations	   –	   is	   the	   work	   of	  David	  Rousseau.	  His	   intention	   is	   to	   shed	  new	   light	  on	   the	  debate	   about	   the	   impact	  of	  material	  and/or	   ideational	   factors	   “by	   presenting	   a	  model	   of	   identity	   formation	   that	   can	   explain	  when	  ideas	   will	   (and	   will	   not)	   have	   a	   decisive	   impact	   on	   threat	   perception”,	   his	   case	   studies	   being	  “American	  and	  Japanese	  responses	  to	  the	  economic,	  political	  and	  military	  rise	  of	  China	  over	  the	  past	   two	   decades”	   (Rousseau	   2006,	   3,	   7).	   The	   central	   conclusion	   of	   his	   book	   is	   that	   “threat	  perception	  is	  a	  social	  construct”	  and	  that	  it	  is	  the	  degree	  of	  “shared	  identity”	  or	  the	  definition	  of	  “in	  group”	  and	  “out	  group”	  that	  determines	  whether	  ‘material	  factors’	  are	  viewed	  as	  threatening	  or	  not.	  He	  is	  guided	  by	  the	  questions	  how	  individuals	  develop	  ideas,	  how	  they	  transmit	  them	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  On	   a	   general	   ‘reclaiming’	   of	   “identity	   as	   a	   useful	   variable	   for	   the	   social	   sciences”	   see	  Abdelal	   et	   al.	   (2006),	   for	   a	  criticism	  of	  “attempts	  to	  ‘soften’	  the	  term,	  to	  acquit	  it	  of	  the	  charge	  of	  ‘essentialism’”	  see	  Cooper	  and	  Brubaker	  (2000).	  142	  Bahar	  Rumelili	   in	   turn	   claims	   that	   ‘liberal	   constructivists’	   (in	   contrast	   to	   critical	   constructivists,	  who	  draw	   from	  poststructuralism	   in	  his	   understanding)	   compromise	   their	   premises	   on	   the	   socially	   constructed	  nature	   of	   identities	  because	  they	  do	  not	  see	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  ontological	  view	  of	  identity	  as	  constituted	  through	  difference,	  and	  a	  “behavioral”	  (i.e.	  here:	  empirical)	  relationship	  between	  self	  and	  other	  (Rumelili	  2004,	  34).	  ‘Critical	  constructivists’	  in	  turn	   in	   his	   view	   tend	   to	   read	   the	   ontological	   preconditions	   into	   the	   “behavioral	   relationship”,	   thus	   neglecting	  cases/possibilities	  of	  difference	  without	  othering.	  For	  a	  related	  problematic	  within	  the	  theory	  of	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  see	  Opratko	  (2012).	  	  	  143	  However,	  I	  see	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  amalgam	  not	  so	  much	  in	  “the	  tension	  between	  the	  constructivist	  language	  that	  is	  required	   by	   academic	   correctness	   and	   the	   foundationalist	   or	   essentialist	   message	   that	   is	   required	   if	   appeals	   to	  ‘identity’	   are	   to	   be	   effective	   in	   practice”,	   but	   in	   the	   residual	   dualism	   as	   well	   as	   the	   mechanistic	   understanding	   of	  causality	  in	  constructivist	  approaches,	  that	  I	  will	  address	  in	  what	  follows.	  144	  These	  and	  the	  following	  criticisms	  are	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘bashing’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  focusing	  on	  the	  deficits	  of	  other	   approaches	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   ones	   own	   (cf.	   Scherrer	   1999,	   who	   eschews	   giving	   a	   ‘state	   of	   the	   art’	   for	   this	  reason).	  However,	   I	  believe	  that	   the	  kind	  of	  (in	  some	  cases	  probably	  seemingly	  petty)	  problematizations	  that	   follow	  are	  necessary,	  as	  these	  scholars	  are	  prominent	  and	  widely	  cited	  in	  their	  field,	  which	  calls	  for	  clarity	  or	  clarifications	  in	  their	  formulations.	  	  145	  He	  indeed	  does	  refer	  to	  what	  I	  would	  call	  ‘sources’	  as	  “measures”.	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others,	  how	  certain	   ideas	  become	  dominant	   in	   society	   –	  here	  Rousseau	  even	   refers	   to	  Antonio	  Gramsci	  and	  the	  question	  of	  ‘hegemonic	  ideas’	  –	  and	  what	  the	  international	  consequences	  of	  this	  dominance	   are	   (Rousseau	   2006,	   4,	   6,	   14,	   	   211).	   As	   his	   aim	   is	   to	   “demonstrate	   the	   utility	   of	   a	  
testable	   constructivist	   theory	   of	   international	   politics”	   (Rousseau	   2006,	   8	   emphasis	   added),	   he	  evidently	  sticks	  with	  a	  conceptualization	  of	  ‘ideas’	  and	  ‘identity’	  as	  ‘variables’	  (i.e.	  fixed	  ‘entities’)	  that	   aims	   at	   generalization	   and	   hence	   makes	   foundational	   claims	   (e.g.	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   fully	  constituted	  individual	  subject)	  at	  several	  instances,	  and	  for	  instance	  conceives	  of	  discourse	  only	  as	  language	  (e.g.	  Rousseau	  2006,	  62,	  71,	  142).	  	  I	  address	  the	  in	  my	  eyes	  widely	  disseminated	  misunderstandings	  about	  fluidity,	  ‘anything	  goes’,	   relativism,	   idealism	   or	   ‘missing	   real	   world	   relevance’	   (cf.	   Howarth	   2013,	   226)	   of	   the	  poststructuralist	  understanding	  of	  identity	  in	  chapter	  two.	  To	  put	  it	  briefly	  in	  this	  context:	  in	  my	  eyes	   one	   should	   not	   conflate	   a	   non-­‐essentialist	   understanding	   of	   identity	   in	   practice	   with	   an	  impossibility	  to	  conceptualize	   it	  as	  an	  analytical	  category	  per	  se	  (i.e.	  although	  identity	  does	  not	  exist	  as	  fixed	  phenomenon	  or	  essence,	  we	  can	  still	  try	  to	  grasp	  and	  study	  it).	  Neither	  should	  we	  reify	   ‘categories	   of	   practice’	   (i.e.	   what	   we	   study	   through	   research	   ‘on	   the	   ground’)	   through	  ‘categories	   of	   analysis’	   (i.e.	   theory/concepts).	   But	   the	   answer	   to	   this	   ‘problem’	   can	   of	   course	  equally	  not	  be	  to	  ‘fill’	  the	  category	  with	  everything	  ‘identity’	  in	  practice	  could	  possibly	  encompass	  (cf.	   Cooper	   and	   Brubaker	   2000,	   1–5).146	  As	   has	   been	   repeatedly	   pointed	   out	   in	   discursive	  approaches	  towards	   identity,	   for	   instance	   in	  works	  that	  precisely	   focus	  on	  how	  articulations	  of	  collective	   and/or	   national	   identity	   make	   (U.S.)	   foreign	   policy,	   a	   discursive	   or	   performative	  reading	  of	   identity	   concerning	   theory	  and	  analysis	   sheds	   light	  on	   the	  productive	  as	  well	   as	   the	  
constraining	  features	  implicated	  in	  articulations	  of	  identity	  ‘on	  the	  ground’	  (Campbell	  1998,	  9–13;	  Doty	  1993,	  299,	  314;	   see	  also	  Hansen	  2006,	  1;	  Milliken	  1999,	  229;	  e.g.	  Weldes	  and	  Saco	  1996,	  373).	   Interestingly,	   this	  work	   is	  not	   taken	   into	  account	   for	   instance	   in	   the	  overview	  by	  Cooper	  and	  Brubaker,	  although	  their	  suggestions	  to	  dismiss	  the	  term	  ‘identity’	  as	  analytical	  category	  and	  rather	   go	   for	   what	   they	   call	   identification,	   self-­‐understandings/self-­‐representations,	  commonality/connectedness	   (Cooper	   and	   Brubaker	   2000,	   14–33;	   cf.	   also	   Richard	   Ned	   Lebow	  2012,	   17),	   speaks	   to	   many	   of	   the	   issues	   addressed	   by	   discourse	   theorists	   (cf.	   Howarth	   2013,	  244ff.	   on	   identification).147 	  In	   line	   with	   Felix	   Berenskoetter’s	   overview	   one	   can	   align	   the	  aforementioned	  works	   among	   others	   to	   scholarship	   focusing	   on	   “how	   conceptions	   of	   national	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  See	   also	   Rumelili	   (2004)	   on	   what	   he	   criticizes	   as	   conflation	   between	   ontological	   premises	   and	   ‘empirical	  observations’,	  cf.	  also	  Opratko	  (2012).	  	  147	  Although	  Cooper	  and	  Brubaker	  seem	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  any	  “Foucauldian/post-­‐Freudian	  understanding	  of	   ‘identification’”	  and	  the	  “discursive	  and	  psychoanalytic	  repertoire”	  (p.	  43,	  FN	  57),	   they	  do	  consider	   ‘identification’	  through	  discourses	  and	  “public	  narratives”	  (ibid.,	  16).	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identity	   are	   constructed	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   state,	   specifically	   on	   how	   images	   of	   Self	   and	   Other	  influence	   foreign	  policy”	   (Berenskoetter	   2010,	   3604),	   a	   topic	   that	   is	   also	  missing	   from	  Cooper	  and	  Brubaker’s	  overview.	  These	  accounts	  point	   to	   “states	  as	  never	   finished	  entities”	   (Campbell	  1998,	  12)	  “constructed	  by	  the	  discursive	  practices	  of	  those	  who	  speak	  about,	  write	  about,	  and	  act	  on	  its	  behalf”	  (Doty	  1993,	  310)	  and	  whose	  foreign	  policy	  or	  “the	  policy	  of	  making	  foreign”	  (Dalby	  1988,	  419)	   is	  a	  discursive/performative	  articulation	  and	  making	  of	   its	   self-­‐identity	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  an	  external	  other	  (cf.	  Campbell	  1998,	  9;	  Doty	  1993,	  310;	  Hagström	  2014;	  Hansen	  2006,	  6).148	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  theoretical	  controversies	  on	  ‘state	  identity’	  in	  IR,	  Jens	  Bartelson	  –	  by	  linking	  them	  to	  questions	  of	  ‘being’	  and	  ‘knowing’149	  –	  seems	  to	  capture	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  by	  asserting	  that	  in	  this	  understanding	  the	  state	  “is	  but	  a	  name	  for	  a	  certain	  structural	   impossibility	  made	  possible	  by	   a	  political	  practice”,	   and	   in	   line	  with	   the	   ‘international	   system’	   “nothing	  but	   [a]	  momentary	  stabilization	  […]	  of	  historical	  practices	  of	  power	  politics”	  (Bartelson	  1998,	  321,322).	  	  Another	  reason	  for	  misunderstandings	  about	  ‘categories’	  and	  ‘practices’	  in	  my	  view	  is	  the	  residual	   ‘ideational	   versus	   material’-­‐dualism	   (and	   in	   this	   understanding	   discursive	   equals	  ideational)	   even	   among	   self-­‐declared	   ‘all	   the	   way	   down’	   discourse-­‐approaches.	   Although	   for	  instance	  Charlotte	  Epstein	   initially	  claims	  to	  revisit	  and	  ultimately	  reject	   this	  distinction,	   in	   the	  same	   piece	   she	   does	   speak	   of	   “the	   co-­‐constitution	   of	   discursive	   and	   material	   factors”	   and	  “discursive	   and	  material	   interests”.	   Furthermore,	   in	   her	   formulations	   she	   ultimately	   seems	   to	  maintain	   a	   separation	   between	   ‘ideas’	   and	   ‘discourse’	   although	   claiming	   not	   to	   do	   so	   (Epstein	  2010a,	   182,	   183).	   The	   same	   unclarity	   lies	   within	   Lene	   Hansen’s	   work	   when	   she	   states	   that	  “poststructuralism	   argues	   that	   foreign	   policy	   discourses	   articulate	   and	   intertwine	   material	  factors	  and	  ideas	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  the	  two	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  one	  another”.	  Hence,	  are	  they	  supposed	  to	  be	  ‘actually’	  separated	  from	  “non-­‐discursive	  material	  factors”,	  as	  “discourse	  incorporates	   material	   as	   well	   as	   ideational	   factors”	   (Hansen	   2006,	   1,	   17,	   21)?	   Nonetheless,	  Epstein	   does	   address	   a	   crucial	   point	   about	   a	   discursive	   approach	   towards	   ‘ideas’:	   it	   precisely	  tackles	   the	   ‘how	   ideas	   matter’	   question	   without	   having	   to	   wonder	   about	   “getting	   into	   actors	  heads	  to	  discover	  ideas”	  (Epstein	  2010a,	  182,	  183)	  as	  has	  basically	  been	  the	  case	  for	  most	  of	  the	  ‘ideas’-­‐literature,	  and	  which	  in	  my	  view	  is	  again	  linked	  to	  the	  ‘causal	  story’	  (see	  in	  what	  follows)	  most	  authors	  are	  trying	  to	  tell	  (see	  also	  Weldes	  and	  Saco	  for	  their	  criticism	  of	  the	  study	  of	  ‘belief-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  I	  address	  the	  criticism	  by	  Berenskoetter	  and	  others	  of	  too	  much	  emphasis	  on	  ‘the	  necessary	  other’	  or	  ‘othering’	  in	  chapter	  two.	  See	  also	  Hansen	  (2006,	  38–54).	  149	  Michael	  C.	  Williams	  in	  turn	  argues	  that	  a	  specific	  conception	  of	  identity	  related	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  “liberal	  sensibility”	  is	  constitutive	  of	  (neo-­‐realist)	  theories	  of	  IR,	  in	  particular	  of	  theories	  of	  security,	  and	  he	  sees	  the	  debates	  between	  neo-­‐realists	  and	  constructivists	  as	  “historically	  located	  disputes	  about	  the	  politics	  of	  theorizing	  security	  and	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  doing	  so	  in	  different	  ways”,	  rather	  than	  as	  differences	  in	  theoretical	  foundations	  (Williams	  1998,	  204–206).	  See	  also	  Walker	  (1995).	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systems’	   in	   this	   respect	   (1996,	   371f.),	   as	  well	   as	   Krebs	   and	   Jackson	   (2007)	   for	   their	   focus	   on	  public	  rhetoric).150	  	  	  
Ideas	  
	  While	  I	  certainly	  argue	  for	  using	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘discourse’	  instead	  of	  ‘ideas’	  for	  reasons	  I	  will	  lay	  out	   in	   what	   follows,	   I	   address	   the	   ‘ideas-­‐debate’	   in	   IR	   and	   IPE	   here	   as	   exemplification	   of	   the	  dualist	  ‘ideational’/’material’	  divide	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE,	  as	  it	  is	  connected	  and	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  similar	  controversies	  around	  the	  terms	  identity	  and	  ultimately	  also	  discourse.	  While	  the	  ideas-­‐debate	  is	  related	   to	  my	   topic	   of	   ‘economic	   discourses’,	   as	   there	   are	   a	   few	  works	   on	   ideas	   and	   economic	  policy,	  it	  will	  not	  resurface	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  those	  on	  identity	  and	  discourses	  in	  chapter	  two	  –	   as	   ‘ideas’	   are	   conceptualized	   and	   treated	   as	   discourse	   in	   PDT	   –	   another	   reason	   for	   why	   I	  address	  it	  more	  extensively	  here	  in	  this	  chapter.151	  	  The	  so	  called	  ‘ideational	  turn’	  in	  the	  social	  and	  political	  sciences	  in	  general	  has	  evolved	  in	  numerous	  debates	  and	  disputes	  on	  if	  and	  why	  ‘ideas’	  do	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  ‘material’,	  and	  if	  and	  how	   they	   should	  be	   studied	   (De	  Goede	  2003;	   cf.	  Gofas	  and	  Hay	  2010;	   e.g.	   J.	  Goldstein	  and	  Keohane	   1993;	   Hagström	   2014;	   Hall	   1989;	   cf.	   P.	   T.	   Jackson	   2011;	   and	   Jacobsen	   1995	   for	   IPE,	  2003;	  Laffey	  and	  Weldes	  1997;	  Owen	  2010;	  Schmidt	  2008).152	  In	  a	  nutshell	  it	  can	  be	  stated	  that	  the	  mainstream	  (constructivist)	  research	  focuses	  on	  the	  ‘impact’	  of	  ‘ideas’	  in	  terms	  of	  	  ‘variables’,	  whereas	   those	   called	   ‘radical’	   or	   ‘post-­‐positivist’	   constructivists	   (see	   earlier	   footnote	   in	   this	  chapter)	   study	   ‘ideas’	   in	   terms	   of	   language	   and	   discourses	  (Hülsse	   2003,	   214,225;	   cf.	   Nymalm	  2014).153	  For	   IPE,	   de	   Goede	   summarizes	   the	   “three	   models	   of	   ‘ideas’	   in	   IPE”	   as	   epistemic	  community	   approach,	   the	   work	   by	   Susan	   Strange	   (and	   those	   inspired	   by	   her)	   on	   knowledge	  structures,	  and	  approaches	  based	  on	  Robert	  Cox’s	  reading	  of	  Gramsci.	  None	  of	  these	  approaches	  goes	   beyond	   the	   conceptual	   separation	   between	   a	   ‘material’	   and	   an	   ‘ideational’	   sphere,	   as	  poststructuralist	   work	   does,	   i.e.	   by	   emphasizing	   that	   neither	   the	   politics/economics	   nor	   the	  ‘idealism/realism’	  distinction	  exist	  beyond	   their	  historical	   articulation	   (De	  Goede	  2003,	  86–91,	  2006,	  5;	  cf.	  also	  Hansen	  2006,	  10	  on	  “causal	  epistemology”	  as	  discourse;	  Howarth	  2013,	  62,	  254).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  See	  also	  Michael	  Shapiro’s	  argument	  for	  the	  study	  of	   ‘practice’	  rather	  than	  ‘perceptions’	  or	   ‘belief	  systems’	  (1989,	  18).	  	  151	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  ‘ideas’	  literature	  from	  a	  PDT	  perspective	  see	  Howarth	  (2013,	  253ff.).	  	  152	  For	  an	  overview	  and	  critique	  of	  ‘ideational	  analysis’	  in	  political	  science	  see	  Finlayson	  (2004,	  533ff.),	  especially	  FN	  18,	  p.	  544.	  	  153	  For	   the	   field	   of	   IPE,	   in	   his	   overview	   of	   “constructivism	   in	   IPE”	   Broome	   speaks	   of	   interpretive	   (i.e.	   critical),	  qualitative	  (i.e.	  conventional)	  and	  quantitative	  (i.e.	  embracing	  rationalist	  methods)	  constructivism,	  mostly	  dependent	  on	   what	   ‘methods’	   they	   use	   and	   still	   separate	   from	   “non-­‐positivist”	   approaches	   (Broome	   2013,	   197),	   or	   what	   are	  called“	  post-­‐modern	  constructivists”	  in	  other	  overviews	  (e.g.	  Abdelal,	  Blyth,	  and	  Parsons	  2010,	  13).	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The	  divide	  stays	  also	  true	  for	  the	  mainstream	  of	  approaches	  to	  explaining	  U.S.	  foreign	  economic	  policy,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  classified	  as	  “system-­‐centered,	  society-­‐centered	  or	  state-­‐centered	   approaches”	   (cf.	   G.	   J.	   Ikenberry,	   Lake,	   and	  Mastanduno	   1988).	   In	  most	   cases	   –	   in	  my	  view	   also	   the	   self-­‐proclaimed	   ‘interpretive	   constructivist’	   ones	   claiming	   that	   ‘ideas’	   constitute	  how	  actors	  conceive	  of	  their	  ‘interests’	  	  –	  this	  subsequently	  means	  that	  ‘ideas’	  are	  ultimately	  still	  understood	  as	  “epiphenomenal	  factors	  that	  either	  reinforce	  or	  compete	  with	  an	  actor’s	  material	  interests	  as	  alternative	  motivations	  for	  their	  behavior”	  (Broome	  2013,	  193;	  Finlayson	  2004,	  530f.;	  Howarth	   2013,	   255	   on	   the	   separation	   of	   “ideas”	   and	   “interests”;	   see	   Turner	   2014,	   20	   for	   this	  assessment	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   U.S.-­‐China	   relations),	   and	   are	   mostly	   (implicitly)	   treated	   as	  ‘objects’	  (Laffey	  and	  Weldes	  1997,	  194).154	  Although	  the	  debate	  is	  more	  recent	  in	  IPE	  than	  in	  IR,	  it	  still	   runs	   largely	   along	   the	   same	   ‘dualist’	   lines	   in	   IR	   –	   revolving	   around	   the	   question	  whether	  ‘ideas’	  should	  be	  accorded	  a	  causal	  role	  independent	  of	   ‘material	  factors’	  or	  not	  (Gofas	  and	  Hay	  2010,	  5,	  15).	  This	  becomes	  clear	   in	  Andreas	  Gofas	  and	  Colin	  Hay’s	  overview	  of	  the	  “varieties	  of	  ideational	   explanation”	   from	   rational	   choice	   theory	   to	   what	   they	   call	   “thick	   (radical)	  constructivism”,	   in	  which	   they	  point	  out	   the	  different	  manifestations	  of	   “the	  persistence	  of	   the	  perennial	   dualisms	   in	   political	   analysis	   […]	   at	   the	   ontological,	   epistemological	   and	  methodological	   level	   of	   analysis”	   (Gofas	   and	   Hay	   2010,	   4,	   17).	   In	   the	   end,	   Gofas	   and	   Hay	  themselves	   abide	  by	  what	   they	   call	   “analytical	   duality”.155	  For	  Albert	  Yee	   the	   “two	  overarching	  dilemmas	  of	  ideational	  analysis”	  are	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  If	   one	  wanted	   to	   stick	   to	   the	   term	   ‘ideas’	   (instead	   of	   discourses,	   as	   proposed	   in	   this	   study),	   in	   accordance	  with	  poststructuralist	   discourse	   theory	   they	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   “an	   upshot	   of	   discursive	   variation”	   in	   terms	   of	  	  “constituted	  by	  the	  meanings	  we	  learn	  and	  reproduce,	  not	  [as]	  their	  source;	  nor	  are	  they	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  language	  we	  speak”	  (Nabers	  2015,	  forthcoming).	  	  155	  Gofas	   and	   Hay	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   between	   their	   “analytical	   duality”	   and	   what	   they	   call	   “ontic	  duality”/”analytical	  dualism”,	  such	  as	  that	  theirs	  is	  just	  a	  “heuristic	  device”	  not	  an	  ontological	  position.	  However,	  in	  my	  view	  it	  remains	  unclear	  how	  their	  critical	  realist	  position	  could	  be	  conceived	  of	  in	  non-­‐dualist	  terms	  (cf.	  P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2011,	   37).	   For	   example,	   Gofas	   and	   Hay	   criticize	   ‘postmodernism’	   as	   a	   form	   of	   ‘idealism’	   as	   in	   their	   view	   it	   denies	  “causal	  efficacy	   to	  material	   factors”	  and	  gives	  “absolutely	  no	  consideration	  whatsoever	   to	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  [‘cats’	  and	   ‘dogs’]	   materiality	   might	   set	   limits	   on	   the	   social	   properties	   assigned	   to	   them”(Gofas	   and	   Hay	   2010,	   32,33).	  Apparently	  for	  Gofas	  and	  Hay	  it	  is	  not	  feasible,	  that	  the	  authors	  they	  cite	  as	  ‘postmodern’	  (e.g.	  Doty)	  precisely	  eschew	  this	   kind	   of	   dichotomization	   and	   hierarchization	   between	   ‘material’	   and	   ‘social’	   properties,	   while	   they	   themselves	  claim	   to	  maintain	   this	   separation	   ‘only’	   for	   analytical	   purposes.	  While	   criticizing	   the	   ‘mainstream’	  understanding	  of	  causality	   for	   good	   reasons,	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   Gofas	   and	   Hay’s	   “constructivist	   critical	   realist”	   conceptualization	   of	  causality	  also	  remains	  committed	  to	  a	  residual	  dualism.	  While	  critical	  realist	  authors	  seek	  to	  broaden	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘cause’	  from	  only	  referring	  to	  a	  narrow	  understanding	  as	  ‘observable	  efficient	  or	  moving	  causes’	  (hence	  the	  billiard	  ball	  analogy,	  see	  in	  what	  follows),	  they	  also	  aim	  at	  “deepening”	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  “deep	  ontology”	  that	  conceives	  of	  causes	  not	  as	  ‘observable	  regularity	  relations’	  but	  as	  “real	  causal	  powers	  of	  ontological	  entities”.	  The	  latter	  relates	  to	  “drawing	  on	  philosophical	  realism	  […]	  that	  maintains	  that	  we	  must	  accept	  that	  the	  world	  exists	  independently	  of	  our	  efforts	  to	  understand	  it”	  (Kurki	  2008,	  6,	  10,	  11).	  	  In	  her	  criticism	  of	  ‘reflectivists’	  (the	  term	  being	  originally	  coined	  by	  Robert	  Keohane	  in	  his	  distinction	  to	  ‘rationalists’,	  see	  Kurki	  (2008,	  2f.),	  Hansen	  (2006,	  4f.),	  Jackson	  (2011,	  158)),	  Milja	  Kurki	   as	   well	   buys	   into	   the	   typical	   misunderstanding	   resulting	   from	   the	   maintenance	   of	   the	   ‘material’/’ideational’	  dichotomy.	   In	   this	  sense	  she	  disapproves	  of	  reflectivists’	  alleged	  concentrating	  only	  on	  the	  study	  of	   the	  “‘ideational’,	  normative	  or	  discursive	  aspects	  of	  world	  politics,	  without	  asking	  holistic	  questions	  about	  the	  material	  constraints	  and	  conditioning	  of	  rules,	  norms	  and	  discourses”	  (Kurki	  2008,	  17).	  See	  also	  Colin	  Wight	  (2013)	  in	  his	  criticism	  of	  Patrick	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“[f]irst,	  meaning	   oriented	   behavioralists	   and	   ideational	   institutionalists	  who	   focus	   on	   causation	  generally	   do	   not	   analyze	   the	   causal	   mechanisms	   stemming	   from	   the	   ideas	   themselves.	   Second,	  discursivists	  who	  analyze	  ideas	  themselves	  generally	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  their	  causal	  effects.	  Together,	  these	  dilemmas	  constitute	  the	  particular	  manifestations	  within	  the	  international	  relations	  field	  of	  both	   the	   enduring	   disagreement	   between	   explanation	   and	   understanding	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	  and	   the	   more	   recent	   controversy	   over	   modernity	   and	   postmodernity	   in	   contemporary	   social	  theory”	  (A.	  S.	  Yee	  1996,	  102).	  	  	  Yee’s	  issue	  is	  not	  with	  dualism,	  but	  through	  the	  overview	  in	  his	  article	  –	  in	  which	  he	  claims	  that	  the	  “core	  problem”	  of	  “ideational	  analysis”	  lies	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  “the	  causal	  effects”	  of	  ideas	  (A.	  S.	  Yee	  1996,	  70)	  –	  it	  becomes	  very	  clear	  that	  the	  dualism	  between	  ‘idea’	  and	  ‘policy’	  or	  ‘behavior’	  is	  linked	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  causality	  or	  causal	  relations	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  Humean	  conception:	  tied	  to	  observable	  regularities	  that	  give	  grounds	  for	  prediction	  and	  manifest	  themselves	  as	  ‘efficient	  causes’.	   In	   other	  words	   ‘causality’	  means	   relying	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   constant	   conjunction	   (co-­‐variation)	  or	  regular	  succession	  (if	  A	   then	  B)	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  billiard	  ball	  model	  as	  relationship	  between	  cause	  A	  and	  effect	  B,	  in	  which	  A	  is	  independent	  of,	  exterior,	  and	  prior	  to	  B	  (cf.	  Gofas	  and	  Hay	  2010,	  16;	  Kurki	  2008,	  58;	  see	  also	  Ruggie	  1995).156	  It	  is	  this	  cause-­‐and-­‐effect-­‐understanding	  and	   search	   for	   them	   –	   embedded	   in	   the	   dualist	   separation	   between	   the	   ‘ideational’	   and	   the	  ‘material	  (cf.	  P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2011,	  63–69),	  	  that	  I	  will	  address	  in	  the	  next	  section	  –	  that	  on	  the	  one	  hand	   makes	   us	   look	   for	   ‘ideas’	   as	   ‘objects’	   (although	   ‘mental’	   ones)157	  that	   somehow	   exist	  
independently	   from	   the	   policymaker	   and	   the	   ‘policy’	   itself.	   But	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   this	  understanding	  also	  leads	  us	  leads	  to	  a	  search	  for	  ‘ideas’	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘real	  truths’	  and	  ‘what	  people	  really	   believe’	   inside	   their	   heads	   (e.g.	   J.	   Goldstein	   and	   Keohane	   1993,	   27).158	  This	   is	   precisely	  what	  discourse	  theorists	  are	  not	  aiming	  at,	  because	  the	  question	  lies	  not	  in	  finding	  ‘hidden	  truths’	  but	  on	  what	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  true	  by	  a	  particular	  discourse	  (Abdelal,	  Blyth,	  and	  Parsons	  2010,	  13f.;	  cf.	  De	  Goede	  2006,	  4)	  –	  hence,	  on	  what	  discourse	  does,	  not	  what	  it	  reveals	  (cf.	  Doty	  1993,	  304).	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  take	  on	   ‘monism’	  and	   ‘dualism’,	  as	  well	  as	   Jackson’s	  response	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  conflation	  between	  “every	  day	  common	  sense	  realism	  […]	  with	  a	  stricter	  dualist	  claim	  about	  how	  objects	  exist	  […](P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2013,	  373).	  156	  That	  A	  and	  B	  need	  to	  be	  separated	  becomes	  also	  clear	   i.e.	   from	  John	  Owen’s	  statement,	   that	  “the	  difficulty	   lies	   in	  inferring	   the	   ideas	   that	   subjects	   hold	   independent	   of	   the	   behavior	   to	   be	   explained”	   (Owen	   1997,	   18).	   See	   also	   the	  criticism	  of	  Mark	  Laffey	  and	  Jutta	  Weldes	  on	  the	  ‘neo-­‐positivist’	  narrow	  Humean	  conception	  of	  causality	  in	  most	  of	  the	  ‘ideas’	   literature	  (Laffey	  and	  Weldes	  1997,	  201–209).	   	  However,	  they	  also	  seem	  to	  differentiate	  between	  what	  Judith	  Goldstein	   and	   Robert	   Keohane	   have	   termed	   ‘causal	   ideas’	   and	   ‘broader	   world	   views’.	   In	   contrast	   to	   Goldstein	   and	  Keohane,	  Laffey	  and	  Weldes	  claim	  causal	  powers	  also	  for	  the	  latter.	  	  	  157	  See	   Laffey	   and	  Weldes’	   references	   to	   George	   Lakoff’s	   ‘commodity’	   and	   ‘conduit’	   metaphors	   (Laffey	   and	  Weldes	  1997,	  206–209).	  On	  Lakoffian	  metaphors	  and	  discourse	  analysis	  see	  also	  Blanchard	  (2012).	  158	  Laffey	   and	  Weldes	   point	   to	   the	   conceptual	   unclarities	   in	  much	   of	   the	   ideas-­‐literature	   in	   this	   regard	   (Laffey	   and	  Weldes	  1997,	  197–199).	  Another	  albeit	  interrelated	  reason	  in	  my	  view	  is	  the	  prevailing	  commitment	  to	  neo-­‐positivist	  methodologies	   that	   I	  will	  address	   in	   the	  next	  section.	  See	  also	  Weldes	  and	  Saco	  (Weldes	  and	  Saco	  1996,	  370).	  For	  a	  criticism	  of	  the	  search	  for	  ‘true	  beliefs’	  and	  the	  argument	  to	  focus	  on	  public	  rhetoric	  instead	  see	  also	  Krebs	  and	  Jackson	  (2007).	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This	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   discourse	   and	   language	   as	  productive	   regardless	   of	   “the	  motivations,	  perceptions,	  intentions,	  or	  understandings	  of	  social	  actors”	  (Doty	  1993,	  302;	  cf.	  also	  Jerdén	  2014,	  86;	  Krebs	  and	   Jackson	  2007).	  This	   is	  one	   important	  aspect	  of	  why	  I	  argue	   for	   the	  concept	   of	   discourse	   over	   ‘ideas’	   (at	   least	   in	   the	   dominant	   understandings	   in	   IR	   and	   IPE	  addressed	  here),	  as	   I	  will	   illustrate	   in	  more	  detail	   in	   the	  chapters	   two	  and	  three	  on	  theory	  and	  method/political	  rhetoric.159	  Moreover,	  if	  ‘ideas’	  and	  ‘identities’	  are	  understood	  as	  discursive,	  i.e.	  articulated	  for	  instance	  through	  foreign	  economic	  policy,	  it	  is	  simply	  not	  possible	  to	  separate	  and	  conceptualize	  them	  as	  distinct	  ‘variables’	  of	  the	  policies	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  have	  an	  ‘impact’	  on,	  thus	  to	  treat	  them	  in	  the	  conventional	  causal	  A-­‐B	  framework	  (cf.	  Hansen	  2006,	  26–28).	  	  	  
Discourse	  
	  In	  much	  of	  (constructivist)	   IR	  and	  IPE-­‐literature	   ‘discourses’	  are	  treated	  along	  the	  same	  line	  as	  ‘ideas’.	   	   Although	   in	   the	   broad	   field	   of	   discourse	   theoretical	   and	   analytical	   studies	   there	   exist	  quite	   different	   positions	   and	   argumentations	   on	   and	   about	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘discourse’	   –	   for	  instance	   whether	   one	   can	   speak	   of	   ‘the	   discursive’	   versus	   the	   ‘non-­‐discursive’	   or	   whether	  discourse	  is	  ‘only	  language	  and	  text’	  –	  until	  today	  these	  profound	  debates	  have	  reached	  the	  field	  of	   IR	   (Campbell	   1998,	   6;	   cf.	   Dalby	   1988;	   Epstein	   2010b;	   George	   1994;	   Hansen	   2006;	  Milliken	  1999;	  Weldes	  and	  Saco	  1996)	  and	  IPE	  (cf.	  Abdelal,	  Blyth,	  and	  Parsons	  2010,	  16	  ff.	  Epstein	  2010a,	  176,	  182	  ff.	  De	  Goede	  2006,	  8	  f.	  Maxwell	  2001,	  3)	  only	  to	  a	  limited	  extent.	  The	  mainstream	  take	  on	  discourses	  locates	  them	  in	  the	  ‘ideas-­‐realm’,	  and	  mostly	  the	  term	  is	  understood	  as	  referring	  to	  ‘text	  and	  talking’	  distinct	  from	  ‘action’	  or	  ‘practice’	  (e.g.	  Adler	  and	  Pouliot	  2011	  although	  claiming	  not	   to	   do	   so,	   see	   p.	   12)	   and	   ‘facts	   on	   the	   ground’.	   Viviane	   Schmidt	   for	   instance	   claims	   to	  differentiate	   between	   approaches	   that	   “focus	   exclusively	   on	   ideas	   [and]	   tend	   to	   leave	   the	  interactive	  processes	  of	  discourse	  implicit”,	  and	  	  	   “those	  scholars	  who	  speak	  of	  discourse	   [and]	  address	  explicitly	  the	  representation	  of	   ideas	  (how	  
agents	  say	  what	  they	  are	  thinking	  of	  doing)	  and	  the	  discursive	  interactions	  through	  which	  actors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  However,	  there	  might	  be	  a	  point	  in	  Yee’s	  argument,	  that	  although	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘postmodernists’	  reject	  this	  kind	  of	  simple	  cause-­‐and-­‐effect-­‐scenario,	   the	  cited	  analyses	  of	  U.S.	   foreign	  policy	  –	  e.g.	  by	  Doty	  and	  Weldes,	   focusing	  on	   the	  discursive	  construction	  of	  external	  others	  that	  in	  turn	  enabled	  the	  respective	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  –	  could	  be	  read	  as	   ‘causing’	   the	   policies	   (see	   also	   Kurki	   2008,	   138–142;	   A.	   S.	   Yee	   1996,	   101).	   But	   again	   this	   would	   require	   an	  understanding	   of	   causality	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	   rather	   mechanistic	   understanding	   described	   above.	   In	   this	   sense	  critical	  realism	  tries	  to	   find	  a	   ‘middle	  way’.	   If	   this	   from	  a	  poststructuralist	  perspective	  means	  that	  one	  has	  to	  “break	  with	  causality”,	  or	  whether	  one	  should	  rather	  seek	  alternative	  accounts	  of	  causality	  has	  not	  been	  too	  explicitly	  debated	  so	  far	  (cf.	  Diez	  2001,	  12ff.).	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generate	  and	  communicate	  ideas	  (to	  whom	  they	  say	  it)	  within	  given	  institutional	  contexts	  (where	  and	  when	  they	  say	  it)”	  (Schmidt	  2008,	  306	  emphases	  added).	  	  	  She	  thus	  clearly	  maintains	  a	  separation	  of	  discourse	  as	   ‘speech’	   (as	  well	  as	  between	   ‘ideas’	  and	  ‘discourse’)	  apart	  from	  other	   ‘action’.	  Akin	  to	  the	   ‘reclaiming/saving	  identity-­‐endeavor’	  one	  can	  discern	  the	  attempt	  to	  “strip	  discourse	  of	  its	  postmodernist	  baggage”	  by	  referring	  the	  term	  “not	  only	  to	  structure	  […]	  but	  also	  to	  agency	  […]”	  (Schmidt	  2008,	  305).160	  But	  again	  even	  some	  self-­‐proclaimed	   ‘all	   the	   way	   down’	   understandings	   apparently	   cannot	   free	   themselves	   from	   the	  common	   dichotomies,	   for	   instance	   between	   ‘discourse’	   and	   ‘action’,	   as	   discourse	   is	   still	   often	  conceived	   simply	   as	   ‘language’.	   For	   example,	   Epstein	   again	   from	  my	  perspective	   rightly	  brings	  forward	  a	  focus	  on	  “the	  discourses	  spoken	  by	  actors”	  (regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  actually	  believe	  it)	  as	  “actor	  behavior”,	  as	  it	  is	  through	  discourse	  that	  actors	  “make	  their	  own	  identity”	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  “speaking	  subject”:	   “[w]hat	  matters	   is	  quite	  simply	  what	  the	  actor	  says”	  (Epstein	  2010a,	  184,	  189).	  Although	  she	  advocates	  locating	  discourse	  in	  the	  field	  of	  ‘action’	  –	  “’[t]o	  say	  is	  also	  ‘to	  do’”	  (Epstein	  2010a,	  190)	  –	  apparently	  for	  her	  ‘action’	  in	  general	  is	  not	  necessarily	  encompassed	  by	  her	   understanding	   of	   discourse,	   as	   she	   speaks	   of	   “immaterial	   factors”,	   that	   “have	   become	  crystallizations	  of	  the	  dominant	  discourses	  that	  regulate	  specific	  field	  of	  action”	  (Epstein	  2010a,	  193),	   what	   ultimately	   makes	   her	   argument	   slightly	   unclear.	   Discourse	   scholars	   have	   widely	  argued	  against	  the	  dichotomization	  of	  language	  versus	  action/actor	  and	  discourse	  versus	  ‘reality’,	  as	  well	   as	   against	   the	   understanding	   of	   discourse	   as	   ‘only	   language’	   (Campbell	   1998,	   6f.,	   193;	  Dalby	  1988,	  416f.;	  George	  1994,	  29ff.;	  Tuathail	  and	  Agnew	  1992,	  193;	  cf.	  Weldes	  and	  Saco	  1996,	  374f.),	  and	  of	  language	  as	  merely	  referential,	   ‘transparent’	  or	  instrumental	  (Blanchard	  2012;	  cf.	  Doty	  1993,	  301f.;	  Howarth	  2013,	  241).	   In	  Doty’s	  words,	  “how	  we	   ‘know’	  what	  a	  practice	   is	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  subject	  engaging	  in	  it	  is	  through	  language”	  (Doty	  1993,	  312).	  Meanwhile	  “[d]iscourses	  do	   not	   present	   themselves	   as	   such;	   what	   we	   observe	   are	   people	   and	   verbal	   productions”	  (Tuathail	   and	   Agnew	   1992,	   193	   quoting	   Alker	   and	   Sylvan).	   Thus,	   contra	   the	   (common)	  understanding	   close	   to	   Schmidt’s,	   “we	   have	   to	   overcome	   the	   disabling	   view	   of	   discourse	   as	  transparent	  communication	  between	  subjects	  about	  things,	  a	  view	  within	  which	  the	  value	  of	  the	  statements	  of	   a	  discourse	   is	  wholly	   absorbed	   in	   a	   statement’s	   truth	  value”	   (Shapiro	  1989,	  17).	  Still	  many	  scholars	  remain	  partly	  divided	  over	  the	   ‘discursive’/’non-­‐discursive’	   issue,	  that	  I	  will	  address	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   PDT	   in	   chapter	   two.	   	   As	   to	   the	   ‘causal-­‐story’,	   it	   has	   been	  repeatedly	  pointed	  out,	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  On	   the	   ‘agency/structure’	   problematique	   from	   a	   poststructuralist	   perspective	   see	   Ashley	   (1989,	   272f.,	   309),	  Herschinger	  (2011,	  41–46),	  Howarth	  (2013,	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5),as	  well	  as	  chapter	  two.	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   “discourses	  do	  not	  function	  as	  explanatory	  causes	  in	  the	  conventional	  (i.e.,	  Humean)	  sense.	  […]	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  one	  term	  or	  element	  of	  a	  discourse	  ‘causes’	  the	  meaning	  of	  another.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  the	  relationships	  between	  them	  […]	  that	  constitute	  their	  meanings”	  (Weldes	  and	  Saco	  1996,	  373).	  	  	  The	   relationship	   between	   ‘discourse’	   and	   ‘policy’	   (both	   conceived	   as	   elements	   within	   the	  discursive!)	   put	   forward	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   mainly	   in	   line	   with	   this	   understanding.161	  Thus	   the	  “explanatory	  power	  of	  ideas	  and	  discourses”	  should	  not	  simply	  be	  understood	  as	  demonstrating	  “their	  causal	  influence”	  (Schmidt	  2008,	  305)	  in	  the	  conventional	  sense.162	  	  	  How	   a	   PDT	   understanding	   of	   ‘discourse’	   mostly	   departs	   from,	   but	   also	   in	   some	   instances	  connects	  to	  those	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE,	  is	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  	  
2.	  THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  lay	  out	  the	  central	  characteristics	  of	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  for	   this	   study,	  which	   is	  Political	  Discourse	  Theory	   (PDT),	   and	   to	   connect	   it	   to	  poststructuralist	  work	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE,	  focusing	  on	  both,	  common	  features	  and	  disagreements	  or	  divergences.	  After	  briefly	  pointing	  out	  the	  common	  issues	  and	  concerns	  addressed	  by	  poststructuralist	  scholars	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE,	  I	  then	  focus	  more	  closely	  on	  PDT	  in	  order	  to	  flesh	  out	  what	  I	  read	  as	  its	  key	  concepts	  of	  discourse,	  identity	  and	  hegemony.	  	  Although	  PDT	  referred	   to	  as	  a	   ‘school’	  has	  only	  quite	  recently	  started	   to	  make	   its	  way	   into	   the	  fields	  of	  IR	  and	  IPE,163	  its	  central	  characteristics	  and	  premises	  have	  been	  present	  to	  some	  extent	  since	  the	  1980s	  –	   in	   IPE,	  which	  has	  been	  “particularly	  resistant	  to	  poststructural	   intervention”,	  rather	  since	  the	  1990ies	  (cf.	  De	  Goede	  2006,	  1)	  –	  mostly	  through	  the	  work	  of	  poststructuralist,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  Albeit	   importantly	  not	  with	  Weldes’	   and	  Saco’s	  understanding	  of	  discourses	  as	   ‘causal	  mechanisms’	  according	   to	  scientific/critical	  realism.	  On	  ‘causal	  mechanisms’	  from	  a	  PDT	  perspective	  see	  Chapter	  3	  in	  Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  2007.	  	  162	  Which	  however	  does	  not	  mean,	  that	  poststructuralists	  should	  not	  engage	  in	  deliberating	  and	  developing	  alternative	  accounts	  of	  ‘causality’.	  163	  So	   far	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   happening	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   through	   mostly	   German	   (speaking)	   authors	   such	   as	   Eva	  Herschinger,	  Dirk	  Nabers,	  Chris	  Methmann,	  Martin	  Nonhoff,	   Joscha	  Wullweber.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  poststructuralist	  discourse	   studies	   from	   the	   German	   speaking	   field	   see	   Herschinger	   and	   Renner	   (2014),	   who	   also	   point	   to	   the	  prevalence	  of	  PDT	  among	  these	  authors.	  They	  also	  provide	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  poststructuralism	  in	  IR	  (pp.18-­‐21).	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  discourse	   theory	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   see	  Torfing	   (2005).	  For	   the	   field	  of	  European	  studies	   see	  e.g.	  Rogers	  (2009).	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even	  more	  generally	  post-­‐positivist	  scholars.164	  Those	  commonly	  referred	   to	  as	  early	   ‘pioneers’	  in	  IR	  are	  first	  and	  foremost	  Richard	  Ashley,	  James	  Der	  Derian,	  Michael	  Shapiro	  and	  R.B.J.	  Walker	  (e.g.	   Ashley	   1989,	   1996;	   Der	   Derian	   and	   Shapiro	   1989;	   cf.	   also	   Howarth	   2013,	   277;	   Rob	   B.	   J.	  Walker	  1995).	  They	  drew	  from	  the	  debates	  in	  other	  fields	  of	  social	  sciences	  and	  the	  humanities,	  about	   what	   constitutes	   ‘knowledge’	   and	   claims	   about	   ‘the	   world’,	   and	   in	   the	   first	   instance	  criticized	  the	   ‘traditional’	   IR-­‐perspectives	  of	  realist	  and	  neo-­‐realist	   theories	  (cf.	  Campbell	  2010,	  216).	  What	  was	  described	  or	  “loosely	  constructed	  as	  postmodern	  or	  poststructuralist	  approach”	  by	  the	  ‘pioneers’	  was	  regarded	  as	  an	  “organizing	  strategy	  [that]	  is	  to	  deconstruct	  or	  denaturalize	  through	   detailed	   interpretation	   the	   inherited	   language,	   concepts,	   and	   texts	   that	   have	   occupied	  privileged	  discourses	  in	  international	  relations”	  (Der	  Derian	  1989,	  4).	  More	  concretely	  the	  target	  was	  no	  less	  than	  	  	   “the	  foundationalism	  and	  essentialism	  of	  post-­‐Enlightenment	  scientific	  philosophy,	  its	  universalist	  presuppositions	   about	   modern	   rational	   man,	   its	   hidden	   metaphysics,	   its	   metatheoretical	  commitment	   to	   dualized	   categories	   of	  meaning	   and	   understanding,	   its	   logocentric	   strategies	   of	  identity	  and	  hierarchization,	  its	  theorized	  propositions	  about	  human	  nature,	  its	  dogmatic	  faith	  in	  method,	   its	   philosophies	   of	   intention	   and	   consciousness,	   and	   its	   tendency	   toward	   grand	   theory	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  its	  imposition”	  (George	  and	  Campbell	  1990,	  280).	  	  	  	  The	  initial	  central	  issue	  in	  both	  IR	  and	  IPE	  was	  the	  problematization	  of	  ‘the	  state’	  in	  theory	  and	  analysis,	  notably	  always	   in	  connection	   to	  a	  deeper	  engagement	  with	  questions	  on	   the	  status	  of	  ‘knowledge’	   and	   ‘science’	   itself,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   politics	   and	   exercise	   of	   power	   involved	   in	   the	  (academic)	   disciplines	   and	   political	   practices	   themselves	   (cf.	   Ashley	   1983,	   465;	   see	   also	  Herschinger	  and	  Renner	  2014,	  18).	  From	  this	  followed	  criticisms	  of	  positivism,	  rationalism	  and	  empiricism	  –	  as	  for	  example	  in	  the	  works	  of	  authors	  such	  as	  David	  Campbell,	  Roxanne	  Lynn	  Doty,	  Jutta	   Weldes	   and	   Diana	   Saco	   (see	   chapter	   one)	   who	   problematized	   the	   taken	   for	   granted	  character	  of	  ‘state	  identity’	  and	  ‘foreign	  policy’.165	  Meanwhile	  there	  has	  never	  been	  anything	  like	  a	   clearly	   delineated	  poststructuralist	   (Finlayson	   and	  Valentine	   2002,	   1f.;	   cf.	  Howarth	   2013,	   6),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  PDT	  has	  also	  only	  recently	  started	  to	  take	  the	  respective	  approaches	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE	  into	  account,	  and	  it	  still	  seems	  to	  lack	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  ‘newer’	  developments.	  Howarth	  for	  example	  points	  to	  James	  Der	  Derian	  and	  Michael	  Shapiro’s	  1989-­‐edited	  volume	  that	  he	  classifies	  as	  “pathbraking“	  (cf.	  Howarth	  2013,	  77f.),	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  social	  constructivism	  in	  IR	  (maybe	  a	  bit	  surprisingly	  referring	  only	  to	  Wendt	  as	  an	  example!).	  However,	   there	   have	   been	   quite	   a	   few	   later	   works	   and	   developments	   (see	   chapter	   one	   and	   what	   follows	   in	   this	  chapter)	  that	  in	  my	  view	  would	  be	  worthwhile	  taking	  into	  account.	  165	  See	  also	  George	  (1994,	  204–209).	  For	  a	  critical	  assessment	  of	  how	  the	  question	  of	  ‘state	  identity’	  has	  been	  treated	  in	  IR	  see	  Bartelson	  (1998).	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postmodern,166	  or	  of	  course	  even	  less	  a	  post-­‐positivist	  ‘school’	  (George	  1994,	  155;	  Gregory	  1989,	  xii;	  cf.	  Hansen	  2006,	  5;	  see	  also	  C.	  Hughes	  2012,	  9f.)	  –	  the	  authors	  being	  rather	  not	  preoccupied	  with	   labeling	   or	   being	   labeled	   (1988,	   189,	   cf.	   1989,	   8;	   Howarth	   2013,	   58)	   –	   nor	   are	  poststructuralists	   the	   only	   ones	   to	   focus	   on	   ‘discourse’	   as	   key	   theoretical	   concept	   (cf.	  Milliken	  1999,	   225).167	  George	   and	  Campbell	   note	   four	   elements	   that	   they	   regard	   as	   shared	   throughout	  what	   they	   call	   the	   “broad	   agenda	   of	   dissent”:	   1.	   The	   inadequacy	   of	   positivist/empiricist	  approaches	   to	   knowledge	   and	   society;	   2.	   A	   focus	   on	   the	   social	   and	   historical	   process	   of	  knowledge	  construction	  taking	  into	  account	  power	  relations	  and	  rejecting	  all	  foundationalism;	  3.	  A	   focus	   on	   the	   language	   debate	   and	   the	   linguistic	   construction	   of	   reality;	   4.	   The	   extension	   of	  these	   issues	   to	   “the	   construction	   of	   meaning	   and	   identity	   in	   all	   its	   forms	   […]”	   (George	   and	  Campbell	  1990,	  270).	  These	   four	  points	   largely	  concur	  with	   the	   four	   features	  of	   the	  concept	  of	  ‘discourse’	  by	  the	  Essex	  School	  that	  I	  address	  and	  expand	  on	  in	  what	  follows.	  	  In	  order	  not	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  am	  not	  reproducing	  general	  accounts	  on	  poststructuralism	   in	   IR	  and	   IPE,168	  but	   instead	   focusing	  on	   the	  central	  premises	  of	  PDT	  and	  referring	  them	  to	  the	  corresponding	  issues	  and	  arguments	  by	  authors	  in	  these	  fields.	  In	  general	  it	  can	  be	  said,	  that	  although	  IR-­‐and	  IPE-­‐scholars	  might	  refer	  to	  Laclau	  especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	   understanding	   of	   discourse,	   identity,	   hegemony,	   or	   concepts	   such	   as	   empty	   signifiers	   or	  nodal	  points	  (e.g.	  Campbell	  1998,	  Herschinger	  2012,	  Nabers	  2010,	  Methmann	  2010,	  Dietz	  2001),	  an	  explicit	  contextualization	  and	  ‘application’	  of	  the	  whole	  PDT-­‐approach	  as	  social	  and	  political	  theory	   in	   the	   study	   of	   global	   politics	   is	  more	   seldom	   (cf.	   Herschinger	   2012,	   70;	   Nabers	   2009,	  2015;	   e.g.	  Nonhoff	   2006a;	   Solomon	  2009,	   270;	  Wullweber	  2014).	  However,	   this	   assessment	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  The	   terms	   poststructuralist	   and	   postmodern	   are	   used	   somewhat	   interchangeably	   at	   least	   in	   most	   of	   the	   IR-­‐literature,	  see	  the	  	  footnote	  on	  these	  terms	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  and	  for	  instance	  the	  uses	  of	  these	  terms	  throughout	  the	  edition	  International/Intertextual	  Relations	  as	  “first	  collection	  in	  its	  kind	  in	  international	  relations”	  (Der	  Derian	  and	  Shapiro	   1989;	   Gregory	   1989,	   xii).	   In	   the	   Oxford	   Handbook	   of	   International	   Relations	   for	   example	   the	   entry	   is	   on	  ‘postmodernism’,	  which	  is	  denoted	   	  “in	  terms	  of	  writings	  that	  have	  taken	  up	  insights	  from	  ‘post-­‐structuralist’	   theory	  and	  applied	  them	  to	  world	  politics”	  (Burke	  2008,	  360).	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  George	  and	  Campbell,	  Der	  Derian	  had	  noted	  (already	  in	  the	  1980ies)	  that	  poststructuralism	  had	  emerged	  as	  the	  “sponge	  word”	  for	  diverse	  approaches	  comprising	  discourse	  analysis,	  genealogy,	  deconstruction	  and	  intertextualism.	  	  They	  consider	  the	  main	  shared	  ‘features’	  to	  be	  “the	  constitutive	  nature	  of	   language”	  and	  an	  opposition	  to	  “closed	  systems	  of	  knowledge”	  (Der	  Derian	  1988,	  192;	  cf.	  also	  George	  1994,	  155–166	  who	  uses	  the	  term	  postmodernism	  throughout	  his	  volume;	  cf.	  George	  and	  Campbell	  1990,	  270,	  FN	  2).	  David	  Howarth	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  poststructuralism	  and	  postmodernism	   (as	  does	  Campbell	   in	  his	  later	  writings,	   see	  Campbell	  2010),	  by	  pointing	   to	  Laclau’s	  argument	   that	  poststructuralism	  “need	  not	   include	  more	  extreme	   critics	   of	   modernity	   such	   as	   Jean	   Baudrillard	   and	   Lyotard”,	   while	   situating	   poststructuralism	   first	   and	  foremost	  within	   the	   linguistic	   turn	   in	  Western	  philosophy	  and	   theory	  (see	  also	   in	  what	   follows	   in	   this	  chapter).	  For	  Howarth,	   to	  repeat,	  poststructuralism	  “constitutes	  a	  particular	  style	  of	   theorizing,	  and	  a	  specific	  way	  of	  doing	  social	  and	   political	   theory,	   which	   is	   informed	   by	   a	   distinctive	   ethos.	   This	   style	   and	   ethos	   is	   rooted	   in	   a	   particular	   set	   of	  ontological	  presuppositions”	  (Howarth	  2013,	  6,	  73).	  As	  a	  side	  note,	  according	  to	  Nigel	  Thrift	  Baudrillard	  and	  Lyotard	  themselves	  have	  disavowed	  ‘postmodernism’	  (Thrift	  1991,	  457).	  167	  For	   instance	  other	  schools	  such	  as	  Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis	   (CDA),	  but	  also	   the	   fields	  of	  discursive	  psychology,	  communication	  and	  media	  studies	  work	  with	  the	  concept	  (cf.	  i.e.	  Jørgensen	  and	  Phillips	  2002).	  	  168	  For	  some	  of	  these	  accounts	  and	  collections	  of	  central	  debates	  see	  e.g.	  Campbell	  (1998,	  Epilogue,	  2010),	  de	  Goede	  (2006),	  Edkins	   (1999),	  Hansen	   (2006,	   Introduction),	   Smith	  et	   al.	   (1997),	   Sjolander	   (1994),	  George	   (1994),	  Caldwell	  (1982),	  Samuels	  (1996),	  Burke	  (2008),	  George	  and	  Campbell	  (1990),	  Herschinger	  (2011,	  4–8).	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course	  depends	  to	  some	  extent	  to	  what	  one	  takes	  ‘the	  whole	  approach’	  to	  be.	  My	  understanding	  in	   this	   sense	   is	   mostly	   in	   line	   with	   the	   ‘Logics	   of	   Critical	   Explanation’	   (see	   chapter	   3.2.),	   that	  conceives	  of	  PDT	  as	  explanatory,	   interpretative	  and	  critical	   theory.	   I	  come	  back	  to	  and	  address	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  following	  subchapters	  on	  discourse,	  identity	  and	  hegemony,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  chapter	  three.	  	  	  
	  
Political	  Discourse	  Theory	  
	  Political	  Discourse	  Theory	  (PDT,	  also	  called	  Poststructuralist	  Discourse	  Theory)	  and	  analysis	   is	  related	  to	  what	  has	  become	  called	  the	  Essex	  School	  of	  Discourse	  Theory	  –	  in	  which	  the	  writings	  of	  Ernesto	  Laclau	   inhabit	   a	   central	  position.	   Starting	  with	   the	  problematization	  of	   essentialism	  and	  determinism	   in	  Marxist	   theory	   in	  Hegemony	  and	  Socialist	  Strategy	  (HSS)	  by	  Ernesto	  Laclau	  and	   Chantal	   Mouffe	   (2001;	   originally	   published	   in	   1985),	   proponents	   of	   political	   discourse	  theory	  since	  then	  have	  set	  out	  to	  emphasize	  in	  their	  work	  the	  contingency	  and	  historicity	  of	  what	  we	   call	   ‘objectivity’,	   in	   terms	  of	   fleshing	  out	   the	   role	  of	  politics	   and	  power	   in	   its	   formation,	   by	  drawing	   primarily	   on	   the	  works	   of	  Michael	   Foucault,	   Jaques	  Derrida,	   Jaques	   Lacan	   and	   Slavoij	  Žižek	  (Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	  7).	   In	  this	  sense	  the	  focus	  lies	  on	  inquiring	  into	  the	  reproduction	  and	  transformation	   of	   orders	   and	   practices	   standing	   for	   our	   articulations,	   representations	   or	  categorizations	   of	   the	   world,	   by	   problematizing	   or	   questioning	   their	   ‘taken	   for	   granted’	   or	  hegemonic	   character.169	  Laclau	   and	   Mouffe	   started	   by	   formulating	   a	   theory	   of	   hegemony	   via	  deconstructing	   the	   classical	   Marxist	   ontology	   that	   reduces	   identity	   to	   a	   class	   essence	   (cf.	  HSS	  Chapter	   1),	   by	   engaging	   and	   taking	   further	   Louis	   Althusser’s	   (cf.	   HSS	   pp.	   97-­‐105,	   109)	   and	  Antonio	  Gramsci’s	   (cf.	  HSS	  pp.	  65-­‐71,	  136-­‐145,	  109,	  134-­‐145)	  works	  on	  Marxist	  conceptions	  of	  politics	  and	  ideology	  and	  through	  drawing	  from	  poststructuralist	  theories	  of	  language	  (cf.	  HSS	  pp.	  112-­‐113)170	  (Howarth	  2013,	  123–127;	  cf.	  Howarth	  and	  Stavrakakis	  2000,	  5),	  and	  especially	  the	  work	  of	  Derrida	  and	  Lacan	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  xi).	  In	  their	  preface	  to	  the	  second	  edition	  of	  
HSS	   they	  speak	  of	  poststructuralism	  as	   their	  main	  source	  of	   theoretical	   reflection,	  while	   taking	  into	   account	   among	   others	   the	   late	   Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	   and	  Martin	   Heidegger,	   but	   also	   Karl	  Popper,	  Thomas	  Kuhn	  and	  Paul	  Feyerabend,	  as	  well	  as	  of	   course	  Gramsci	   (ibid.).	  Evidently	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  It	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  Laclau’s	  and	  Mouffe’s	  understanding	  of	  hegemony	  is	  different	  from	  the	  common	  understanding	  in	  political	  science	  of	  hegemony	  as	  domination.	  See	  what	  follows	  in	  this	  chapter	  (2.3)	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  hegemony.	  170	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  criticize	  that	  the	  ‘linguistic	  turn’	  also	  imported	  structuralism	  into	  the	  field	  of	  human	  sciences,	  see	  also	  ibid.	  p.	  146,	  FN	  22.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Swiss	  structuralist	  linguist	  Ferdinand	  de	  Saussure’s	  aim	  (see	  in	  what	  follows)	  in	  fact	  was	  to	  go	  beyond	  linguistics	  and	  to	  develop	  a	  structuralist	  approach	  to	  the	  human	  and	  social	  sciences.	  	  For	  a	  thorough	  assessment	  of	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe’s	  work	  see	  the	  contributions	  in	  the	  edited	  volume	  by	  Simon	  Critchley	  and	  Oliver	  Marchart	  (2009).	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writings	  of	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  were	  not	   aimed	  at	   a	   theory	  of	  discursive	  processes	   ‘only’	   in	   the	  sense	   of	   communication	   via	   language	   or	   other	   means,	   but	   at	   a	   social	   and	   political	   theory.	   It	  cannot	  be	  overemphasized	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  discourse	  encompasses	  not	  only	  language,	  but	  all	  social	   phenomena	   (Laclau	  1990,	   100).	  The	  outset	  became,	   as	   stated	  by	  Laclau,	   to	   elaborate	   an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  structuration	  of	  socio-­‐political	  spaces	  –	  in	  their	  words	   in	  HSS:	   a	   theory	   of	   hegemony	   (HSS	   Chapter	   3)	   –	   by	   articulating	   a	   novel	   conception	   of	  discourse	  (Laclau	  2000,	  x).	  Discourse	  theory	  thus	  	   “is	   not	   just	   a	   simple	   theoretical	   or	   epistemological	   approach;	   it	   implies,	   by	   asserting	   the	   radical	  historicity	  of	  being	  and	  therefore	  the	  purely	  human	  nature	  of	  truth,	  the	  commitment	  to	  show	  the	  world	  for	  what	  it	  is:	  an	  entirely	  social	  construction	  of	  human	  beings	  which	  is	  not	  grounded	  on	  any	  metaphysical	  ‘necessity’	  external	  to	  it	  –	  neither	  God,	  nor	  ‘essential	  forms’	  nor	  the	  ‘necessary	  laws	  of	  history’”	  (Laclau	  1990,	  129).	  	  	  In	   its	   further	  development	  PDT	  has	  drawn	   from	  hermeneutical	   critiques	  of	   behavioralism	   that	  oppose	  the	  separation	  of	  ‘meanings	  and	  interpretations’	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  ‘objective	  political	  behavior’	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   but	   instead	   stressed	   the	   connectedness	   between	   meaning,	  interpretation	  and	  practice.	   In	  this	  sense	  PDT	  does	  not	  conceive	  of	   itself	  as	  “an	   independent	  or	  free-­‐standing	  approach	  to	  social	  and	  political	  theory”	  nor	  as	  detached	  from	  social	  and	  historical	  contexts.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  and	  must	  be	  articulated	  in	  connection	  to	  the	  latter	  ones	  in	  order	  to	  “critically	   explain	   problematized	   objects	   of	   research”.	   In	   this	   respect	   social	   theory	   should	   not	  exclude	  the	  pursuit	  of	  empirical	  research	  that	  is	  in	  turn	  theoretically	  and	  philosophically	  informed	  (Howarth	  2013,	  12,	  266).	  However,	  PDT	  opposes	   rationalist	   approaches	   that	  presume	  entirely	  self-­‐conscious	   actors	  with	   given	   interests	   and	   preferences,	   as	  well	   as	   positivist	   conceptions	   of	  knowledge	  and	  method	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  ‘unitary	  science’	  bound	  for	  generalizations	  and	  predictions	  by	  assuming	  an	  unproblematic	  ‘objective	  reality’	  (Howarth	  and	  Stavrakakis	  2000,	  6–7).	  	  What	   this	   means	   for	   conducting	   research	   in	   terms	   of	   methodology	   and	   methods	   is	  addressed	   in	   the	   following	   chapters,	   here	   I	   concentrate	   on	   laying	   out	   the	   key	   terms	   for	   this	  project:	  discourse,	  identity	  and	  hegemony,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  related	  concepts	  that	  will	  be	  articulated	  as	  analytical	  categories	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  rhetorical	  analysis.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  at	  this	  point	  though,	  that	  initially	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  themselves	  were	  not	  preoccupied	  with	  problems	  of	  how	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to	   ‘use’	   their	   theories	   in	   research,	   but	   that	   this	   has	   later	   become	   a	  major	   project	   of	   the	   Essex	  School	  (Howarth	  2013,	  15f.;	  see	  e.g.	  Torfing	  2005).171	  
	  
2.1.	  Discourse172	  
	  According	  to	  PDT	  the	  term	  ‘discourse’	  or	  ‘discursive	  structure’	  is	  significantly	  understood	  on	  the	  ontological,	   as	  well	   as	   on	   the	   ontical	   level.	   In	   a	   nutshell	   –	   to	   be	   expanded	   on	   in	  what	   follows	  under	  the	  central	  features	  –	  this	  means	  that	  discourse	  is	  both,	  a	  constitutive	  structure	  of	  meaning	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  ontological	  horizon	  that	  we	  cannot	  get	  outside	  of,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  concrete	  practice	  of	  speaking	  and	  acting	  in	  terms	  of	  linguistic	  and	  non-­‐linguistic	  elements.	  In	  this	  sense	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  explicitly	  refer	  to	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	  and	  take	  his	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘language	  game’	  to	  be	  an	  example	  of	  what	  they	  have	  called	  ‘discourse’	  (Laclau	  2005,	  106;	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  108;	  cf.	  also	  Zerilli	  2009,	  90f.):	  	  	   “A	   is	   building	  with	  building-­‐stones:	   there	   are	  blocks,	   pillars,	   slabs	   and	  beams.	  B	  has	   to	  pass	   the	  stones,	   and	   that	   in	   the	   order	   in	   which	   A	   needs	   them.	   For	   this	   purpose	   they	   use	   a	   language	  consisting	  of	  the	  words	  ‘block’,	  ‘pillar’,	  ‘slab,	  ‘beam’.	  A	  calls	  them	  out;	  B	  brings	  the	  stone	  which	  he	  has	  learnt	  to	  bring	  at	  such	  and	  such	  call	  […]	  I	  shall	  also	  call	  the	  whole,	  consisting	  of	  language	  and	  
the	   actions	   into	   which	   it	   is	   woven,	   the	   ‘language-­‐game’”	   (Ludwig	   Wittgenstein,	   Philosophical	  Investigations,	  Oxford	  1983,	  p.3,	  cited	  	  in	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  108,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  	  And	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  add:	  “It	  is	  evident,	  that	  the	  very	  material	  properties	  of	  objects	  are	  part	  of	  what	  Wittgenstein	  calls	  language	  game,	  which	  is	  an	  example	  of	  what	  we	  have	  called	  discourse”.	  (ibid.,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  The	  broader	  concept	  of	  discourse	  according	  to	  PDT	  can	  be	  summarized	  by	  pointing	  out	  four	  central	  features	  (cf.	  Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	  8f):	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	  For	  an	  understanding	  of	  poststructuralism	  as	  theoretical	  discourse	  see	  Ashley	  (1989,	  278f.),	  which	  in	  my	  reading	  amounts	   to	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   traditional	   separation	   between	   ‘theory’	   and	   ‘empirics’.	   As	   George	   and	   Campbell	   have	  pointed	  out	  regarding	  the	  difference	  between	  critical	  theory	  and	  poststructuralism:	  “Whereas	  Critical	  Theory	  wants	  to	  realize	   in	   practical	   political	   terms	  what	   traditional	   theory	   only	   contemplates,	   poststructuralism	   assumes	   that	   such	  theory	  is	  already	  practice.	  To	  understand	  society	  and	  politics	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  to	  ground	  theory	  not	  in	  practice,	  but	  as	  practice”	   (George	   and	   Campbell	   1990,	   280).	   See	   also	   Zalewski’s	   understanding	   of	   “theory	   as	   everyday	   practice”	  (Zalewski	  1997).	  On	  disagreements	  by	  proponents	  of	  critical	  theory	  and	  critical	  geopolitics	  with	  IR-­‐poststructuralists	  see	  for	  example	  the	  exchange	  around	  Tuathail’s	  review	  essay	  on	  David	  Campbell	  (Dalby	  1996;	  Tuathail	  1996a,	  1996b).	  See	   also	   George	   (1994,	   159–169)	   and	   Ashley	   (1996,	   243f.),	   as	  well	   as	   the	   debate	   between	   Hoffmann	   and	   Rengger	  (Hoffman	  1987,	  1988;	  Rengger	  1988).	   	  On	  a	  critique	  of	  critical	   theory	  as	   “latest	  edition	  of	   liberal	   idealism”	  see	   Jahn	  (1998).	  	  172	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  continue	  to	  also	  cite	  and	  refer	  to	  (poststructuralist)	  IR-­‐authors	  –	  although	  they	  are	  not	  ‘part’	  of	  the	  Essex	  School	  –	  in	  connection	  with	  thoughts	  formulated	  by	  PDT	  scholars	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  they	  in	  my	  view	  converge.	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  1.	   Discourse	   as	   meaningful	   practice	   that	   constructs	   and	   makes	   the	   social	   world	   intelligible	  through	   the	   attribution	   of	   meaning	   in	   what	   becomes	   what	   Dryzek	   calls	   “a	   shared	   way	   of	  apprehending	   the	   world”	   (Dryzek	   1997,	   8;	   cf.	   Glynos	   et	   al.	   2009,	   8).	   PDT	   presumes	   that	   all	  objects	   and	   actions	   are	   meaningful,	   their	   meaning	   being	   conferred	   by	   historically	   specific	  systems	   of	   rules	   (Howarth	   and	   Stavrakakis	   2000,	   2ff.).	   There	   is	   no	   (!)	   separation	   between	  discursive	  and	  non-­‐discursive	  phenomena,	  as	  every	  object	  is	  constituted	  as	  an	  object	  of	  discourse	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  107),	  having	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  question	  whether	  there	  actually	  is	  a	  world	   ‘out	   there’	   external	   to	   our	  mind,	   or	  not.173	  PDT	  does	  not	  deny	   the	   existence	  of	   objects	  external	   to	   thought	  –	   as	   this	  would	  presume	  an	  extreme	   form	  of	   idealism174	  –	  but	  opposes	   the	  claim	  that	   these	  objects	  could	  constitute	   themselves	  as	  objects	   ‘outside’	  discourse	   (cf.	  Howarth	  2013,	   93).	   Although	   having	   become	   one	   of	   the	  most	   quoted	   passages	   of	  HSS	   (cf.	   Howarth	   and	  Stavrakakis	  2000,	  3)	  the	  misunderstanding	  about	  PDT	  and	  an	  ‘external	  reality’	  is	  so	  persistent	  (cf.	  Nonhoff	  2011,	  98)	  that	  it	  is	  worth	  being	  quoted	  again:	  	   “The	  fact	  that	  every	  object	  is	  constituted	  as	  an	  object	  of	  discourse	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  world	  external	  to	  our	  thought,	  or	  with	  the	  realism/idealism	  opposition.	  An	  earthquake	  or	  the	  falling	  of	  a	  brick	  is	  an	  event	  that	  certainly	  exists,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  occurs	  here	  and	  now,	  independently	   of	   my	   will.	   But	   whether	   their	   specificity	   as	   objects	   is	   constructed	   in	   terms	   of	  ‘natural	   phenomena’	   or	   ‘expressions	   of	   the	   wrath	   of	   God’,	   depends	   upon	   the	   structuring	   of	   a	  discursive	  field.	  What	  is	  denied	  is	  not	  that	  such	  objects	  exist	  externally	  to	  thought,	  but	  the	  rather	  different	   assertion	   that	   they	   could	   constitute	   themselves	   as	   objects	   outside	   any	   discursive	  condition	  of	  emergence”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  108).	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  This	  is	  an	  important	  difference	  to	  Foucault,	  who	  –	  at	  least	  according	  to	  the	  reading	  of	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  (ibid.)	  and	  for	   instance	   Dreyfus	   and	   Rabinow	   (1983,	   58f.)	   –	   separates	   between	   discursive	   and	   non-­‐discursive	   phenomena.	  However,	   Foucault	   himself	   was	   apparently	   not	   unambiguous	   on	   this,	   see	   for	   instance	   his	   statement	   on	   “no	  prediscursive	  providence	  which	  disposes	  the	  world	  in	  our	  favor”	  in	  his	  Orders	  of	  Discourse	  (cited	  in	  Campbell	  1998,	  6,	  who	  links	  this	  passage	  to	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe’s	  understanding	  of	  no	  separation).	  See	  also	  Methmann	  (2010,	  354),	  Edkins	  (1999,	  47ff.),	  Howarth	  (2013,	  190).	  Whereas	   a	   fair	   amount	   of	   scholars	   explicitly	   agree	   on	   no	   separation	   between	   ‘discursive’	   and	   ‘non-­‐discursive’	   (cf.	  Campbell	  1998,	  6;	  Diez	  2001,	  19;	  Doty	  1996,	  5;	  Herschinger	  2011,	  13;	  Solomon	  2009,	  273),	  this	  remains	  a	  contested	  and	  sometimes	  confusing	  issue,	   if	   this	  problematique	  is	  not	  spelled	  out,	  as	   it	  has	  happened	  in	  the	  texts	  criticized	  for	  this	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter.	   Others	   in	   turn	   separate	   between	   discourse	   and	   practices	   (Adler	   and	   Pouliot	   2011,	   7;	  Neumann	  2002,	  e.g.	  2012,	  62,	  176).	  While	  Adler	  and	  Pouliot	  (Adler	  and	  Pouliot	  2011,	  3–4)	  credit	  the	  poststructuralists	  for	  drawing	  attention	  to	  “textual	  practices”,	  they	  maintain	  that	  the	  “return	  of	  practice	  to	  the	  linguistic	  turn”	  came	  only	  later.	  In	  my	  view	  the	  scholars	  they	  cite	  (Der	  Derian,	  Shapiro,	  Doty)	  never	  left	  practices	  out	  when	  speaking	  of	  discourse,	  but	  precisely	  understood	  discourse	  as	  practice.	  	  174	  For	  a	  refutation	  of	  misreading	  PDT	  as	  idealist	  and	  relativist	  see	  Laclau	  (Howarth	  2013,	  93;	  1990,	  103–133;	  Laclau	  and	  Bhaskar	  1998,	  9f.).	  	  For	   countering	   a	  misreading	   of	   his	   own	   reading	   of	   ‘monism’	   as	   subjectivist,	   idealist	   and	   relativist	   see	   P.T.	   Jackson	  (2011,	  115–116;	  135–141).	  
71	  
	  
Usually	   not	   quoted	   is	   the	   subsequent	   paragraph,	   which	   addresses	   the	   alleged	   idealism	   (and	  ‘dualism’):	  	  	   “At	   the	   root	   of	   the	   previous	   prejudice	   lies	   an	   assumption	   of	   the	  mental	   character	   of	   discourse.	  Against	   this,	   we	   will	   affirm	   the	  material	   character	   of	   every	   discursive	   structure.	   To	   argue	   the	  opposite	  is	  to	  accept	  the	  very	  classical	  dichotomy	  between	  an	  objective	  field	  constituted	  outside	  of	  any	  discursive	  intervention,	  and	  a	  discourse	  consisting	  of	  the	  pure	  expression	  of	  thought.	  This	  is,	  precisely,	   the	   dichotomy	  which	   several	   currents	   of	   contemporary	   thought	   have	   tried	   to	   break”	  (ibid.).	  	  Hence,	  we	  always	  encounter	  objects	  already	  as	  meaningful	  and	   ‘in	  context’,	  not	  as	   ‘neutral’	  and	  available	  to	  be	  inspected	  in	  theoretical	  or	  cognitive	  terms,	  and	  we	  ourselves	  can	  not	  get	  outside	  of	  this	  context	  and	  act	  upon	  it	  (cf.	  Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  2008,	  8).	  Objects	  and	  processes	  that	  we	  think	   about	   exist,	   “though	   our	   practices	   of	   reflection	   are	   never	   external	   to	   the	   lifeworlds	   into	  which	  we	  are	  thrown”.	  This	  perspective	  amounts	  to	  what	  Howarth	  calls	  a	  “minimal	  realism”	  or	  more	   accurately,	   a	   “philosophy	   of	   radical	  materialism,	   in	  which	   our	   conceptual	   and	   discursive	  forms	  can	  never	  exhaust	  the	  materiality	  of	  objects.	  Objects	  are	  thus	  constructed	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  different	  contexts	  […]”	  (Howarth	  2013,	  10).	  Accordingly	  there	  can	  be	  no	  unmediated	  access	  to	  a	   ‘real-­‐concrete’	  or	   to	  a	   ‘final’	  or	  absolute	   truth,	  as	  decisions	  about	   truth	  and	   falsity	  are	  settled	  within	   orders	   of	   discourse	   according	   to	   the	   criteria	   established	   by	   those	   orders	   themselves	  (Howarth	   2000,	   133,	   cf.	   2005,	   322,	   328).	   This	   follows	  Martin	   Heidegger’s	   critique	   of	   classical	  epistemology	  by	  conceiving	  the	  subject	  as	  always	  already	  within	  a	  world	  of	  meaningful	  objects	  and	  practices,	  what	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  call	   ‘the	  discursive’	  (Heidegger	  1993,	  142ff.	  §§31,	  32;	  cf.	  Howarth	   2005,	   322;	   Laclau	   and	   Mouffe	   2001,	   107).175	  Discourses	   as	   configurations	   of	   social	  relations	   and	   practices	   are	   always	   understood	   as	   involving	   the	   exercise	   of	   power,	   as	   they	  constitute	  and	  structure	  the	  social	   in	  a	  particular	  way	  and	  not	   in	  another,	  which	  always	  brings	  the	   drawing	   of	   boundaries	   and	   exclusions	   with	   it	   (Howarth	   and	   Stavrakakis	   2000,	   4).	   This	  understanding	  largely	  converges	  with	  the	  accounts	  of	  IR-­‐scholars,176	  who	  understand	  discourse	  as	  generating	  the	  categories	  of	  meaning	  by	  which	  ‘reality’	  is	  understood	  and	  explained,	  thus	  not	  only	  as	   “a	  way	  of	   learning	   ‘about’	   something	  out	   there	   in	   the	   ‘real	  world’;	   it	   is	   rather	  a	  way	  of	  producing	   that	   something	   as	   real,	   as	   identifiable,	   classifiable,	   knowable,	   and	   therefore,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  On	  a	  critique	  of	  epistemology	  see	  also	  Rorty	  (1979	  especially	  chapter	  three),	  and	  referring	  to	  him,	  Nabers	  (2015,	  forthcoming).	  See	  also	  Marchart	  (2007,	  167).	  On	  his	  reading	  of	  Heidegger	  in	  terms	  of	  	  ‘monism’,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  a	  critique	  of	  ‘epistemology’	  see	  also	  P.T.	  Jackson	  (2011,	  31,	  129ff.).	  	  176	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  study	  of	  discourse	  in	  IR	  that	  still	  speaks	  to	  the	  most	  important	  issues	  see	  Milliken	  (1999).	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meaningful.	  Discourse	  creates	  the	  conditions	  of	  knowing”	  (cf.	  George	  1994,	  30;	  Klein	  1987,	  4;	  cf.	  also	  e.g.	  Shapiro	  1989,	  11).	  As	  pointed	  out	  for	  instance	  by	  Marieke	  de	  Goede	  and	  David	  Campbell,	  the	  idea	  of	  an	   ‘external	  reality’,	  or	  the	   ‘ideal’/’material’	  distinction	  itself	   is	   internal	  to	  discourse	  (Campbell	  1998,	  7;	  cf.	  De	  Goede	  2003,	  91).	  In	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe’s	  words:	  	  
“[…]	  any	  distinction	  between	  what	  are	  usually	  called	   the	   linguistic	  and	  behaviourial	  aspects	  of	  a	  social	   practice,	   is	   either	   an	   incorrect	   distinction	   or	   ought	   to	   find	   its	   place	   as	   a	   differentiation	  within	  the	  social	  production	  of	  meaning,	  which	  is	  structured	  under	  the	  form	  of	  discursive	  totalities”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  107).	  	  The	  contrasting	  view	  is	  described	  by	  Campbell	  as:	  	  
“[…]	  epistemic	  realism	  –	  whereby	  the	  world	  comprises	  objects	  whose	  existence	  is	  independent	  of	  ideas	  or	  beliefs	  about	   them	  –	  both	  of	   these	  understandings	   [in	   the	   text	  he	   refers	   to	   realism	  and	  Marxism,	  NN]	  maintain	  that	  there	  are	  material	  causes	  to	  which	  events	  and	  actions	  can	  be	  reduced.	  And	  occasioned	  by	  this	  epistemic	  realism,	  they	  sanction	  two	  other	  analytic	  forms:	  a	  narrativizing	  
historiography	  in	  which	  things	  have	  a	  self-­‐evident	  quality	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  speak	  for	  themselves,	  and	  a	   logic	  of	  explanation	   in	  which	  the	  purpose	  of	  analysis	  is	  to	  identify	  those	  self-­‐evident	  things	  and	  material	   causes	   so	   that	   actors	   can	   accommodate	   themselves	   to	   the	   realm	   of	   necessity	   they	  engender”	  (Campbell	  1998,	  4).	  	  This	   position	   largely	   concurs	   with	   what	   since	   Bernstein	   has	   been	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘Cartesian	  anxiety’	  (see	  introduction),	  i.e.	  the	  view	  that	  we	  have	  to	  have	  some	  sort	  of	  ‘ultimate	  foundation’	  for	   ‘reality’	   and	   what	   we	   ‘know’	   about	   it,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   an	   ‘anything	   goes’.	   However,	   in	  Foucauldian	  terminology,	  there	  is	  no	  reality	  perceivable	  outside	  techniques	  of	  truth	  (cf.	  De	  Goede	  2006,	  7),	  i.e.	  outside	  discourse.	  	  2.	  Discourse	  as	  ontological	  horizon	  that	  implicates	  the	  understanding	  of	  any	  objectivity	  and	  social	  relations	   as	   relational	   configurations	   of	   elements	   that	   comprise	   agents/subjects,	   words	   and	  actions,	   that	   are	   rendered	   intelligible	   within	   the	   context	   of	   a	   particular	   practice,	   while	   each	  element	   acquires	   meaning	   only	   in	   relation	   –	   and	   in	   differentiation	   –	   to	   the	   other	   elements	  (Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	  8).	  This	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  structural	  linguistics	  of	  Ferdinand	  de	  Saussure	  and	  the	  understanding	  of	  language	  as	  a	  differential	  system	  of	  signifiers	  without	  positive	  terms,	  where	  the	  meaning	  of	  each	  sign	  depends	  on	  its	  difference	  to	  other	  signs	  (cf.	  Jørgensen	  and	  Phillips	  2002,	  9f.;	   Laclau	   2007,	   37).	   Going	   further	   into	   detail	   this	   means	   that	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   de	   Saussure	  distinguished	  between	  langue	  (the	  linguistic	  rules	  necessary	  for	  meaningful	  communication	  to	  be	  possible)	  and	  parole	   (individual	  acts	  of	   speaking),	   as	  well	   as	  between	   signifiers	   (sound-­‐images,	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e.g.	  the	  sound	  d-­‐o-­‐g)	  and	  signifieds	  (the	  concept	  ‘dog’)	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  Signifier	  and	  signified	  together	   constitute	   the	   basic	   unit	   of	   language	   for	   de	   Saussure,	   the	   linguistic	   sign.	   Importantly,	  according	  to	  de	  Saussure’s	  theory	  there	  exists	  no	  natural	  relationship	  between	  the	  signified	  and	  the	   signifier	   (the	   sound	  d-­‐o-­‐g	   and	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   ‘dog’),	   but	   it	   depends	   on	   the	   functions	   and	  conventions	   of	   the	   language	   used.	   Thus	   the	   signifier	   d-­‐o-­‐g	   derives	   its	   meaning	   not	   out	   of	   its	  reference	   to	   the	   signified	   ‘dog’	   but	   from	   its	   difference	   to	   ‘cat’	   and	   other	   related	   terms.	   This	   is	  meant	   by	   an	   entirely	   relational	   and	   differential	   understanding	   of	   language,	   hence	   “Saussure’s	  purely	   formal	   and	   relational	   theory	   of	   language	   claims	   that	   the	   identity	   of	   any	   element	   is	   a	  product	   of	   the	   differences	   and	   oppositions	   established	   by	   the	   underlying	   structures	   of	   the	  linguistic	   system”	   (Howarth	   2013,	   25–27).	   Departing	   from	   the	   Saussurean	   understanding	   of	  these	  systems	  as	  fixed	  or	  closed	  (cf.	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  106,	  113)	  –	  and	  first	  and	  foremost	  building	  on	  Derrida’s	  critique	  of	  de	  Saussure	  and	  structuralist	  linguistics	  (Edkins	  1999,	  21ff.;	  cf.	  George	  and	  Campbell	  1990,	  284;	  Gregory	  1989,	  xv)	  –	  PDT	  stresses	  the	   incompleteness	  of	  every	  system	   of	   signification,	   and	   the	   impossibility	   of	   fixing	   a	   particular	  meaning	   once	   and	   for	   ever	  (Stäheli	   2000a,	   35;	   see	   also	  Waever	  1997,	   171	   for	   poststructuralism	   in	   IR).	   In	   Laclau’s	  words:	  “The	   unfixity	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   words	   and	   images	   is	   the	   very	   precondition	   of	   any	  discursive	  operation	  which	  is	  politically	  meaningful”	  (Laclau	  2005,	  24–25).	  Derrida	  argued	  that	  it	  was	   not	   possible	   to	   fully	   capture	   the	   essential	   character	   of	   language	   (or	   any	   system)	   in	   its	  entirety	  understood	  as	   a	   closed	  and	   complete	   system.	  De	  Saussure’s	   shortcoming	   according	   to	  this	  critique	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  language	  as	  product	  and	  not	  as	  a	  process	  (or	  only	  on	  the	  synchronic,	  and	   not	   the	   diachronic	   character),	   which	   also	   led	   him	   to	   first	   rigidly	   separate	   signifier	   and	  signified	   and	   then	   connect	   them	   through	   a	   one-­‐to-­‐one	   correspondence.	   This	  would	   imply	   that	  signifiers	   (i.e.	   the	   ‘material’)	   and	   signifieds	   (i.e.	   the	   ‘ideational’)	   can	   exist	   independently	   from	  each	  other,	  but	  in	  practice	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  “The	  distinction	  between	  ‘bat’	  and	  ‘cat’	  is	  not	  just	  the	   result	   of	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   letters	   ‘b’	   and	   ‘c’;	   it	   is	   also	   determined	  by	  what	   these	  words	  mean”	   (Howarth	   2013,	   39–40).	   De	   Saussure’s	   concept	   ultimately	   amounts	   to	   a	   dualism	  between	   the	   ‘substantial’	   and	   the	   ‘conceptual’	   or	   the	   ‘material’	   and	   the	   ‘ideational’,	   and	   an	  understanding	   of	   signs/language	   as	   vehicles	   for	   ideas	   or	   human	   consciousness,	   which	   is	   also	  very	   common	   at	   least	   in	   the	   ‘ideas’	   literature	   in	   IR	   and	   IPE	   (see	   chapter	   1.4).	   ‘Ideas’	   in	   this	  understanding	   would	   thus	   pre-­‐exist	   language	   and	   lie	   and	   remain	   outside	   the	   dynamics	   of	  linguistic	   structure	   and	   its	   development,	   hence	   outside	   ‘discourse’	   (cf.	   Howarth	   2013,	   42).	  Derrida’s	   ‘answer’	   was	   the	   concept	   of	   différance,	   which	   accounts	   for	   the	   active	   production	   of	  language	  and	  discourse.	  In	  a	  nutshell	  it	  means	  that	  although	  things	  and	  words	  are	  co-­‐constituted,	  their	  co-­‐constitution	  is	  itself	  never	  complete,	  as	  –	  because	  of	  their	  entirely	  relational	  character	  –	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words	  can	  never	  completely	  exhaust	  the	  meaning(s)	  of	  things.	  This	  is	  the	  case,	  because	  things	  are	  always	  related	  to	  other	  things	  by	  differing	  from	  them,	  thus	  carrying	  their	  ‘traces’.	  While	  meaning	  is	  produced,	  there	  always	  remain	  alternative	  possibilities	  visible	  but	  deferred	  in	  these	  traces	  (cf.	  Howarth	   2013,	   51–53).177	  This	   understanding	  was	   also	   taken	   up	   by	   IR-­‐poststructuralists,	  who	  engaged	   in	  deconstruction	  (see	  e.g.	   the	  references	   to	  Derrida	   throughout	   the	  volume	  edited	  by	  Der	   Derian	   and	   Shapiro	   1989).	   In	   short,	   a	   deconstructive	   approach	   seeks	   to	   problematize	   the	  binaries	   or	   dualist	   understandings	   stemming	   from	   ‘Cartesian	   anxiety’,	   i.e.	   body	   versus	   mind,	  material	   versus	   ideational,	   truth	   versus	   fiction	   etc.,	   as	  well	   as	   their	   hierarchical	   positioning.	   It	  does	   not	   question	   the	   relational	   character	   of	   meaning	   itself,	   but	   emphasizes	   the	   processual	  character	  of	  meaning	  as	  dynamic,	  historically	  bound	  and	  context	  dependent	   (Ashley	  1989,	  319	  FN	  58;	  cf.	  Gregory	  1989,	  xv	  f.).	  This	  happens	  by	  looking	  for	  instance	  at	  a	  text	  on	  its	  own	  terms,	  in	  the	   sense	  of	   noting	  binaries	   and	  hierarchies	   and	  pointing	   to	   their	  premises	   in	  order	   to	   situate	  them	   in	   the	   context	   they	   are	   derived	   from.	   In	   Derrida’s	   words,	   “the	   task	   is	   […]	   to	   dismantle	  [déconstruire]	  the	  metaphysical	  and	  rhetorical	  structures	  which	  are	  at	  work	  in	  [the	  text],	  not	  in	  order	   to	   reject	   or	  discard	   them	  but	   to	   reinscribe	   them	   in	   another	  way”	   (cited	   in	  Nabers	  2015,	  forthcoming).178	  	  3.	   The	   centrality	   of	   meaning	   and	   language	   and	   the	   understanding	   of	   discourse	   as	   system	   of	  differences	  does	  neither	   reduce	  everything	   to	   language	  nor	   to	   text	  –	  as	   “the	   linguistic	  and	  non-­‐
linguistic	  elements	  are	  not	  merely	  juxtaposed,	  but	  constitute	  a	  differential	  and	  structured	  system	  of	  positions	  –	  that	  is	  a	  discourse”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  108	  emphasis	  added)	  –	  	  but	  implies	  that	   the	   relational	   and	   differential	   character	   of	   language	   applies	   to	   all	   signifying	   or	   meaning	  systems	  	  (Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	  8).	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Laclau	  discourse	  “is	  not	  restricted	  to	  speech	  and	  writing	  but	  embraces	  all	  systems	  of	  signification.	  It	  is,	  in	  that	  sense,	  coterminous	  with	  social	  life”	  (Laclau	  2006,	  106,	  2014,	  145).	   Laclau	  has	   repeatedly	  argued	  against	   separating	   ‘language’	   and	  ‘action’	  or	   ‘speaking’	  and	   ‘doing’,	  as	  this	  “evokes	  only	  too	  clearly	  an	  old	  differentiation	  between	  ideas	  in	  people’s	  heads	  and	  actions	  in	  which	  they	  participate.	  Since	  Wittgenstein,	  we	  know	  that	  language	  games	  comprise	  both	  linguistic	  exchanges	  and	  actions	  in	  which	  they	  are	  embedded	  […]”	  (Laclau	  2005,	  13).	  Hence,	  PDT	  conceives	  of	  the	  social	  as	  structured	  through	  difference,	  analogous	  to	  language	  (cf.	  Gregory	  1989,	  xxi;	  Stäheli	  2000a,	  8).	  The	  social	  world	  is	  read	  ‘as	  text’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	   focusing	   on	   central	   concepts	   in	   (Western)	   philosophical	   discourse	   such	   as	   ‘meaning’	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  For	   a	   more	   detailed	   account	   of	   Derrida’s	   theory	   developed	   through	   criticisms	   of	   i.e.	   Claude	   Lévi-­‐Strauss	   and	  Edmund	  Husserl	  see	  Howarth	  (2013,	  28–55).	  178	  Jonathan	  Culler	  adds	   the	   feature	   that	   “to	  decontruct	  a	  discourse	   is	   to	   show	  how	   it	  undermines	   the	  philosophy	   it	  asserts,	   or	   the	   hierarchical	   oppositions	   on	   which	   it	   relies,	   by	   identifying	   in	   the	   text	   the	   rhetorical	   operations	   that	  propuce	  the	  supposed	  ground	  of	  argument,	  the	  key	  concept	  or	  premise	  (Culler	  1994,	  86).	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‘knowing’	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  theory	  and	  practice	  (George	  1994,	  191).	  In	  this	  context	  it	  is	  important	   (and	   in	   accordance	   with	   Wittgenstein’s	   understanding)	   to	   stress	   that	   language	   is	  considered	   a	   socially	   and	   collectively	   shared	   system	   of	   rules	   and	   conventions,	   not	   a	   “private	  property”	   (cf.	  Herschinger	  2011,	  13).	  Accordingly,	   the	  emphasis	  on	   language	  once	  more	  equals	  no	   retreat	   into	   ‘subjectivism’	   or	   ‘idealism’.	   As	   pointed	   out	   by	   Campbell:	   “The	   world	   exists	  independently	  of	  language,	  but	  we	  can	  never	  know	  that	  (beyond	  the	  fact	  of	  its	  assertion),	  because	  the	   existence	   of	   the	   world	   is	   literally	   inconceivable	   outside	   of	   language	   and	   our	   traditions	   of	  interpretation”	  (Campbell	  1998,	  6).	  This	  is	  also	  why	  	  
“textualist	   or	   poststructuralist	   modes	   of	   analysis	   emphasize	   ‘discourse’	   rather	   than	   language	  because	   the	   concept	   of	   discourse	   implies	   a	   concern	   with	   the	   meaning-­‐	   and	   value-­‐producing	  practices	   in	   language	   [and	  beyond,	  NN]	   rather	   than	   simply	   the	   relationship	  between	  utterances	  and	  their	  referents”	  (Shapiro	  1989,	  14).	  	  Meanwhile,	  as	  meaning	  and	  sense-­‐making	  is	  conferred	  not	  only,	  but	  primarily	  through	  language,	  a	   focus	   on	   language	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   a	   poststructuralist	   understanding	   of	   discourse	   (cf.	   i.e.	  Nonhoff	  2011,	  96;	  Herschinger	  and	  Renner	  2015,	  14).	  Importantly,	  in	  this	  sense	  language	  is	  not	  treated	   as	   transparent	   or	   merely	   referential	   (cf.	   chapter	   3.3)	   but	   the	   focus	   lies	   on	   both	   the	  linguistic	   practices	   constitutive	   of	   different	   fields,	   e.g.	   political	   or	   economic,	   as	  well	   as	   “on	   the	  language	  of	  inquiry	  itself”	  (ibid.).	   	  In	  the	  poststructuralist	  understanding	  of	  discourse	  “theory	  is	  as	  much	  the	  object	  of	  analysis	  as	  the	  tool	  for	  analysis”	  (cf.	  also	  George	  1994,	  Chapter	  1	  and	  pp.155	  ff.;	  George	  and	  Campbell	  1990,	  285).	  	  4.	  Last	  but	  not	   least	  and	  relating	  again	  to	  PDT	  as	  an	  ontological	  horizon,	  all	  systems	  of	  meaning	  
are	  understood	  as	  structurally	  incomplete	  or	  undecidable	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  fundamental	  lack	  or	  radical	  contingency	  (Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	  8	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  works	  of	  Jaques	  Lacan	  and	  Slavoj	  Zizek;	  Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  2008,	  6).	  Discourses	  as	  structure	  of	  ‘the	  social’	  are	  never	  closed	  entities	  but	  they	  are	  constantly	  being	   transferred	   through	  contact	  with	  other	  discourses.	  On	  an	  ontological	  level	   they	   are	   always	   already	   dislocated	   –	   because	   of	   their	   differential	   character	   (see	   in	  what	  follows)	   –	  while	   this	   dislocation	  manifests	   itself	   on	   the	  ontical	   level	   through	  particular	   events,	  experienced	  as	  ‘crises’.179	  Every	  discourse	  as	  a	  system	  of	  differences	  strives	  for	  closure	  in	  form	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  To	  reiterate	  what	  was	  briefly	  stated	  on	  ‘events’	  in	  the	  introduction,	  in	  a	  poststructuralist	  understanding	  an	  event	  is	  not	  “’the	  thing	  that	  happens	  (the	  content	  […])	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  happens:	  to	  wit,	  the	  eventfulness	  of	  its	  event	  (or,	  yet	  again,	   its	  event	  rather	  than	   its	  advent)’”	  (Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  cited	   in	  Marchart	  2007,	  74f.).	   In	   this	  sense	  Tom	  Lundborg	  refers	   to	   studying	   the	   ‘reality’	   of	   the	   pure	   event	   (as	   distinguished	   from	   the	   historical	   event)	   as	   “expressions	   of	  
disruption	  or	  dislocation,	  which,	  instead	  of	  referring	  to	  something	  specific	  that	  has	  happened	  in	  a	  particular	  moment	  in	  time,	   relate	   to	   how	   something	   ambiguous	   and	   indeterminate	   disrupts	   the	   fantasy	   of	   the	   static	   being	   of	   things	   –	   of	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drawing	   its	   limits	   and	   fixing	   the	   meanings.	   With	   pure	   difference	   –	   if	   the	   differences	   did	   not	  constitute	   a	   system,	   a	   system	   itself	   being	   conceivable	   only	   by	   differentiation	   from	   what	   it	  excludes	  –	  no	  meaning	  at	  all	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  signification	  would	  be	  possible	  (cf.	  Laclau	  2007,	  37).	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  establish	  a	  position	  without	  differentiating	  it	  from	  a	  ‘context’,	  and	   this	   process	   of	   differentiation	   in	   turn	   establishes	   the	   context	   itself	   (cf.	   Hetzel	   2004,	   199;	  Laclau	  2007,	  27).	  As	  “any	  structure	  or	  system	  of	  differences	  is	  defined	  by	  reference	  to	  something	  that	  is	  actively	  excluded	  from	  that	  system,	  thus	  establishing	  the	  limits	  of	  a	  particular	  structure”,	  the	  excluded	  is	  always	  present	  within	  the	  system	  itself,	  in	  turn	  accounting	  for	  the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  completely	  closed	  or	  sutured	  system	  (cf.	  Howarth	  2013,	  270).180	  From	  this	  ‘essential	  instability’	  follows	   the	  political	   character	   of	   social	   objectivity	   (cf.	   Glynos	   and	  Howarth	   2008,	   7),	   ‘political’	  understood	  as	  non-­‐essential	  or	  non-­‐foundational,	  as	  taking	  a	  decision	  in	  an	  ‘undecidable’	  terrain	  (cf.	   Glynos	   and	   Howarth	   2007,	   114;	   cf.	   Marchart	   2010).	   Asserting	   the	   contingency	   of	   all	  knowledge,	   identities	  and	  social	  relations	  opposes	  any	   foundationalist	  premise,	   that	   they	  could	  be	   grounded	   on	   a	   fixed	   ‘meta-­‐theoretical’	   base	   transcending	   human	   actions,	   as	   well	   as	   all	  essentialism	   that	   ascribes	   pre-­‐given	   characteristics	   or	   essences	   to	   all	   being	   (Jørgensen	   and	  Phillips	   2002,	   5f.).	   	   This	   understanding	   of	   no	   ultimate	   groundings	   or	   foundations,	   thus	   their	  historical	   and	   contingent	   character	  was	   (and	   still	   is)	   a	   central	   concern	  of	   IR-­‐poststructuralists,	  who	   repeatedly	   pointed	   out	   that	   they	   did	   not	   want	   to	   establish	   poststructuralism	   as	   ‘new	  paradigm’,	  while	  however	  arguing	  against	  claims	  that	  this	  positioning	  would	  lead	  to	  an	  ‘anything	  goes’.	  In	  Laclau’s	  words:	  
“This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  at	  any	  time	  everything	  that	  is	  logically	  possible	  becomes,	  automatically,	  an	  actual	  political	  possibility.	  There	  are	  inchoated	  possibilities	  which	  are	  going	  to	  be	  blocked,	  not	  because	   of	   any	   logical	   restriction,	   but	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   historical	   contexts	   in	   which	   the	  representative	  institutions	  operate”	  (Laclau	  1997,	  50).	  Knowledge,	  identities	  and	  social	  relations	  can	  and	  indeed	  do	  become	  fixed	  or	  institutionalized	  all	  the	  time,	  however	  this	  fixation	  can	  never	  be	  totally	  beyond	  (political)	  contestation	  (cf.	  Solomon	  2009,	  274).	  In	  Ashley’s	  argumentation,	  the	  main	  issue	  for	  poststructuralist	  analysis	  is	  taking	  the	  question	  of	  “historicity”	  seriously	  (1989,	  261f.),	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  opposing	  any	  presupposition	  of	  “an	  unexamined	  metaphysical	  faith	  in	  its	  [modern	  discourse’s,	  NN]	  capacity	  to	  speak	  a	  sovereign	  voice	   of	   suprahistorical	   truth”	   (1989,	   264),	   thus	   of	   ultimate	   foundations	   for	   knowledge	   and	  ensuing	   claims	   about	   the	   course	   of	   things	   through	   “the	   sovereignty	   of	   ‘reasoning	   man’”.	   This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  subjects,	  objects	  and	  individual	  moments	  in	  time”	  (Lundborg	  2012,	  9).	  This	  largely	  corresponds	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  ‘the	  Rise	  of	  Japan’	  and	  ‘the	  Rise	  of	  China’	  as	  dislocations	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  180	  This	  understanding	  again	  goes	  back	  to	  Derrida’s	  différance	  and	  the	  traces,	  see	  above.	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critique	  is	  not	  meant	  as	  ‘anti-­‐modern’	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  directed	  against	  ‘man’	  and	  ‘reason’	  (1989,	  289)	   or	   against	   other	   ‘Enlightenment	   notions’	   (cf.	   George	   1994,	   140,	   156),181	  but	   as	   ascribing	  historicity	   or	   discursivity	   to	   what	   we	   seemingly	   unproblematically	   call	   modernity	   and	   its	  ‘achievements’.	  More	  generally	  speaking,	   in	   Jim	  George’s	   terms	   the	  postmodernist	  contribution	  to	   IR	  emphasizes	   the	  “historical,	   cultural,	  and	   linguistic	  practices	   in	  which	  subjects	  and	  objects	  (and	  theory	  and	  practice,	  facts	  and	  values)	  are	  constructed”	  (George	  1994,	  192).	  It	  is	  a	  criticism	  and	  eschewing	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  foundationalism	  as	  such,	  not	  of	  modernism	  in	  particular	  (cf.	  George	  1994,	  160).	  George	  has	  pointed	  to	  the	  “paradox	  of	  modernity”	  though,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  its	  	  
“celebration	  of	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  distance	  from	  the	  primitive	  premodern	  world	  (and	  its	  idealism	  and	   metaphysics)	   continually	   predicated	   upon	   the	   most	   basic	   of	   assumptions	   in	   “premodern”	  thinking	  –	   the	  assumption	   that	   there	   is	   a	   foundation	   for	  human	  knowledge,	  prior	   to	  and	  beyond	  history,	  culture	  and	  language.	  In	  the	  age	  that	  has	  triumphantly	  detached	  itself	   from	  the	  legacy	  of	  “premodern”	   traits,	   the	   paradox	   of	  modernity	   is	   that	   faith	   in	   (premodern)	   foundationalism	   still	  reigns	  at	  its	  ontological	  core”	  (George	  1994,	  43).	  	  	   	  George	   argues	   for	   dealing	   with	   this	   paradox	   not	   through	   seeking	   to	   detach	   oneself	   from	  modernity	  in	  terms	  of	  proposing	  a	  sort	  of	  counter-­‐project	  (which	  actually	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  as	   we	   are	   also	   part	   of/embedded	   in	   modernist	   discourse),	   but	   through	   engaging	   with	   the	  paradox	  –	  and	   thus	  with	   ‘modernist’	   theories	  –	   from	  within,	  by	  ascribing	   to	  what	  Foucault	  has	  called	  an	  attitude	  or	  philosophical	  ethos	  of	  permanent	  critique	  of	  our	  historical	  era,	   in	  his	  view	  actually	   a	   thread	   connecting	   to	   the	   critical	   Enlightenment	   spirit	   (1994,	   162).182	  As	   George	  maintains,	  	  
“the	   aim	   here	   [is]	   not	   to	   dismiss	   the	   dominant	   readings	   but	   to	   illustrate	   that	   they	   are,	   indeed	  
readings	   –	   that	   they	   can	  be	   read	   in	  different	  ways	  and	   that	   their	   status	   is	  derived	  not	   from	  any	  correspondence	   with	   an	   essential	   (real)	   meaning	   but	   from	   a	   discursive	   strategy	   intrinsically	  connected	  to	  the	  dominant	  form	  of	  (sociohistorical)	  knowledge	  and	  power”	  (1994,	  192	  emphasis	  added).	  	  What	  Richard	  Ashley183	  in	  turn	  calls	  the	  ‘paradox	  of	  poststructuralism’	  is	  basically	  the	  eschewing	  of	  any	  foundationalism	  as	  consequence	  of	  taking	  historicity	  seriously,	  thus	  as	  in	  his	  example	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  See	  footnotes	  on	  poststructuralism	  and	  postmodernism	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  as	  well	  as	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  on	  the	  discursive	  construction	  of	  ‘Man’	  (2001,	  116–117).	  On	  the	  latter	  see	  also	  Howarth	  (2013,	  61).	  182 	  See	   Foucault’s	   What	   is	   Enlightenment?	   (Foucault	   1984).	   On	   what	   he	   sees	   as	   possible	   dialogue	   between	  postmodernism	  and	  “Modernist-­‐Enlightenment	  thought”	  see	  for	  instance	  Chris	  Hughes	  (2012,	  Chapter	  7).	  	  183	  But	  see	  also	  George’s	  criticism	  of	  Ashley	  in	  this	  context,	  in	  George	  (1994,	  165,	  175).	  William	  Connolly	  also	  criticizes	  Ashley	   for	   what	   he	   terms	   “a	   recipe	   for	   theoretical	   postponism”	   and	   argues	   not	   for	   eschewing	   or	   negating	   the	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instance	   not	   taking	   a	   position	   in	   terms	   of	   choosing	   ‘structure’	   over	   ‘agency’,	   but	   instead	  respecting	  this	  undecidable	  opposition	  as	  “an	  inescapable	  feature	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  may	  think	  about	  history”	  (1989,	  273f.)	  In	  the	  words	  of	  David	  Howarth,	  “the	  problem	  of	  structure	  and	  agency	  does	  not	  admit	  of	  theoretical	  resolution	  at	  all,	  because	  it	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  resides	  in	  social	  relations	   themselves”	   (Howarth	   2013,	   149,	   151,	   161,	   182,	   270).	  184	  Hence	   poststructuralism	  cannot	   and	  does	   not	   intend	   to	   serve	   as	   an	   alternative	   ‘ground’	   in	   the	   foundational	   sense,	   as	   it	  claims	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  its	  own	  historicity	  and	  contingency.	  This	  awareness	  is	  characterized	  as	  “an	  unceasing	   determination	   to	   see	   the	   consequences	   of	   this	   reasoning	   through	   matched	   by	   an	  insistent	  openness	  to	  criticism	  at	  every	  turn”,	  and	  attributed	  to	  “a	  rigorously	  sustained	  integrity	  of	   theoretical	   intellect”	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   theoretical	   detachment	   from	  what	  Ashley	   calls	   ‘historical	  practice’.	   	  However,	  again,	  against	  the	  numerous	  assertions	  to	  the	  contrary,	  this	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  lead	  to	  an	   ‘anything	  goes’,	  as	  poststructuralists	  understand	  every	  practice	  –	  be	   it	   theoretical	  or	  ‘historical’	  –	  as	  political	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  participating	  “in	  the	  inscription	  of	  a	  sovereign	  voice	  and	  the	   narrative	   structuring	   of	   history”	   (Ashley	   1989,	   280),	   or	   in	   other	   words,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  necessarily	   taking	   a	   certain	   position	   or	   decision	   while	   always	   being	   aware	   of	   its	   contingent	  foundations.	  I	  understand	  this	  as	  what	  Laclau	  and	  the	  Essex	  School	  have	  called	  to	  take	  a	  decision	  in	  an	  undecidable	  terrain.	  In	  Laclau’s	  words:	  “To	  understand	  something	  historically	  is	  to	  refer	  it	  back	  to	  its	  contingent	  conditions	  of	  emergence”	  (Laclau	  1990,	  36).	  	  
The	  ‘political’	  
	  The	   emphasis	   on	   ‘historicity’	   is	   further	   addressed	   by	   other	   authors	   in	   IR	  who	   emphasize	   and	  elaborate	  on	  the	  concept	  and	  understanding	  of	   ‘the	  political’	   in	  poststructuralism,	  mostly	  again	  by	  connecting	  to	  the	  works	  of	  Foucault,	  Derrida,	  Lacan	  and	  Žižek	  (cf.	  Edkins	  1999).	  The	  ‘political’	  as	  differentiated	  from	  and	  opposed	  to	  ‘politics’	  	   “has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  that	  very	  social	  order	  which	  sets	  out	  a	  particular,	  historically	  specific	  account	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  politics	  and	  defines	  other	  areas	  of	  social	  life	  as	  not	  politics.	  […]	  It	  is	  central	  to	  this	  process	  that	  the	  act	  of	  constitution	  is	  immediately	  concealed	  or	  hidden:	  Hence,	  “the	   political	   is	   …	   revealed,	   not	   in	   what	   we	   call	   political	   activity	   but	   in	   the	   double	   movement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  grounding	   of	   theoretical	   approaches,	   but	   for	   problematizing	   the	   grounding	   at	   the	   same	   time	   (Connolly	   2002,	   56),	  which	   I	   would	   read	   as	   ‘weak	   ontolgy’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   Stephen	   K.	  White	   (see	   in	   what	   follows).	   See	   also	   Howarth’s	  criticism	  of	  Ashley,	  that	  points	  into	  the	  same	  direction	  (Howarth	  2013,	  77f.).	  	  See	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  differentiating	  ‘post-­‐foundationalism’	  from	  ‘anti-­‐foundationalism’.	  	  184	  In	  the	  same	  vein	  Laclau	  discusses	  the	  relationship	  between	  ‘the	  universal’	  and	  ‘the	  particular’,	  which	  is	  not	  about	  privileging	  one	  or	  the	  other,	  but	  articulating	  the	  (philosophical	  and	  political)	  relationship	  between	  them	  (Laclau	  2007,	  Chapter	  2;	  cf.	  Zerilli	  2009,	  89).	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whereby	   the	  mode	   of	   institution	   of	   society	   appears	   and	   is	   obscured””	   (Edkins	   1999,	   2	   quoting	  Claude	  Lefort,	  Democracy	  and	  Political	  Theory,	  11).	  	  	  	  As	   expressed	   by	   Chantal	  Mouffe,	   ‘the	   political’	   is	   the	   dimension	   of	   antagonism	   constitutive	   of	  societies,	  while	  ‘politics’	  is	  the	  set	  of	  practices	  through	  which	  an	  order	  is	  created,	  that	  organizes	  coexistence	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘the	  political’	  (Mouffe	  2005,	  9).	  Poststructuralist	  analysis	  bears	  the	  capacities	  to	  concern	  itself	  with	  and	  to	  render	  ‘the	  political’	  visible.	  In	  his	  study	  on	  what	  he	  calls	  “post-­‐foundational	   political	   thought”	   –	   encompassing	   a	   chapter	   on	   Laclau	   –	   Oliver	   Marchart	  extensively	   focuses	   on	   the	   difference	   between	   ‘politics’	   and	   ‘the	   political’	   (‘la	   politique’/’le	  politique’;	  ‘Politik’/’das	  Politische’)	  (Marchart	  2007,	  1).	  From	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  political	  theory	  he	  characterizes	   the	   “moment	   of	   the	   political”	   as	   the	  moment	   of	   the	   encounter	  with	   contingency,	  which	  	   “is	  not	  only	  a	  crisis	  within	  a	   specific	  discourse	   (which	   leads	   to	  conceptual	   change	  only),	  but	   the	  encounter	  with	  the	  crisis	  or	  breakdown	  of	  discursive	  signification	  as	  such	  –	  in	  political	  terms,	  the	  encounter	  with	  society’s	  abyss	  or	  absent	  ground.	  And	  it	  is	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  groundlessness	  of	  the	  social	  as	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  discursive,	  rather	  than	  just	  […]	  of	  any	  particular	  discourse,	  which	  has	  come	  to	  define	  the	  emerging	  post-­‐foundationalist	  constellation”	  (Marchart	  2007,	  32f.).185	  	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  term	  post-­‐foundationalism	  does	  not	  figure	  prominently,	  if	  at	  all	  in	  Essex-­‐School	  works.	  Laclau	  makes	  an	  explicit	  reference	  to	  the	  term	  in	  Marchart’s	  understanding	  and	  referring	  to	   him	   only	   in	   a	   text	   in	   2012,	   reprinted	   in	   the	   2014	   collection	   of	   essays	   (Laclau	   2014,	   119).	  Laclau	  emphasizes,	  that	  in	  contrast	  to	  anti-­‐foundationalism,	  post-­‐foundationalism	  does	  not	  mean	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  ground,	  but	  the	  realization	  of	  its	  presence	  as	  an	  absent	  ground.	  He	  refers	  to	  the	  same	   passage	   in	   Heidegger	   on	   the	   ‘abyss’	   or	   ‘Abgrund’	   as	   Howarth	   (2013,	   183),	   but	   Howarth	  does	  not	   employ	   the	   term	  post-­‐foundationalism.	  Other	   scholars	   in	   fact	   do	   characterize	  PDT	  as	  anti-­‐foundational	   or	   anti-­‐essentialist,	   or	   as	   having	   an	   anti-­‐foundational	   epistemology	  (Herschinger	   and	   Renner	   2014,	   13;	   Koch	   2007,	   1;	   Methmann	   2010,	   351;	   Torfing	   2005,	   13).	  François	   Debrix	   in	   turn	   speaks	   of	   non-­‐foundationalism,	   by	   which	   he	  means	   “to	   hold	   given	   or	  accepted	  foundational	  beliefs	  in	  suspense”	  (Debrix	  2003,	  24).186	  For	  example,	  poststructuralism	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  Marchart	  reads	  Laclauian	  discourse	  theory	  as	  a	  ‘political	  ontology’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  (political)	  theory	  of	  signification	  (as	   such).	   Since	   there	   can	   be	   no	   social	   reality	   outside	   signification	   or	   beyond	   meaning,	   a	   theory	   of	   signification	  amounts	   to	   a	   theory	   of	   all	   possible	   being,	   thus	   to	   an	   ontology.	   Every	   ontology	   is	   ‘political’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	  concerned	   with	   every	   aspect	   of	   being	   in	   a	   quasi	   transcendental	   approach	   in	   the	   post-­‐Heideggerian	   sense,	   thus	  concerned	   with	   ontological	   conditions,	   not	   the	   conditions	   or	   foundations	   of	   ‘knowing’	   or	   ‘understanding’,	   hence	  leaving	   the	   modern	   hegemonic	   terrain	   of	   epistemology	   (167).	   Importantly,	   not	   everything	   is	   political	   but	   the	  ground/abyss	   of	   everything	   is	   ‘the	   political’	   (2007,	   146–149,	   167–169).	   On	   Laclau	   and	   ‘the	   political’	   see	   also	   Bech	  Dyrberg	  (2009),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  work	  of	  Chantal	  Mouffe	  (1993,	  2005).	  	  186	  On	  what	  they	  call	  foundations	  without	  foundationalism	  see	  also	  Chernoff	  (2013,	  355)	  and	  P.T.	  Jackson	  (2011,	  189).	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is	  not	   ‘anti-­‐structuralism’	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  positing	   a	  different	   ‘theory	  of	   origin’,	   but	   it	   asks	   “not	  why	   and	   how	   there	   is	   stability	   to	   social	   systems,	   it	   asks	   why	   and	   how	   structures	   become	  undone”(Finlayson	  and	  Valentine	  2002,	  12).	  	  In	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe’s	  work	  these	  issues	  figure	  in	  the	  central	  concepts	  of	  hegemony	  and	  antagonism	  and	  the	  social,	  political	  and	  fantasmatic	  logics	  that	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  in	  the	  chapter	  three.	  In	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe’s	  	  words:	  	  	  “Our	   approach	   is	   grounded	   in	   privileging	   the	   moment	   of	   political	   articulation,	   and	   the	   central	  category	  of	  political	  analysis	  is,	  in	  our	  view,	  hegemony.	  […]	  But	  to	  say	  contingent	  articulation	  is	  to	  enounce	   a	   central	   dimension	   of	   ‘politics’.	   This	   privileging	   of	   the	   political	   moment	   in	   the	  structuration	   of	   society	   is	   an	   essential	   aspect	   of	   our	   approach.	   […]	   the	   hegemonic	   link	   is	   […]	  constitutively	  political.	   […]	  This	   is	  why	  we	  conceive	  of	   the	  political	  not	  as	   superstructure	  but	  as	  having	  the	  status	  of	  an	  ontology	  of	  the	  social”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  x,	  xii,	  xiii,	  xiv).	  	  	  This	  is	  also	  why	  Laclau	  understands	  social	  relations	  as	  always	  contingent,	  and	  as	  power	  relations.	  For	  the	  understanding	  of	  identity	  this	  means	  that	  	  “the	  construction	  of	  a	  social	  identity	  is	  an	  act	  of	  power	  and	  that	  identity	  as	  such	  is	  power”	  (Laclau	  1990,	  31).	  In	  this	  sense,	  Laclau	  understands	  ‘the	   field	  of	   the	  political’	   as	   “[t]he	  moment	  of	  antagonism	  where	   the	  undecidable	  nature	  of	   the	  alternatives	  [of	  sedimented	  forms	  of	  objectivity	  that	  make	  up	  the	  field	  that	  we	  will	  call	  the	  ‘social’,	  (ibid.)]	  and	  their	  resolution	  through	  power	  relations	  becomes	  fully	  visible”	  (Laclau	  1990,	  35,	  see	  also	  2014,	  68).	  	  	  
Ontology	  
	  From	  all	  that	  has	  been	  said	  it	  follows	  that	  ontology	  for	  PDT	  	  	   “is	   not	   just	   about	   what	   sorts	   of	   things	   exist,	   but	   that	   they	   exist	   and	   how	   they	   exist.	   Indeed,	   of	  capital	  importance	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  objects	  and	  subjects	  are	  marked	  by	  an	  ‘essential	  instability’	   that	   problematizes	   a	   simple	   listing	   of	   their	   necessary	   intrinsic	   properties	   and	   causal	  capacities”	  (Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  2007,	  11).	  	  	  Instead	  “the	  meaning	  and	  identity	  of	  beings	  depends	  on	  the	  historical	  and	  relational	  contexts	  in	  which	  they	  appear”	  (Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  2008,	  10;	  Howarth	  2013,	  145). 	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I	   read	   PDT’s	   understanding	   of	   ontology	   as	   a	   weak	   ontology	   in	   the	   understanding	   of	   Stephen	  White,	  as	   “ontological	  commitments	   in	   this	  sense	  are	   thus	  entangled	  with	  questions	  of	   identity	  and	  history,	  with	  how	  we	  articulate	  the	  meaning	  of	  our	  lives,	  both	  individually	  and	  collectively”	  (S.	   K.	  White	   2000,	   4).	  White	   refers	   to	   Heidegger’s	   emphasis	   on	   being	   (‘Sein’)	   as	   a	   not	   purely	  cognitive	  matter,	  but	  as	   inextricably	   linked	   to	   ‘existential	  human	  being’	   (‘Dasein’)	   –	  and	  points	  out	   that	   postmodernism	   and	   poststructuralism	   are	   not	   the	   only	   currents	   in	   this	   stream	   of	  thought	   (ibid.,	   5).	   This	   resonates	   with	   what	   has	   been	   said	   about	   foundational	   versus	   post-­‐foundational	   understandings	   earlier.	   ‘Strong	   ontologies’	   claim	   to	   show	   “the	  way	   the	  world	   is”,	  and	   “it	   is	   by	   reference	   to	   this	   external	   ground	   that	   ethical	   and	  political	   life	   gain	   their	   sense	  of	  what	  is	  right;	  moreover	  this	  foundation’s	  validity	  is	  unchanging	  and	  of	  universal	  reach”	  (ibid.,	  6).	  ‘Weak	  ontologies’	  in	  turn	  accept	  that	  	  	  	   “all	  fundamental	  conceptualizations	  of	  self,	  other,	  and	  world	  are	  contestable.”	  Importantly,	  all	  the	  same	  “there	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  such	  conceptualizations	  are	  nevertheless	  necessary	  or	  unavoidable	  for	  an	   adequately	   reflective	   ethical	   and	   political	   life.	   The	   latter	   demands	   from	   us	   the	   affirmative	  gesture	   of	   constructing	   foundations,	   the	   former	   prevents	   us	   from	   carrying	   out	   this	   task	   in	   a	  traditional	   fashion.	   One	   aspect	   of	   constructing	   such	   contestable	   foundations	   involves	   the	  embodiment	  within	  them	  of	  some	  signaling	  of	  their	  own	  limits.	  […]	  In	  a	  way,	  its	  contestability	  will	  thus	  be	  enacted	  rather	  that	  just	  announced”	  (S.	  K.	  White	  2000,	  8	  emphases	  added).	  	  	  Hence,	  a	  ‘weak	  ontology’	  does	  not	  mean	  no	  ontology	  or	  no	  foundations	  at	  all,	  but	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  contingency	  of	  the	  foundations.	  	  	  
‘Discourse’	  according	  to	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  
	  I	   turn	  now	  briefly	   to	   the	  more	  detailed	  conceptualization	  of	   the	   term	   ‘discourse’	  by	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe,	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  ‘origin’	  of	  their	  understanding	  of	  identity	  and	  hegemony,	  and	  that	  enfolds	  their	   key-­‐notions	   (nodal	   points,	   antagonism,	   dislocation,	   logics	   of	   equivalence	   and	   difference,	  empty	   signifiers),	   which	   I	   will	   articulate	   into	   analytical	   categories	   in	   chapter	   three.	   Concrete	  examples	  of	  the	  terms	  and	  categories	  do	  follow	  with	  the	  discourse	  analysis	  of	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  in	  the	  chapters	  four	  to	  seven.	  	  What	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	   call	   discursive	   structure	   in	   their	  words	   “is	  not	   a	  merely	   ‘cognitive’	   or	  ‘contemplative’	   entity:	   it	   is	   an	   articulatory	   practice	   which	   constitutes	   and	   organizes	   social	  relations”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  96).	  Discourse	  is	  “the	  structured	  totality	  resulting	  from	  the	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articulatory	  practice”,	  while	  articulation	   is	  “any	  practice	  establishing	  a	  relation	  among	  elements	  such	  that	  their	  identity	  is	  modified	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  articulatory	  practice”.	  In	  this	  case	  an	  element	  becomes	   a	   “moment”,	   thus	   a	   temporarily	   fixed	   position;	   temporarily	   because	   “no	   discursive	  formation	   is	   a	   sutured	   totality	   and	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   elements	   into	  moments	   is	   never	  complete”	   (Laclau	   and	  Mouffe	   2001,	   107).187	  Elements	   in	   turn	   are	   “floating	   signifiers”	   (Laclau	  2005,	  131–133;	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  113)	  that	  may	  become	  “nodal	  points”	  when	  turned	  into	  moments.	  Nodal	  points	  are	  understood	  as	  partial	   fixations	  of	  meaning	  to	  which	  the	  differential	  positions	  relate	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  112).	  	  Hence,	  	  	   “the	  practice	  of	  articulation,	  therefore,	  consists	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  nodal	  points	  which	  partially	  fix	  meaning;	  and	  the	  partial	  character	  of	  this	  fixation	  proceeds	  from	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  social,	  a	  result,	   in	   its	   turn,	  of	   the	  constant	  overflowing	  of	  every	  discourse	  by	   the	   infinitude	  of	   the	   field	  of	  discursivity”	  (2001,	  113).	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	   attributed	  meanings	  are	  and	  always	   remain	   contested	  by	  other	  possibilities	  of	  articulation.	   Importantly,	  articulation	   is	  not	   to	  be	  understood	  as	   linguistic	  practice	  only,	  but	  as	  any	   social	   practice,	   “[t]he	   social	   is	   articulation	   insofar	   as	   ‘society’	   is	   impossible”	   (Laclau	   and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  114)188,	  meaning	  that	  complete	  closure	  or	  saturation	  of	  the	  social	  as	  a	  fixed	  ‘society’	  is	  never	  possible.	  The	   impossibility	  of	   final	   closure	   is	  due	   to	   the	  differential	   (hence	   essentially	  instable)	  character	  of	  any	  system	  of	  signification	  (see	  point	  4.	   in	  this	  subchapter).	  Meaning	  can	  only	   be	   established	   as	   difference	   from	   that	   which	   it	   is	   not	   and	   from	   that	   which	   it	   excludes.	  Through	  this	  negating	  or	  excluding	  reference	  the	   ‘what	   is	  not’	   is	  always	  present	   in	   ‘what	   is’,	  so	  that	   ‘what	   is’	   is	  always	  confronted	  with	   its	  own	  limits.	  As	   laid	  out	  under	  point	  4.,	   the	  strive	   for	  closure	  is	  always	  present	  as	  well.	  From	  this	  ‘impossible	  (strive	  for)	  fullness’	  follows	  what	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	   term	   antagonism	   as	   “experience	   of	   the	   limit	   of	   the	   social”,	   as	   “the	   presence	   of	   the	  ‘Other’	  prevents	  me	  from	  being	  totally	  myself”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  125),	  see	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  identity.	  This	  limit	  of	  the	  social	  is	  not	  something	  ‘external’	  to	  the	  social,	  but	  it	  is	  “given	  within	   the	   social	   itself	   as	   something	   subverting	   it,	   destroying	   its	   ambition	   to	   constitute	   a	   full	  presence”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  127).189	  Furthermore,	  	  	   “antagonism	  escapes	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  apprehended	  through	  language,	  since	  language	  only	  exists	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   fix	   that	  which	   antagonism	   subverts”	   […],	   “for	   every	   language	   and	   every	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  Martin	  Nonhoff	  discusses	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  Laclau’s	  shifting	  from	  ‘elements’	  to	  ‘demands’,	  see	  Nonhoff	  (2007,	  176).	  188	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Laclau	  in	  a	  debate	  with	  Roy	  Bhaskar:	  “The	  notion	  of	  discourse,	  could,	  if	  you	  prefer,	  be	  replaced	  by	  that	  of	  practice”	  (Laclau	  and	  Bhaskar	  1998,	  9).	  	  189	  For	  differences	  between	  a	  Laclauian	  and	  a	  Lacanian	  understanding	  of	  ‘antagonism’	  see	  Zerilli	  	  (2009,	  97–102).	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society	   are	   constituted	  as	   a	   repression	  of	   the	   consciousness	  of	   the	   impossibility	   that	  penetrates	  them”	  (2001,	  125).	  	  	  Antagonism	   is	   expressed	   instead	   through	   the	   logics	   of	   equivalence	   and	   difference,	   which	   I	  address	  under	   the	   following	  subchapter	  on	   ‘identity’.	   It	   should	  be	   further	  noted	  here	  however,	  that	  while	  in	  HSS	  the	  notion	  of	  antagonism	  is	  central,	  it	  is	  complemented	  by	  the	  term	  dislocation	  in	  New	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Revolutions	  of	  our	  Time	  (NR,	  1990).	  A	  (hegemonic)	  discourse	  becomes	  challenged	  or	  dislocated	  by	  events	   that	  cannot	  be	  reconciled	  or	   integrated	  by	   it	   (Torfing	  2005:	  16).	  “The	  response	  to	  the	  dislocation	  of	  the	  structure	  will	  be	  its	  recomposition	  around	  particular	  nodal	   points	   of	   articulation	   by	   the	   various	   antagonistic	   forces.	   […]	   [D]islocation	   is	   both	   the	  condition	   of	   possibility	   and	   impossibility	   of	   a	   center	   at	   the	   same	   time.”	   Therefore,	   like	  antagonism,	   “dislocation	   is	   the	   primary	   ontological	   level	   of	   constitution	   of	   the	   social”	   (Laclau	  1990,	  40,	  44),	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  structure	  enables	  agency	  (see	  in	  what	  follows).	  	  Importantly	   however,	   as	   pointed	   out	   for	   instance	   by	   Ty	   Solomon,	   for	   the	   relationship	  between	   (collective)	   self	   and	   other	   this	   means	   that	   because	   of	   its	   (ontological)	   lack,	   every	  identity	  is	  prevented	  from	  achieving	  ‘closure’	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  fully	  constituted	  identity	  from	  within	  itself,	  and	  not	  because	  of	  an	  encounter	  with	  the	  other	  as	  something	  external.	  It	  is	  the	  encounter	  with	  the	  other	  that	  renders	  the	   lack	  visible	  on	  an	  ontical	   level	  (Solomon	  2015,	  13).	   	  Because	  of	  the	   impossibility	   of	   a	   fully	   sutured	   social	   system	   dislocations	   are	   always	   possible,	   while	   the	  inherent	   strive	   for	   closure	   attempts	   at	   precluding	   them.	   Then,	   in	   case	   of	   a	   dislocation	   the	  articulation	   of	   a	   constitutive	   outside	   can	   be	   made	   responsible	   for	   the	   own	   ‘deficiency’,	   as	   it	  serves	   to	   suppress	   the	   contingency	   of	   all	   identity	   and	   society	   (cf.	   Torfing	   2005,	   17).	   	   In	   my	  reading	   (see	   in	  what	   follows	  on	   identity),	   the	  dislocation	   then	   results	   in	   an	  antagonism	   that	   is	  expressed	  through	  the	  logics	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference.190	  	  	  	  
2.2.	  Identity191	  
	  In	  IR-­‐literature,	  poststructuralism	  is	  commonly	  credited	  with	  mostly	  contributing	  to	  IR	  research	  by	   ‘bringing	   identity	   in’	   (cf.	   Diez	   2004,	   321;	   Herschinger	   2011,	   25).192	  The	   most	   important	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	  Laclau	   points	   out	   that	   “the	   defence	   of	   the	   community	   against	   an	   external	   threat	   has	   dislocated	   that	   community,	  which,	   in	   order	   to	   persist,	   cannot	   simply	   repeat	   something	   that	   preceded	   the	   dislocatory	   moment.	   That	   is	   why	  someone	  who	  wants	  to	  defend	  an	  existing	  order	  of	  things	  has	  already	  lost	  it	  through	  its	  very	  defence”	  (Laclau	  2005,	  121).	  This	   is	  an	  important	  point	  regarding	  my	  argument	  about	  the	  U.S.	   trying	  to	  preserve	  its	   identity	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   Japan	  and	  China,	  I	  take	  it	  up	  in	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapters	  four	  to	  seven.	  	  191	  This	  subchapter	  partly	  draws	  from	  Nymalm	  (2013).	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difference	   of	   discourse-­‐theoretical	   approaches	   in	   general	   and	   PDT	   in	   particular	   compared	   to	  other	  (constructivist)	  approaches	  towards	  identity	  –	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  chapter	  1.4	  –	  is	  that	  identity	  is	  not	  established	  as	  a	  pre-­‐fixed	  category	  to	  be	  then	  applied	  to,	  or	  filled	  out	  by	  the	  ‘empirical	  results’	  of	   an	   analysis	   (cf.	   Howarth	   2013,	   233,	   235).	   Identity	   is	   understood	   as	   discursively	   articulated	  (not	  only	  but	  also	  through	  language,	  and	  in	  this	  respect	  ‘articulation’	  is	  understood	  in	  the	  sense	  laid	   out	   in	   chapter	   2.1,	   hence	   not	   only	   as	   linguistic	   expression),	   thus	   as	   an	   entirely	   social	   and	  relational	  phenomenon.	  In	  a	  strict	  sense	  ‘identity’	  as	  such	  does	  not	  exist,	  but	  it	  ‘happens’	  through	  identification	  with	  ‘subject	  positions’	  being	  articulated	  in	  discourses,	  meaning	  that	  every	  identity	  is	  constituted	  within	  a	  relationship	  to	  others	  that	  is	  only	  temporarily	  fixable	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	   111ff.). The	   subject	   positions	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   these	   temporal	   and	   partial	   –	   hence	  never	  complete	  –	   fixations,193	  which	  also	  means	  that	   in	  a	  PDT	  understanding	  no	  self-­‐contained,	  completely	  self-­‐conscious,	  stable	  subject	  exists.194	  The	  ‘self’	   is	  what	  it	   is	  because	  it	   is	  contrasted	  with	  something	  else	  that	   it	   is	  not,	  and	  groups	  constitute	  themselves	   in	  relation	  to	  other	  groups	  (Jørgensen	   and	   Phillips	   2002,	   40,	   43).	   The	   formation	   of	   individual	   and	   collective	   identities	  happens	   through	   discursive	   processes,	   during	   which	   identities	   are	   accepted,	   refused	   and	  negotiated.	   As	   meaning	   can	   never	   be	   ultimately	   fixed,	   the	   way	   is	   open	   for	   constant	   social	  struggles	   about	   definitions	   of	   society	   and	   identity	  with	   their	   respective	   effects	   (Jørgensen	   and	  Phillips	  2002,	  24ff.,	  36).	  Self	  and	  other	  are	  thus	  always	  constituted	  in	  differential	  relation	  to	  each	  other,	   also	   implicated	  by	   the	   strive	   for	   impossible	   closure	  or	   fullness,	  which	   renders	   the	  other	  into	  the	  constitutive,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  antagonistic	  other,	  that	  is	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  ‘necessary’,	  but	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  For	   an	   ‘inventory’	   of	   poststructuralist	   ‘achievements’	   see	   i.e.	   Ashley	   (1996,	   245f.)	   and	  Howarth	   (2013,	   1–2),	   for	  ‘deficits’	  see	  ibid.	  75f.	  193	  David	  Howarth	  reads	   ‘subject	  positions’	  as	   [temporarily!]	   sedimented	   forms	  of	   identity	   “with	  which	  social	  actors	  identify	  in	  their	  ongoing	  social	  reproduction”,	  and	  he	  further	  differentiates	  them	  from	  ‘(radical)	  subjectivity’,	  which	  in	  turn	   accounts	   for	   the	   incomplete	   and	   split	   subject	   at	   the	   ontological	   level.	   The	   lack	   is	   rendered	   visible	   through	  dislocations	  on	  the	  ontical	  level,	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  enables	  identifications	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  experienced	  lack	  (cf.	  Howarth	  2013,	  246).	  Laclau	  himself	  criticized	  the	  understanding	  of	  ‘subject	  positions’	  as	  something	  fixed	  in	  terms	  of	  “replacing	  the	  transcendental	  subject	  with	   its	  symmetrical	  other,	   that	  of	  reinscribing	  the	  multifarious	   forms	  of	  undomesticated	  subjectivities	   in	   an	   objective	   totality”,	   in	   other	   words,	   by	   a	   reification	   of	   structure.	   Instead	   he	   also	   pointed	   to	   the	  essential	  lack	  in	  the	  structure	  that	  enables	  the	  subject	  to	  emerge	  (Laclau	  2007,	  21),	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  (cf.	  also	  Nabers	  2015,	  forthcoming).	  	  	  See	  also	  Stephen	  White’s	   critique	  of	  a	   tendency	   in	   “postmodernism	  […]	   to	   reproduce	   in	  a	  new	  guise	   the	  problem	  of	  frictionless	  subjectivity	  within	  their	  own	  stance”	  (S.K.	  White	  2000,	  6).	  	  	  While	   I	  agree	  with	  Howarth	  (cf.	  Howarth	  2013,	  227,	  246,	  250)	  and	  other	  scholars	   (for	   instance	  Richard	  Ned	  Lebow	  2012,	  17)	  –	  and	  ultimately	  in	  his	  later	  work	  also	  Laclau	  –	  that	  ‘identification’	  (cf.	  Laclau	  2005,	  54ff.)	  might	  actually	  be	  a	  better	  notion	  than	  ‘identity’,	  as	  it	  emphasizes	  a	  processual	  or	  performative	  understanding.	  Along	  with	  these	  authors	  I	  will	  however	  also	  stick	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘identity’	  (in	  a	  PDT	  understanding)	  here.	  See	  also	  chapter	  1.4.	  	  	  	  194	  Furthermore,	   in	   this	  view	   the	   subject	   also	  does	  not	  possess	  a	   ‘hidden	  human	  nature’,	   and	   it	   is	  not	   ‘the	  origin’	  of	  discourse,	  but	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  constituted	  or	  generated	  by	  discourse	  as	  social	  structure	  that	  enables	  the	  subject	  to	  become	  what	  it	  ‘is’	  through	  identification	  with	  particular	  structural	  positions	  	  (cf.	  Nabers,	  2015	  forthcoming).	  See	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  next	  footnote.	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the	   other	   hand	   reminds	   the	   self	   of	   its	   essential	   lack	   (see	   chapter	   2.1	   on	   Derrida’s	   ‘traces’).195	  “[T]his	  constitutive	  outside	   is	  inherent	  to	  any	  antagonistic	  relationship”	  (Laclau	  1990,	  9).	  This	  is	  why	   poststructuralist	   understandings	   mostly	   refer	   to	   ‘identity’	   as	   “identity/difference”	   (i.e.	  Howarth	   2013,	   227).	   Referring	   to	   the	   fundamental	   lack	   in	   every	   structure,	   every	   identity	   is	  conceived	  as	  “dislocated	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  depends	  on	  an	  outside	  which	  both	  denies	  that	  identity	  and	  provides	   its	   condition	   of	   possibility	   at	   the	   same	   time”	   (Laclau	   1990,	   39)	   on	   the	   ontological	  
level.196	  	  On	  the	  ontical	  level	  the	  ‘essential	  dislocation’	  may	  manifest	  itself	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  an	  ‘event’,	  or	  confrontation	  with	  an	  other,	  that	  cannot	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  existing	  meaning	  system,	   or	   reconciled	   with	   the	   so	   far	   existing	   articulations	   of	   the	   self.	   What	   Oliver	   Marchart	  denotes	  as	  ‘crisis’	  in	  my	  view	  comes	  close	  to	  ‘dislocation’	  in	  this	  sense:	  “a	  result	  of	  a	  growing	  non-­‐correspondence	  between	  an	  old	  paradigm	  and	  its	  changing	  institutional	  or	  social	  context,	  where	  competing	   hegemonic	   practices	   seek	   to	   take	   the	   old	   paradigm’s	   place”	   (Marchart	   2007,	   56).	  	  Importantly,	   this	   relation	   “arises	   not	   from	   full	   totalities,	   but	   from	   the	   impossibility	   of	   their	  constitution”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  125).	  	  In	  case	  of	  a	  dislocation,	  the	  other,	  or	  the	  constitutive	  outside,	  can	  be	  made	  responsible	  for	  it,	   resulting	   in	   an	   antagonism	   that	   is	   expressed	   by	   Laclau	   and	   Mouffe	   through	   the	   logics	   of	  equivalence	  and	  difference	  (cf.	  Laclau	  1990,	  39,	  50;	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  132).197	  The	  logic	  of	  equivalence	  creates	  equivalent	  identities	  through	  the	  negation	  of	  other	  discursive	  systems	  –	  i.e.	  other	  groups	  –	  by	  subverting	  the	  differential	  character	  within	  the	  own	  discourse	  or	  in-­‐group.	  The	  internal	   differences	   are	   (temporarily)	   canceled	   out	   by	   referring	   to	   an	   external	   other	   that	   is	  articulated	  as	  fundamentally	  opposed	  to	  everything	  that	  constitutes	  the	  self.	  In	  consequence,	  the	  internal	  differences	  become	  equivalent	  (only)	  as	  being	  opposed	  to	  a	  common	  external	  other.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Ty	  Solomon,	  who	  also	  draws	  on	  Jaques	  Lacan:	  “It	  is	  this	  quest	  for	  a	  sense	  of	  fullness	  that	  leads	  to	  perpetual	  processes	  of	  identification,	  rather	  than	  the	  construction	  of	  fixed	  and	  conclusive	  ‘identity’”,	  and	  “one	  does	  not	  ‘start	  out’	  as	  a	  subject,	  but	  only	  engages	  in	  identification	  because	  it	  is	  initially	  lack	  […]“	  (Solomon	  2015,	  31,	  52).	  	  196	  Meanwhile	  dislocation	  is	  also	  productive,	  as	  it	  is	  this	  fundamental	  lack	  in	  the	  structure	  that	  allows	  for	  agency	  –	  or	  the	  ‘subject’	  –	  to	  emerge.	  In	  this	  sense	  “the	  subject	  is	  merely	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  undecidable	  structure	  and	  the	  decision”.	  BUT	  importantly	  “[…]	  because	  structural	  dislocation	  is	  constitutive,	  the	  dislocated	  structure	  cannot	  provide	  the	  principle	  of	   its	   transformations.	  The	  dislocated	   structure	   thus	  opens	  possibilities	  of	  multiple	   and	   indeterminate	  rearticulations	  […]”(cf.	  Laclau	  1990,	  60,	  39,	  42).	  In	  this	  sense	  anything	  said	  about	  identity	  on	  the	  ontological	  level	  does	  not	  necessarily	  translate	  in	  any	  predetermined	  features	  on	  the	  ontical	  level,	  see	  also	  what	  was	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  passage	  on	  identity	  in	  chapter	  1.4.	  In	  Laclau’s	  words:	  “It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  there	  is	  no	  necessary	  relation	  between	  the	  dislocation	  as	  such	  […]	  and	  the	  discursive	  space	  that	  is	  to	  constitute	  its	  principle	  of	  reading	  its	  particular	  form	  of	  representation”	  (Laclau	  1990,	  65).	  	  197	  However,	  Laclau	  points	  out	  that	  no	  dislocation	  needs	  to	  be	  constructed	  in	  an	  antagonistic	  way,	  meaning	  that	  there	  are	   no	   “natural”	   antagonisms	   (Laclau	   2009,	   319),	   while	   “any	   position	   in	   a	   system	   of	   differences,	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   is	  negated,	  can	  become	  the	   locus	  of	  an	  antagonism	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  131).	   	   In	   this	  sense	  “[a]ntagonism	  as	   the	  negation	  of	  the	  given	  order	  is,	  quite	  simply,	  the	  limit	  of	  that	  order,	  and	  not	  the	  moment	  of	  a	  broader	  totality	  in	  relation	  to	  which	  the	  two	  poles	  of	  the	  antagonism	  would	  constitute	  differential	  –	  i.e.	  objective	  –	  partial	  instances”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  126).	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In	   relation	   and	   to	   link	   up	   to	  what	  was	   said	   earlier	   (in	   chapter	   1.3)	   on	   exclusive	   and	   inclusive	  articulations	   of	   identity,	   the	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   are	   aimed	   at	   or	   can	   lead	   to	   an	   exclusive	  articulation	   (cf.	   Rumelili	   2004).	   The	   logic	   of	   difference	   does	   the	   opposite,	   it	   expands	   a	   given	  system	   of	   differences	   by	   dismantling	   existing	   relations	   of	   equivalence	   and	   thereby	  weakening	  and	  dissolving	  antagonisms,	  which	  corresponds	  to	  a	  potentially	  inclusive	  articulation	  of	  identity.	  The	  logic	  of	  equivalence	  thus	  simplifies	  the	  ‘political	  space’,	  while	  the	  logic	  of	  difference	  makes	  it	  more	  complex	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  130).198	  These	  two	  logics	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive,	  but	  as	   between	   identity	   and	   difference,	   there	   is	   always	   interplay	   between	   them,	   as	   the	   in-­‐group	  strives	   to	   construct	   itself	   in	   non-­‐antagonistic	   terms	   (Howarth	   and	   Stavrakakis	   2000,	   11;	   cf.	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  130).	  	  Importantly	  however,	  in	  my	  reading	  the	  internal	  differences	  can	  also	  be	  articulated	  into	  what	  I	  call	  ‘internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence’	  between	  opposed	  internal	  positions.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  	  	  “the	   antagonistic	   camp(s)	   will	   always	   be	   something	   more	   than	   the	   simple	   opposite(s)	   of	   the	  hegemonic	   force.	   For	   empirical	   analysis	   it	   is	   therefore	   necessary	   not	   to	   look	   for	   one	   single	  antagonistic	   border,	   but	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   different	   perspectives	   from	   which	   different	  antagonisms	  are	  constructed“(see	  also	  Laclau	  2005,	  130f.;	  Wullweber	  2014,	  13).199	  	  	  Moreover,	  differences	  are	  not	  eliminated	  through	  equivalence,	  they	  are	  ‘only’	  weakened.	  Without	  difference,	  there	  would	  simply	  be	  no	  equivalence,	  as	  the	  equivalential	  relation	  consists	  of	  nothing	  positive,	   just	   of	   the	   common	   ‘lack’	   or	   deficiency	   –	   experienced	   because	   of	   the	   dislocation,	   and	  attributed	   to	   the	   other	   (cf.	   Laclau	   2005,	   79,	   96).	   This	   is	   why	   the	   logics	   of	   equivalence	   and	  difference	  are	  articulated	  through	  so-­‐called	  empty	  signifiers	  as	  signifiers	  of	   lack.	  Being	   ‘empty’,	  they	  provide	  a	  common	  point	  of	  reference	  –	  a	  nodal	  point	  –	  or	  equivalent	  notion	  of	  identification	  for	  different	  positions.	  They	  stand	  for	  both,	  what	  is	  lacking	  in	  a	  group	  or	  issue	  at	  stake,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  offering	  a	  possibility	   for	   the	   solution	   to	  overcome	   the	   lack	   (cf.	  Howarth	  2013,	  250).	   Laclau	  gives	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘order’	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   disorder	   as	   an	   example.	   In	   a	   situation	   of	   disorder,	  ‘order’	  becomes	  an	  empty	  signifier	  as	  it	  signifies	  its	  own	  lack	  or	  absence,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  relate	  the	  logic	  of	  difference	  to	  the	  syntagmatic	  (combinative),	  and	  the	  logic	  of	  equivalence	  to	  the	  paradigmatic	  (substitutive)	  pole	  of	  language	  (ibid.).	  199	  In	   the	   discourse	   analysis	   of	   the	   Congressional	   Record	   in	   this	   case,	   this	   means	   to	   focus	   also	   on	   the	   mentioned	  ‘internal	  antagonisms’	  between	  the	  proponents	  and	  critics	  of,	  for	  example,	  a	  policy	  of	  ‘engagement’	  or	  ‘retaliation’.	  In	  this	  respect	  it	   is	  important	  to	  look	  at	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  articulations	  of	  Japan	  and	  China	  as	   ‘different’	  from	  the	  U.S.,	  as	  this	  also	  happens	  in	  a	  more	  or	  less	  confrontational	  or	  accommodating	  way.	  Furthermore,	  this	  means	  that	  there	   is	   not	   only	   one	   ‘hegemonic	   force’	   (on	   hegemony	   see	   the	   following	   subchapter),	   but,	   following	   from	   the	  dislocation,	  U.S.	  identity	  in	  both	  cases	  may	  take	  on	  different	  forms.	  I	  expand	  on	  this	  in	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapters	  four	  to	  seven.	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pointing	  to	  the	  ‘solution’	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  its	  absence	  (i.e.	  the	  restoration	  or	  creation	  	  of	  order).	  In	   this	   sense,	   when	   an	   empty	   signifier	   becomes	   a	   signifier	   of	   a	   lack,	   various	   proponents	   can	  compete	  for	  establishing	  their	  particular	  concept	  to	  abolish	  or	  deal	  with	  the	  lack.	  To	  exercise	  the	  filling	   of	   the	   empty	   signifier	   is	   when	   the	   discourse	   becomes	   hegemonic,	   when	   a	   particular	  proponent	   or	   group	   succeeds	   in	   (temporarily!)	   establishing	   its	   objectives	   as	   ‘universal’,	   i.e.	   as	  that	   of	   the	  whole	   collective	   (cf.	   Laclau	  2007,	  44).	  This	   goes	  hand	   in	  hand	  with	   articulating	   the	  other,	  that	  now	  becomes	  the	  ‘excluded’	  or	  ‘evil	  other’	  as	  responsible	  for	  the	  lack.	  	  In	  my	  view,	  this	  can	  be	  expressed	  through	  the	  words	  of	  Campbell	  as	  follows:	  to	  preserve	  its	   identity,	   a	   community	   engages	   in	   “exclusionary	   practices	   in	   which	   resistant	   elements	   to	   a	  secure	  identity	  on	  the	  ‘inside’	  are	  linked	  through	  a	  discourse	  of	   ‘danger’,	  with	  threats	  identified	  and	   located	   on	   the	   ‘outside’”	   (cf.	   Campbell	   1994,	   149).	   To	   conceal	   this	   process,	   the	   aim	   is	   to	  inscribe	  this	  ‘absolute	  difference’	  to	  the	  outside	  not	  just	  as	  one	  interpretation	  among	  many,	  but	  as	  universally	  valid,	   thus	  as	  hegemonic	  (cf.	  Ashley	  1988,	  257;	  Campbell	  1998,	  65;	  Laclau	  2007,	  42f.).	   This	   includes	   rendering	   alternatives	   to	   the	   hegemonic	   articulation	   unthinkable	   (Laclau	  1988,	   57;	   Marchart	   1998,	   14).	   However,	   it	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   (temporarily)	   hegemonic	  articulation	  cannot	  be	  challenged	  again	   through	  alternative	  perspectives	  aiming	  at	  establishing	  themselves	  in	  turn	  as	  ‘common	  sense’	  (see	  also	  what	  follows	  on	  hegemony).	  	  In	  this	  sense	  identities	  can	  be	  partly	  understood	  as	  “strategic	  constructs”	  –	  and	  indeed	  a	  hegemony	   perspective	   emphasizes	   the	   role	   of	   political	   articulations	   in	   the	   construction	   of	  identities	   –	   however	   not	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   completely	   freely	   manipulable	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  employing	  it	  as	  a	  conscious	  strategy,	  as	  (successful)	  identification	  always	  depends	  on	  the	  context	  available	   (cf.	   Howarth	   2013,	   243,	   251),	   but	   also	   on	   the	   degree	   of	   the	   proponents	   of	   a	   certain	  position	  being	  gripped	  by	  a	  particular	  perspective,	  i.e.	  unable	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  it	  (see	  also	  in	  what	  was	  laid	  out	  earlier	  on	  the	  constraining	  and	  enabling	  features	  of	  discourse).	  In	  this	  sense	  for	  instance	  also	  Linus	  Hagström	  and	  Karl	  Gustafsson	  point	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  what	  they	  call	  the	   “actorising”	  of	   “identity	  discourses”,	   in	   terms	  of	   there	  being	  a	   limit	   to	   an	  understanding	  of	  “cynical,	   rational	   actors	  who	   tamper	  with	   identities	   in	   an	   instrumentalist	   and	   strategic	  way	   in	  order	   to	   achieve	   their	   purposes	   without	   themselves	   being	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   identities”	  (Hagström	  and	  Gustafsson	  2015,	  8).200	  	  	  What	  is	  of	  particular	  importance	  for	  this	  project,	  the	  attempts	  at	  preserving	  or	  stabilizing	  a	   particular	   identity	   or	   discourse	   has	   been	   termed	   “defensive	   hegemonic	   strategy”	   by	   Martin	  Nonhoff	  (2006b,	  238–240).	  Laclau	  in	  turn	  retains	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  completely	  follow	  them	  in	  their	  conceptualization	  of	  identity	  and	  of	  “identity	  entrepreneurs”.	  	  On	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘strategy’	  in	  IR-­‐poststructuralism	  and	  PDT	  see	  also	  Herschinger	  (2011,	  41ff).	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“someone	  who	  wants	   to	  maintain	   an	   existing	   order	   of	   things	   has	   already	   lost	   through	   its	   very	  defense.	   In	   our	   terms:	   the	   perpetuation	   of	   a	   threatened	   order	   can	   no	   longer	   rely	   on	   a	   purely	  differential	   logic;	   its	   success	   depends	   on	   the	   inscription	   of	   those	   differences	   within	   an	  equivalential	  chain”	  (Laclau	  2005,	  121).	  	  In	   my	   reading	   this	   may	   lead	   either	   to	   articulating	   the	   self	   versus	   the	   ‘excluded	   other’,	   or	   a	  ‘rearticulated	  self	   in	   terms	  of	  dealing	  with	   ‘internal’	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  (cf.	  also	  Herschinger	  2011,	  50ff.,	  who	  understands	  what	  she	  calls	  “counter-­‐hegemonic	  strategies”	  as	  aimed	  at	  shifting,	  not	   eliminating	   ‘the	   frontier’).	   How	   these	   dynamics	   play	   themselves	   out	   in	   practice,	   will	   be	  shown	  through	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapters	  four	  to	  seven.	  	  In	  view	  of	  what	  has	  been	  said	  on	   identity	   from	  a	  PDT	  perspective,	  with	   respect	   to	  my	   topic	  of	  research	   I	  consent	   that	   “no	  state	  possesses	  a	  prediscursive,	   stable	   identity,	  and	  no	  state	   is	   free	  from	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  various	  domains	  that	  need	  to	  be	  aligned	  for	  a	  political	  community	  to	   come	   into	  being,	   an	   alignment	   that	   is	   a	   response	   to,	   rather	   than	   constitutive	  of,	   a	  prior	   and	  stable	  identity”	  (Campbell	  1998,	  91).201	  The	  identity	  of	  states	  is	  discursively	  constructed	  through	  the	  inscription	  of	  limits	  that	  serve	  to	  distinguish	  a	  self	  from	  an	  other,	  an	  inside	  from	  an	  outside,	  a	  domestic	  from	  a	  foreign	  (Campbell	  1998,	  9).	  In	  this	  sense	  a	  state	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  product	  of	   competing	  hegemonic	   struggles	   seeking	   to	   impose	   their	  projects	  on	   society	   (Howarth	  2000,	  120),	  as	  “[...]every	  social	  order	  rests	  on	  a	  forgetting	  of	  the	  exclusion	  practices	  through	  which	  one	  set	  of	  meanings	  has	  been	  institutionalized	  and	  various	  other	  possibilities	  –	  other	  possible	  forms	  of	  meaning	  –	  have	  been	  marginalized”	  (Shapiro	  1989,	  15).	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  research	  is	  to	  inquire	  into	  how	  and	  with	  what	  outcomes	  these	  hegemonic	  struggles	  take	  place	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
	  From	  what	  has	  been	  said,	  probably	  the	  two	  most	  important	  aspects	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  differences	  (and	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   misunderstandings)	   between	   poststructuralist	   and	   more	   conventional	  (also	  constructivist)	  conceptualizations	  of	   identity,	  are	   that	   identities	  are	  neither	  primordial	  or	  essential,	   nor	   in	   a	   constant	   state	   of	   fluidity	   or	   flux	   (cf.	   Howarth	   2013,	   236).	   Because	   of	   their	  mutual	   dependence,	   neither	   identity	   nor	   difference	   can	   ever	   be	   fully	   constituted,	   while	   the	  permanent	   strive	   to	  do	   so	  produces	   the	  partial	   fixations	   that	  make	   it	   possible	   to	   conceive	   and	  speak	  of	  ‘identity’	  and	  ‘difference’	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (ibid.,	  242ff.).	  	  An	   important	  question	  arising	   from	  this	  understanding	  –	  as	  well	  as	   from	  what	  was	   laid	  out	   earlier	   on	   the	   ‘inclusive’	   and	   ‘exclusive’	   features	   of	   ‘liberal	   identity’	   in	   terms	   of	   American	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  201	  And	  Campbell	  adds:	  “Yet	  for	  no	  state	  is	  this	  condition	  as	  central	  as	  it	  is	  for	  America.”	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   “Hegemony	  is,	  quite	  simply,	  a	  political	  type	  of	  relation,	  a	  form,	  if	  one	  so	  wishes,	  of	  politics;	  but	  not	  a	  determinable	  location	  within	  a	  topography	  of	  the	  social.	  In	  a	  given	  social	  formation	  there	  can	  be	  a	  variety	  of	  hegemonic	  nodal	  points”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  138,	  139).	  	  These	  words	  by	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  basically	  encompasses	  the	  major	  characteristics	  of	  ‘hegemony’	  in	   a	   poststructuralist	   understanding,	   that	   differs	   to	   important	   extents	   from	   the	   more	  conventional	   understandings	   in	   IR	   and	   IPE	   of	   hegemony	   as	   domination	   (cf.	   Howarth	   2013,	  197).203	  The	  most	  prominent	  theorizations	  of	   ‘hegemony’	  in	  IPE	  (and	  IR)	  are	  the	  frameworks	  of	  hegemonic	  stability	  theory	  (HST),	  World-­‐Systems	  Theory	  (WST)	  and	  Neo-­‐Gramscian	  approaches	  (cf.	   Herschinger	   2012,	   69;	   Saull	   2010).204	  Their	   main	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   interrelation	   between	   a	  global	  political	  and	  economic	  order	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  (hegemonic)	  actor/’state’/’historical	  bloc’	  in	   it.205	  Although	   Laclau	   and	   Mouffe	   in	   Hegemony	   and	   Socialist	   Strategy	   (HSS)	   do	   discuss	   (or	  rather	  deconstruct)	  the	  Marxist	  uses	  and	  understandings	  of	  hegemony	  and	  they	  explicitly	  refer	  to	   Gramsci	   regarding	   their	   theory	   of	   hegemony,	   they	   also	   make	   very	   clear	   that	   in	   taking	   the	  concept	   further,	   they	  depart	   from	  what	   remains	   “a	  core	  essentialism”	   in	  Gramsci’s	   thought,	   i.e.	  that	  hegemony	  must	  always	  correspond	  to	  a	  ‘fundamental	  economic	  class’	  (see	  also	  for	  example	  Dallmayr	  2009,	  38f.;	  cf.	  Howarth	  2013,	  195f.;	  Laclau	  2005,	  127).	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  PDT	  this	  means	  not	  only	  to	  reaffirm	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  ‘last	  determining	  instance’,	  but	  also	  to	  exempt	  ‘the	  economy’	  from	  being	  a	  hegemonic	  constitution	  itself	  (cf.	  Barrett	  1991,	  63;	  Howarth	   1995,	   130;	   cf.	   Laclau	   and	   Mouffe	   2001,	   69;	   cf.	   Torfing	   1999,	   36).	   PDT	   rejects	   both	  assertions.	  The	  historical	  materialist	  approach	  as	  put	   forward	   for	  example	  by	  Stephen	  Gill	   and	  William	   Robinson	   (and	   also	   Robert	   Cox	   and	   for	   example	   van	   Kees	   van	   der	   Pijl)	   not	   only	  reproduces	  this	  kind	  of	  essentialism	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  (see	  also	  Methmann	  2010,	  348,	  354;	  cf.	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  This	  subchapter	  builds	  and	  expands	  on	  Nymalm	  (2014).	  203	  Authors	   addressing	   the	   problems	   of	   miscommunication	   between	   different	   understandings	   are	   for	   example	  (Destradi	  2010,	  909,	  912ff.;	  Herschinger	  2012,	  66;	  see	  also	  Joseph	  2008,	  109;	  Nabers	  2010,	  937).	  On	  an	  early	  critique	  of	  hegemonic	  stability	  theory	  (HST)	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  hegemony	  in	  IPE	  see	  Leaver	  (1989).	  204	  For	  a	  quite	  comprehensive	  characterization	  of	   these,	  as	  well	  as	   literature,	   see	   for	  example	  Saull	   (2010),	  Destradi	  (2010),	  Bieler	  and	  Morton	  (2004).	  	  205	  Importantly,	  Richard	  Saull	  for	  example	  points	  to	  both	  historical	  ‘sources’	  of	  this	  understanding,	  which	  are	  the	  more	  acknowledged	  Prince	  by	  Niccolò	  Machiavelli	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  but	  also	  debates	  among	  Russian	  revolutionaries	  about	  the	  strategy	  of	  the	  Bolshevik	  revolution	  –	  in	  particular	  within	  the	  Third	  International	  (cf.	  R.	  W.	  Cox	  1983,	  163)	  –	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  (Saull	  2010,	  Introduction).	  The	  latter	  ones	  often	  tend	  to	  be	  overlooked	  in	  IR-­‐	  and	  IPE-­‐literature	  that	  does	  not	  take	  Gramscian	  or	  Neo-­‐Gramscian	  understandings	  into	  account.	  Gramsci	  himself	  relied	  on	  both	  of	  these	  strands	  (cf.	  R.W.	  Cox,	  ibid.).	  Most	  commonly	  the	  work	  of	  Robert	  Cox	  is	  taken	  to	  stand	  for	  the	  origins	  of	  Neo-­‐Gramscian	  approaches,	  but	  Hummel	   for	   example	   argues	   for	   differentiating	   critical	   theory	   à	   la	   Cox	   from	  Neo-­‐Gramscian	   approaches,	   as	   Cox	  draws	  on	  Gramsci,	  but	  not	  exclusively	  on	  him	  (cf.	  Hummel	  2000,	  31).	  Also	  Cox	  himself,	  who	   identifies	  his	  approach	  with	  historical	  materialism	  (R.	  W.	  Cox	  2010),	  has	  distanced	  himself	  from	  the	  label.	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Scherrer	   1999,	   28f.),	   as	   it	   sticks	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   “hegemony	   [as]	   the	   basis	   for	   the	  supremacy	  of	  a	  class”,	  be	  it	  on	  a	  national	  or	  a	  “transnational	  capitalist	  class”	  level	  (cf.	  Gill	  2008,	  91–96;	   cf.	   Saull	   2010).	   Furthermore,	   in	   consequence	   this	   approach	   also	   harbors	   a	   dichotomy	  between	   ‘ideas’	   and	   ‘the	   material’	   that	   proponents	   of	   PDT	   –	   for	   whom	   ‘the	   economy’	   is	   not	  exempted	  from	  the	  discursive	  character	  of	  the	  social	  world	  –	  discard	  (cf.	  Ryner	  2006,	  145),	  and	  that	   is	   also	   challenged	   for	   instance	   by	   cultural	   political	   economy	   approaches	   (cf.	   Best	   and	  Patterson	  2010,	  5,	  10).	  	  As	   has	   been	   laid	   out	   earlier,	   to	   speak	   of	   the	   ‘discursive	   character	   of	   the	   social	   world’	  means	   to	   understand	   it	   as	   consisting	   of	  meaningful	   social	   practices	   that	   constitute	   and	   shape	  ‘discourse’	  as	  structure	  of	  the	  social.	  Discourse	  is	  not	  understood	  as	  ‘ideology’	  in	  a	  narrow	  sense,	  but	   includes	   all	   types	   of	   social	   and	  political	   practice	   (importantly,	   as	   already	   stated,	   discourse	  does	   thus	  not	  refer	  only	   to	   language	  or	  a	  purely	   ‘ideational’	   realm!	  (Laclau	  2005,	  12;	  cf.	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	   2001,	   108)),	   institutions	   and	   organizations	   (Howarth	   1995,	   115).	   Institutions	   and	  organizations	   might	   be	   understood	   as	   (temporarily)	   fixed	   or	   ‘sedimented	   discourses’.	  Importantly,	  speaking	  of	  ‘discursive	  hegemony’	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  exclude	  ‘material	  (i.e.	  economic	  or	  military)	  capabilities’.	  Instead	  it	  refers	  to	  them	  being	  part	  of	  the	  discourse:	  it	  is	  the	  meaning	  or	  signification	   of	   these	   material	   capabilities	   in	   context	   that	   matters	   (Hagström	   and	   Gustafsson	  2015,	   18;	   Herschinger	   2012,	   71;	   cf.	   Nabers	   2010,	   938),206	  a	   perspective	   that	   is	   not	   very	  commonly	   addressed	   when	   speaking	   of	   hegemony	   in	   IR	   and	   IPE	   (see	   also	   Herschinger	   2012,	  66f.).	  Furthermore,	  this	  also	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  exclude	  an	  analysis	  of	  power,	  but	   instead	  power	  here	   is	  not	  understood	  as	   ‘power	  over’	   but	  precisely	   as	   ability	   to	  hegemonize	   the	  discourse	   in	  terms	  of	  establishing	  a	  particular	  view/meaning	  as	  universal	   (see	   in	  what	   follows).207	  Whereas	  this	   understanding	   clearly	   bears	   resemblance	   to	   Gramsci,	   the	   points	   of	   departure	   are	   also	  obvious,	  as	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	   take	   issue	  with	   the	  main	   tension	   they	  see	   in	  Gramsci	   (cf.	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  138):	  the	  contingency	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  subjects	  through	  the	  political	  process	  of	  articulation	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  versus	  his	  ultimate	  reliance	  on	  classes	  as	  structural	  determinants	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  (cf.	  Retamozo	  2011,	  44).	  Meanwhile,	  they	  do	  have	  the	  same	  starting	  point	  in	  defining	  ‘hegemony’	  as	  when	  a	  particularity	  takes	  up	  a	  universal	  signification	  (Laclau	  2005,	  70),	  or	  more	  concretely,	  a	  group	  establishing	  its	  ‘particular’	  goal	  as	  that	  of	  ‘society’	  as	  a	  whole.208	  This	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  And	   –	   although	   conceptualized	   in	   a	   slightly	   different	  way	   –	  what	   these	   capabilities	  may	  be	   indented	   for,	   see	   for	  example	   Legro	   (2007).	   For	   studying	   ‘ideas’	   in	   terms	   of	   “American	   representations	   of	   China	   [that]	   have	   been	   […]	  responsible	  for	  creating	  a	  threatening	  identity”	  see	  for	  example	  Turner	  (2013).	  207	  In	  a	  related	  way	  	  on	  the	  role	  of	  rhetoric,	  see	  Krebs	  and	  Jackson	  (2007,	  45).	  208	  In	  the	  writings	  of	  Gramsci	  the	  entry	  of	  ‘ideas’	  occurs	  through	  his	  ‘enlarged’	  definition	  of	  the	  state	  as	  encompassing	  civil	  society.	  Together	  they	  constitute	  what	  he	  called	  a	  solid	  structure	  or	   ‘historic	  bloc’	  (blocco	  storico),	  which	  –	  and	  here	   Gramsci’s	   historical	   materialism	   shines	   through	   –	   encompasses	   ‘structures’	   (=	   ‘material	   conditions’)	   and	  ‘superstructures’	  (=	  ‘ideas’)	  that	  mutually	  influence	  each	  other	  and	  are	  not	  reducible	  to	  one	  another	  (R.	  W.	  Cox	  1983,	  
92	  
	  
happens	  via	  the	  (attempts	  at)	  filling	  of	  the	  empty	  signifier	  and	  the	  playing	  out	  of	  the	  antagonism	  through	   the	   logics	   of	   equivalence	   and	   difference,	   as	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   previous	   subchapter	   on	  ‘identity’.	   In	   most	   cases	   the	   antagonisms	   are	   expressed	   through	   articulations	   of	   opposed	  identities.	  However,	  I	  question	  an	  inevitably	  necessary	  link	  between	  ‘hegemony’	  and	  ‘identity’,	  as	  put	   forward	   for	   instance	   by	   Herschinger	   (2012),	   and	   rather	   take	   articulations	   aiming	   at	  hegemony	  to	  be	  a	  more	  general	  characteristic	  of	  ‘politics’	  (cf.	  Retamozo	  2011,	  53ff.),209	  as	  “a	  set	  of	  equivalences	   that	   is	  established	  between	  a	  series	  of	  particular	  demands”	   (cf.	  Howarth	  2013,	  82).	   Herschinger	   claims	   to	   offer	   a	   “comprehensive	   operationalization	   of	   central	   discourse	  theoretical	   concepts	   […]	   leading	   to	   a	   framework	   of	   international	   hegemony	  missing	   from	   the	  current	   literature”.	   Building	   on	   conceptualizations	   of	   ‘identity’	   in	   the	   Essex	   School	   and	   “IR-­‐poststructuralism”	   she	   conceptualizes	   “international	   hegemony	   as	   the	   production	   of	   a	   specific	  type	  of	  identity:	  hegemonic	  practices	  dichotomize	  the	  discursive	  space	  by	  conferring	  a	  particular	  meaning	   upon	   antagonistic	   poles,	   thereby	   creating	   a	   Self	   and	   its	   antagonized	   Other(s)”	  (Herschinger	  2012,	  71,	  75).210	  Her	  ‘definition’	  of	  hegemony	  is	  “the	  production	  of	  a	  new	  collective	  identity,	   as	   shaping	   an	   Other	   and	   a	   corresponding	   Self”	   (2012,	   67,	   74).	   Although	   this	  conceptualization	   does	   clearly	  make	   sense	   in	   her	   cases	   (international	   discourses	   on	   terrorism	  and	   drug	   prohibition),	   other	   accounts	   of	   the	   Essex	   School’s	   understanding	   of	   hegemony	  convincingly	  make	   the	   identity-­‐linkage	   less	   prominent	   (e.g.	  Methmann	   2010	   on	   discourses	   on	  climate	  protection).211	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167f.).	  This	  historic	  bloc	  in	  turn	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  hegemonic	  social	  class,	  that	  “maintains	  cohesion	  and	  identity	  within	  the	  bloc	  through	  the	  propagation	  if	  a	  common	  culture”.	  “A	  new	  bloc	  is	  formed	  when	  a	  subordinate	  class	  establishes	  its	  hegemony	  over	  other	  subordinate	  groups”,	  which	  means	  “passing	  from	  the	  specific	  interests	  of	  a	  group	  or	  class	   to	   the	  building	  of	   institutions	  and	   the	  elaboration	  of	   ideologies.”	  Being	   ‘hegemonic’	  means	   that	   they	  will	  be	  ‘universal’	   in	   form,	   thus	  not	  appear	  as	   those	  of	  a	  particular	  class.	  Moreover	   they	  will	   consent	   to	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  subordinate	   groups	  while	   not	   undermining	   those	   vital	   to	   the	   hegemonic	   class.	   Here	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   Gramsci	  referred	  to	  Machiavelli’s	  image	  of	  ‘power’	  as	  a	  centaur	  (when	  aiming	  at	  picturing	  the	  effort	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  party	  in	  its	  aim	  to	  engage	  with	  its	  base	  of	  support),	  thus	  he	  took	  ‘power’	  to	  be	  a	  mix	  of	  consent	  and	  coercion:	  with	  hegemonic	  power	   the	  consensual	  aspect	  prevails,	   as	   it	   is	   “enough	   to	  ensure	  conformity	  of	  behavior	   in	  most	  people	  most	  of	   the	  time”	  (R.	  W.	  Cox	  1983,	  164).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ‘superstructure’	  provided	  for	  a	  ‘common	  sense’	  (what	  PDT	  would	  call	  ‘hegemonic	  discourse’)	  “through	  the	  embedding	  and	  reproduction	  of	  a	  cultural,	   ideational,	  and	  normative	  consensus	  within	  wider	  social	  layers	  beyond	  those	  that	  occupy	  positions	  of	  material	  power”	  (cf.	  Saull	  2010).	  Gramsci	  formulated	  his	   thoughts	   in	   his	   so-­‐called	   ‘Prison	   Notebooks’,	   written	   between	   1929-­‐1935	   during	   his	   imprisonment	   as	   former	  leader	  of	  the	  Italian	  Communist	  Party	  (cf.	  R.	  W.	  Cox	  1983,	  162).	  209	  In	   his	   article	   on	   The	  Uses	   of	   Hegemony	   in	   the	   Political	   Theory	   of	   Ernesto	   Laclau,	   Martín	   Retamozo	   distinguishes	  between	  hegemony	  as	  a	  category	  –	  referring	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  universality	  and	  particularity	  –	  and	  as	  three	  different	  concepts:	  the	  political,	  politics	  and	  the	  constitution	  of	  collective	  identities	  (Retamozo	  2011).	  Furthermore,	  he	  points	  to	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  logics	  of	  hegemony	  as	  a	  form	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  form	  of	  politics	  per	  
se.	  	  210	  I	   do	   not	   quite	   follow	   her	   on	  what	   IR-­‐poststructuralism	   adds	   or	   can	   add	   to	   the	   Essex	   School’s	   understanding	   of	  identity,	   but	   rather	   see	   it	   the	   other	   way	   around,	   as	   I	   lay	   out	   in	   what	   follows.	   Herschinger	   might	   have	   a	   point	   in	  referring	   to	   the	  debates	  about	  a	  non-­‐threatening	  other	   in	   IR	  (Herschinger	  2012,	  67,	  73),	  but	   these	  exist	  also	  among	  PDT	  scholars.	  	  211	  On	  the	  question	  of	  ‘hegemony’	  and	  ‘identity’	  see	  for	  example	  also	  	  Tuathail’s	  critique	  of	  David	  Campbell:	  “Questions	  of	   identity	  may	   insinuate	   their	  way	   into	  all	   forms	  of	  politics	  but	  all	   forms	  of	  politics	  are	  not	   [necessarily,	  NN]	  about	  questions	   of	   identity”	   (Tuathail	   1996a,	   652).	   However,	   I	   do	   not	   agree	   with	   Tuathail’s	   subsequent	   (historical	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In	   a	   nutshell,	   for	   PDT	   ‘hegemony’	   is	   “a	   kind	   of	   political	   practice	   that	   captures	   the	  making	   and	  breaking	  of	  political	  projects	  and	  discourse	  coalitions.	  But,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  form	  of	  rule	  or	  governance	  that	  speaks	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  policies,	  practices,	  and	  regimes	  that	  are	  formed	  by	  such	   forces	   ”	   (Howarth	  2013,	  274).	  Howarth	  calls	   these	   the	   two	   faces	  of	  hegemony:	  hegemony	   as	   a	   practice	   of	   coalition	   building	   and	   hegemony	   as	   a	   form	   of	   rule	   or	   governance	  (Howarth	  2013,	  202ff.),	  which	   in	  both	   faces	   is	  premised	  rather	  on	   incorporation	  of	  rival	   forces	  through	  consent	  than	  coercion,	  through	  the	  logics	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe,	  hegemony	   is	   an	  articulatory	   relation	  where	  persuasion	  dominates	  over	   the	  use	  of	  force	  and	  –	  in	  case	  of	  its	  achievement	  –	  a	  supremacy	  visible	  in	  the	  imposition	  of	  one	  will	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  society	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  consent	  and	  the	  incorporation	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  rival	  forces	  (cf.	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  134ff.;	  Norval	  2000,	  229,	  2009,	  155f.).	  In	  practice,	  hegemony	  is	   about	   struggles	   for	   the	   fixation	   of	   meaning	   or	   a	   particular	   meaning	   system	   (conscious	   and	  unconscious,	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  gripped	  by	  certain	  discourses,	  cf.	  Wullweber	  2014,	  10),	  which	  can	  only	   take	   place	   in	   an	   ‘open	   system’,	   thus	   absent	   from	   any	   (economic)	   determinism	   or	   pure	  structuralism.	  Meaning	  is	  never	  permanently	  fixable	  –	  which	  is	  NOT	  to	  say	  that	  everything	  is	  in	  ‘constant	   flux’	   (!)	   (cf.	   for	   example	   Methmann	   2010,	   352)	   –	   and	   it	   is	   articulated	   not	   only,	   but	  primarily	  through	  language.	  Hence,	  	  
“from	  a	  poststructuralist	  point	  of	  view	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  –	  or	  at	  least	  it	  lacks	  sufficient	  complexity	  –	  to	  say	  that	  a	  certain	  person,	  class,	  or	  political	  group	  has	  become	  hegemonic.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  a	  certain	  element	   of	   common	   sense	   (Gramsci	   1971,	   419-­‐425),	   a	   world-­‐view,	   a	   societal	   relation,	   or	  more	  generally,	  a	  specific	  spatio-­‐temporal	  discourse	  organization	  that	  is	  or	  becomes	  hegemonic	  [...]“	  (cf.	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  142;	  Wullweber	  2014,	  9).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  discourse	  ‘on	  a	  grand	  scale’	  becomes	  hegemonic	  when	  it	  figures	  as	  the	  ‘normal’	  and	   only	   way	   of	   explaining	   the	  world,	   like	  what	   in	   this	   thesis	   I	   treat	   as	   the	   ‘liberal	   theory	   of	  history’	  immediately	  after	  1989,	  exemplified	  by	  Francis	  Fukuyama’s	  notion	  of	  ‘the	  end	  of	  history’	  (see	  also	  references	  to	  Fukuyama	  in	  introduction	  and	  in	  chapter	  1.3)	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  “unabashed	  victory	   of	   economic	   and	   political	   liberalism”	   (Fukuyama	   1989,	   3).	   On	   a	   smaller	   scale,	   though	  related	  to	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  the	  attempts	  to	  react	  to	  the	  dislocation	  of	  this	  particular	  discourse	  through	  the	  Rise	  of	  Japan	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  China	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  are	  read	  as	  struggles	  about	  fixing	  a	  particular	  perspective	  on	  these	  issues	  and	  how	  they	  should	  be	  dealt	  with	  (i.e.	  in	  terms	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  materialist)	  argument	  that	  “preoccupation	  with	  the	  politics	  of	  identity”	  (targeting	  not	  only	  Campbell	  but	  “dissident	  IR”	  in	  general)	  would	  lose	  sight	  of	  ‘material	  politics’	  like	  “economic	  exploitation,	  capital	  accumulation	  and	  power	  applied	  for	   the	   instrumental	   purposes	   of	   economic	   gain”.	   This	   line	   of	   reasoning	   is	   in	   line	   with	   critical	   realist	  misunderstandings	  of	  poststructuralism	  as	  idealist,	  as	  pointed	  out	  in	  chapter	  1.4.	  On	  refuting	  these	  kinds	  of	  criticisms	  see	  also	  Howarth	  (2013,	  226).	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a	  ‘defensive	  hegemonic	  strategy’),	  as	  well	  as	  about	  the	  ‘meaning’	  of	  ‘Japan’,	  ‘China’,	  ‘the	  U.S.’,	  and	  their	  relationship	  in	  a	  changing	  ‘context’.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  key	  of	  a	  hegemonic	  articulation	  in	  my	  reading	   is	   the	  ability	   to	  establish	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	   ‘the	  problem’	  actually	   is,	  as	  well	  as	  offering	   or	   pointing	   at	   the	   solution	   for	   it,	   and	   both	   ultimately	   happens	   through	   the	   empty	  signifier.	  The	  contestation	  can	  emerge	  over	  both,	  the	  ‘definition’	  of	  the	  problem	  as	  well	  as	  over	  its	  ‘solution’,	  and	  one	  approach	   is	   to	  make	  the	   ‘excluded	  other’	  responsible	   for	   the	  problem,	   i.e.	   in	  this	   case	   articulating	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   towards	   Japan	   and	   China,	   and	   their	   unfair	   trade	  policies	  as	  reason	  for	  the	  trade	  deficit.	  Voices	  in	  turn	  resisting	  a	  particular	  problematization	  for	  instance	   may	   aim	   at	   dissolving	   the	   articulation	   of	   the	   other	   as	   responsible	   for	   the	   problem	  through	  chains	  of	  difference,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  building	  up	  ‘internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence’,	  i.e.	  accusing	  the	  executive	  of	  not	  having	  a	  proper	  economic	  policy	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  analysis).	  	  From	   what	   has	   been	   said,	   it	   follows	   that	   there	   is	   no	   escape	   from	   focusing	   on	   the	   actual	  articulation	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘a	  problem’	  in	  discourses	  –	  which	  in	  the	  approach	  I	  am	  proposing	  means	  to	  engage	  in	  Rhetorical	  Political	  Analysis	  (RPA)	  –	  and	  taking	  PDT	  further	  on	  the	   level	  of	  method,	   aspects	   that	   are	   rather	   scarcely	   addressed	   by	   the	   Gramscian	   or	   Neo-­‐Gramscian	  historical	  materialist	  approaches	  (cf.	  Herschinger	  2012,	  70),	  and	  that	  were	  also	  often	  neglected	  by	   poststructuralist	   discourse	   theorists	   themselves.	   This	   is	   a	   problem	   in	   so	   far	   as	   discourse	  theoretical	   or	   analytical	   approaches	   are	   often	   criticized	   for	   a	   lack	   of	   ‘methodological	   rigor’	   or	  ‘solid	   methods’	   (see	   chapter	   three).	   Whereas	   this	   criticism	   in	   many	   cases	   might	   stem	   from	   a	  rather	   narrow	   (neo-­‐positivist)	   understanding	   of	   methods,	   it	   has	   its	   point	   considering	   the	  reluctance	   of	   many	   discourse	   theorists	   to	   elaborate	   on	   ‘how	   they	   actually	   do	   it’,	   because,	   as	  phrased	   by	   Torfing,	   “they	   threw	   the	   methodological	   baby	   out	   with	   the	   epistemological	   bath	  water”	  (Torfing	  2005,	  27).	  	  How	  to	  capture	  the	  processes	  at	  work	  when	  speaking	  of	   ‘discursive	  hegemony’	  through	  the	   filling	   of	   the	   empty	   signifier(s)	   via	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   and	   difference	   in	   the	   discourse	  analysis	   of	   the	   Congressional	   Record,	   is	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   following	   chapter	   on	  methodology	   and	  methods,	  as	  well	  as	  through	  the	  analysis	  itself.	  	  
3.	  METHODOLOGY	  AND	  METHODS	  	  	  	  In	   this	  chapter	   I	   first	   situate	   the	   issue	  of	   ‘discourse	  and	  method’	   in	   to	   the	   field	  of	   IR,	  and	   then	  expand	   on	   how	   methodological	   questions	   are	   dealt	   with	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   PDT.	  
95	  
	  
Subsequently,	  for	  this	  study	  I	  propose	  an	  enhancement	  of	  the	  key	  concepts	  of	  PDT	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  chapter	   two	   (logics	   of	   equivalence	   and	   difference,	   empty	   signifiers,	   etc.)	   through	   analytical	  categories	   drawn	   from	   Rhetorical	   Political	   Analysis	   (RPA).	   Finally,	   linking	   up	   to	   the	   following	  analysis,	   I	   come	   to	   addressing	   the	   concrete	   ‘application’	   of	   PDT/RPA	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	  Congressional	  Record,	  i.e.	  the	  collection,	  treatment	  and	  organization	  of	  the	  sources.	  	  As	   long	  as	  there	  have	  been	  studies	  on	  discourse	  in	  the	  broader	  field	  of	  IR	  (and	  IPE),	  one	  of	  the	  main	  criticisms	  brought	  forward	  against	  these	  approaches	  is	  their	   lack	  or	  neglect	  of	   ‘(rigorous)	  methods’.	   This,	   in	   my	   view,	   has	   mainly	   to	   do	   with	   two	   reasons:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   early	  proponents	  of	  discourse	  focused	  approaches	  in	  IR,	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  distinguish	  themselves	  and	  critique	  ‘mainstream	  IR’,	  did	  not	  engage	  themselves	  with	  ‘standard’	  methodological	  and	  even	  less	  with	  methodical	  issues,	  at	  least	  not	  in	  the	  way	  and	  terminology	  they	  would	  have	  been	  expected	  to	  do	  so	  by	  the	  mainstream.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  criticisms	  of	  ‘lacking	  rigor’	  stem	  from	  a	  particular	  understanding	   of	   what	   ‘rigorous	  methods’	   are	   and	   should	   be,	   that	   usually	   neglects	   taking	   the	  differing	   philosophical/theoretical	   premises	   of	   discourse	   approaches	   into	   account	   (Bevir	   and	  Rhodes	  2006;	  cf.	  Yanow	  2006).	  To	  situate	  this	  debate	  into	  the	  (mainstream)	  field	  and	  categories	  of	  IR,	  discourse	  approaches	  broadly	  speaking	  are	  mostly	  considered	  to	  fall	  within	  qualitative	  or	  what	   has	   become	   called	   ‘interpretive’	   methods.212	  While	   the	   distinction	   of	   ‘qualitative’	   from	  ‘quantitative’	   first	  and	   foremost	  goes	  back	   to	   the	  aim	  to	  distinguish	   ‘field	  research’	  and	  related	  (participant)	  observing,	   interviewing	  and	  document	  analysis	   from	  survey	  research	  designs	  and	  statistical	  methods,	  it	  is	  nowadays	  also	  questioned	  in	  its	  usefulness	  or	  meaningfulness.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  overly	  simplifying	  and	  even	  misleading	  to	  put	  the	  differences	  as	   ‘counting’	  versus	   ‘interpreting’	  (cf.	  Yanow	  2007,	  406;	  Yanow	  and	  Schwartz-­‐Shea	  2006,	  xv–xix).213	  What	  has	  been	  neglected	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  are	  the	  differences	  in	  theoretical	  or	  ontological	  premises	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  use	  of	  ‘statistics’	  or	  ‘document	  analysis’	  (see	  also	  P.	  T.	  Jackson	  2011,	  7),	  but	  also	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  research	   questions	   posed	   that	   are	   linked	   to	   these	   premises	   (a	   point	   that	   is	   in	   my	   view	   also	  neglected	   in	   most	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   methodologies).	   As	   Dvora	   Yanow	   has	   put	   it:	   “Different	  methods	   presume	   different	   “reality	   statuses”	   for	   the	   topic	   of	   research.	   […]	   Different	   reality	  statuses	   in	   turn	   presume	   different	   ways	   of	   knowing	   and	   different	   rules	   of	   evidence	   (that	  supports	  the	  “truth	  claims”	  of	  the	  analysis)	  or	  criteria	  for	  assessing	  its	  trustworthiness”	  (Yanow	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  212	  This	  holds	  first	  and	  foremost	  true	  for	  the	  U.S.,	  as	  in	  Europe	  discourse	  studies	  are	  often	  considered	  as	  constituting	  their	  own	  field	  (cf.	  Herschinger	  and	  Renner	  2014).	  	  213	  In	   this	   respect,	   for	   instance	   the	  distinction	   sometimes	  made	  between	   large-­‐n	   studies	  as	  quantitative	  and	  small-­‐n	  ones	  as	  qualitative	  is	  in	  fact	  only	  premised	  on	  the	  number	  of	  cases,	  as	  both	  might	  use	  the	  same	  techniques,	  for	  example	  statistics,	  based	  on	  the	  same	  theoretical	  premises,	  but	  just	  on	  fewer	  cases	  with	  small-­‐n.	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2007,	   406).	   She	   proposes	   that	   a	   categorization	   into	   quantitative,	   qualitative-­‐positivist	   and	  qualitative-­‐interpretive	  would	  be	   clearer.	   The	  understanding	  of	   ‘interpretive’	   (cf.	   Rabinow	  and	  Sullivan	  1987)	  she	  puts	  forward	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  basic	  question	  about	  the	  differences	  between	  ‘the	  world	  of	  nature’	  and	  ‘the	  human	  social	  world’214	  and	  how	  they	  can	  be	  known	  and	  should	  be	  studied,	  the	  basic	  differences	  being	  commonly	  seen	  in	  the	  centrality	  of	  meaning	  making	  as	  well	  as	   context	   specificity	   for	   the	   latter	   one,	   leading	   to	   the	   view	   that	   the	   researcher	   cannot	   take	   ‘a	  view	   from	   nowhere’	   on	   the	   phenomena	   he	   or	   she	   is	   looking	   at	   (Neufeld	   1993;	   Rabinow	   and	  Sullivan	   1987,	   Introduction;	   Yanow	   2007,	   407).215 	  As	   meaning	   is	   central,	   and	   meaning	   is	  conveyed	   –	   not	   only	   but	   mostly	   –	   through	   language,	   this	   is	   a	   principal	   focus	   of	   what	   in	   this	  context	   has	   become	   called	   ‘interpretive	   research’.	   Although	   this	   classification	   might	   be	   more	  accurate	  than	  quantitative-­‐qualitative,	  I	  maintain	  that	  it	  is	  also	  not	  without	  caveats,	  as	  it	  suggests	  that	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative-­‐positivist	  researchers	  do	  not	  ‘interpret’	  their	  data,	  but	  just	  need	  to	  collect	  it	  as	  ‘ready	  to	  speak	  for	  itself’.216	  This	  again	  –	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  alleged	  ‘non-­‐interpretivists’	   –	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  plays	   into	   the	   common	  allegation	   that	  discourse	  approaches	  concern	   themselves	   ‘merely	   with	   language’,	   which	   is	   not	   considered	   to	   be	   actual	   ‘empirical	  research’	   in	   a	   traditional	   positivist	   understanding	   (see	   introduction	  on	   ‘Cartesian	   anxiety’).	  On	  the	  other	  hand	   it	   looks	  as	   if	   only	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘interpretivists’	  would	   concern	   themselves	  with	  questions	   of	   language	   (cf.	   Fierke	  2003,	   69ff.).	   	   As	  put	   nicely	   by	  Karin	   Fierke,	   the	  more	  precise	  question	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  debate	  is	  or	  should	  be	  how	  language	  matters,	  as	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  what	  she	  calls	  two	  languages	  of	  language	  (Fierke	  2003,	  71),	  which	  in	  a	  nutshell	  are	  the	  two	  positions	  of	  language	  as	  ‘mere	  rhetoric’	  and	  language	  as	  constitutive	  of	  reality,	  which	  I	  also	  address	  in	  what	  follows	   on	   the	   analysis	   of	   rhetoric.217	  Originally	   this	   distinction	   goes	   back	   to	   what	   Fierke	  characterizes	  as	  not	  only	  one,	  but	  the	  two	  linguistic	  turns	  in	  philosophy,	  that	  can	  in	  principle	  be	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   issues	  are	  evidently	  also	  at	   the	  bottom	  of	   the	  debates	  on	   ‘explaining’	  versus	   ‘understanding’,	   see	   the	  most	  prominent	   discussion	   on	   this	   in	   Hollis	   and	   Smith	   (1990),	   and	   also	   on	   what	   was	   said	   on	   ‘Cartesian	   anxiety’	   in	   the	  introduction.	  	  215	  For	  varieties	  of	   ‘interpretive	  research	  methods’	  according	  to	  this	  classification,	  where	  for	  example	   ‘poststructural	  analysis’	  figures	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  its	  own,	  see	  Yanow	  and	  Schwartz-­‐Shea	  (2006,	  xx).	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  common	  division	  and	  classification	  between	  ‘nature’	  and	  ‘the	  social’	  and	  ‘natural’	  and	  ‘social	  sciences’	  it	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  however,	  that	  also	  the	  natural	  sciences	  are	  not	   ‘neutral’	  or	  exempt	  from	  the	  concepts	  and	  meaning	  we	  use	  (cf.	  Campbell	  2010,	  219;	  Nabers	  2015,	  forthcoming).	  	  216	  For	   a	   criticism	   of	   (behavioral)	   separations	   between	   ‘meaning’	   and	   ‘interpretation’	   see	   also	   Howarth	   (2013,	   12,	  266).	   Although	   I	   do	   not	   buy	   into	   their	   rather	   strict	   separation	   of	   ‘explaining’	   and	   ‘understanding’,	  Hollis	   and	   Smith	  aptly	  noted	  that	  “even	  facts	  of	  observation	  need	  to	  be	  interpreted	  before	  they	  can	  be	  counted	  on,	  and	  any	  facts	  about	  underlying	  mechanisms	   or	   structures	   are	   ‘visible’	   only	   through	   theoretical	   spectacles”	   (Hollis	   and	   Smith	   1990,	   66).	  Furthermore,	  taking	  the	  role	  of	  language	  into	  account,	  following	  Putnam	  and	  Skinner,	  “there	  can	  be	  no	  observational	  evidence	  which	   is	  not	   to	  some	  degree	  shaped	  by	  our	  concepts	  and	   thus	  by	   the	  vocabulary	  we	  use	   to	  express	   them”	  (Skinner	  2002,	  46).	  	  217	  Fierke	  also	  addresses	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  different	  languages	  in	  IR,	  in	  terms	  of	  “positivism”	  and	  “postmodernism”,	  that	  are	  not	  always	  able	  to	  have	  a	  conversation	  with	  each	  other	  (Fierke	  2003,	  72).	  See	  also	  P.T.	   Jackson	  (2011).	  For	  similar	  debates	  in	  the	  field	  of	  economics	  see	  i.e.	  the	  edited	  volume	  by	  Henderson,	  Dudley-­‐Evans	  and	  Backhouse	  (1993).	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captured	  by	  the	  difference	  between	  Wittgenstein’s	  early	  and	  late	  work:	  language	  as	  a	  picture	  or	  mirror	   of	   an	   independent	   reality,	   and	   language	   as	   a	   game,	   or	   rather	   many	   games,	   which	   the	  individual	  is	  part	  of	  as	  an	  actor,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  constrained	  by	  them	  like	  by	  a	  structure	  (Fierke	  2003,	  74ff.).	  	  	  
3.1.	  Discourse	  and	  Method	  in	  IR	  and	  PDT	  
	  One	  of	  the	  earliest	  treatments	  of	  methodological	  issues	  when	  studying	  discourse	  in	  IR	  is	  Jennifer	  Milliken’s	  article	  from	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s,	  and	  it	  still	  speaks	  to	  many,	  if	  not	  the	  most	  prevalent	  questions	  and	  issues.	  She	  argues	  that	  the	  refusal	  “to	  engage	  in	  mainstream	  modes	  of	  doing	  social	  science”	   (referring	   to	   the	   ‘IR-­‐pioneers’,	   i.e.	  George,	  Der	  Derian,	  Campbell	   etc.,	   see	   chapter	   two)	  should	  not	  lead	  to	  an	  exclusion	  of	   issues	  of	  research	  practice	  and	  method	  (Milliken	  1999,	  226).	  The	  same	  argument	   is	  brought	   forward	  by	   Jacob	  Torfing	   in	   the	  context	  of	  PDT,	  as	  he	  criticizes	  that	   “discourse	   theory	   has	   thrown	   the	   methodological	   baby	   out	   with	   the	   epistemological	  bathwater”	   by	   dismissing	   questions	   of	   method	   and	   methodology	   as	   “a	   positivist	   obsession”	  (Torfing	   2005,	   27).	   Milliken	   summarizes	   the	   critique	   of	   discourse	   scholarship	   as	   ‘bad’	   and	  ‘dangerous’	   science	   (i.e.	   by	   Robert	   Keohane,	   John	   Mearsheimer	   and	   Stephen	   Walt,	   cited	   in	  Milliken	   1999),	   as	   well	   as	   the	   efforts	   by	   ‘constructivist’	   scholars	   (i.e.	   by	   Emmanuel	   Adler	   and	  Alexander	  Wendt)	   to	  distinguish	   themselves	   from	  discourse	   scholarship,	   and	   attributes	   this	   to	  the	   aforementioned	   reasons	   (see	   also	   Levine	   and	   Barder	   2014,	   866;	   Milliken	   1999,	   227f.).	  	  However,	   in	  my	   view	   some	   of	   these	   persisting	   criticisms	   also	   rest	   on	  misunderstandings	   that	  arise	  from	  a	  neglect	  of	   the	  philosophical	  or	  ontological	  premises	   laid	  out	   in	  the	  chapter	   two	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  a	  narrow	  understanding	  of	   ‘methods’	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  Ultimately,	  and	  as	  I	  explain	   in	   what	   follows,	   these	   issues	   are	   or	   become	   intertwined.	   Referring	   to	   PDT,	   Torfing	  summarizes	   the	  most	   common	  misunderstandings	  as	  discourse	   theory	   leading	   to	   idealism	  and	  relativism,	  as	  not	  being	  an	  explanatory	  but	  only	  a	  descriptive	   theory,	   as	  not	  being	   critical,	   and	  finally,	   as	   being	   essentialist	   although	   claiming	   the	   contrary	   (Torfing	   2005,	   18–21).	   The	  misunderstanding	   about	   idealism	   has	   been	   addressed	   already	   in	   chapter	   two:	   asserting	   the	  discursive	   character	   of	   all	   social	   reality	   does	   not	   mean	   to	   deny	   an	   ‘independent’	   existence	   of	  reality,	   but	   it	   means	   that	   ‘reality’	   is	   not	   accessible	   to	   us	   outside	   of	   discourse.	   A	   (dualist)	  separation	  of	   ‘ideas’	   and	   ‘the	  material’	   or	   ‘ideas	   and	   ‘the	  discursive’	   in	   the	   common	   sense	   it	   is	  maintained	   in	   mainstream	   IR	   (constructivism)	   is	   not	   part	   of	   the	   understandings	   of	   PDT.	  Regarding	   questions	   of	   methodology	   and	   method,	   this	   misunderstanding	   leads	   to	   questions	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directed	  to	  PDT	  scholars	  and	  approaches,	   like	   ‘how	  to	  study	  what	   is	   in	  peoples’	  heads’,	   ‘how	  to	  show	   that	   ideas	   causally	   impact	   the	  material	   (if	   they	  do)’,	   and	   ‘how	   to	  account	   for	   ideas	  being	  constrained	  by	  material	  conditions’.	  These	  are	  questions	  that	  actually	  miss	  the	  point	  because	  of	  their	   neglect	   of	   the	   ‘non-­‐dualist’	   philosophical	   premises	   of	   PDT.	   In	   a	   way	   connected	   to	   the	  misunderstanding	   about	   idealism	   is	   the	   one	   on	   PDT	   being	   relativistic,	   as	   it	   pertains	   that	   if	  everything	   is	  discursive,	   then	   there	  will	   be	  no	   ‘objective’	   truth	  or	   right	   and	  wrong,	   but	   just	   an	  ‘anything	  goes’.	  While	  philosophically	  speaking	  the	  premise	   is	   in	   line	  with	  PDT,	  what	   follows	  is	  not	  an	  ‘anything	  goes’	  or	  a	  ‘free	  flux’,	  as	  we	  are	  never	  just	  freely	  floating	  outside	  of	  the	  different	  discourses	  that	  have	  become	  established	  or	  fixed	  along	  lines	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  ‘true’	  or	  ‘good	  and	  bad’.	  That	   theoretically	  no	  discourse	   is	  protected	   from	  becoming	  dislocated	  or	   challenged	  does	  not	   mean	   that	   it	   will	   automatically	   and	   easily	   happen	   (see	   chapter	   two),	   as	   the	   ontological	  conditions	   of	   possibility	   do	  not	   inevitably	   translate	   themselves	   into	   predetermined	  necessities	  on	   the	  ontical	   level	   (see	  also	  paragraph	  on	   ‘the	  political’	   in	   chapter	   two).	  To	  repeat	   in	  Laclau’s	  words:	  “It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  there	  is	  no	  necessary	  relation	  between	  the	  dislocation	  as	  such	  […]	  and	  the	  discursive	  space	  that	  is	  to	  constitute	  its	  principle	  of	  reading	  its	  particular	  form	  of	   representation”	   (Laclau	   1990,	   65).	   With	   the	   assertion	   that	   ‘everything	   goes’,	   questions	   of	  methodology	  and	  method	  become	  somewhat	  obsolete,	  as	  accordingly	  there	  could	  be	  no	   ‘(good)	  science’	   without	   truth	   or	   ‘objectivity’	   (cf.	   what	   was	   said	   on	   ‘Cartesian	   anxiety’	   in	   the	  introduction).	  However,	  again	  the	  philosophical	  claim	  of	  there	  existing	  no	  ultimate	  foundation	  or	  ‘final	   truth’	   does	  not	  mean	   that	  we	   are	  not	   part	   of,	   and	   ‘constrained’	   by	   existing	  discourses	   as	  very	   real	   and	   concrete	   ‘regimes	   of	   truth’,	   that	   clearly	   speak	   against	   an	   alleged	   free	   floating	  proliferation	   of	   differences.	   Similarly,	   the	   argument	   of	   there	   being	   no	   ‘true	   method’,	   or	   no	  method	   guaranteeing	   ‘truth’,	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   an	   anarchy	   of	  methods	   or	   their	   dissolution,	   but	  again,	  as	  can	  clearly	  be	  seen	  with	  the	   ‘method	  debate’	   laid	  out	  here,	   the	  understanding	  of	  what	  counts	   as	   method	   and	   methodological	   rules	   are	   linked	   to	   paradigms	   within	   the	   field.	  Theoretically,	  they	  could	  change,	  but	  practically	  this	  does	  not	  take	  place	  easily	  (cf.	  Torfing	  2005,	  27).	   In	  this	  context,	   it	   is	  however	  equally	   important	  to	  note	  that	  for	  PDT	  truth	  and	  ‘knowledge’	  are	  not	  reducible	  or	  equivalent	  to	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘subjective	  impositions’.	  As	  any	  other	  theory,	  method	  or	  interpretation,	  PDT	  and	  readings	  of	  phenomena	  derived	  through	  it	  can	  only	  count	  as	  “candidate	   for	   truth	  and	   falsity”	  within	  and	  according	   to	   the	  paradigms	   they	  are	  articulated	   in.	  This	  means	  that	  they	  are	  evaluated	  and	  judged	  upon	  by	  the	  paradigmatic	  criteria,	  i.e.	  consistency,	  reliability,	  validity	  etc.	  (Howarth	  2005,	  328).	  The	  present	  discussion	  of	  PDT	  and	  methodology	  by	  scholars	  advocating	  it	  would	  simply	  not	  take	  place,	  were	  this	  not	  the	  case.	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The	  charge	  that	  PDT	  does	  not	  or	  cannot	  engage	  in	  critique	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  allegation	  about	  relativism,	  because,	   if	   ‘anything	  goes’,	  how	  could	  there	  be	  a	  basis	  or	  measure	  for	  critique?	  And,	  connecting	   to	   the	  question	  on	   essentialism,	   the	  question	   arises,	  whether	  PDT	   is	  not	  ultimately	  turning	   its	   (alleged)	   ‘anti-­‐essentialism’	   into	   an	   essentialism	   itself	   (cf.	   Torfing	   2005,	   21)?218	  I	  address	  the	  understanding	  of	  critique	  according	  to	  PDT	  in	  further	  detail	   in	  what	  follows	  on	  the	  Logics	  of	  Critical	  Explanation.	  As	  for	  essentialism,	  against	  this	  claim	  stands	  –	  as	  already	  stated	  –	  that	  ontological	  presuppositions	  do	  not	  predetermine	  any	  ontical	  effects.	  In	  this	  sense,	  claiming	  that	   there	   is	  no	  metaphysical,	  positively	  defined	  essence	  of	   the	  social	  world,	  does	  not	   result	   in	  particular,	  necessarily	  ensuing	  effects	  of	  this	  absence.	  Thus,	  on	  these	  premises	  	  “the	  rejection	  of	  an	  essentialist	  grounding	  of	  the	  social	  world	  cannot	  fulfill	  the	  role	  of	  a	  new	  essentialist	  ground”,	  or	  –	  as	  in	  the	  example	  given	  by	  Torfing,	  “an	  economic	  structure	  is	   logically	  speaking	  capable	  of	  determining	  the	  structure	  of	  society,	  but	  nothing	  [necessarily,	  NN]	  follows	  from	  the	  dislocation	  of	  the	  economic	  structure”	  (Torfing	  2005,	  21).	  Finally,	  the	  allegation	  of	  PDT	  not	  being	  explanatory	  but	  ‘only’	  seeking	  an	  understanding	  is	  tied	  to	  a	  narrow	  concept	  of	  ‘explanation’	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  mechanistic	  account	  of	  causality.219	  In	  the	  view	   of	   PDT	   however,	   explanation	   and	   understanding	   are	   not	   separable	   from	   each	   other,	   as	  explanation	  first	  requires	  an	  initial	  understanding,	  and	  then	  again	  becomes	  part	  of	  an	  enhanced	  or	   increased	   understanding	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   we	   are	   investigating.	   In	   this	   sense	   PDT	   does	  place	   itself	   within	   the	   hermeneutical	   tradition	   of	   the	   social	   sciences,	   but,	   with	   the	   element	   of	  
logics	   addressed	   in	   what	   follows,	   also	   departs	   from	   relying	   ‘only’	   on	   contextualized	   self-­‐interpretations	  (Howarth	  2005,	  319f.;	  cf.	  Torfing	  2005,	  19).	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  218	  On	   the	   question	   of	   ‘anti’-­‐essentialism	   and	   ‘anti’-­‐foundationalism	   see	   chapter	   two.	   As	   already	   explained	   there,	   I	  maintain	  that	  the	  term	  ‘post’-­‐foundationalism	  is	  more	  adequate.	  219	  As	   mentioned	   in	   chapter	   one,	   I	   do	   find	   PDT’s	   ‘silence’	   on	   questions	   of	   causality	   problematic.	   It	   is	   clear,	   that	   it	  opposes	   causal	  explanations	   in	   terms	  of	   searches	   for	  universal	   laws	  or	   intrinsic	   causal	  properties	   (cf.	  Torfing	  2005,	  19),	   but	   does	   not	   really	   engage	   in	   debates	   on	   alternative	   understandings	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   causality,	   thus	   basically	  ‘leaving	   the	   field’	   (on	   the	  post-­‐positivist	   side)	   to	  critical	   realists.	  Furthermore,	   this	  silence,	  or	  what	  has	  mostly	  been	  perceived	   as	   rejection	   of	   causality	   by	   the	   mainstream,	   is	   one	   crucial	   aspect	   pertaining	   to	   the	   ‘bad’	   or	   ‘no	   science’	  allegations.	   Although	   one	   might	   argue,	   that	   “poststructuralism’s	   break	   with	   causality	   is	   thus	   not	   a	   flaw	   within	   its	  research	  design	  but	  an	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  choice”,	  that	  however	  should	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  conducting	  one’s	   analysis	  without	  methodological	   principles	   (cf.	   Hansen	   2006,	   28).	   In	  my	   view	   it	  might	   be	   too	   easy	   to	   simply	  retreat	  to	  the	  ‘causal’	  versus	  ‘constitutive’	  ground,	  without	  trying	  to	  problematize	  the	  monopolization	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  causality	  and	  the	  subsequent	  dichotomization	  of	  phenomena	  into	  ‘variables’	  by	  mainstream	  understandings.	  This	  is	  an	  endeavor,	  that	  at	  this	  point	  however	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation.	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3.2.	  The	  Logics	  of	  Critical	  Explanation	  	  	  Like	  most	  discourse	  approaches,	  PDT220	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  clear-­‐cut,	  ready-­‐made	  set	  of	  methods	  regarding	  the	  objects	  or	  the	  conduct	  of	  concrete	  research.221	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  theory	  chapter,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  concern	  of	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  (cf.	  Laclau	  2009,	  321),	  but	  became	  one	  of	  the	  later	  proponents	   of	   PDT.	   They	   started	   to	   debate	   and	   address	   what	   they	   themselves	   called	   the	  “Cinderella	  role”	  of	  methodological	  questions	  in	  discourse	  theory	  (cf.	  Howarth	  2005,	  316,	  2013,	  84;	   Nonhoff	   2007,	   174)	   with	   several	   publications	   on	   ‘applied’	   discourse	   theory	   and	   possible	  research	  strategies	  (for	  example	  Howarth	  and	  Torfing	  2005).222	  	  	  Briefly	  put,	  PDT	  opposes	  any	  understanding	  of	  method	  as	  “a	  free-­‐standing,	  neutral	  set	  of	  rules	  and	  techniques	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  mechanically	  to	  all	  empirical	  objects”	  (Howarth	  2005,	  317;	   cf.	   Torfing	   2005,	   27).	   Instead	   questions	   of	   method	   in	   PDT	   are	   always	   related	   to	   its	  philosophical	   premises	   –	   that	   reject	   essentialist,	   i.e.	   representational,	   theories	   of	   knowledge	  production	   –	   as	  well	   as	   to	   the	   particular	   topics	   and	   objects	   of	   research	   (Glynos	   and	   Howarth	  2007,	   6;	   Howarth	   2000,	   132,	   cf.	   2005,	   317).	   Here,	   PDT	   also	   distinguishes	   itself	   from	   several	  variants	  of	  discourse	  analysis,	  for	  example	  Critical	  Discourse	  Analysis	  (CDA;	  on	  differences	  see	  in	  what	  follows)	  (cf.	  Howarth	  2005,	  318).	  	  	  Again,	  these	  premises	  resonate	  with	  poststructuralist/’postmodern’	  IR-­‐work	  discussed	  in	  the	  chapter	  two.	  The	   ‘problem’	  however	   is,	   that	   in	  IR	  as	  well	  as	   in	  other	  fields,	  many	  discourse	  studies	  do	  not,	  or	  rather	  did	  not,	  extensively	  elaborate	  on	   issues	  of	  methodology	  and	  methods.	  They	  basically	  conducted	  their	  analyses	  without	  expanding	  on	  these	  aspects	  (cf.	  Torfing	  2005,	  26;	  see	  Yanow	  and	  Schwartz-­‐Shea	  2006,	  xiv	  for	  “interpretive”	  methods	  in	  general).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  220	  For	  the	  terminology	  of	  ‘discourse	  theory’	  and	  ‘discourse	  analysis’	  one	  could	  hold	  on	  to	  locating	  the	  ‘theory’	  on	  the	  ontological	   level,	   “where	   the	   concept	   of	   discourse	   specifies	   the	   necessary	   presuppositions	   of	   any	   inquiry	   into	   the	  nature	   of	   objects	   and	   social	   relations”.	   This	   concept	   is	   also	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘the	   discursive’	   (cf.	   Howarth	   2000,	   8f.).	  Discourse	  analysis	  accordingly	  refers	  to	  the	  ontic	  level,	  and	  is	  aimed	  at	  analyzing	  particular	  objects	  specified	  by	  one’s	  ontological	  presuppositions.	  (cf.	  Howarth	  2005,	  336;	  see	  also	  Nonhoff	  2006a,	  242).	  	  221	  The	  concern	  with	  methods	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  to	   ‘prescribe’	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  providing	  some	  sort	  of	   ‘toolkit’	   for	  discourse	   analysis	   varies	   according	   to	   the	   different	   schools.	   For	   overviews	   see	   for	   example	   Jørgensen	   and	   Phillips	  (2002).	   As	   they	   point	   out,	   basically	   discourse	   analysis	   can	   be	   conducted	   within	   all	   areas	   of	   research,	   however	   –	  depending	   on	   the	   understanding	   of	   ‘discourse’	   –	   it	   would	   not	   fit	   within	   all	   theoretical/philosophical	   frameworks	  (Jørgensen	  and	  Phillips	  2002,	  3–4).	  This	   is	   certainly	   true	   for	  PDT,	   that	   is	  not	   “just	  a	  method	   for	  data	  analysis,	  but	  a	  theoretical	  and	  methodological	  whole”	  (ibid.)	  222	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  themselves	  would	  have	  not	  been	  interested	  in	  the	  ‘real	  world	  political	  life’.	  Although	  their	  writings	  are	  often	  labelled	  (and	  oftentimes	  dismissed)	  as	  ‘purely	  theoretical’,	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  have	  repeatedly	  elaborated	  on	  how	  their	  theories	  are	  connected	  to	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  events	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  like	  Budapest	  1956,	  Prague	  1968,	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  wars	  in	  Vietnam	  and	  Cambodia	  (cf.	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  1ff),	   the	   transformations	   in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	   the	  Soviet	  Union	   in	   the	   late	  1980s	   (cf.	  Laclau	  1990,	  xi)	  and	  also,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Laclau,	  in	  connection	  to	  his	  experiences	  in	  Argentina	  since	  the	  1960s	  (cf.	  Laclau	  2014,	  1ff.).	  See	  also	  Dallmayr	  (2009,	  35).	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To	  provide	  a	   ‘grammar’	  of	  how	  to	   translate	  PDT	   into	  research	  practice	   Jason	  Glynos	  and	  David	  Howarth	   (Glynos	   and	   Howarth	   2007)	   have	   come	   forward	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   Logics	   of	  
Critical	   Explanation,	   which	   conceives	   of	   PDT	   as	   an	   “explanatory,	   interpretative	   and	   critical	  theory”,	   that	   in	   its	   application	   seeks	   to	   avoid	   the	   problems	   of	   empiricism,	   subsumption	   and	  eclecticism	   (with	   reference	   to	   R.	   J.	   Bernstein	   1976,	   235;	   Glynos	   and	   Howarth	   2011). 223	  Empiricism	   refers	   to	   suggesting	   an	   unmediated	   access	   to	   a	   ‘real	   concrete’	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   ‘raw	  material’	   of	   ‘empirical	   observations’	   that	   can	   be	   used	   to	   draw	   generalizing	   conclusions.	  Subsumption	   in	   contrast	   refers	   to	   theoreticism	  or	   theory-­‐drivenness	   that	   derives	   explanations	  only	   from	   abstract	   theories	   or	   subsumes	   phenomena	   under	   laws	   derived	   from	   empirical	  generalization	   (Howarth	   2005,	   322).	   Avoiding	   eclecticism,	   as	   also	   referred	   to	   in	   what	   follows	  under	   the	   element	   of	   articulation,	   basically	   means	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   philosophical	  presuppositions	  of	  PDT	  when	  drawing	  from	  and	   ‘combining’	   it	  with	  other	  approaches,	  which	  is	  entirely	   possible	   (see	   in	  what	   follows	   on	  RPA).	   	   In	   a	   nutshell	   the	   Logics	   approach	   aims	   at	   the	  
problematization	   of	   empirical	   phenomena,	   their	   retroductive	   explanation	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
persuasion	   of,	   and	   intervention	   into	   the	   relevant	   community	   and	   practices	   of	   scholars	   and	   lay-­‐actors.	   The	   Logics	   thus	   consist	   of	   five	   basic	   elements:	   problematization,	   retroduction,	   logics,	  articulation	  and	  critique	  (Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	  10;	  italics	  in	  original).	  	  In	   short,	   problematization	   relates	   to	   a	   Foucault-­‐inspired	   construction	   of	   the	   object	   of	  research	   or	   research	   question	   that	   encompasses	   an	   archeological,	   as	   well	   as	   genealogical	  elements.	  This	  means	  looking	  at	  the	  rules,	  orders	  or	  epistemes	  of	  discourse	  (i.e.	  at	  the	  question	  how	  objects	  do	  become	  objects	  of	  discourse)	  and	  at	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  certain	  rules	  or	   orders	   etc.	   to	   emerge.	   In	   this	   sense,	   “genealogy	   strives	   to	   distance	   us	   from	   the	   rationale	  implicit	  in	  past	  and	  present	  practices”	  (Connolly	  1984,	  155).	  Social	  and	  political	  phenomena	  are	  not	   taken	  as	  pre-­‐given,	  but	   their	   formation	   is	  part	  of	   the	  problematization.	  Furthermore,	   in	  my	  understanding,	   it	   is	   the	   problematization	   that	   to	   some	   extent	   ‘makes	   the	   case’	   in	   terms	   of	  choosing	  what	  to	   focus	  on,	  as	  “rarely,	   if	  ever,	  does	  a	  case	  present	   itself	   ‘beyond	  any	  reasonable	  choice’	  […]”	  (cf.	  Hansen	  2006,	  73).	  This	  ‘problem	  drivenness’	  –	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  what	  has	  been	  termed	  ‘problem-­‐solving	  theory’	  (cf.	  Howarth	  2005,	  318)224	  –	  in	  most	  cases	  leads	  discourse	  theorists	   to	   ask	   different	   kinds	   of	   questions	   than	   those	   scholars	   explicitly	   aiming	   at	  generalization,	  causal	  inference	  and	  maybe	  also	  prediction	  (cf.	  Torfing	  2005,	  22).	  In	  my	  case	  the	  problematization	   encompasses	   the	   ‘puzzle’	   of	   similarities	   in	   the	   U.S.	   economic	   discourses	   on	  China	  and	  Japan	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  ‘dissimilarities’	  in	  the	  bilateral	  relationships,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  neglect	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  223	  On	  the	  difference	  between	  what	  he	  –	  with	  reference	  to	  Ulrich	  Oevermann	  –	  calls	  logics	  of	  subsumption	  versus	  logics	  of	  reconstruction	  see	  Herborth	  2011:	  138ff.	  In	  these	  terms	  I	  characterize	  the	  LCE	  as	  reconstructive	  approach.	  	  224	  For	  the	  seminal	  distinction	  between	  problem-­‐solving	  and	  critical	  theory	  see	  Cox	  (1983).	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by	  previous	   research	  of	   a	   historical	   dimension	   that	   considers	   the	   economic	  disputes	  beyond	   a	  ‘topic	   oriented’	   or	   empiricist	  way.	  Whereas	   this	   accounts	   for	   the	   archeological	   component,	   the	  aim	   to	   inquire	   into	   the	   present	   discourses	   on	   China	   in	   light	   of	   the	   historical	   example	   of	   the	  discourses	  on	  Japan	  relates	  to	  the	  genealogical	  element.	  	  
Retroduction	  is	  meant	  as	  a	  form	  of	  explanation	  in	  contrast	  to	  induction	  and	  deduction	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  regards	  the	  most	  important	  criterion	  for	  admitting	  a	  ‘hypothesis’,	  i.e.	  assumption,	  its	  accountability	  for	  the	  phenomenon	  or	  problem	  at	  stake.	  Retroductive	  reasoning	  begins	  with	  the	  observation	  of	  a	   ‘problem’	  or	  phenomenon.	  The	   latter	  would	  be	  explainable	   if	  a	  hypothesis	  were	   true,	   and	   so	   one	   can	   assume	   this	   to	   be	   the	   case.	   This	  means	   that	   the	   ‘hypothesis’	   is	   not	  inferred	  until	  its	  content	  is	  already	  present	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  (Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	   10–11;	  with	   reference	   to	  Hanson	  1961,	   86),	   or	   in	   other	  words,	   “	   its	   criterion	   of	   validity	  depends	   on	   whether	   the	   posited	   hypothesis	   accounts	   for	   a	   problematized	   phenomenon	   by	  rendering	   it	   intelligible”	   (ibid.,	   quoted	   in	   Glynos	   and	   Howarth	   2007,	   39).225	  For	   me	   this	   also	  means	   that	  methodology	  and	  methods	  are	  not	   separable	   from,	  or	  external	   to	   the	  phenomenon	  one	  wants	  to	  investigate.	  Instead	  they	  can	  only	  prove	  themselves	  in	  practice,	  thus	  in	  the	  concrete	  research	  project.	   In	   this	   sense	  Howarth	   cites	  Max	  Weber’s	   suggestion	  of	   conceiving	  method	  as	  “the	   reflective	   understanding	   of	   the	   means	   which	   have	   already	   demonstrated	   their	   value	   in	  practice	  by	  raising	  them	  to	  the	  level	  of	  explicit	  consciousness”	  (cited	  in	  Howarth	  2005,	  317).	  To	  my	  understanding	  this	  also	   implies	  that	  the	   ‘hypothesis’	   is	   informed	  by	  the	  way	  the	  problem	  is	  ‘diagnosed’	   or	   constructed	   (and	   vice	   versa),	   the	   latter	   in	   turn	   relating	   to	   the	  theoretical/ontological/philosophical	   premises	   of	   the	   researcher.	   My	   ‘hypothesis’	   on	   the	  ‘entailments	   of	   U.S.	   identity’	   is	   thus	   predicated	   on	   my	   problematization,	   which	   of	   course	  resonates	  with	  my	  discourse	  theoretical	  perspective	  (cf.	  Herborth	  2011,	  139,	  145).	  	  Whereas	   retroduction	   still	  mostly	   relates	   to	   the	   form	   of	   an	   explanation,	   the	   element	   of	  
logics	   addresses	   its	   content,	   thus	   the	   practices	   or	   regimes	   of	   practices	   and	   the	   purposes,	   rules	  and	  ontological	  presuppositions	  that	  render	  a	  practice	  or	  regime	  possible	  and	  understandable	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  encompass	  its	  precariousness	  and	  limits	  on	  the	  other	  hand.226	  For	  this	  purpose	  Glynos	   and	  Howarth	   develop	   a	   three-­‐fold	   typology	   of	   logics	   –	   social,	   political,	   and	   fantasmatic	  logics.	   The	   category	   of	   social	   logics	   is	  meant	   to	   capture	   or	   characterize	   particular	   practices	   or	  regimes	   (that	   have	   become	   established	   or	   sedimented),	   political	   logics	   refer	   to	   moments	   of	  emergence	  and	  contestation	  of	  these	  regimes	  (Laclau	  2005,	  117;	  along	  the	  logics	  of	  equivalence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  seem	  to	  make	  no	  difference	  between	  retroduction	  and	  what	  was	  conceptualized	  as	  ‘abduction’	  by	  Charles	  Sanders	  Peirce	  (ibid.).	  	  226	  This	  concept	  of	  logic	  is	  invoked	  as	  departure	  from	  contextualized	  self-­‐interpretations	  of	  the	  hermeneutist	  tradition	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  approach	  of	  proponents	  of	  critical	  realism	  (cf.	  Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  2007,	  12).	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and	   difference,	   cf.	   Laclau	   and	  Mouffe	   2001,	   127–134),	  whereas	   fantasmatic	   logics	   point	   to	   the	  level	   of	   how	   subjects	   are	   gripped	   by	   certain	   regimes	   or	   practices	   (Glynos	   et	   al.	   2009,	   10–11	  italics	   in	   original;	   Glynos	   and	   Howarth	   2008,	   11–12),	   in	   a	   way	   that	   they	   are	   considered	   as	  ‘normal’	  with	  no	  alternative	  in	  sight.	  With	  respect	  to	  my	  study,	  and	  relating	  the	  logics	  back	  to	  the	  central	  concepts	  developed	   in	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe’s	   theory	  of	  hegemony,	   in	  a	  nutshell	   the	  social	  logics	   correspond	   to	   the	   sedimented	   or	   hegemonic	   discourse	   of	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	  (embedded	  in	  and	  connected	  to	  American	  exceptionalism),	  which	  had	  become	  the	   ‘normal’	  and	  largely	  uncontested	  perspective	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  dislocation	  and	  questioning	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  discourse	   and	   the	   articulation	  of	   antagonisms	  via	   the	   logics	   of	   equivalence	   and	  difference	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  political	  logics.	  The	  aim	  to	  preserve	  or	  stabilize	  the	  discourse	  by	  attributing	  its	  dislocation	  to	  an	  ‘external	  enemy’	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  fantasmatic	  logics.	  	  
Articulation	   goes	   back	   to	   Laclau	   and	   Mouffe’s	   understanding	   of	   articulation	   as	   “[…]	  practice	  establishing	  a	  relation	  among	  elements	  such	  that	  their	  identity	  is	  modified	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  articulatory	  practice”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  105).	  PDT	  understands	  articulation	  not	  only	  as	  practice	  to	  be	  studied	  by	  the	  researcher,	  but	  also	  as	  practice	  of	  the	  researcher,	  who	  links	  the	  phenomena	  or	  ‘problems’	  to	  be	  studied	  as	  well	  as	  the	  methodological	  approach	  and	  the	  methods	  themselves	  to	  the	  ontological	  premises,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  subsuming	  or	  eclecticism.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   one	   cannot	   draw	   from	   more	   than	   one	   concrete	   method	   in	   practice,	   but	   that	   the	  different	  ‘sources’	  have	  to	  be	  articulated	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ontological	  premises	  of	  PDT	  (cf.	  Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	  12).227	  In	  this	  study,	  articulation	  in	  two	  first	  steps	  encompasses	  the	  linking	  of	  the	  key	  concepts	   of	   PDT	   and	   my	   assumptions	   on	   the	   role	   of	   U.S.	   identity	   (thus	   emphasizing	   the	  understandings	  of	  discourse,	  identity	  and	  hegemony)	  to	  the	  questions	  I	  am	  asking	  concerning	  the	  similarities	  in	  the	  discourses	  on	  Japan	  and	  China	  (the	  explanandum),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  constitution	  of	   an	   explanans	  by	   referring	   to	   the	   three	   types	  of	   logics	   (social,	   political,	   fantasmatic	   or	   in	  my	  case	   sedimentation,	   contestation,	   preservation	   of	   ‘liberal	   identity’).	   A	   third	   and	   fourth	   step	  consist	   of	   taking	   up	   the	   findings	   and	  methodological	   approaches	   of	   previous	   research	   (i.e.	   for	  instance	  in	  work	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  relations,	  see	  chapter	  1.1)	  as	  well	  as	  specific	  concepts	  or	  methods	  I	  draw	  from,	  and	  articulating	  them	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  PDT,	  before	  actually	  ‘applying’	  them	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  227	  For	   example,	   discourse	   theorists	   do	   engage	   in	   ‘comparative	   analysis’,	   but	   their	   understanding	   of	   ‘comparison’	  differs	  crucially	  from	  an	  understanding	  in	  ‘comparative	  politics’,	  whereas	  in	  my	  view	  it	  comes	  closer	  to	  ‘comparative	  history’.	  On	  comparative	  research	  from	  a	  discourse	  theoretical	  perspective	  see	  Howarth	  (2005,	  332–335).	  Important	  to	   point	   our	   in	   this	   respect	   is	   that	   “comparative	   research	   in	   discourse	   theory	   does	   not	   involve	   the	   comparison	   of	  identical	   practices	   or	   institutions	   which	   are	   treated	   as	   purely	   equivalent	   units.	   Instead	   we	   compare	   practices	   and	  objects	  which	  share	  certain	  family	  resemblances,	  rather	  than	  essences.	   It	   is	   for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  interpretation	  of	  particular	  phenomena	  necessarily	  precedes	  the	  comparative	  dimension”	  (ibid.,	  334).	  See	  also	  Hansen	  (2006,	  75,	  79),	  on	   comparative	   aspects	   in	   (historical)	   discourse	   analysis,	   and	  Adcock	   (2006)	   on	   generalization	   in	   comparative	   and	  historical	  social	  science.	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my	  discourse	  analysis.	   I	  address	   this	  step	   for	   the	  concept	  of	  Rhetorical	  Political	  Analysis	  (RPA)	  under	  the	  next	  section.	  The	  element	  of	  critique	  finally	  relates	  to	  the	  ontological	  horizon	  of	  PDT	  that	  stresses	  the	  radical	   contingency	   of	   social	   relations	   and	   ‘knowledge	   claims’,	   and	   thus	   also	   informs	   the	  construction,	   investigation	   and	   explanation	   of	   social	   phenomena	   through	   the	   researcher.	   One	  aspect	  is	  to	  engage	  in	  revealing	  the	  non-­‐necessary	  character	  of	  the	  regimes	  and	  practices	  studied,	  as	   well	   as	   pointing	   to	   their	   reliance	   on	   foreclosures	   and	   exclusions	   of	   possible	   alternatives.	  Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  relate	  this	  aspect	  to	  a	  “deconstructive	  genealogy”	  à	  la	  Derrida	  and	  Foucault	  (Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  2008,	  15).	  In	  my	  understanding	  this	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  thoughts	  expressed	  in	   the	  words	  of	  Quentin	  Skinner	   in	   the	   introduction,	   in	   terms	  of	   looking	  at	   the	  past	   to	  become	  aware	   of	   the	  historicity	   of	   the	  present.	  Meanwhile,	   critique	   can	  be	   articulated	   along	   an	   ethical	  and	  a	  normative	  dimension.	  Ethical	  critique	  addresses	  the	  dimension	  of	  fantasy,	  thus	  in	  how	  far	  fantasmatic	   logics	   operate	   in	   an	   ideological	   mode	   that	   aims	   at	   concealing	   the	   ultimate	  contingency	  of	  our	  social	  and	  political	  practices.	  Normative	  critique	  involves	   judgment	  through	  characterizing	  concrete	  relations	  of	  domination	  and	  challenging	  them	  in	  the	  name	  of	  alternative	  values	  (Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	  13).	  Importantly	  –	  and	  relating	  to	  what	  was	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  theory	  referring	  to	  ‘taking	  historicity	  and	  contingency	  seriously’	  –	  Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  reject	  the	  option	  of	  developing	  a	  comprehensive	  normative	  framework	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  	  	  “[…]	  the	  lure	  of	  elaborating	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  normative	  schema	  with	  which	  to	  evaluate	  and	  prescribe	  policies	   and	   practices	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	   failing	   to	   engage	   with	   the	   singular	   instances	   of	   power,	  domination	   and	   oppression	   that	   require	   careful	   empirical	   analysis,	   ethical	   critique	   and	   political	  intervention”.	  	  	  Meanwhile	  they	  also	  oppose	  	  	   “solutions	   that	  would	   involve	  a	  retreat	   into	  a	   type	  of	   relativism	  or	  subjectivism	  where	   ‘anything	  goes’	  […].	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  whole	  point	  […]	  is	  to	  develop	  an	  ontological	  stance	  and	  a	  grammar	  of	   concepts,	   together	  with	  a	  particular	   research	  ethos,	  which	  makes	   it	  possible	   to	   construct	  and	  furnish	  answers	  to	  empirical	  problems	  that	  can	  withstand	  charges	  of	  methodological	  arbitrariness,	  historical	   particularism	   and	   idealism”	   (Glynos	   and	   Howarth	   2007,	   7–8;	   see	   also	   Torfing	   2005,	  20).228	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  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  chapter	  two,	  in	  my	  reading	  this	  is	  in	  line	  with	  what	  has	  been	  termed	  “weak	  ontology”	  by	  Stephen	  White.	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I	   understand	   this	   ‘critical	   ethos’	   also	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   way	   of	   conducting	   research,	   thus	   as	  reflecting	  on	  ones	  own	  ethical	  and/or	  normative	  standpoints	  that	  (implicitly)	  inform	  the	  whole	  study	   from	   the	   beginning	   on,	   as	   I	   do	   not	   believe	   that	   it	   is	   possible,	   nor	   in	   the	   case	   of	   PDT	  desirable,	  to	  ‘bracket’	  these	  commitments	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  simplistic	  ‘facts/value’	  distinction.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  these	  standpoints,	  commitments	  or	  choices,	  already	  in	  a	  way	  manifest	  themselves	  in	   the	   questions	   one	   is	   asking	   (or	   choosing	   to	   ask),	   as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   ways	   one	   intends	   to	  investigate	  or	  answer	   them	  (cf.	  Herborth	  2011,	  147f.),	   i.e.	   in	   the	  sense	  of	   ‘solving	  problems’	  or	  taking	  a	  critical	  stands	  towards	  what	  constitutes	  these	  ‘problems’	  in	  the	  first	  place.229	  Relating	  to	  my	  problematization	  and	  assumptions	  regarding	  the	  discourses	  on	   Japan	  and	  China	   in	   the	  U.S.,	  my	   aim	   in	   this	   sense	   is	   neither	   to	   criticize	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   or	   American	  exceptionalism	  for	  their	  particular	  ‘content’	  from	  a	  normative	  point	  of	  view,	  nor	  to	  put	  forward	  an	   alternative	   particular	   concept.	   Instead	   my	   ethical	   critique	   amounts	   to	   their	   ideological	  dimension	   of	   concealment/denial	   of	   radical	   contingency	   in	   favor	   of	   universalist	   claims,	   hence	  relating	   to	   a	   problematization	   of	   the	   ‘limits	   of	   inclusiveness’	   and	   the	   role	   of	   ‘the	   other’	   from	  within	  PDT	  (see	  chapters	  1.4	  and	  2.).	  I	  come	  back	  to	  these	  aspects	  in	  the	  summary	  of	  the	  analysis,	  as	  well	   as	   in	   the	   conclusion,	   while	   elaborating	   on	   the	   element	   of	   articulation	   in	   the	   following	  subchapter.	  	  	  
3.3.	  From	  ‘Ideas’	  to	  Discourses	  –	  Rhetorical	  Political	  Analysis230	  	   “Political	  ideas,	  even	  one’s	  own,	  are	  apprehended	  only	  as	  statements”	  (Barker	  2000,	  227).	  	  Through	  rhetorical	  analysis	  we	  “observe	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  political	  concepts	  are	  rhetorically	  formulated	  and	  deployed	  as	  ways	  of	  grasping	  a	  political	  situation	  and	  winning	  the	  consent	  of	  others	  for	  some	  course	  of	  action	  or	  another.	  In	  so	  doing	  we	  fill	  out	  the	  
ideational	  with	  the	  political”	  (Finlayson	  2004,	  541).	  	  	  PDT	   stresses	   the	   centrality	   of	   language	   (while	   not	   limiting	   itself	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   it!)	  when	   it	  comes	   to	   the	   aim	   of	   characterizing	   practices	   and	   regimes	   of	  meaning-­‐making	   and	   -­‐fixing	   (see	  chapter	   2.1),	   and	   indeed	   this	   is	  where	  my	   analysis	   aims	   at	   going	   further	   than	   for	   instance	   the	  ones	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  context	  of	  previous	  research	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japanese	  relations	  and	  revisionism	  –	  as	   well	   as	   the	   policy	   oriented	   ones	   in	   the	   field	   of	   U.S.-­‐Japanese	   and	   U.S.-­‐Chinese	   economic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  229	  As	  emphasized	  by	  Beate	  Jahn,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  any	  theorist	  to	  simply	  assert	  his/her	  reflexivity	  on	  values	  “at	  the	  epistemological	  level.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  practised	  on	  the	  methodological	  level”	  (Jahn	  1998,	  638).	  	  230	  For	  an	  overview	  on	   the	   (missing)	   rhetorical	   turn	   in	   social	  and	  political	   sciences,	   linked	   to	   ‘ideational	  analysis’	   in	  political	  science	  see	  Finlayson	  (2004).	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relations	   –	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   concrete	   articulations	   in	   the	   elite	   public	   discourses	   (i.e.	   here	   in	  Congress)	   on	   Japan	   and	   China.	   Building	   on	   the	   centrality	   assigned	   to	   the	   role	   of	   language	   and	  rhetoric	  conceived	  on	  an	  ontological	  and	  on	  an	  ontical	   level	  (see	  in	  what	  follows)	  in	  PDT,	  I	  will	  additionally	   draw	   from	   methods	   for	   the	   analysis	   of	   political	   rhetoric	   (RPA).	   Rhetoric	   can	   be	  characterized	   as	   the	   practical	   science	   and	   art	   of	   effective	   or	   efficient	   speaking	   and	  writing	   in	  public	   or,	   more	   specifically,	   the	   science	   and	   art	   of	   persuasive	   language	   use,	   the	   three	   crucial	  objectives	  of	  such	  persuasion	  being	  logos,	  ethos	  and	  pathos.	  From	  a	  prevailing	  (dualist)	  point	  of	  view	   (that	   will	   be	   scrutinized	   in	   what	   follows)	   persuasion	   connected	   with	   logos	   uses	   sound	  argumentation	   like	   factual	   information,	   whereas	   ethos	   and	   pathos	   draw	   from	   ‘non-­‐argumentative’	   means	   like	   emotionalization,	   suggestion,	   demagogy,	   propaganda,	   the	   use	   of	  threats,	   etc.231	  Rhetorical	   analysis	   then	   intends	   to	   analyze	   the	   employment	   and	   effects	   of	  linguistic	   and	   other	   semiotic	  means	   of	   persuasion	   in	   rhetorical	   terms.	   Political	   rhetoric	   in	   this	  context	  refers	  to	  the	  use	  of	  rhetorical	  means	  of	  persuasion	  by	  professional	  politicians	  (see	  also	  Gottweis	  2007,	  243;	  cf.	  Reisigl	  2008,	  97).	  	  Taking	  up	  Robert	  Uriu’s	  understanding	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  policy	  assumptions	  as	  ‘concrete,	  tangible	   and	   visible	   manifestation	   of	   ideas’	   –	   and	   thus	   also	   the	   other	   predominant	   ‘ideas’-­‐approaches	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one	  –	  I	  side	  with	  Alan	  Finlayson	  who	  argues	  that	  	  	  “we	   need	   to	   examine	   not	   ideas	   but	   arguments	   and	   […]	   to	   analyze	   political	   persuasion	   and	  preference	   transformation	   we	   must	   reacquaint	   ourselves	   with	   the	   rhetorical	   tradition.	   […]	  Rhetoric	   draws	   our	   attention	   to	   forms	   of	   argument	   and	   reasoning	   that	   exceed	   the	   strictures	   of	  syllogism	   yet	   manifestly	   operate	   und	   function	   in	   real-­‐world	   contexts	   of	   argument”	   (Finlayson	  2007,	  546;	  553	  emphasis	  added).	  	  Hence	  RPA	   argues	   against	   the	   treatment	   of	   rhetoric	   as	  mere	   supplement	   to	   ‘real	   action’,	   or	   as	  manipulative,	  only	  instrumental	  and	  strategic	  means	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘reason’	  and	  ‘truth’,	  in	  other	  words	   against	   the	   tendency	   to	   reduce	   argumentation	   to	   the	   operation	   of	   logos,	   expelling	   the	  other	   two	  components	  of	   rhetoricity,	  ethos	  and	  pathos	   (Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	  13–14;	   cf.	  Gottweis	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  231	  In	  accounts	  that	  regard	  discourse	  as	  ‘mere	  rhetoric’,	  it	  is	  usually	  understood	  as	  being	  differentiated	  from	  the	  ‘logos’,	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  ‘irrational’	  (see	  also	  Gottweis	  2007,	  239;	  cf.	  Laclau	  2005,	  12).	  See	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  RPA.	  For	  the	  argument	  of	  persuasion	  being	   inseparable	   from	  politics	   in	  general,	  as	  accounting	   for	   “the	  politicality	  of	  politics”	   see	  Finalyson	  (2004,	  536),	  who	  also	  argues	  for	  the	  rhetorical	  conception	  of	  politics	  in	  general.	  While	  being	  sympathetic	  to	  Laclauian	  discourse	  analysis,	  he	  characterizes	  it	  as	  too	  abstract	  for	  being	  turned	  into	  a	  methodology.	  	  	  For	  a	  conceptualization	  of	  rhetorical	  coercion,	  rather	  than	  persuasion	  see	  Krebs	  and	  Jackson	  (2007),	  who	  also	  argue	  against	  an	  understanding	  of	  rhetoric	  as	  epiphenomenal	  or	  ‘mere	  rhetoric’.	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2007,	  240;	  cf.	  Hülsse	  2003,	  212f.,	  237f.;	  cf.	  De	  Man	  1984,	  196f.;	  cf.	  Shapiro	  1984,	  229f.,	  239f.).232	  In	  this	  sense,	  argumentation	  is	  also	  not	  reduced	  to	  “the	  creation	  and	  exchange	  of	  arguments”	  but	  it	   is	   also	   considered	  as	   a	   “performative	  process	   in	  which	   the	  boundaries	  of	   argumentation	  are	  defined”	  (Gottweis	  2007,	  245).	  The	  question,	  as	  put	  by	  Karin	  Fierke	   in	  relation	  to	   ‘language’	   in	  general,	   is	  thus	  about	  how	   ‘ideas’	  matter.	  PDT	  regards	  rhetoric	  as	  a	  constitutive	  aspect	  of	  social	  reality,	   and	   its	   analysis	   as	   essential	   part	   of	   understanding	   and	   explaining	   social	   phenomena	  (Howarth	  and	  Griggs	  2008,	  199).233	  On	  an	  ontical	  level	  the	  analysis	  of	  rhetoric	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  functioning	   and	   structuration	   of	   discourses.	  On	   the	   ontological	   level	   these	   phenomena	   are	   not	  understood	  as	  being	  represented	  by	  how	  we	  speak	  about	  them,	  but	  are	  considered	  as	  bearing	  a	  character	  of	   rhetoricity	  (Stäheli	  2000a,	  13f.),	   in	   terms	  of	  being	  expressivist	   and	   constitutive	  as	  opposed	   to	   designative	   (cf.	   Michel	   2013,	   275).234	  In	   this	   sense	   Laclau	   not	   only	   mentions	   the	  central	   role	   of	   rhetoric	   in	   the	   structuration	   of	   any	   signifying	   system	   (Laclau	   2009,	   325),	   and	  states	   that	   rhetoric	   should	  be	   a	   privileged	   field	   of	   inquiry	   “if	  we	   are	   searching	   for	   a	   terrain	   in	  which	   the	   subversion	   of	   identities	   resulting	   from	   antagonistic	   relations	   could	   be	   represented”	  (Laclau	  2006,	  106).	  But	  he	  also	  speaks	  of	  the	  social	  organized	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  space	  or	  rhetorical	  mechanisms	  as	  “anatomy	  of	  the	  social	  world”	  (Laclau	  2000,	  79,	  2005,	  110).	  	  It	  follows	  that	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  PDT	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  escape	  the	  dimension	  of	  rhetoric,	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  ontological	  dimension	  of	  PDT	  regarding	  the	  materiality	  of	  discourses.	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Laclau:	  	  	  “The	   main	   consequence	   of	   a	   break	   with	   the	   discursive/extra-­‐discursive	   dichotomy	   is	   the	  abandonment	   of	   the	   thought/reality	   opposition	   […].	   Synonymy,	   metonymy,	   metaphor	   are	   not	  forms	  of	   thought	   that	   add	  a	   second	   sense	   to	  a	  primary,	   constitutive	   literality	  of	   social	   relations;	  instead,	   they	  are	  part	  of	   the	  primary	  terrain	   itself	   in	  which	  the	  social	   is	  constituted.	  Rejection	  of	  the	   thought/reality	   dichotomy	   must	   go	   together	   with	   a	   rethinking	   and	   interpretation	   of	   the	  categories	  which	  have	  […]	  been	  considered	  exclusive	  of	  one	  or	  the	  other”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  110).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  232	  For	  the	  role	  of	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  field	  of	  argumentative	  policy	  analysis	  see	  Gottweis	  (2007).	  Although	  he	  argues	  against	  separating	  logos	  from	  ethos	  and	  pathos,	  he	  seems	  to	  treat	  argumentation	  in	  general	  in	  a	  rather	  instrumental	  way	  (cf.	  2007,	  246–247).	  233	  For	  references	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  antique	  school	  of	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  Laclau	  (cf.	  Hetzel	  2007,	  88ff.).	  234	  Urs	  Stäheli	  points	  to	  Hayden	  White’s	  work	  on	  19th	  century	  historiography	  in	  which	  White	  focuses	  not	  only	  on	  the	  ‘content’	  of	  the	  respective	  works,	  but	  on	  their	  linguistic	  mode,	  as	  “thought	  remains	  the	  captive	  of	  the	  linguistic	  mode	  in	  which	  it	  seeks	  to	  grasp	  the	  outline	  of	  objects	  inhabiting	  its	  field	  of	  perception”	  (H.	  White	  1974,	  xi,	  ix–xii,	  1–42).	  In	  other	  words	   we	   as	   ‘observers’	   can	   only	   observe	   via	   the	   (linguistic)	   communicative	   concepts	   we	   possess	   (cf.	   Walter	   and	  Helmig	   2008,	   120).	   See	   also	   Hetzel	   (2007,	   90).	   For	   rhetorical	   analyses	   of	   social	   science	   itself	   see	   for	   example	  McCloskey	  (1998),	  Fuchs	  and	  Ward	  (1994,	  488ff.)	  and	  Gusfield	  (1976).	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“So,	  far	  from	  these	  devices	  being	  mere	  rhetoric,	  they	  are	  inherent	  in	  the	  logics	  presiding	  over	  the	  constitution	  and	  dissolution	  of	  any	  political	  space”	  (Laclau	  2005,	  19).	  	  Considering	   the	   ontological	   horizon	   Laclau	   articulates	   hegemony	   as	   “politico-­‐tropological	  movement”	  and	  more	  precisely	  as:	  “[…]	  metonymical:	  its	  effects	  always	  emerge	  from	  a	  surplus	  of	  meaning	   which	   results	   from	   an	   operation	   of	   displacement”,	   meaning	   that	   a	   particular	   group	  takes	  up	  demands	  of	  other	  groups	  or	  extends	   its	  demands	   into	  nearby	  domains	   (Howarth	  and	  Griggs	  2005,	  11;	  Laclau	  1998,	  154;	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  141).235	  Where	  a	  demand	  or	  claim	  of	  a	   particular	   group	   comes	   to	   symbolize	   the	   demands	   of	   an	   entire	   community,	   thus	   becoming	  hegemonic	   by	   filling	   the	   ‘empty	   signifier’,	   it	   becomes	   a	   metaphor.	   It	   creates	   new	   meaningful	  entities	   –	   orders	   of	   discourse	   or	   regimes	   of	   practices	   –	   by	   disarticulating	   and	   replacing	   the	  previously	   existing	   ones	   (Howarth	   and	   Griggs	   2008,	   207).	   Meanwhile	   this	   practice	   bears	   a	  catachrestical	  element,	   the	   trope	  of	  catachresis	  standing	   for	   the	  misapplication	  of	  a	  word	  or	   “a	  transfer	   of	   terms	   from	   one	   place	   to	   another	   employed	   when	   no	   proper	   word	   exists”,	   e.g.	   the	  ‘wings’	  of	  an	  airplane	  or	  the	  ‘leg’	  of	  a	  chair	  (Parker	  1990,	  60,	  cited	  in	  Howarth	  and	  Griggs	  2008,	  200;	  Laclau	  2005,	  71)	  which	   is	  also	  true	  of	   the	  empty	  signifier,	   that	  carries	  no	  proper	  meaning	  but	  acquires	  it	  only	  through	  the	  hegemonic	  operation.236	  Analogous	  to	  the	  ultimately	  precarious	  character	   of	   every	   (hegemonic)	   discourse	   Laclau	   points	   out,	   that	   the	   demarcations	   between	  these	   rhetorical	   tropes	   as	   categories	   are	   permeable,	   thus	   corresponding	   to	   the	   ultimate	  impossibility	  to	  fix	  a	  particular	  meaning	  once	  and	  for	  all	  (cf.	  also	  Michel	  2013,	  286),	  and	  in	  these	  terms,	  to	  the	  structural	  incompleteness	  of	  all	  social	  reality	  (cf.	  Laclau	  2001,	  170).	  On	  the	  ontical	  level	  the	  analysis	  of	  these	  and/or	  other	  rhetorical	  figures,	  as	  they	  appear	  in	  the	   discourses,	   is	   a	  means	   for	   fleshing	   out	   how	   the	   dynamics	   laid	   out	   in	   chapter	   two	   actually	  happen,	   in	   other	   words	   how	   certain	   tropes	   function	   to	   articulate	   particular	   viewpoints	   as	  without	  alternative	  and	  universal,	  in	  order	  to	  hegemonize	  the	  discourse.	  	  While	  one	  possibility	  of	  putting	  PDT	  into	  practice	  through	  rhetorical	  analysis	  is	  to	  focus	  explicitly	   on	   these	   tropes	   mentioned	   by	   Laclau	   (see	   for	   instance	   Howarth	   and	   Griggs,	   2008;	  Nabers	  2015,	   forthcoming),	   in	   this	   study	   I	  am	  proposing	  a	  different	  approach,	   that	   I	   am	   laying	  out	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	  In	  the	  sense	  of	  reading	  these	  ‘domains’	  as	  non-­‐essential	  but	  political,	  I	  would	  add	  that	  these	  ‘domains’	  themselves	  become	  rearticulated	  (for	  example	  extended	  or	  reduced)	  as	  to	  encompass	  (and	  exclude)	  different	  kinds	  of	  demands.	  	  236	  Here	  only	  in	  a	  nutshell:	  This	  corresponds	  to	  PDT’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  mutual	  interweaving	  of	  the	  literal	  and	  the	  figurative,	   or	   in	   other	  words	   the	   ‘real’	   and	   its	   representation,	  which	   points	   to	   Žižek’s	   Lacanian	   inspired	   account	   of	  naming	   and	   its	   performative	   and	   retroductive	   effects,	   that	   in	   turn	   also	   relate	   to	   Laclau’s	   understanding	   of	   the	  relationship	  between	  universal/particular	  and	  contingency/necessity	  (Howarth	  and	  Griggs	  2008,	  200f.;	  Laclau	  2005,	  102–110).	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3.4.	  Putting	  Theory	  into	  Practice237	  	  For	   putting	   the	   key	   terms	   of	   PDT	   according	   to	   Laclau	   and	  Mouffe	   into	   practice	   in	   a	   discourse	  analysis,	   I	   draw	   from	   the	   so-­‐called	  politicolinguistic	   approach	  by	  Martin	  Reisigl.	   In	  particular	   I	  make	   use	   of	   the	   categories	   of	   nomination	   (naming	   of	   actors),238	  predication	   (attribution	   of	  features), 239 	  argumentation	   (justification/delegitimization	   of	   nominations	   and	   predications),	  perspectivation	   (point	   of	   view	   of	   expression)	   and	   intensification/mitigation	   of	   the	  aforementioned	   categories	   (cf.	   Reisigl	   2008),240	  to	   capture	   the	   Laclauian	   logics	   of	   equivalence	  and	   difference	   and	   the	   relating	   to	   an	   excluded	   other.	   Reisigl	   is	   a	   proponent	   of	   the	   school	   of	  Critical	   Discourse	   Analysis	   (CDA),	   which	   in	   turn	   encompasses	   a	   variety	   of	   approaches.241	  The	  major	  differences	  in	  the	  theoretical	  premises	  of	  CDA	  with	  reference	  to	  PDT	  are	  that	  CDA	  regards	  some	  societal	  phenomena	  as	  not	  having	  a	  discursive	  character.	  Discourse	  as	  a	  social	  practice	   is	  seen	  as	  constituting	  and	  constituted	  by	  other	  social	  practices	  through	  dialectic	  interaction.	  Social	  practices	   are	   seen	   as	   originally	   discursively	   constituted,	   but	   as	   having	   become	   sedimented	   in	  institutions	   and	   non-­‐discursive	   practices	   (Jørgensen	   and	   Phillips	   2002,	   61f.).242	  Accordingly,	  discourse	  is	  mainly	  understood	  as	  “linguistic	  action,	  be	  it	  written,	  visual	  or	  oral	  communication,	  verbal	  or	  nonverbal,	  undertaken	  by	  social	  actors	  in	  a	  specific	  setting	  determined	  by	  social	  rules,	  norms,	   conventions”	   (Wodak	   and	   Krzyżanowski	   2008,	   5).	   Moreover,	   CDA	   does	   neither	  completely	   abandon	   the	   Marxist	   view	   on	   ideological	   effects	   of	   discursive	   practices,	   nor	   the	  possibility	   to	   distinguish	   between	   ideological	   and	   non-­‐ideological	   discourses	   (Jørgensen	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  237	  This	  passage	  partly	  draws	  from	  Nymalm	  (2013)	  and	  Nymalm	  (2010).	  	  238	  On	  what	  she	  calls	  subject	  positioning	  see	  i.e.	  Doty	  (1993,	  308–309,	  313–316).	  239	  On	  predicate	  analysis	  see	  also	  i.e.	  Milliken	  (1999,	  231–234)	  and	  Doty	  (1993,	  306–307,	  310–312).	  	  240	  On	   her	   conceptualization	   of	   these	   categories	   as	   ”discursive	   strategies”	   see	   also	   Wodak	   (2009,	   40ff.),	   who	   for	  instance	  includes	  metaphors,	  metonymies	  and	  synecdoches	  under	  nominations.	  	  241	  Reisigl	  distinguishes	  at	  least	  five	  different	  variants,	  among	  them	  the	  ‘Vienna	  Variation	  of	  CDA’	  he	  affiliates	  himself	  to.	  This	  variant	  is	  characterized	  by	  its	  emphasis	  on	  trans-­‐	  and	  interdisciplinarity,	  its	  discourse-­‐historical	  approach	  and	  a	  triangulate	  access	  –	  meaning	  a	  multimethodological	  approach	  –	  to	  its	  research	  topics	  and	  materials	  (Reisigl	  2007,	  28;	  Wodak	  and	  Krzyżanowski	  2008,	  12).	  With	  his	  politicolinguistic	  approach	  Reisigl	  wants	  to	  assume	  a	  transdisciplinary	  perspective	   by	   combining	   rhetoric,	   political	   science	   and	   linguistics	   (Reisigl	   2008,	   96).	   In	   his	   study	   on	   the	   use	   of	  nationalist	   political	   rhetoric	   in	  Austria,	  Reisigl	   focuses	  on	   the	   rhetorical	   constructions	   and	   representations	  of	   social	  actors	   and	   collective	   subjects	   like	   nations	   (Reisigl	   2007,	   9).	   In	   general,	   proponents	   of	   CDA	   have	   been	   more	  preoccupied	  with	  methods	  of	  discourse	  analysis	  than	  those	  of	  ‘early’	  PDT,	  as	  they	  have	  commonly	  engaged	  in	  linguistic	  textual	  analysis	  of	  language	  use	  in	  social	  interaction.	  242	  However,	   if	  Norman	  Fairclough	  for	  example	  considers	  these	  social	  practices	  as	  originally	  discursively	  constituted	  and	   sedimented	   over	   time,	   then	   I	   would	   see	   the	   difference	   to	   PDT	   not	   so	   much	   in	   this	   aspect,	   but	   rather	   in	   the	  consequence	  of	  assigning	  an	  ‘independent’	  role	  to	  those	  sedimentations	  or	  structures.	  As	  Fairclough	  maintains:	  “The	  discursive	  constitution	  of	  society	  does	  not	  emanate	  from	  a	  free	  play	  of	  ideas	  in	  peoples	  heads	  but	  from	  a	  social	  practice	  which	   is	   firmly	   rooted	   in	   and	   oriented	   to	   real,	   material	   social	   structures”	   (Fairclough	   1992,	   66;	   cf.	   Jørgensen	   and	  Phillips	   2002,	   62).	   But	   as	   pointed	   out,	   according	   to	   PDT	   this	   dichotomy	  between	   a	   ‘reality’	   and	   ‘what	   is	   in	   peoples	  heads’	  is	  not	  part	  of	  their	  conception.	  On	  sedimentation	  Laclau	  points	  out	  that	  it	  does	  not	  take	  place	  simply	  on	  the	  level	  of	   “words	  and	   images”,	  but	   in	  practices	  and	   institutions,	   as	   “our	  notion	  of	  discourse	   […]	   involves	   the	  articulation	  of	  words	   and	   actions,	   so	   that	   the	   quilting	   function	   is	   never	   a	   merely	   verbal	   operation	   but	   is	   embedded	   in	   material	  practices	  which	  can	  acquire	  institutional	  fixity	  (Laclau	  2005,	  106	  emphasis	  added).	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Phillips	  2002,	  17f.,	  63f.).243	  	  Working	  with	  the	  analytic	  categories	  thus	  importantly	  does	  not	  mean	  to	   incorporate	   the	   whole	   CDA	   approach	   and	   its	   differing	   premises,	   but	   to	   articulate	   the	  categories	  I	  am	  drawing	  from	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  premises	  and	  concepts	  of	  PDT.244	  	  	  	   Conceived	   in	   this	   way,	   I	   articulate	   Reisigl’s	   categories	   and	   the	   Laclauian	   concepts	   as	  follows:	   within	   the	   logics	   of	   equivalence	   and	   difference	   the	   (non-­‐pre-­‐existing	   and	   never	   fully	  constituted)	  self	  and	  other	  are	  constructed	  through	  articulating	  them	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  and	  this	  happens	   via	   nomination	   and	   predication.	   In	   linking	   these	   characterizations	   to	   chains	   of	  equivalence	   and	   difference,	   the	   speakers	   use	   arguments	   to	   justify	   the	   nominations	   and	  predications.	  By	  differentiating	   the	   in-­‐group	   from	  the	  out-­‐group	  –	   the	  self	   from	  the	  other	  –	   the	  speakers	  articulate	  themselves	  from	  a	  certain	  perspective,	  thus	  they	  relate	  themselves	  to	  nodal	  points	   that	   are	   eventually	   turned	   into	   an	   empty	   signifier.	   The	   empty	   signifier	   makes	   the	  cancellation	   of	   differences	   within	   the	   in-­‐group	   possible	   by	   enabling	   an	   equalization	   of	   its	  characteristics	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  out-­‐group	  (see	  chapter	  two).	  The	  intensification	  of	  the	  nominations,	  predications,	  arguments,	  and	  perspectives	  finally	  endorses	  the	  articulation	  of	  an	  excluded	  other	  (or	   the	   ‘internal	   other’	   through	   internal	   chains	   of	   equivalence)	   through	   the	   attempt	   to	   fill	   the	  empty	  signifier(s).	  Mitigation	  in	  turn,	  like	  the	  logics/chains	  of	  difference	  stands	  for	  the	  other	  side	  in	  the	  struggle	  to	  fill	   the	  empty	  signifier	  and	  hegemonize	  the	  discourse,	  the	  attempt	  to	  dissolve	  antagonisms.	   Furthermore,	   in	   this	   analysis,	   the	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   and	   the	   intensifications	  stand	   for	   an	   exclusive	   or	   confrontational	   articulation	   of	   ‘liberal	   identity’	   in	   terms	   of	   American	  exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history,	   while	   the	   chains	   of	   difference	   and	   the	  mitigations	  point	  to	  the	  inclusive	  and	  accommodative	  potential	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  (see	  chapter	  1.3).	  	  	  Drawing	   on	   Reisigl’s	   analytical	   categories	   read	   through	   the	   theoretical	   lens	   of	   PDT	   (and	   the	  Logics)	   lead	  me	   to	   structure	   the	   research	  material	   in	   a	   first	   step	   by	   answering	   following	   five	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  five	  categories	  and	  the	  key	  concepts	  of	  PDT:	  	  	  1.	  How	  are	   the	   actors	   linguistically	   constructed	  by	  being	  named	   (nominations/self	   and	  other)?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  243 	  Laclau	   rejects	   the	   main	   two	   notions	   of	   ideology	   within	   the	   Marxist	   terrain,	   namely	   ideology	   as	   a	   “false	  consciousness”	   and	   as	   a	   necessary	   level	   of	   social	   formation.	   The	   only	   acceptable	   notion	   in	   his	   opinion	   would	   be	  ideology	   as	   an	   “absolute	   metaphor”	   or	   as	   a	   “gigantic	   as	   if”,	   aiming	   at	   the	   closure	   of	   a	   discourse	   or	   social	   space	  respectively	  (Laclau	  2006,	  114).	  244	  On	  the	  differences	  and	  the	  question	  of	  possible	  “combinations”	  of	  concepts	  from	  PDT	  and	  CDA,	  see	  Jørgensen	  and	  Phillips	  (2002,	  17,	  62),	  Wodak	  and	  Krzyżanowski	  (2008,	  5),	  Fairclough	  (2003,	  88),	  Nabers	  (2009,	  194),	  Torfing	  (2005,	  9).	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  2.	   What	   positive	   or	   negative	   traits,	   qualities	   and	   features	   are	   attributed	   to	   the	  linguistically	  constructed	  actors	  (predications/self	  and	  other)?	  	  3.	   Through	  what	   arguments	   and	   argumentation	   schemes	   are	   claims	   containing	   specific	  nominations	   and	   predications	   attempted	   to	   being	   justified	   or	   delegitimized	  (argumentation/chains	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference)?	  	  4.	   From	   what	   perspective	   or	   point	   of	   view	   are	   these	   nominations,	   predications	   and	  argumentations	  expressed	  (perspectivation/chains	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference)?	  	  5.	   Are	   the	   nominations,	   predications	   and	   argumentations	   articulated	   overtly,	   are	   they	  intensified	  or	  are	  they	  mitigated	  (intensification	  and/or	  mitigation/empty	  signifiers)?	  (cf.	  Reisigl	  2008:	  99f.).	  	  	  Yet,	  I	  maintain	  that	  in	  many	  –	  if	  not	  most	  –	  cases,	  the	  analytic	  categories	  are	  not	  clearly	  separable:	  most	  frequently	  the	  nominations	  are	  carrying	  already	  a	  predicative,	  qualitative	  meaning,	  and	  the	  perspective	   is	   already	   part	   of	   the	   argument.	   In	   those	   cases	   I	   conceive	   of	   the	   predications	   and	  perspectivations	  as	  functioning	  already	  as	  intensifications	  or	  mitigations	  of	  the	  nominations	  and	  argumentations	  respectively.	  Furthermore,	  as	  Reisigl	  states	  in	  his	  study	  on	  the	  use	  of	  nationalist	  political	   rhetoric	   in	  Austria,	   from	  the	  category	  of	  predication	  and	  argumentation	  one	  can	  draw	  the	  main	  contextual	  topics	  and	  lines	  of	  argumentation	  of	  the	  debates	  (cf.	  Reisigl	  2007:	  41,	  250),	  and	  this	  corresponds	  to	  how	  the	  actors	  are	  nominated	  with	  respect	  to	  their	   ‘identity’	  regarding	  the	  topic.245	  	  	  To	  summarize	  at	  this	  point:	  While	  drawing	  from	  different	  ranges	  of	  tropes	  and	  other	  devices	  for	  the	   analysis	   of	   rhetoric	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   problematize	   them	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   philosophical	  premises	  of	  PDT,	  thus	  to	  articulate	  them	  from	  within	  the	  framework.	  Hence	  it	  remains	  important	  to	  conceptually	  distinguish	  between	  discourse	  as	  an	  ontological	  category	  that	  stresses	  the	  radical	  contingency	   and	   structural	   incompleteness	   of	   all	  meaning	   systems/systems	   of	   social	   relations	  that	   can	   be	   expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘tropological	   movements’	   of	   metaphors,	   metonyms,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  245	  To	  briefly	   reiterate	   in	   this	   context	  and	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   structuring	  of	   the	  analysis	  what	  was	   said	  on	   identity	   in	  chapter	  2.2:	  While	  identities	  can	  be	  partly	  understood	  as	  “strategic	  constructs”	  –	  and	  indeed	  a	  hegemony	  perspective	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  political	  articulations	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  identities	  –	  this	  does	  however	  not	  translate	  into	  an	  understanding	  of	  identities	  being	  completely	  freely	  manipulable,	  as	  (successful)	  identification	  always	  depends	  on	  the	  context	  available	   (cf.	  Howarth	  2013,	  243,	  251),	  but	  also	   to	   the	  degree	  of	   the	  proponents	  of	   a	   certain	  position	  being	  gripped	   by	   a	   particular	   perspective,	   hence,	   unable	   to	   distance	   themselves	   from	   it	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   employing	   it	   as	   a	  conscious	  strategy.	  In	  this	  sense,	  employing	  these	  analytical	  categories	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  ‘actorise’	  identity	  discourses	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  understanding	  of	  “cynical,	  rational	  actors	  who	  tamper	  with	  identities	  in	  an	  instrumentalist	  and	  strategic	  way	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  their	  purposes	  without	  themselves	  being	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  identities”	  (cf.	  Hagström	  and	  Gustafsson	  2015,	  8).	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synechdoches	  etc.	  On	  the	  ontical	  level	  of	  discourse	  as	  set	  of	  representations	  and	  meaningful	  and	  meaning	  making	  practices,	  the	  role	  of	  these	  tropes	  can	  be	  invoked	  for	  the	  concrete	  analysis	  of	  the	  latter,	  while	  still	  being	  informed	  by	  the	  ontological	  dimension	  (Howarth	  and	  Griggs	  2008,	  199).	  This	  also	  means	  that	  my	  aim	  in	  this	  study	  is	  not	  to	  inextricably	  link	  Laclau	  and	  CDA/Reisigl,	  but	  to	  suggest	  a	  way	  that	  might	  help	  to	  flesh	  out	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  the	  Laclauian	  concepts,	  as	  I	  show	  with	  my	  analysis.	  	  
Structuring	  of	  the	  Analysis	  	  For	   these	   reasons,	   the	   findings	   of	   my	   discourse	   analysis	   of	   the	   Congressional	   Record	   are	  organized	   as	   follows:	   I	   am	   starting	   with	   an	   overview	   on	   the	   more	   general	   nominations	   and	  predications	  (4.),	  then	  laying	  out	  the	  central	  topics	  of	  the	  discourses	  on	  Japan	  and	  China	  through	  the	   argumentations	   (5.),	   followed	  by	   the	  perspectivations	   (6.)	   relating	   to	   the	   topics.	  Discerned	  from	  the	  material,	  the	  two	  major	  themes	  relating	  to	  the	  dislocation	  of	  U.S.	  identity	  through	  Japan	  and	   China	   are	   the	   trade	   deficit	   and	   the	   (possible)	   challenge	   to	   the	   global	   leadership	   and	   role	  model	   character	   of	   the	   U.S.	   according	   to	   American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	  history	   (see	   introduction	   to	   the	   analysis	   and	   the	   analysis	   itself).	   These	   topics,	   and	   the	   central	  nodal	  points	  connected	  to	  them	  (see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  analysis),	  and	  the	  positioning	  towards	  them	   account	   for	   the	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   and	   difference	   throughout	   the	   categories	   of	  argumentation	   and	   perspectivation,	   and	   finally,	   intensification	   and	   mitigation	   (7.).	   While	  intensification	  attempts	  at	  fostering	  the	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  through	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  empty	  signifier	  and	  the	  aim	  to	  establish	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  ‘the	  problem’,	  as	  well	  as	  offering	  a	  solution	  to	  it,	  mitigation	  aims	  at	  weakening	  or	  even	  dissolving	  the	  antagonisms	  through	  chains	  of	  difference.	   The	   dislocation,	   nodal	   points	   and	   empty	   signifiers	   are	   present	   in	   articulation	   and	  perspectivation	   as	   well,	   however	   they	   figure	   even	   more	   clearly	   through	   intensification	   and	  mitigation	  in	  the	  corresponding	  topics.	  How	   these	  analytic	   categories	  and	  PDT-­‐key	   terms	   translate	   into	  a	  discourse	  analysis	  of	  the	  cases	  in	  this	  study	  is	   laid	  out	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis	  and	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  chapters,	  while	  focusing	  on	  what	  this	  tells	  us	  about	  U.S.	  identity	  in	  the	  summaries	  of	  the	  chapters	  and	  subchapters.	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Collection	  and	  Organization	  of	  the	  Sources	  
	  My	   analysis	   is	   based	   on	   debates	   in	   the	  U.S.	   Congress	   on	   economic	   issues	   related	   to	   Japan	   and	  China	  from	  1985	  to	  2008.	  As	  I	  did	  not	  want	  to	  confine	  myself	  ‘only’	  to	  specific	  events,	  but	  instead	  capture	  a	  broader	  picture	  on	  topics	  and	  matters	  that	  were	  brought	  up	  in	  or	  related	  to	  the	  field	  of	  economic	  policies,	  I	  decided	  on	  a	  ‘middle	  way’.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  I	  did	  focus	  on	  specific	   years	  within	   the	   timeframe,	   during	  which	   significant	   events	   (understood	   in	   the	   sense	  explained	  earlier)	  concerning	  the	  economic	  field,	  Japan	  and	  China,	  but	  also	  global	  developments,	  happened.	   The	   selection	   in	   a	   first	   instance	   was	   thus	   based	   on	   a	   careful	   reading	   of	   secondary	  literature,	  with	  adjustments	  made	  in	  the	  course	  of	  reading	  the	  materials	  (see	  in	  what	  follows).	  To	  repeat	  from	  the	  introduction,	  the	  events246	  were:	  	  	   1985:	  Plaza	  Accords,	  first	  year	  since	  WWII	  that	  U.S.	  is	  a	  debtor	  country,	  	  1989:	  Structural	  Impediments	  Initiative	  (SII),	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  	  1994/1995:	   important	   trade	   summits	   with	   Japan,	   debates	   on	   China’s	   Most	   Favored	  Nation	  (MFN)	  status,	  	  1997:	  Asian	  financial	  crisis,	  	  2000/2001:	  China’s	  accession	  to	  the	  WTO,	  	  2005:	  China	  announces	  end	  of	  exclusive	  dollar	  peg	  of	  its	  currency,	  debates	  on	  acquisition	  of	  Californian	  oil	  company	  (Unocal)	  by	  Chinese	  company	  (CNOOC),	  2008:	  the	  ‘outbreak’	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  China	  becomes	  the	  U.S.’	  largest	  creditor	  	  While	  the	  1985,	  1989,	  1994/1995,	  2000/2001	  and	  2005	  incidents	  are	  more	  Japan/China	  specific	  (although	  with	  global	   implications),	   the	   end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War,	   the	  Asian	   financial	   crisis	   and	   the	  global	   financial	   crisis	   account	   for	   what	   are	   commonly	   denominated	   as	   globally	   significant	  (economic)	   developments	   with	   implications	   for	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   U.S.	   and	   the	  respective	  number	  two	  economy.	  	  To	  not	  confine	  my	  analysis	  ‘only’	  to	  these	  events,	  I	  looked	  at	  the	  respective	  years	  in	  their	  entirety.	  Also,	  I	  did	  not	  only	  search	  for	  explicit	  statements	  on	  or	  connected	  to	  these	  events,	  or	  for	  instance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  246	  While	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   a	   selection	   of	   these	   ‘events’	   (see	   what	   was	   laid	   out	   earlier	   on	   a	   poststructuralist	  understanding	  of	  this	  term)	  could	  be	  read	  as	  acknowledging	  or	  even	  ‘reifying’	  them	  as	  sedimented	  ‘historical	  events’,	  in	   this	  dissertation	   they	   function	  only	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  analytic	  and	  practical	  devices	   for	   setting	   the	   timeframe	  of	   the	  analysis.	  However,	   their	   contestedness	   becomes	   clear	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   Congressional	  Record,	   see	   also	   in	  what	  follows	  in	  this	  section.	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on	   Japan	  or	  China	  as	  a	   ‘threat’	  –	  which	  would	   lead	   to	   implicit	  articulations	  going	  unnoticed,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  finding	  only	  what	  one	  is	  looking	  for	  –	  as	  I	  wanted	  to	  capture	  a	  broader	  picture	  of	  how	  economic	  debates	  are	  intertwined	  with	  the	  articulation	  of	  U.S.	  identity	  towards	  Japan	  and	  China	  and	  the	  understandings/constructions	  of	  Japan	  and	  China	  as	  ‘excluded	  other’,	  or	  something	  else.	  For	   these	   reasons	   I	   also	  decided	  against	  only	   focusing	  on	  specific	   cases.	   Instead,	   I	   conducted	  a	  search	  of	  the	  Congressional	  Record247	  consisting	  of	  statements	  of	  the	  members	  of	  Congress	  –	  the	  Senate	  and	   the	  House	  of	  Representatives248	  –	   speaking	  on	   the	   floor	  of	   the	   two	  chambers	  on	  all	  occurrences	  (including	  the	  extensions	  of	  remarks).249	  The	  keywords	  for	  the	  search	  were	  “Japan	  economy”	  and	  “China	  economy”,	  and	  I	   included	  the	  results	  for	  the	  terms	  in	  the	  same	  order	  and	  near	  each	  other.	  	  Because	   of	   this	   proceeding,	   not	   all	   of	   the	   events	   that	   I	   used	   as	   initial	   guideline	   for	  collecting	   a	   text	   corpus	   did	   actually	   turn	   out	   to	   figure	   prominently	   in	   the	   debates	   themselves,	  while	  other	  incidents	  happening	  during	  the	  same	  year	  were	  at	  the	  forefront,	  as	  the	  analysis	  will	  show.	  For	   instance,	   in	  1989	  the	  debates	  on	   the	  FSX-­‐fighter	  plane	  played	  a	  very	  prominent	  role	  (see	   in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  overview),	  while	   in	  2005	  the	  announcement	  by	  China	  not	  to	  peg	  its	  currency	  exclusively	  to	  the	  dollar	  anymore,	  but	  to	  a	  basket	  of	  different	  currencies,	  did	  not	  come	  up	  explicitly	  in	  the	  documents	  retrieved.	  This	  did	  not	  really	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  analysis	  itself	  however,	  as	  once	  more	  my	  initial	  goal	  was	  not	  to	  study	  these	  events	  in	  particular,	  but	  to	  look	  at	  the	  broader	  evolving	  discourse	  of	  economic	  relations	  instead.	  	  	  	  The	  average	  turnout	  for	  the	  years	  1989,	  1994,	  1995	  and	  1997,	  was	  around	  60	  documents	  for	  each	  country	  and	  year.	  For	  2000,	  2001,	  2005	  and	  2008	  the	  documents	  on	  Japan	  decreased	  to	  around	  30	  per	  year,	  with	  an	  increase	  for	  China	  to	  around	  100.250	  In	  1985	  there	  were	  60	  results	  for	  Japan,	  while	  China	  was	  mentioned	  only	  a	  few	  times	  within	  these	  documents.251	  The	  length	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  247	  See	  http://thomas.loc.gov/home/cr_help.htm	  (last	  accessed	  January	  24,	  2015).	  	  248	  These	  two	  parts	  contain	  debates	  and	  statements	  made	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  each	  chamber,	  as	  well	  as	  records	  of	  various	  parliamentary	  actions	  and	  roll	  call	  votes.	  In	  addition,	  it	  contains	  communications	  from	  the	  president	  and	  the	  executive	  branch,	  memorials,	  petitions	  and	   information	  about	   legislation,	   including	  amendments.	  Committee	  activities	  are	  not	  reported	  here,	   though	  mention	   is	  made	  of	   reports	   received	  and	  meeting	  notices.	   Conference	   committee	   reports	   are	  typically	  printed	  in	  the	  record.	  Members	  are	  allowed	  to	  edit	  the	  transcript	  of	  their	  floor	  remarks	  before	  publication	  in	  the	  daily	  record	  or	  the	  permanent	  record.	  (see	  ibid.)	  249	  This	  section	  is	  now	  used	  only	  by	  representatives	  to	  include	  additional	  legislative	  statements	  not	  actually	  delivered	  on	  the	  House	  floor,	  as	  well	  as	  extraneous	  material,	  such	  as	  texts	  of	  speeches	  delivered	  outside	  Congress,	  letters	  from	  and	  tributes	  to	  constituents	  and	  newspaper	  or	  magazine	  articles.	  Similar	  extraneous	  material	  from	  senators	  is	  inserted	  in	  the	  Additional	  Statements	  section	  of	  the	  Senate	  part	  of	  the	  record.	  (see	  ibid.)	  250	  This	  concurs	  with	  Daniel	  Bob’s	  findings	  who	  concludes	  from	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  from	  1991-­‐2000	   	   that	   the	   104th	   Congress	   (1995-­‐96)	  was	   the	   turning	   point.	   Before	   it,	  more	   bills	   and	   references	  were	  made	   to	  Japan,	  after	  it	  to	  China	  (Bob	  2001,	  111f.).	  	  251	  As	  the	  record	  is	  publicly	  available	  online	  only	  from	  1989	  onwards,	  the	  sources	  for	  1985	  (scans	  of	  the	  bound	  record)	  were	  collected	  and	  downloaded	  through	   the	  database	  Proquest	  Congressional,	   that	   is	  accessible	   from	  the	  Library	  of	  Congress	  and	  certain	  university	  libraries	  in	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  U.S.	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the	  documents	  greatly	  differed	  from	  one	  to	  around	  80	  or	  more	  pages,	  depending	  on	  the	  occasion	  and	  nature	  of	  remarks.	  	  	  Through	   a	   first	   reading	   of	   the	   still	   relatively	   large	   amount	   of	   documents,	   I	   discerned	   the	   two	  main	  topics	  –	  the	  trade	  deficit	  and	  the	  leadership	  challenge	  –	  and	  this	  went	  along	  with	  selecting	  the	   documents	   for	   a	   more	   detailed	   rhetorical	   analysis.	   For	   this,	   I	   coded	   219	   exemplary	  documents	  (according	  to	  the	  initial	  key	  term	  results,	  137	  on	  Japan	  and	  82	  on	  China,	  while	  China	  was	   additionally	   often	   referenced	   in	   the	   documents	   on	   Japan)252	  using	   the	   coding	   software	  atlas.ti,	  with	  the	  analytic	  categories	  derived	  from	  RPA	  as	  codes.253	  The	  ordering	  of	  the	  documents	  according	  to	  the	  codes/analytic	  categories/PDT	  key	  concepts	   led	  to	  a	  further	  structuring	  of	  the	  analysis	  into	  the	  subtopics	  of	  the	  respective	  chapters	  (see	  contents	  and	  analysis).	  	  The	  organization	  along	  the	  topics	  and	  subtopics,	  analytic	  categories	  and	  PDT	  key	  terms	  means	   that	   the	   analysis	   is	   not	   strictly	   chronological,	   but	   topical	   and	   conceptual/categorical.	  However,	   if	   the	  year	   is	  not	  explicitly	  mentioned,	   the	  references	   to	   the	  documents	  allow	   for	   the	  reader	  to	  check	  in	  the	  bibliography	  at	  what	  occasion	  in	  which	  year	  the	  statement	  was	  made.	  The	  analytical	  reasons	  for	  splitting	  the	  articulations	  into	  the	  analytic	  categories	  and	  concepts	  and,	  in	  a	   first	   step,	   in	   a	   sense	   detaching	   them	   from	   their	   original	   ‘context’254	  and	   not	   treating	   them	  strictly	   chronologically,	   are	   that	   the	   analysis	   is	   not	   meant	   to	   recapitulate	   or	   narrate	   what	  ‘actually	   happened’.	   Instead,	   the	   focus	   lies	   on	   the	   discursive	   production	   and	   articulation	   of	  identities	   that	   does	   not	   occur	   in	   a	   linear	   way,	   i.e.	   starting	   from	   a	   clear	   ‘beginning’	   and	   then	  leading	  to	  a	  particular	  outcome.	  The	  articulation	  of	  identities	  happens	  through	  constant	  shifts	  in,	  and	  renegotiations	  of	  relations	  and	  meanings,	  that	  can	  thus	  be	  captured	  in	  a	  better	  way	  through	  looking	  at	   the	   topics	  or	  nodal	  points	   in	  relation	   to	  which	   the	  different	  modes	  and	  potentials	  of	  identifications	  are	  enabled	  or	  become	   feasible.	  In	   this	   sense,	  again	   the	   focus	   is	  on	  how	   the	   text	  argues,	   not	  why	   (and	  who	   says	   something)	   (Torfing	   2005,	   41;	   cf.	   introduction).	  As	   laid	   out	   in	  chapter	   two,	   discourses	   are	   not	   (only)	   understood	   as	   ensemble	   of	   utterances	   or	   statements	  produced	   or	   initiated	   by	   speakers,	   but	   as	   structures	   of	   meaning	   that	   are	   productive	   and	  constraining	  ‘on	  their	  own	  terms’,	  hence	  in	  turn	  affecting	  the	  speaker	  and	  his/her	  possibilities	  of	  articulation	  (cf.	  Diaz-­‐Bone	  and	  Schneider	  2010,	  464).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  The	  documents	  explicitly	  focusing	  on	  China	  retrieved	  through	  	  the	  Japan	  search	  are	  indicated	  in	  the	  bibliography	  of	  sources.	  	  253	  I	  used	  atlas.ti	  as	  an	  organizing	  tool	  to	  manage	  the	  amount	  of	  documents	  and	  codes,	  not	  as	  an	  analytic	  device.	  For	  literature	  on	  discourse	  analysis	  and	  coding	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  see	  for	  instance	  Diaz-­‐Bone	  and	  Schneider	  (2010),	  Glasze	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  254	  The	  nominations	  and	  predications	  will	  however	  reappear	  in	  their	  ‘context‘	  of	  argumentation	  and	  perspectivation	  in	  the	  respective	  chapters.	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While	  in	  the	  end	  I	  did	  conduct	  a	  supplementary	  word	  count	  to	  highlight	  and	  summarize	  the	  most	  frequently	  used	  expressions	  on	  Japan,	  China	  and	  the	  U.S.	  itself	  (see	  tables	  five	  to	  eight),	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  frequencies	  do	  not	  convey	  anything	  on	  their	  own,	  but	  always	  have	  to	  be	  read	  as	  a	  supplement	  and	   in	  relation	  to	   the	  overall	  discourse	  analysis.	   In	   this	  sense,	   they	  only	  reflect	  a	  certain	  trend	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  findings	  from	  reading	  and	  analyzing	  the	  complete	  material.	  I	  come	  back	  to	  these	  findings	  in	  chapters	  four	  to	  seven,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  tables	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  summary	  of	  the	  analysis.255	  	  All	  this	  having	  been	  said,	  these	  are	  also	  the	  reasons	  for	  taking	  Congress	  as	  ‘unitary	  actor’	  (while	  still	  accounting	  for	  the	  differential	  positions	  voiced,	  but	  not	  for	  the	  individual	  speakers	  or	  their	  party	   or	   committee	   affiliation),	   as	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   study	   is	   not	   on	   the	   (hidden/implicit)	  ‘purposes’	   of	   the	   speakers	   in	   a	   narrow	   behavioral	   or	   motivational	   sense,	   but	   instead	   on	   the	  structuration	   of	   the	   publicly	   and	   openly	   conducted	   discourses	   as	   meaning-­‐structures	   within	  which	  the	  speakers	  navigate,	  while	  being	  more	  or	  less	  aware	  or	  reflective	  on	  them.256	  As	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  introduction	  and	  in	  chapter	  one,	  the	  procedural	  and	  ‘motivational’	  aspect	  of	  Congressional	  policies	  in	  terms	  of	  voting	  behavior	  and	  party/interest	  group	  affiliation	  have	  been	  addressed	  by	  previous	  studies	  (see	  introduction	  and	  chapter	  one),	  whereas	  questions	  of	  identity	  and	  discourse	  in	  Congress	  have	  remained	  disregarded	  so	  far.	  	  Furthermore,	   my	   aim	   is	   not	   to	   ‘evaluate’	   whether	   Japan	   and	   China	   and	   their	   policies	   were	  ‘actually	  unfair’	  or	  not	  –	  but	  on	  	  how	  unfairness	  was	  articulated	  –	  which	  has	  remained	  a	  more	  or	  less	  controversial	  or	  unresolved	  issue	  also	  among	  scholars	  and	  experts	  (cf.	  i.e.	  Reifman	  1989,	  2).	  Balanced	  views	  (i.e.	  from	  the	  Congressional	  Research	  Service)	  point	  to	  what	  they	  classify	  as	  ‘real	  problems’	   but	   also	   to	   hyperbole	   and	  misperceptions	   in	   the	   political	   debates	   on	   both	   sides	   (cf.	  Nanto	  1992,	  Morrison	  2014).257	  The	  bottom	  line	  in	  both	  cases	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  Japan	  and	  China	  were	  or	  are	  seen	  as	  pursuing	  policies	  aimed	  at	  their	  advantage	  (such	  as	  restricting	  imports	  and	  pegging	  their	  currency),	  but	  the	  effects	  on	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  trade	  deficit	  are	  not	  as	   self-­‐evident	   as	   argued	   by	   those	   blaming	   only	   Japan	   and	   China	   for	   the	   deficit	   and	   its	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  While	  many	   scholars	   start	  with	   the	   frequencies	   to	  discern	   important	   expressions	   (see	   for	   instance	  Nabers	  2009,	  2015)	  in	  my	  view	  this	  may	  be	  an	  option,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  indispensable.	  Frequency	  may	  be	  an	  indicator	  for	  how	  ‘important’	  an	  expression	  is,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  so,	  as	  it	  always	  depends	  on	  the	  context	  and	  relations	  of	  the	  expression.	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  am	  treating	  the	  word	  count	  as	  ‘only’	  supplementary	  and	  as	  an	  (non-­‐necessary)	  addition	  to	  the	  analysis.	  256	  To	   repeat,	   this	   study	   does	   not	   conceive	   of	   the	   subject	   as	   pre-­‐given,	   fully	   constituted	   and	   self-­‐conscious	   rational	  actor,	  see	  chapter	  two.	  257	  For	  instance	  Nanto’s	  CRS	  report	  characterizes	  Congressional	  policymaking	  with	  respect	  to	  trade	  towards	  Japan	  as	  “driven	  by	  strong	  domestic	  interests,	  appeals	  to	  broad	  political	  principles,	  and	  numerous	  horror	  stories”	  (Nanto	  1992,	  1,	  emphasis	  added).	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consequences	   (cf.	   i.e.	   Bown	  and	  McCulloch	  2009).258	  The	   imbalances	   are	   also	  due	   to	   structural	  differences	  in	  the	  economies,	  for	  instance	  between	  saving,	  spending	  and	  investment	  rates,	  i.e.	  the	  continuous	  U.S.	  dependency	  on	  foreign	  investment	  to	  finance	  its	  budget	  deficit	  (Keidel	  2011;	  for	  a	  general	  assessment	  of	  these	  factors	  see	  for	  instance	  Moran	  2015;	  cf.	  Reifman	  1989,	  4f.).	  	  	  Finally,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  question	  of	  ‘the	  context’,	  i.e.	  the	  timeframe	  and	  the	  events,	  I	  do	  not	  extensively	   recapitulate	  what	  has	  been	  written	   in	   the	  vast	   ‘topical’	   literature	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  and	  U.S.-­‐China	  economic	   relations,	   in	  order	   to	  provide	  a	   ‘historical	   context’	   for	   the	  analysis.	   In	   line	  with	   PDT	   there	   is	   no	   extra-­‐discursive,	   pre-­‐given	   ‘context’	   external	   or	   apart	   from	   discourse.259	  Hence,	  the	  aim	  of	  my	  approach	  is	  to	  start	  from	  the	  actual	  material,	  the	  articulations	  in	  Congress	  and	  the	  ‘context’/references	  they	  generate	  themselves,	  while	  giving	  ‘background	  information’	  for	  the	  reader	  on	  the	  issues	  brought	  up	  in	  the	  debates	  not	  in	  a	  separate	  chapter,	  but	  in	  connection	  to	  the	   analysis	   itself.	   	   However,	   I	   did	   lay	   out	   the	   most	   significant	   events	   and	   policies	   in	   the	  introduction	  and	  in	  chapter	  one.	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis	  I	  am	  providing	  a	   brief	   overview	   of	   the	   major	   events	   and	   issues	   during	   the	   timeframe	   studied	   (based	   on	  secondary	  literature	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  itself),	  while	  addressing	  them	  again	  in	  further	  detail	  through	  the	  actual	  analysis.	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  “[I]t’s	  not	  the	  resemblances	  but	  the	  differences,	  which	  resemble	  each	  other”.	  Claude	  Lévi-­‐Strauss,	  Totemism,	  1969,	  p.	  149,	  quoted	  in	  Howarth	  (2000,	  25).	  	  As	   laid	  out	   in	  the	   introduction,	   the	  main	  question	  of	   this	  project	   is	   to	   find	  out	  how	  U.S.	   ‘liberal’	  identity	  as	  globally	  leading	  economic	  and	  political	  role	  model	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  what	  are	  taken	   to	   be	   possible	   contestants,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Japan	   since	   the	   1980s	   and	   China	   since	   the	  1990s.	  Within	   this	   dissertation	   I	   focus	   on	   the	   discourse	   in	   the	   economic	   realm,	  which	   centers	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  For	  a	  recent	  assessment	  on	  past	  and	  present	  ‘currency	  manipulation’	  see	  for	  instance	  Jeffrey	  Frankel’s	  commentary	  (Frankel	  2015).	  	  259	  In	  this	  respect	  it	  should	  also	  be	  noted,	  that	  against	  another	  common	  allegation,	  discourse	  analysis	  does	  not	  amount	  to	   ‘mere	   description’,	   as	   it	   does	   not	   presuppose	   that	   the	   discursive	   practices	   analyzed	   are	   ‘neutral’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  merely	   reflecting	   “pre-­‐discursive	   experiences	   or	   objective	   interests”	   (Norval	   1996,	   3f.).	   A	   discourse	   analysis	   as	  understood	  in	  this	  dissertation	  is	  aimed	  at	  revealing	  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  ‘naturalizations’	  occurred	  or	  are	  aimed	  at,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  concealing	  the	  socially	  constructed	  and	  contingent	  nature	  of	  ‘reality’	  and	  institutionalizing	  a	  certain	  ‘view’	  as	  hegemonic	  (cf.	  ibid.).	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mainly	  on	  trade	  policy,	  and	  take	  the	  debates	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  elite	  public	  discourse	   for	   inquiring	   into	   how	   U.S.	   identity	   is	   articulated	   towards	   Japan	   and	   China	   when	  debating	   economic	   issues	   (for	   the	   significance	   of	   Congress	   in	   the	   field	   of	   trade	   policy,	   see	  introduction).	   I	   assume	   American	   exceptionalism	   as	   well	   as	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   (see	  chapter	  1.3)	   to	  play	   a	   significant	   role	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  U.S.’	   self-­‐understanding	  or	   ‘subject	  positioning’	  (see	  chapter	  two)	  as	  global	  economic	  and	  political	  role	  model,	  how	  the	  U.S.	  relates	  to	  Japan	  and	  China,	  and	  how	  it	  conceives	  of	  them.	  	  
TOPICS,	  STRUCTURE	  AND	  ‘CONTEXT’	  	  	  Once	  more,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  I	  do	  not	  anticipate	  the	  ‘cases’	  of	  Japan	  and	  China	  to	  be	  similar	  (see	  introduction).	  The	  two	  most	  important	  differences	  broadly	  put	  lie	  in	  the	  overall	  character	  of	   the	  bilateral	   relationship	  with	   the	  U.S.	  outside	   the	  economic	   field:	   (1)	   the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan	  were	   close	   allies,	   and,	   also	  due	   to	   its	  post-­‐war	   constitution,	   Japan	  was	  generally	   seen	  as	  posing	  no	  military	  or	   security	   threat	   to	   the	  U.S.;260	  (2)	   Japan	  was	  considered	  a	   ‘member’	  of	   the	  ‘Western’	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  having	  (been)	  transformed	  to	  a	  liberal	  democratic	  capitalist	  system,	  and	  being	  an	  established	  industrialized	  nation,	  after	  WWII.	  Although	  –	  contrary	  to	  Japan	  –	  China	  had	  been	  an	  U.S.-­‐ally	  during	  WWII,	  after	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  Peoples	  Republic	  of	  China	  (PRC)	  in	  1949	  it	  became	  a	  Cold	  War	  adversary	  that	  remained	  ‘ideologically	  suspicious’	  (see	  introduction	  and	  chapter	  one)	  also	  after	  the	  rapprochement	  since	  the	  1970ies.	  This	  evidently	  also	  holds	  true	  and	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  for	  the	  military	  and	  security	  realm,	  but	  also	  has	  repercussions	  on	  the	  economic	  field.	  Due	  to	  China’s	  size,	  weight,	  and	  role	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region,	  the	  “China	  problem”	  is	   commonly	   articulated	   as	   encompassing	   economic	   and	   security/military	   dimensions	   (cf.	   N.	  Morris	  2010,	  141;	  Uriu	  2009,	  244).261	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  However,	  because	  of	   the	  economic	   frictions	  and	   Japan’s	  economic	  rise	   this	  possibility	  was	  debated	  at	   the	   time	   in	  political	   as	   well	   as	   in	   academic	   circles,	   see	   for	   instance	   Berger	   (1993),	   Packard	   (1987).	   The	   most	   prominent	   and	  extreme	  articulation	  of	   this	  scenario	  was	  probably	  George	  Friedman	  and	  Meredith	  Le	  Bard’s	  book	  “The	  coming	  War	  with	   Japan”	   published	   in	   1991	   (cf.	   N.	   Morris	   2010,	   28).	   On	   parallels	   with	   later	   literature	   on	   China,	   like	   Ted	   Galen	  Carpenter’s	  	  “America’s	  Coming	  War	  with	  China”,	  see	  also	  Morris	  (2010,	  141).	  	  As	  the	  development	  of	  its	  military	  power	  did	  not	  take	  place	  	  as	  ‘predicted’	  first	  and	  foremost	  by	  realist	  IR	  theory,	  Japan	  was	  either	  attributed	  with	  being	  an	   ‘abnormal	   state’,	  or	   for	   instance	  a	   ‘trading	  state’,	   ‘civilian	  power’,	   a	   ‘reactive’	  or	  ‘defensive’	  state	  (see	  Gustafsson	  and	  Hagström	  2015,	  3).	  	  Huntington	   for	   instance	  argued	  at	   the	   time	   that	   Japan	  had	   “accepted	  all	   the	   assumptions	  of	   realism	   [maximation	  of	  power	  to	  insure	  security	  in	  an	  anarchic	  world,	  first	  and	  foremost	  through	  military	  power,	  see	  ibid.	  in	  Huntington]	  but	  applied	   them	  purely	   in	   the	  economic	  realm”	   (Huntington	  1993,	  72).	   	  For	  an	  overview	  on	  criticisms	  on	  Huntington’s	  take	   on	   Japan	   as	   a	   ‘threat’,	   see	   Kataoka	   (1995),	   who	   also	   ‘credits’	   Huntington	   for	   having	   linked	   the	   trade	   related	  revisionist	  discourse	  to	  geopolitics	  (ibid.,	  1).	  261	  On	  differences	  between	  ‘Japan	  bashing’	  and	  ‘China	  bashing’	  see	  also	  N.	  Morris	  (2010,	  141).	  While	  she	  maintains	  that	  so	  far	  the	  ‘bashing’	  was	  far	  more	  intense	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan,	  Morris	  also	  points	  out	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  criticism	  of	  
119	  
	  
These	  two	  main	  differences	  do	  also	  figure	  in	  the	  discourses	  on	  economic	  issues,	  where	  they	  are	  met	   by	   the	   two	  major	   similarities	   (cf.	   for	   example	   also	  Uriu	   2009,	   243f.;	   Bown	   and	  McCulloch	  2009,	  670ff.)	  between	  Japan	  and	  China	   in	   their	  relationship	  to	   the	  U.S.:	   (1)	   the	   largest	  bilateral	  trade	  deficit	  with	  the	  U.S.,262	  resulting	  in	  becoming	  the	  major	  (worldwide)	  creditor,	  bringing	  with	  it	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘mutual	  dependence’	  in	  both	  cases;263	  (2)	  an	  ensuing	  debate	  on	  whether	  Japan’s	  and	  China’s	   economic	   performance	   and	   the	   implications	   for	   the	   economic,	   but	   also	   political	  relationship	  with	  the	  U.S.	  poses	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  U.S.	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  global	  leadership	  and	  role	  model	  character	  for	  economic	  and	  political	  development.264	  	  	  Based	   on	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   economic	   debates	   in	   Congress	   I	   argue	   that	   these	   two	   issues,	   the	  unbalanced	   trade	  relationship	  and	   the	  ensuing	   leadership	  question,	   challenge	  or	  dislocate	  U.S.-­‐identity	   (especially	   in	   terms	   of	   American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history)	   as	  global	   economic,	   but	   also	  political	   role	  model.	   This	   in	   turn	   affects	   the	  way	   Japan’s	   and	  China’s	  identities	  and	  their	  relations	  to	  the	  U.S.	  are	  articulated	  in	  these	  debates.	  	  The	   analysis	   itself	   starts	   out	   along	   these	   two	   major	   topics	   –	   the	   trade	   deficit	   and	   the	  question	   on	   the	   U.S.’	   global	   role	   –	   preceded	   by	   an	   overview	   through	   introducing	   the	   most	  important	  general	  nominations	  and	  predications	  (chapter	   four),	  while	   these	  and	  also	   the	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  overdrawing	   parallels	   between	   Japan-­‐	   and	   China	   bashing,	  what	   she	   calls	   “recovering	   Japan	   bashers”,	   such	   as	   Clyde	  Prestowitz	  and	  Chalmers	  Johnson,	  were	  not	  unengaged	  in	  deliberating	  on	  a	  ‘China	  threat’.	  	  Furthermore,	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  differences	   in	   the	  economic	   realm,	  Bown	  and	  McCulloch	  point	  out	   that	   Japan	   in	   the	  1980s	  was	  already	  an	  established	  industrialized	  nation,	  while	  China	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  per	  capita	  income	  –	  is	  still	  a	   ‘poor’	  country	  (Bown	  and	  McCulloch	  2009,	  671).	  	  262	  As	   for	   instance	  pointed	  out	  by	  Bown	  and	  McCulloch,	   “to	  many,	   the	  [trade]	   imbalances	   themselves	  are	  convincing	  evidence	  of	  unfair	  trading	  practices”	  (Bown	  and	  McCulloch	  2009,	  670).	  	  263	  For	  the	  case	  of	  Japan	  Robert	  Gilpin	  at	  the	  time	  maintained	  that	  “by	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  the	  world	  monetary	  and	  financial	  system	  based	  on	  the	  dollar	  had	  become	  largely	  underwritten	  by	  Japanese	  capital.	  The	  greatly	  overvalued	  dollar	  would	  have	  declined	  and	  perhaps	  collapsed	  in	  value	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration’s	  economic	  policies	  had	  it	  not	  been	  for	  this	  Japanese	  financial	  backing”	  (Gilpin	  1987,	  332).	  George	  Packard	  points	  to	  the	  mutual	  dependency	  of	  Japan	   on	   the	   American	  market	   for	   its	   exports,	   while	   it	   was	   financing	   the	   growing	   U.S.	   budget	   deficit	   and	   basically	  sustaining	  an	  economic	  recovery	  through	  keeping	  U.S.	  interest	  rates	  low	  by	  its	  investment	  in	  U.S.	  Treasury	  bonds	  and	  corporate	  securities,	  which	  is	  why	  Japan	  needed	  a	  healthy	  U.S.	  economy	  as	  much	  as	  Americans	  did	  (cf.	  Packard	  1987,	  4).	   Gilpin	   saw	   the	   dependence	   upon	   foreign	   investment	   as	   a	   “vicious	   circle”	   (Gilpin	   1987,	   337).	   	   In	   1988	   Zbigniew	  Brzezinski	  (formerly	  President	  Carter’s	  security	  adviser)	  was	   invoking	  “Amerippon”	  to	  “provide	  new	  leadership	  and	  stability	   to	   the	   global	   economic	   system”	   (cited	   in	   Kataoka	   1995,	   10-­‐11),	   which	   bears	   resemblance	   to	   “Chimerica”	  coined	  by	  Niall	  Ferguson	  and	  Moritz	  Schularick	  (2011).	  On	  China	  having	  replaced	  Japan,	  while	  not	  (yet)	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  see	  i.e.	  Layne	  (2007,	  154).	  On	  the	  ‘dependence’	  of	  the	  U.S.	  on	  China	  as	  an	  export	  market	  and	  China	  as	  a	  financer	  of	  the	  budget	  deficits	  through	  its	  large	  holdings	  of	  U.S.	  Treasury	  securities	  see	  Morrison	  (Morrison	  2014,	  Summary).	  	  All	   this	  having	  been	  said,	   there	  were	  also	  significant	  differences	   in	   the	  bilateral	  economic	  relationships,	   see	   in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  overviews	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  analysis	  (cf.	  also	  i.e.	  Bown	  and	  McCulloch	  2009).	  	  264	  Regarding	  the	  trade	  deficit,	  China	  replaced	  Japan	  as	  the	  largest	  deficit-­‐trading	  partner	  in	  the	  year	  2000,	  while	  the	  U.S.	  had	  been	  running	  a	  deficit	  with	  Japan	  since	  1982	  (cf.	  Xie	  2009,	  61,	  125).	  It	  became	  a	  net	  debtor	  nation	  with	  Japan	  as	  its	  biggest	  creditor	  in	  1985	  (cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  24),	  with	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan	  being	  also	  the	  largest	  worldwide	  debtor	  and	  creditor	  respectively	  (see	  also	  Figure	  5).	  Japan	  had	  become	  the	  second	  largest	  market	  economy	  by	  the	  1970s	  (cf.	  Kunkel	   2003,	   37).	   China	   overtook	   Japan	   as	   largest	   creditor	   to	   the	   U.S.	   in	   2008	   (cf.	   Faiola	   and	   Goldfarb	   2008).	  Furthermore,	   China	   also	   surpassed	   Japan	   as	   the	  world’s	   second	   largest	  manufacturer	   in	  2006,	   and	   the	  U.S.	   in	   2010	  (Morrison	  2014,	  8).	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categories	  derived	  from	  RPA	  are	  always	  read	  through	  and	  linked	  back	  to	  the	  key	  concepts	  in	  PDT.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  nominations	  and	  predications,	  these	  are	  the	  initial	  articulations	  of	  self	  and	  other.	  Following	   in	  chapter	   five	  are	  the	  main	   lines	  of	  argumentation	   for	   the	  topics	  of	   the	  trade	  deficit	  and	  the	  potential	  global	  challenge	  relating	  to	  Japan	  and	  China.	  The	  category	  of	  perspectivation	  in	  chapter	  six	   is	   treated	   for	  both	   topics	   together,	  as	  when	   looking	  at	   the	  perspective	   the	  U.S.	   sees	  itself	  in	  relation	  to	  Japan	  and	  China,	  the	  trade	  deficit	  and	  resulting	  debt	  are	  articulated	  as	  ‘cause’	  of,	   or	   reason	   for	   the	   ensuing	   leadership	   question.	   For	   the	   same	   reason,	   intensification	   and	  mitigation	  are	  also	  treated	  together	  for	  both	  topics.	  Argumentation	  and	  perspectivation	  account	  for	   the	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   and	   difference,	   and	   the	   articulation	   and	   attempts	   at	   filling	   the	  empty	  signifier,	  while	  intensification	  and	  mitigation	  sustain	  or	  weaken	  these	  dynamics.	  I	  briefly	  restate	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  analytic	  categories	  as	  well	  as	  their	  link	  to	  PDT	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  chapter.	  	  	  Finally,	  when	  I	  refer	  to	  ‘the	  U.S.’	  in	  this	  analysis,	  it	  denotes	  the	  expressions	  or	  (self-­‐)	  attributions	  of	   the	  speakers.	   In	   the	  project	  at	   large	   ‘the	  U.S.’	   stands	   for	  Congress	   that	   is	  one	  example	   in	   the	  field	   of	   public	   elite	   discourse	   in	   this	   study.	   Therefore,	   even	   though	   I	   use	   the	   term	   ‘the	   U.S.’,	  regarding	  a	  broader	  perspective	  I	  do	  not	  take	  Congress	  alone	  and	  the	  articulations	  voiced	  there	  to	  be	   entirely	   representative	   for	   ‘the	  U.S.’	   as	   a	  whole,	   but	   conceive	  of	   them	  as	  part	   of	   a	  bigger	  picture,	  that	  however	  lies	  outside	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  
OVERVIEW	  ON	  THE	  U.S.-­‐CONGRESS	  AND	  JAPAN	  
	  The	  major	   issues	   concerning	   Japan	   and	   economic	  policies	  during	   the	   time	   frame	  analyzed	   and	  referred	   to	   in	   the	   debates	   are	   related	   to	   the	   solving	   of	   questions	   on	   how	   to	   deal	   with	   the	  increasing	  Japanese	  imports	   into	  the	  U.S.,	  while	  encountering	  barriers	  for	  U.S.	  exports	  to	  Japan.	  In	   the	   debates	   these	   matters	   of	   market-­‐,	   and	   increasingly	   and	   importantly	   also	   industrial	  competition,	  became	  connected	  to	  the	  prevalent	  trade	  balance	  issue	  (see	  Figures	  1.	  and	  2.)	  as	  a	  ‘lightning	   rod’	   (cf.	   Nanto	   1992),	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	   question	   of	   Japanese	   investment	   in	   the	   U.S.	  (Hodges	  1989;	  Kunkel	  2003,	  32,	  37;	  cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  24).	  	  	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1980s	  the	  prevailing	  topic	  and	  cause	  for	  economic	  frictions	  lay	  in	  the	  high	  numbers	  of	   Japanese	  auto-­‐exports	   into	  the	  U.S.	  After	  many	  rounds	  of	  negotiations,	   the	  parties	  came	  to	  an	  agreement	  on	  so-­‐called	  Voluntary	  Export	  Restrictions	  (VERs)	  by	  the	  Japanese	  side	  in	  1981,	  for	  initially	  three	  years	  with	  following	  extensions	  (and	  slight	  raises	  in	  the	  cap),	  until	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they	  were	  finally	  terminated	  in	  1994.265	  These	  extensions	  were	  frequently	  debated	  in	  Congress.	  Furthermore,	   there	   were	   several	   initiatives	   intended	   to	   ‘open’	   the	   allegedly	   closed	   Japanese	  market	  for	  diverse	  goods	  ranging	  from	  satellites	  to	  beef,	  and	  culminating	  in	  the	  so	  called	  Market-­‐Oriented-­‐Sector-­‐Specific	   (MOSS)	   talks	   in	   1985	   and	   1986,	   however	   not	   leading	   to	   a	   significant	  outcome	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  improvement	  from	  the	  U.S.	  perspective	  (cf.	  Mastanduno	  1992,	  240).266	  In	  1985	   the	   so-­‐called	   Plaza	   Accords	  were	   negotiated	  within	   the	   G7-­‐framework	   by	   the	   five	  major	  industrial	  countries	  (the	  United	  States,	  Japan,	  West-­‐Germany,	  France,	  and	  Britain).267	  Their	  main	  goal	  was	  to	  drive	  down	  the	  value	  of	  the	  U.S.	  dollar	  (cf.	  Hummel	  2000,	  145;	  Kunkel	  2003,	  53),	  as	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	  factors	  contributing	  to	  imbalances	  in	  trade	  and	  investment.268	  Japan	  was	  also	  accused	  of	  manipulating	  its	  currency	  (P16:45;	  P79:4;	  P141:3)	  (cf.	  also	  i.e.	  Kennedy	  1988,	  459),	   although	   this	   argument	   was	   less	   frequently	   voiced	   than	   later	   with	   China.	   While	   the	  depreciated	  dollar	  did	  result	  in	  a	  rise	  of	  U.S.	  exports	  and	  a	  lowering	  of	  the	  bilateral	  trade	  deficit	  by	  1990,	  the	  effect	  seemed	  to	  fade	  again	  from	  1991	  onwards	  (cf.	  Nanto	  1992,	  3ff.,	  11).	  	  In	  1986	  an	  agreement	  was	  reached	  on	  trade	  with	  semiconductors,	  yet	  bringing	  about	  U.S.	  sanctions	   –	   the	   first	   trade	   sanctions	   against	   Japan	   since	  WWII	   (cf.	   Packard	   1987,	   3)	   –	   in	   the	  following	  year	  (cf.	  Hummel	  2000,	  139ff.).	  	  In	  1989	  the	  so-­‐called	  FSX	  fighter	  plane	  agreement	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	   major	   controversy	   (cf.	   i.e.	   Spar	   1992).	   The	   U.S.	   had	   initially	   agreed	   to	   the	   transfer	   of	   F-­‐16	  aircraft	  technology	  to	  Japan	  to	  function	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  new	  Japanese	  aircraft.	  However,	  the	  initial	  agreement	  was	  domestically	  contested,	  and	  the	  central	  issue	  became	  not	  only	  whether	  Japan	  –	  an	  ally	  of	   the	  U.S.	  –	  could	  actually	  be	  trusted	  with	  that	   technology	  (cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  57).	  On	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  265	  This	  agreement	  prompted	  the	  biggest	  car	  producers	  on	  the	  Japanese	  side	  to	  set	  up	  manufactories	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  which	  did	  not	  reduce,	  but	  partly	  added	  to	  the	  frictions	  over	  the	  coming	  years	  (cf.	  Hodges	  1989;	  J.	  K.	  Jackson	  1990,	  4f.).	  See	  also	  Nanto	   (1992,	  8),	  who	  points	  out	   that	   competition	   in	  automobiles	  and	  auto	  parts	  actually	  became	  more	   intense	  after	   the	   VERs.	   The	   report	   also	   emphasizes	   that	   this	   kind	   of	   protection	   of	   home	   industries	   turned	   out	   to	   be	  more	  expensive	   than	  expected	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  cost	   to	  consumers	   for	  each	   job	  saved	  (ibid.).	   See	  also	  Bown	  and	  McCulloch	  (2009,	  671),	  also	  for	  VERs	  in	  other	  sectors	  (ibid.,	  674).	  	  266	  The	  talks	  centered	  on	  the	  sectors	   in	  which	  U.S.	  exporters	  had	  very	   low	  market	  share	   in	   Japan	  compared	  to	  other	  world	   markets,	   such	   as	   medical	   equipment,	   forestry	   products,	   telecommunications	   equipment	   and	   auto	   parts	   (cf.	  Nanto	  1992,	  12).	  267	  The	  other	  two	  G7	  members	  are	  Canada	  and	  Italy.	  	  268	  Hummel	   importantly	   points	   out	   that	   the	   high	   dollar	   was	   in	   part	   a	   result	   of	   policies	   initiated	   by	   the	   Reagan	  administration	   in	   the	   early	   1980s,	   with	   high	   interest	   rates	   as	   measure	   for	   attracting	   foreign	   investors	   to	   buy	   U.S.	  government	  bonds	  to	  lower	  the	  fiscal	  deficit.	  The	  latter	  in	  turn	  was	  even	  further	  increasing	  in	  consequence	  to	  tax	  cuts	  and	  rising	  military	  expenditures.	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  dollar	  following	  from	  increased	  investment	  had	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	   international	   competitiveness	   of	   U.S.	   producers	   and	   exporters	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   European	   and	   Japanese	   competition,	  leading	  to	  job	  losses	  in	  U.S.	  industries	  (Hummel	  2000,	  139).	  A	  report	  by	  the	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  (CRS)	  on	  Japanese	  investment	  in	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  1980s	  points	  out	  that	  the	  surge	  in	  Japanese	  portfolio	  investments	  (i.e.	  Treasury	  securities,	   corporate	  stocks	  and	  bonds)	   resulted	   from	  these	  high	   interest	   rates	  and	  a	   fall	  of	  domestic	   savings	  below	  domestic	   investment	   requirements,	   that	   was	   filled	   in	   by	   foreign	   capital	   inflows.	   In	   this	   sense	   Japanese	   investment	  reflected	   the	   favorable	   investment	   climate	   in	   the	   U.S.,	   while	   –	   according	   to	   the	   report	   –	   the	   full	   impact	   of	   foreign	  investment	  on	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  was	  not	  entirely	  understood	  (at	  the	  time).	  The	  report	  calls	  this	  a	  shortcoming	  “which	  seems	  to	  fuel	  the	  national	  debate	  over	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  investment”(J.	  K.	  Jackson	  1990,	  22ff.).	  See	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  analysis.	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one	  hand	  these	  issues	  were	  tied	  to	  ‘the	  Toshiba	  scandal’	  (see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  analysis),	  but	  also	  to	  the	  fear	  that	  Japan’s	  aircraft	  industry	  might	  want	  to	  outcompete	  the	  U.S.	  (cf.	  Packard	  1987,	  5f.).	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   the	   debate	   also	   ensued	   around	   the	   question	   –	   given	   the	   already	   huge	  trade	  deficit	   (see	   figure	  one),	  which	  had	   in	   total	   risen	   from	  around	  $16	  billion	   in	  1981	   to	   $49	  billion	  in	  1989,	  after	  peaking	  at	  $57	  billion	  in	  1987	  (Nanto	  1992,	  4)	  –	  whether	  the	  deal	  could	  not	  have	  been	  concluded	  in	  a	  more	  profitable	  way	  for	  the	  U.S.	  In	  this	  respect	  it	  was	  debated,	  whether	  the	   agreement	   would	   not	   have	   presented	   an	   opportunity	   for	   Japan	   to	   show	   ‘good	   will’	   as	   a	  trading	  partner	  and	  as	  an	  ally	  (cf.	  Spar	  1992,	  282).	  Finally,	  the	  agreement	  was	  revised	  enabling	  for	   the	   protection	   of	   certain	   U.S.	   technologies	   and	   a	   higher	   share	   for	   U.S.	   companies	   in	   the	  production	  of	  the	  plane.	  	  Also	  in	  1989	  the	  so	  called	  Structural	  Impediments	  Initiative	  (SII)	  attempted	  to	  deal	  with	  what	  had	  by	  then	  become	  the	  highly	  contentious	  issue	  of	  Japanese	  structural	  trade	  barriers	  (i.e.	  in	  the	  six	  areas	  of	  savings	  and	  investment,	  land	  use,	  pricing	  mechanisms,	  the	  distribution	  system,	  keiretsu/inter-­‐firm	   relationships, 269 and	   exclusionary	   business	   practices),	   leading	   to	   two	  agreements	  and	   the	  removal	  of	   Japan	   from	  the	   list	  of	   ‘unfair	   trading	  partners’	  according	   to	   the	  Super	  301	  legislation	  (see	  following	  footnote)	  of	  the	  year	  1988	  (cf.	  Mastanduno	  1992;	  Schoppa	  1997,	  74),	  under	  which	  it	  had	  been	  cited	  earlier	  that	  year.270	  The	  launch	  of	  the	  SII	  initiative,	  only	  shortly	  after	  citing	  Japan	  under	  Super	  301,	  was	  commonly	  regarded	  as	  ‘compromise’,	  or	  rather	  as	  standing	  for	  the	  “institutional	  battle	  between	  Congress	  and	  the	  executive	  and	  [for]	  the	  ideological	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  269	  Meaning	   that	   within	   certain	   industrial	   groups	   firms	   fostered	   their	   business	   relationships	   by	   holding	   blocks	   of	  shares	  of	  the	  other	  firms	  within	  the	  group	  (J.	  K.	  Jackson	  1990,	  28).	  270	  According	   to	   Section	   301	   of	   the	  Trade	  Act	   of	   1974,	   or	   Super	   301	   like	   it	  was	   legislated	   in	   1988,	   the	   president	   is	  authorized	   to	   “take	   all	   appropriate	   and	   feasible”	   action	   in	   response	   to	   any	   foreign	   practice	   that	   is	   “unjustifiable,	  unreasonable,	   or	   discriminatory	   and	   burdens	   or	   restricts	  United	   States	   commerce”.	   The	   Super	   301	   called	   upon	   the	  president,	   or	   –	   if	   in	   response	   to	   a	   petition	   –	   the	   Trade	   Representative,	   to	   retaliate	   if	   negotiations	   to	   abolish	   the	  restrictions	   identified,	   failed	  (J.	  Goldstein	  1993,	  194f.).	   It	  had	  been	  proposed	  already	  in	  1986,	  and	  while	  at	  that	  time	  not	  being	  directly	  targeted	  at	   Japan,	  the	  trade	  issues	  with	  Japan	  were	  the	  major	  motivation	  for	  those	  supporting	  the	  bill,	   and	   it	   had	   likely	   been	   drafted	   “with	   Japan	   in	   mind”	   (Mastanduno	   1992,	   242).	   In	   1989,	   under	   the	   Bush	  administration,	  Japan	  was	  cited	  under	  the	  Super	  301	  as	  ‘unfair	  trading	  nation’,	  along	  with	  Brazil	  and	  India	  (N.	  Morris	  2010,	  56),	  which	  was	  a	  kind	  of	  compromise	  to	  satisfy	  those	  demanding	  ‘retaliation’	  and	  those	  opposing	  Super	  301	  for	  its	  potential	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  ongoing	  Uruguay	  Round	  of	  	  the	  GATT	  talks	  (Schoppa	  1997,	  71–75).	  	  Already	   earlier,	   for	   instance	   in	   1985,	   Section	   301	   was	   initiated	   by	   President	   Reagan	   as	   reaction	   to	   congressional	  pressure	  against	  Japan,	  Brazil,	  South	  Korea	  and	  the	  European	  Community	  (EC).	  According	  to	  Kunkel,	  these	  initiatives	  “averted	  what	  might	  otherwise	  have	  become	  a	  wholesale	   congressional	   revolt	   against	   executive	  branch	  primacy	  on	  trade	  policy”,	  and	  he	  calls	  them	  an	  important	  turning	  point	  “ushering	  in	  a	  new	  policy	  environment	  more	  favorable	  to	  critics	  of	  Japan’s	  trade	  policies”	  (see	  also	  Hummel	  2000,	  139ff.;	  Kunkel	  2003,	  53).	  Another	   legislative	  provision	  passed	  with	   the	  Omnibus	  Trade	  and	  Competitiveness	  Act	  of	  1988	   ‘with	   Japan	   in	  mind’	  was	   the	   so-­‐called	   Exon-­‐Florio	   provision.	   It	   granted	   the	   President	   the	   authority	   to	   suspend	   or	   prohibit	   foreign	  acquisitions,	  mergers	  or	  takeovers	  of	  U.S.	  businesses,	  which	  threaten	  to	  impair	  the	  national	  security.	  Behind	  this	  was	  the	  proposed	  acquisition	  of	  the	  Fairchild	  Semiconductor	  Corporation	  from	  a	  French	  company	  by	  Fujitsu.	  (J.	  K.	  Jackson	  1990,	  27).	  See	  also	  Bown	  and	  McCulloch	  (2009,	  671).	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battle	   between	   traditional	   liberal	   economic	   and	   Cold	   War	   principles	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	  emerging	  “revisionist”	  views	  on	  the	  other”	  (Schoppa	  1997,	  75).271	  	  	  Finally,	   under	   the	   Clinton	   presidency	   the	   so-­‐called	   Framework	   (for	   a	   New	   Economic	  Partnership)	   Talks	   were	   initiated	   in	   1993.	   They	   evolved	   into	   the	   (in)famous	   disputes	   on	  ‘objective	   criteria’	   or	   ‘numerical	   targets’,	   that	   had	   been	   a	   reason	   for	   U.S.	   sanctions	   on	  semiconductors	  already	  in	  1986.	  Whereas	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  agree	  on	  concrete	  numbers	  for	  the	  market	   share	   of	   foreign	   companies	   in	   the	   respective	   sectors	   in	   Japan,	   this	   was	   vehemently	  opposed	   by	   Japan.272	  The	   negotiations	   failed	   in	   1994,	   and	   in	   the	   same	   year	   the	   U.S.	   imposed	  sanctions	  on	  Japanese	  mobile	  phones	  for	  the	  alleged	  violation	  of	  an	  earlier	  agreement,	  and	  also	  reinstated	  the	  Super	  301	  regimentation	  that	  had	  been	  lifted	  in	  1989.	  Sanctions	  were	  averted	  and	  an	   agreement	   reached	   for	   certain	   sectors	   and	   products	   after	   the	   U.S.	   dropped	   its	   demand	   for	  numerical	  targets.	  When	  it	  came	  to	  the	  still	  contentious	  issue	  of	  autos	  and	  auto	  parts	  in	  1995,	  U.S.	  sanctions	  were	  also	  avoided	  through	  a	  last	  minute	  agreement,	  with	  the	  U.S.	  not	  having	  reached	  its	   goals	   of	   concrete	   numbers	   for	   market	   share.	   This	   also	   marked	   the	   end	   of	   U.S.	   offensive	  strategies	  when	  it	  came	  to	  trade	  with	  Japan	  (cf.	  Hummel	  2000,	  149ff.;	  Paulsen	  1999,	  134ff.;	  Uriu	  2009,	  241f.).	  	   	  	   	  




Figure	  1:	  U.S.	  trade	  in	  goods	  with	  Japan	  in	  billions	  of	  U.S.	  Dollars273	  
	  	  Sources:	   Trade	   data	   from	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Commerce,	   Census	   Bureau,	   https://www.census.gov/foreign-­‐trade/balance/c5880.html	   (last	   accessed	   March	   26,	   2015).	   All	   figures	   in	   U.S.	   Dollars	   are	   on	   a	   nominal	   basis,	   not	  seasonally	  adjusted.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  273	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Karsten	  Mau	  for	  his	  assistance	  in	  converting	  the	  data,	  also	  for	  the	  following	  graphics,	  into	  figures.	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Figure	  2:	  U.S.	  trade	  in	  goods	  with	  Japan	  as	  percentage	  of	  U.S.	  GDP	  
	  	  Sources:	   Trade	   data	   from	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Commerce,	   Census	   Bureau,	   https://www.census.gov/foreign-­‐trade/balance/c5880.html	  (last	  accessed	  March	  26,	  2015).	  GDP	  data	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce,	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Analysis,	   http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp	   (last	   accessed	  March	  26,	   2015).	   All	   figures	   in	  U.S.	  Dollars	  and	  GDP	  are	  on	  a	  nominal	  basis,	  not	  seasonally	  adjusted.	  	  
OVERVIEW	  ON	  THE	  U.S.-­‐CONGRESS	  AND	  CHINA	  
	  With	  China	  the	  main	  question	  also	  centered	  on	  the	  growing	  trade	  deficit	  (see	  Figures	  three	  and	  four),	   which	  went	   from	   around	   $6	   billion	   in	   1989	   to	   $286	   billion	   in	   2008,	   accompanied	   by	   a	  heated	  debate	  on	  the	  alleged	  manipulation	  of	  the	  Chinese	  currency	  especially	  from	  the	  year	  2003	  onwards	   (cf.	  Nymalm	  2013).	  Until	   the	  year	  2000	   these	   issues	  were	   linked	   to	   the	   topic	  of	  Most	  Favored	  Nation	  Status	  (MFN)	  or	  Permanent	  Normal	  Trade	  Relations	  (PNTR),	  and	  the	  question	  of	  whether	   trade	   relations	   with	   China	   should	   not	   only	   depend	   on	   ‘economic	   issues’,	   but	   also	   be	  conditioned	  on	  the	  improvement	  of	  its	  domestic	  human	  rights	  situation.	  	  The	   matter	   of	   ‘Most	   Favored	   Nation	   Status’	   (MFN)274	  with	   China	   goes	   back	   to	   the	  suspension	  of	  MFN	  in	  1951	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Trade	  Agreements	  Extension	  Act	  of	  1951,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  274	  Since	  1934	  the	  U.S.	  applied	  MFN	  (with	  regard	  to	  tariffs)	  routinely	  to	  all	  external	   trade	  relations.	  This	  mechanism	  was	  created	  with	  the	  Reciprocal	  Trade	  Agreements	  Act	  (RTAA)	  of	  1934,	  that	  ended	  the	  rather	  protectionist	  regime	  of	  the	   Smoot	  Hawley	  Tariff	  Act	   of	   1930.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   term	   ‘most	   favored	  nation’	   is	   actually	  misleading,	   as	   it	   only	  means	   to	   grant	   the	   same	   benefits/low	   tariffs	   negotiated	   with	   a	   party	   that	   was	   granted	   MFN,	   to	   all	   other	   trading	  
126	  
	  
which	   the	  executive	  was	  called	  upon	  by	  Congress	   to	  suspend	  MFN	  for	   the	  Soviet-­‐Union	  and	  all	  other	   countries	   of	   the	   “Sino-­‐Soviet	   block”.	   The	   Trade	   Act	   of	   1974	   in	   turn	   provided	   for	   a	  procedure	   to	   lift	   the	   suspension,	   which	   however	   became	   tied	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   Jackson-­‐Vanick	  Amendment	  of	  the	  Trade	  Act.	  Accordingly,	  the	  president	  could	  annually	  waive	  the	  suspension	  of	  MFN	   for	   the	   respective	   country,	   provided	   that	   a	   bilateral	   trade	   agreement	  was	   concluded	   and	  that	  the	  requirements	  for	  Jackson-­‐Vanick	  were	  met.	  Originally	  drafted	  for	  pressuring	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  either	  improve	  the	  situation	  and	  rights	  of	  minorities,	  and/or	  granting	  them	  the	  right	  to	  emigrate,	  with	   this	   amendment	   trade	  and	  human	   rights	  became	  connected,	   as	   the	  presidential	  waiver	   was	   tied	   to	   calling	   upon	   the	   trading	   partner	   to	   improve	   its	   human	   rights	   situation.	  Congress	  was	  entitled	  to	  annually	  challenge	  the	  waiver	  through	  a	  joint	  resolution	  by	  the	  Senate	  and	  the	  House	  that	  the	  president	  could	  veto	  in	  turn.	  The	  veto	  could	  be	  overruled	  through	  a	  two-­‐thirds	   majority	   in	   both	   chambers.	   The	   bilateral	   trade	   agreement	   between	   the	   U.S.	   and	   China	  entered	   into	   force	   in	  February	  1980,	  and	  was	  subject	   to	   the	  annual	   renewal	  of	   the	  MFN-­‐status	  until	  2000.	   Importantly,	  MFN	  only	  became	  controversial	   since	  Tiananmen	   in	  1989	   (Dumbaugh	  1998,	   1;	   Gagliano	   2014,	   137;	   cf.	   Kolkmann	   2005,	   102ff.;	   Xie	   2009,	   5,	   101;	   J.	   Yang	   2000,	   17),	  leading	   to	   annual	   debates	   in	   Congress,	   that	   for	   instance	   passed	   legislation	   to	   revoke	  MFN	   for	  reasons	   of	   ‘unfair	   trade’	   and	   human	   rights	   twice	   in	   1992,	   each	   time	   vetoed	   by	   the	   president	  (Bush	   senior)	   with	   the	   vetoes	   sustained	   in	   the	   Senate	   (cf.	   Gagliano	   2014,	   152ff.;	   Xie	   2009,	   6,	  109ff.;	   J.	   Yang	   2000,	   75ff.).275	  Kerry	   Dumbaugh	   in	   his	   report	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Congressional	  Research	  Service	  (CRS)	  characterized	  U.S.-­‐China	  policies	  in	  the	  years	  between	  1989	  and	  1992	  as	  rather	  confrontational,	  with	  	  	  “Beijing	   generally	   unwilling	   to	   make	   policy	   concessions	   to	   the	   United	   States,	   President	   Bush	  unable	   to	   resume	   pre-­‐Tiananmen	   “normal”	   relations	   with	   China,	   and	   Congress	   increasingly	  frustrated	  by	  its	  lack	  of	  significant	  success	  in	  pressuring	  either	  China	  or	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  to	  change	  its	  policy	  approach”,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  partners	   with	   that	   status	   (cf.	   Kolkmann	   2005,	   37,	   102).	   In	   the	   U.S.	   MFN	   was	   renamed	   ‘Permanent	   Normal	   Trade	  Relations	  (PNTR)’	  in	  1998,	  which	  did	  not	  change	  anything	  but	  the	  name.	  The	  reasons	  were	  domestic,	  as	  the	  term	  ‘most	  favored’	  had	  become	  hard	  to	  communicate	  to	  constituents	  especially	   in	  the	  case	  of	  China	  (see	  also	  Dumbaugh	  1998,	  34;	  Gagliano	  2014,	  143f.).	   For	   example,	   in	  Congress	   the	  opponents	  of	  MFN	  articulated	   it	   as	   suggesting	   that	   “certain	  nations	  on	  this	  planet	  are	  most	  favored	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  Americans	  […]”	  (P113:19).	  	  275	  As	  Xie	  points	  out,	  in	  the	  years	  between	  1989	  and	  1995	  a	  total	  of	  75	  bills	  relating	  to	  MFN	  and	  China	  were	  introduced,	  compared	   to	   only	   four	   between	   1973	   and	   1988.	   Since	   1995	   there	   were	   on	   average	   about	   two	   bills	   annually,	   and	  between	  1999	  and	  2001	  the	  House	  voted	  each	  year	  on	  joint	  resolutions	  to	  disapprove	  of	  MFN	  renewal.	  Except	  for	  the	  years	  mentioned,	  they	  were	  all	  defeated	  (Xie	  2009,	  109).	  On	  other	  presidential	  vetoes	  by	  Bush	  against	  congressional	  China	  bills	  (four	  in	  late	  1989	  and	  early	  1990)	  see	  Dumbaugh	  (1998,	  6).	  	  	  Importantly	   however,	   in	   1989	   itself	   the	   process	   of	   MFN	   renewal	   took	   place	   without	   controversies,	   even	   though	   it	  happen	  after	  June	  4.	  Two	  sets	  of	  non-­‐MFN	  related	  sanctions	  were	  passed	  during	  that	  year,	  and	  the	  disputes	  over	  their	  broadening	  as	  well	  as	  over	  the	  China-­‐policies	  of	  the	  executive	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  confrontations	  over	  MFN	  during	  the	  following	  years	  (Dumbaugh	  1998,	  5).	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while	  most	  of	   the	  debates	  were	   carried	  out	   through	   the	  annual	  process	  of	   renewing	  MFN	  as	   a	  vehicle	  (Dumbaugh	  1998,	  4).	  	  	  In	  1993	  President	  Clinton	  –	  who	   in	  his	  election	  campaign	  had	  criticized	  Bush	   for	  being	  too	   soft	   on	   China	   when	   it	   came	   to	   human	   rights	   –	   conditioned	   granting	   China	   MFN	   by	   an	  executive	  order	   that	  explicitly	  demanded	   that	  China	   improved	   its	  human	  rights	  policies	  during	  the	  next	  twelve	  months.	  While	  the	  order	  granted	  MFN	  for	  another	  year,	   it	  was	  not	  a	  waiver.	  276	  However,	   a	  year	   later	  Clinton	  officially	   ‘delinked’	  MFN	  and	  human	  rights	  by	  distancing	  himself	  from	  the	  earlier	  policy	  and	  renewing	  MFN	  in	  1994	  (J.	  Yang	  2000,	  113,	  122f.,	  145).	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  U.S.	  in	  general	  did	  not	  enact	  punitive	  trade	  measures	  on	  China,	  nor	  did	  it	  end	  the	  debates	  on	  human	  rights	  in	  China.	  For	  instance	  in	  1995	  the	  U.S.	  imposed	  100	  per	  cent	  tariffs	  on	  more	  than	  $1	  billion	  value	  of	  Chinese	  goods,	  the	  largest	  imposition	  of	  U.S.	  trade	  sanctions	  so	  far	  (cf.	   Gagliano	   2014,	   143).	  When	   it	   came	   to	   the	   question	   of	   China’s	   membership	   in	   the	  WTO	   –	  which	  was	  under	  negotiation	  since	  1986,	  when	  Beijing	  had	  applied	  to	  resume	  its	  membership	  in	  GATT277	  –	   there	   was	   no	   legal	   need	   for	   Congress	   to	   approve	   the	   1999	   bilateral	   agreement	   on	  China’s	  accession,	  nor	  the	  accession	  itself.	  However,	  if	  Congress	  had	  not	  granted	  China	  PNTR,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  have	  had	  to	  invoke	  a	  specific	  WTO	  clause	  (Article	  XIII)	  in	  order	  not	  to	  be	  in	  violation	  of	   its	   Article	   II	   (unconditional	   MFN	   for	   its	   members).	   This	   in	   turn	   means	   that	   the	   conditions	  negotiated	  in	  the	  bilateral	  agreement	  would	  have	  not	  entered	  into	  force.	  Moreover,	  the	  U.S.	  could	  have	  been	  challenged	  by	  China	  at	  the	  WTO	  in	  this	  case.	  Hence,	  Congress	  became	  a	  central	  actor	  in	  the	  PNTR	  issue	  (cf.	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  105;	  Xie	  2009,	  167,	  FN	  5).	  In	  2000	  Congress	  approved	  PNTR	  for	   China,	   preceded	   by	   intense	   debates	   and	   a	   presidential	   campaign	   for	   PNTR	   (cf.	   Kolkmann	  2005,	  107ff.).278	  China	  became	  a	  member	  of	   the	  WTO	   in	  December	  2001.	  This	  however	  did	  not	  end	   neither	   the	   discussions	   on	   China’s	   ‘unfair	   trade’,	   nor	   on	   human	   rights	   (cf.	   Gagliano	   2014,	  144f.;	  Xie	  2009,	  6,	  66).279	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  276	  Kolkmann	  points	   to	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  North	  Atlantic	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement	  (NAFTA)	  as	  a	   turning	  point	   for	   the	  significance	   of	   (then	   still	   considered	   as)	   not	   strictly	   trade	   related	   issues,	   like	   human	   rights,	   workers	   rights,	  environmental	  standards	  etc.	  for	  trade	  agreements	  (Kolkmann	  2005,	  51).	  277	  China	  –	  at	  that	  time	  under	  rule	  of	  the	  Guomindang	  (GMD)	  –	  was	  actually	  among	  the	  23	  founding	  members	  of	  the	  GATT	   (General	   Agreement	   on	  Tariffs	   and	  Trade)	   in	   1947,	   Japan	   joining	   in	   1955.	   After	   the	   founding	   of	   the	   People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (PRC)	  in	  1949,	  the	  GMD	  government	  that	  had	  fled	  to	  Taiwan	  withdrew	  from	  GATT	  in	  1950.	  Taiwan	  was	   granted	   observatory	   status	   in	   1965,	   that	   ended	   in	   1971	   after	   the	   United	   Nations	   (UN)	   recognized	   the	   PRC	  government	  as	  sole	  representative	  of	  China	  in	  all	  UN	  bodies	  and	  institutions.	  When	  GATT	  became	  institutionalized	  as	  WTO	  in	  1995,	  negotiations	  with	  China	  on	  its	  GATT-­‐membership	  had	  not	  been	  concluded	  yet	  (cf.	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  90).	  278	  In	   the	   same	   year	   China	   replaced	   Japan	   as	   the	   largest	   deficit	   trading	   partner	   of	   the	   U.S.,	   see	   introduction	   to	   the	  analysis.	  	  279	  Also	   in	   2000	   Congress	   established	   a	   commission	   to	   monitor	   human	   rights	   practices	   in	   China,	   as	   well	   as	   a	  requirement	   for	   the	  U.S.	   trade	  representative	  to	  annually	  submit	  a	  report	  on	  China’s	  WTO	  compliances	  (cf.	  Gagliano	  2014,	  145).	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Figure	  3:	  U.S.	  trade	  in	  goods	  with	  China	  in	  billions	  of	  U.S.	  Dollars	  
	  	  Sources:	   Trade	   data	   from	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Commerce,	   Census	   Bureau,	   https://www.census.gov/foreign-­‐trade/balance/c5880.html	  (last	  accessed	  March	  26,	  2015).	  GDP	  data	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce,	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Analysis,	   http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp	   (last	   accessed	  March	  26,	   2015).	   All	   figures	   in	  U.S.	  Dollars	  and	  GDP	  are	  on	  a	  nominal	  basis,	  not	  seasonally	  adjusted.	  	  	  	  
Summary	  
	  To	  summarize,	  while	  with	  both,	  Japan	  and	  China	  trade	  issues	  and	  the	  deficit	  were	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  economic	  agenda	  (see	  figure	  five),	  there	  were	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  both	  cases	  (for	  an	  overview	  see	  for	  instance	  Bown	  and	  McCulloch	  2009,	  672).	  With	  Japan,	  the	  prevalent	  question	  was	  first	  about	  ‘protecting’	  the	  U.S.	  market	  from	  increasing	  imports	  from	  Japan,	  that	  since	  1985	  was	  surmounted	  by	  the	  goal	  of	  gaining	  market	  access	  to	  Japan	  (as	  well	  as	  competing	  with	  Japan	  in	   third	   markets,	   cf.	   Bown	   and	   McCulloch	   2009,	   671)	   for	   U.S.	   companies	   and	   products	   (cf.	  Hummel	  2000,	   219).	   The	  major	  debate	   ensued	  over	  whether	   the	   trade	  deficit	   could	  mostly	  be	  attributed	   to	   ‘Japan’s	   unfairness’,	   and	   how	   to	   deal	   with	   it	   in	   consequence.	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   the	  question	  became	  whether	  ‘free	  trade’	  would	  solve	  the	  ‘Japan	  problem’	  and	  change	  Japan,	  or	  not.	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With	  China,	  the	  trade	  issue	  started	  out	  the	  other	  way	  around,	  as	  the	  goal	  in	  the	  1990s	  was	  first	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  Chinese	  market,	  and	  only	   later,	  after	  2000	  became	  an	   issue	  of	  protecting	  the	  U.S.	  market	  from	  Chinese	  imports	  (cf.	  Gagliano	  2014,	  150).	  While	  the	  alleged	  ‘unfairness’	  of	  China,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  it,	  stood	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  debates	  as	  well,	  it	  was	  –	  also	  for	  historical	   reasons	   –	   also	   linked	   to	   the	   (‘technically’	   not	   connected)	   human	   rights	   issue,	   and	  China’s	  persisting	  ‘illiberalism’.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  U.S.	  trade	  in	  goods	  with	  China	  as	  percentage	  of	  U.S.	  GDP	  
	  	  Sources:	   Trade	   data	   from	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Commerce,	   Census	   Bureau,	   https://www.census.gov/foreign-­‐trade/balance/c5880.html	  (last	  accessed	  March	  26,	  2015).	  GDP	  data	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce,	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Analysis,	   http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp	   (last	   accessed	  March	  26,	   2015).	   All	   figures	   in	  U.S.	  Dollars	  and	  GDP	  are	  on	  a	  nominal	  basis,	  not	  seasonally	  adjusted.	  	  	  	  Here	  the	  question	  on	  the	  transformative	  impact	  of	  free	  trade	  posed	  itself	  within,	  but	  also	  outside	  the	  economic	  realm.	  In	  both	  cases,	  there	  was	  a	  divide	  between	  the	  executive	  and	  Congress,	  but	  also	  within	  Congress	  itself.	  The	  details	  will	  be	  addressed	  with	  the	  following	  analysis.	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Figure	  5:	  U.S.	  trade	  deficits	  in	  trade	  in	  goods	  with	  Japan	  and	  China	  in	  billions	  of	  U.S.	  
Dollars	  	  
	  	  Sources:	   Trade	   data	   from	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Commerce,	   Census	   Bureau,	   https://www.census.gov/foreign-­‐trade/balance/c5880.html	   (last	   accessed	   March	   26,	   2015).	   All	   figures	   in	   U.S.	   Dollars	   are	   on	   a	   nominal	   basis,	   not	  seasonally	  adjusted.	  	  	  
4.	   NOMINATION	  AND	  PREDICATION:	   	   OVERVIEW	  ON	  ARTICULATIONS	  
OF	  SELF	  AND	  OTHER	  	  
	  As	  linguistic	  constructions	  of	  self	  and	  other,	  the	  nominations	  stand	  for	  how	  the	  actors	  are	  being	  named,	  while	  the	  predications	  account	  for	  the	  positive	  or	  negative	  traits,	  qualities	  and	  features	  that	  are	  attributed	  to	  the	  linguistically	  constructed	  self	  and	  other,	  here	  as	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  PDT.	  In	  most	  cases	  however,	  nominations	  and	  predications	  are	  articulated	  together	  (see	  in	  what	  follows).	  	  The	  main	  topics	  (and	  later	  on	  also	  nodal	  points)	  in	  the	  economic	  discourses	  on	  Japan	  and	  China	  can	  first	  and	  foremost	  be	  discerned	  from	  the	  categories	  of	  predication	  and	  argumentation,	  but	   are	   of	   course	   also	   reflected	   in	   how	   the	   self	   and	  other	   are	  nominated.	   In	   the	   congressional	  debates	   analyzed,	   the	  nodal	   points	   develop	   around	   those	   aspects	   of	   the	   economic	   relationship	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that	  account	   for	   the	  dislocation	  or	  dislocatory	  effects	  on	  U.S.	   identity:	   this	   is	   first	  and	   foremost	  the	  unbalanced	  trade	  relationship,	  its	  alleged	  reasons	  and	  consequences,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  it	  in	  an	  ‘effective’	  way	  (cf.	  also	  i.e.	  Cohen,	  Paul,	  and	  Blecker	  1996,	  175;	  Gagliano	  2014,	  136).	  Connected	  to	  this	  topic	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  evolvement	  of	  the	  economic	  relationship	  is	  the	  question	  of	  the	  standing	  of	  the	  U.S.	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  main	  economic	  competitor	  (cf.	  Berger	  1993;	  Uriu	  2009,	  243f.),	  Japan	  and	  China	  respectively,	  which	  is	  then	  linked	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  what	  it	  means	  for	  the	  overall	  global	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  The	  speakers	  in	  Congress	  position	  or	  articulate	  themselves	  differently	  in	  relating	  to	  these	  topics,	  and	  as	  the	  analysis	  shows,	  their	  argument	  about	  Japan	  and	  China	  has	  to	  do	  with	  their	  self-­‐understanding	   and	   the	   perspective	   they	   see	   themselves/the	   U.S.	   (see	   on	   what	   was	   said	   on	  Congress	   as	   ‘the	   U.S.’	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   the	   analysis,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   self,	   other	   and	   the	  subject/subject	  positions	  in	  chapter	  two)	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Japan	  and	  China.	  	  How	  self	  and	  other	  are	  then	  related	  to	  each	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference	  is	   addressed	   in	   more	   detail	   under	   the	   following	   chapters	   five	   and	   six,	   and	   the	   categories	   of	  argumentation	  and	  perspectivation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.1.	  The	  arrogant	  Japanese	  and	  Communist	  China	  versus	  a	  strong	  ally	  and	  a	  
big	  economic	  power280	  
	  Looking	   at	   the	   nominations	   –	   the	   initial	   articulations	   of	   self	   and	   other	   –	   detached	  or	   ‘isolated’	  from	   their	   context	   of	   predication	   and	   argumentation	   (in	   which	   they	   will	   reappear	   in	   the	  respective	  chapters),	  first	  and	  foremost	  reflects	  the	  obvious	  difference	  between	  Japan	  and	  China	  on	  the	  ‘ideological	  level’,	  which	  plays	  an	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  economic	  challenge,	  especially	   through	  China.	  As	  will	  be	  shown,	   the	  predications	   in	   turn	  echo	   this	  difference	  yet	   in	  another	   way,	   as	   the	   qualities	   and	   features	   attributed	   to	   Japan	   and	   China	   are	   articulated	   on	   a	  different	   level	   (differences	   in	  character	  versus	  differences	   in	   ideology,	  see	   in	  what	   follows),	   i.e.	  through	  personal	  or	   impersonal	  characteristics.	  Furthermore,	   in	   line	  with	  the	  two	  major	   topics	  as	  red	  lines	  staying	  the	  same	  over	  the	  years,	  these	  more	  general	  nominations	  and	  predications	  do	  not	  significantly	  change	  over	  the	  time	  period	  studied,	  except	  for	  a	  decrease	  in	  frequency	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  Japan	  and	  an	  increase	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  China.281	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  To	   avoid	   an	   over-­‐extensive	   use	   of	   quotation	   marks	   in	   the	   chapters	   of	   the	   analysis,	   I	   used	   italics	   for	   the	   direct	  quotations.	  	  281	  Whether	  –	  at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  China	  –	  this	  is	  connected	  to	  what	  Gagliano	  states	  as	  one	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  his	  study,	  that	   “congressional	   interests	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   China	   remained	   remarkably	   consistent	   between	   1992	   and	   2012”	   (Gagliano	  
132	  
	  
Through	   the	  most	   frequently	   used	   general	   nominations	   Japan	   is	  mostly	   simply	   referred	   to	   as	  
Japan	   (e.g.	   P2:17;	   P5:37),282	  the	   Japanese	   (P4:5;	   P14:30),	   or	   the	   citizens	   of	   Japan	   (e.g.	   P88:2),	  sometimes	  also	  as	  Japan	  Inc.	  (e.g.	  P:28:4;	  P85:1;	  P87:2,	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  next	  chapter).	  	  China	   in	   turn	   rarely	  goes	  without	   the	  predication	  communist	   (e.g.	  P146:2;	  P125:53,	  60;	  P192:2;	  P138:5,	  44,	  55;	  P207:10),	  which	  figures	  428	  times	  in	  the	  documents	  on	  China	  (see	  table	  seven).	   The	   other	   nominations	   for	   China	   usually	   are	   regime	   (e.g.	   P113:14;	   P125:88;	   P126:10),	  
state	  (e.g.	  P138:44;	  P175:12),	  country	  (e.g.	  P146:4)	  and	  nation	  (e.g.	  P125:69;	  P192:6),	  except	  for	  the	   also	   frequently	   used	   Red	   China	   (e.g.	   P175:17f.;	   P189:16)	   or	   Red	   Chinese	   (e.g.	   P134:8;	  P176:10),	  which	  again	  also	  refer	  to	  China’s	  communism	  (cf.	  also	  Turner	  2014,	  4,	  97ff.).	  China	  is	  also	  often	  more	  figuratively	  called	  the	  (Chinese)	  dragon	  (e.g.	  P146:5;	  P186:4),	  the	  sleeping	  dragon	  (P138:40)	  or	  the	  super	  dragon	  (P176:37),	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  China’s	  potential	  strength	  and	  power	  (an	  equivalent	  for	  Japan	  would	  be	  e.g.	  land	  of	  the	  rising	  sun	  (P71:5),	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  referring	  to	   a	   literal	   translation	  of	   the	  meaning	  of	   ‘Japan’).283	  Sometimes	   the	   leadership/government	   (e.g.	  P138:55;	  P125:60)	  is	  deliberately	  differentiated	  from	  the	  Chinese	  people/the	  people	  of	  China	  (e.g.	  P125:58,	   76),	   mostly	   to	   emphasize	   the	   ‘evilness’	   of	   the	   government	   but	   not	   referring	   to	   the	  Chinese	   as	   a	   people	   (on	   the	   government/people	   distinction	   see	   also	   i.e.	   P.	   Gries	   2014	   and;	  Hoenicke	   Moore	   2015,	   148	   who	   calls	   this	   “a	   long	   cherished	   liberal	   tenet	   of	   American	  democracy”).	  	  With	   Japan	  this	  kind	  of	  distinction	   is	  made	  to	  a	  very	   limited	  extent,	  an	  example	  are	   the	  debates	  on	  a	  ‘missing	  Japanese	  consumer	  culture’	  (see	  in	  what	  follows)	  and	  statements	  like:	  It	  is	  
a	  country	  trying	  to	  break	  free	  from	  the	  bureaucratic	  shackles	  which	  have	  victimized	  its	  people	  and	  
reduced	  its	  quality	  of	  life,	  shackles	  which	  have	  denied	  the	  public	  a	  voice	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  their	  
country	  and	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  its	  considerable	  prosperity	   (P106:1,	   in	  1994),	  which,	   like	   the	  speaker	  himself	   concedes,	   does	   rather	   sound	   like	   a	   characterization	   of	   Russia	   or	   China,	   than	   of	   Japan	  (from	  a	  U.S.	  perspective	  !).	  	  	  For	   China	   the	   overall	   negative	   or	   antagonizing	   nominations,	   like	   dictatorship	   (e.g.	   P145:22),	  again	   mostly	   go	   together	   with	   the	   predication	   communist	   (e.g.	   P124:2;	   P165:2;	   P125:53;	  P138:62).	   Other	   expressions	   in	   this	   vein	   are	   rogue	   dictatorship	   (e.g.	   P145:2;	   P138:43),	  
totalitarian	   dictatorship	   (e.g.	   P181:1;	   138:40),	   and	   brutal/vicious/corrupt	   dictatorship	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2014,	  170),	  is	  debatable.	  However,	  he	  also	  notes	  that	  while	  in	  the	  first	  years	  after	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  Congress	   focused	   on	   China’s	   unfair	   trade	   practices	   blocking	   access	   to	   their	  market,	   it	   shifted	   to	   protecting	   the	  U.S.	  market	  from	  Chinese	  imports	  with	  China’s	  growing	  economic	  strength	  (ibid.,	  150).	  282	  “P”	  and	  the	  number,	  e.g.	  P2	  refer	  to	  the	  document	  number	  (“primary	  document”),	  and	  the	  number	  after	  the	  colon	  stands	  for	  the	  page	  number	  of	  the	  document.	  283	  ‘Rising	  Sun’	  became	  the	  title	  of	  a	  popular	  novel	  by	  Michael	  Crichton	  published	  in	  1992,	  and	  turned	  into	  a	  movie	  by	  Philip	  Kaufman	  in	  1993.	  It	  deals	  with	  the	  Japanese	  industrial	  presence	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  was	  later	  regarded	  as	  “delivering	  Japan-­‐bashing	  to	  the	  masses”	  (cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  103ff.).	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(e.g.P138:43,	   55;	   P202:5).	   I	   address	   these	   kinds	   of	   nominations	   more	   explicitly	   under	   the	  category	  of	  intensification.	  	  Among	  the	  potentially	  accommodating	  nominations	  for	  China	  are	  big	  economic	  power	  (e.g.	  P115:4),	  economic	  giant	   (e.g.	   P150:1),	  a	  regional	  power	  (P112:3),	  an	  emerging	  superpower	   (e.g.	  P176:54),	   as	   well	   as	   economic	   partner	   (P143:6)	   and	   trading	   partner	   (P205:1)	   –	   but	   they	   also	  point	   beyond	   the	   economic	   sphere	   (P188:2;	   P190:1)	   as	   in	   following	   exemplary	   statement:	   no	  
country	  figures	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  impact	  on	  the	  United	  States	  than	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China.	  
The	  emergence	  of	  China	  as	  a	  major	  world	  power	  is	  one	  of	  the	  historic	  events	  of	  the	  late	  20th	  century	  (e.g.	  P190:1).	  In	   the	   case	   of	   Japan	   in	   turn,	   the	   predications,	   even	   if	   referring	   to	   the	   Japanese	  government,	  do	  not	  stay	  on	  the	   level	  of	  characteristics	  or	   features	  attributed	  at	   the	   impersonal	  level	  to	  the	  state	  or	  government,	  but	  they	  are	  frequently	  extended	  to	  ‘the	  Japanese	  character’	  or	  also	  ‘Japanese	  society’	  or	  ‘character’	  of	  the	  latter,	  whereas	  with	  China	  they	  stay	  on	  an	  impersonal	  level	  in	  this	  respect.	  For	  instance,	  ‘the	  Japanese’	  are	  repeatedly	  referred	  to	  as	  arrogant	  (P22:13;	  P63:19),	   intransigent	   (P22:13;	   P107:1),	   acting	   like	   a	   greedy	   child	   (P22:47),	   stubborn	   (P37:33),	  
selfish	   (P42:33;	   P63:19),	   treacherous	   (P50:18),	   conspirative	   (P69:3),	   ruthless	   (P71:66),	   self-­‐
righteous	  and	  aggressive	  (P79:7;	  P93:37)	  and	  disingenuous	  (P:116:1).	  	  On	  the	  accommodative	  side,	  Japan	  is	  referred	  to	  on	  both,	  however	  more	  on	  an	  impersonal	  than	  a	  personal	   level,	   for	   instance	  as	   friend(s)	   (e.g.	  P71:10,	  38),	  (strong/great)	  ally	   (e.g.	  P71:11,	  38;	  P71:45;	  P73:149),	  and	  (trading)partner	  (e.g.	  P25:46;	  P97:3),	  or	  even	  as	  (big/world)	  economic	  
power	   (e.g.	   P72:1;	   P97:4;	   P115:4),	   sometimes	   specified	   as	   second	   largest	   Free-­‐World	   economy	  (P27:7),	  second	  largest	  economic	  power	  in	  the	  free	  world	  (P32:38;	  P56:8)	  or	  one	  of	  the	  three	  super	  
powers	  (P71:157).	  	  	  	  
4.2.	  Our	  nation	  and	  the	  American	  people	  versus	  Uncle	  Sam	  and	  Uncle	  Sucker	  
	  The	  general	  nominations	  for	  the	  U.S.	  with	  respect	  to	  both	  Japan	  and	  China	  are	  our	  nation/we	  as	  a	  
nation/this	  nation/the	  nation	  (e.g.	  P71:51,	  117;	  P95:35;	  P121:4;	  P125:51;	  P95:35),	  America	  (e.g.	  P88:2),	   occasionally	  Americans/we	  as	  Americans	  (e.g.	   P2:17,	   P88:1)	   or	   the	  American	  people/the	  
people	   of	   America	   (e.g.	   P39:48;	   P71:89;	   P95:21;	   P162:4;	   P176:50).	   Also	   very	   frequent	   versus	  Japan	  and	  China	   is	  Uncle	  Sam	   (e.g.	  P71:5,	  100,	  143;	  P130:1;	  P125:53;	  P136:39;	  P138:13)	  which	  mostly	   –	   as	   will	   become	   clear	   under	   argumentation	   and	   perspectivation	   –	   is	   meant	   in	   a	  depreciating	  way	   relating	   to	   the	  U.S.	   being	   economically	   outperformed	   by	   Japan	   and	  China.	   In	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some	  cases	  this	  is	  made	  explicit,	  like	  in:	  Uncle	  Sam	  once	  again	  has	  become	  Uncle	  Sucker	  (P71:143).	  The	  latter	  nomination	  is	  also	  used	  as	  such	  (e.g.	  P95:21;	  P138:13),	  just	  as	  sucker(s)	  (P136:40)	  or	  as	  (good	  old)	  Uncle	  Sugar	  (e.g.	  P92:3),	  which	  often	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  good	  old	  American	  taxpayer	  (e.g.	  P95:21)	  or	  our	  taxpayers	   (e.g.	  P99:1),	   in	  criticisms	  of	   the	  executive	  and	   its	  policies,	   that	   in	  this	  line	  of	  argumentation	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  ‘the	  taxpayer’	  in	  terms	  of	  causing	  unfavorable	  conditions	  on	  the	  U.S.	  job	  market,	  or	  because	  of	  the	  U.S.	  bearing	  the	  costs	  for	  Japan	  in	  the	  field	  of	  defense	  (see	  in	  what	  follows).	  More	  intensified	  versions	  of	   ‘Uncle	  Sugar’	  versus	  Japan	  are	  patsy	  (P5:37),	  losers	  (P29:33),	  or	  pussycat	  (P102:3),	  and	  a	  bunch	  of	  chumps	  (P138:3)	  versus	  China.	  	  In	   this	   line,	   the	  most	   frequent	  nomination	   for	   the	  U.S.	   relating	   to	   Japan	   is	  debtor	   (P4:5;	  P10:12;	   P27:12;	   P39:48;	   P53:8;	   P40:23;	   P77:4,	   11;	   P68:6;	   P82:1;	   P83:22;	   P93:24;	   P100:5,	   8;	  P109:2;	  132:50),	  the	  expression	  figured	  93	  times	  in	  the	  documents	  on	  Japan284	  (see	  category	  of	  argumentation,	  chapter	   five,	  and	  table	  seven).	   It	  also	  comes	  up	  with	  China	  (P133:78),	  however	  surprisingly	   not	   in	   2008	   (at	   least	   in	   the	   documents	   retrieved)	   when	   the	   role	   of	   the	   largest	  creditor	  shifted	   from	  Japan	   to	  China	  –	  but	  otherwise	   the	  emphasis	   towards	  China	   lies	  more	  on	  the	  U.S.	  as	  democracy	  and	  free	  and	  fair	  trader	  (see	  category	  of	  argumentation	  and	  the	  footnote	  on	  ‘debtor’).	  	  The	  U.S.	  as	  a	  people	  in	  difference	  to	  ‘the	  Japanese’	  in	  the	  economic	  realm	  are	  described	  as	  
generous	  (P28:3;	  P42:35),	  compassionate	  people	  with	  a	  finely	  tuned	  sense	  of	  fair	  play	  –	  of	  right	  and	  
wrong	   (P69:3),	   good	  guys	   (P42:37),	   trying	   to	   be	   good	   citizens	   in	   the	  world	  market,	   keeping	  our	  
doors	   open	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   expand	   world	   trade	   (P42:39),	   hopeful,	   big-­‐hearted	   and	   idealistic	  
toward	   the	   Japanese	   and	   others	   (P29:33),	   as	   greeting	   Japanese	   investment	  with	   encouragement	  
and	  open	  arms	   (P80:2),	   and	  as	   tinkerers	  [and]	  people	  who	  use	  our	  ingenuity	   (P134:5f.).	  The	   last	  two	  characterizations	  refer	  to	  the	  attributions	  of	  Japan’s	  markets	  as	  closed	  and	  the	  Japanese	  as	  ‘copiers	   of	   U.S.	   technology’,	   which	   will	   be	   addressed	   in	   the	   chapters	   on	   argumentation	   and	  perspectivation.	   Furthermore,	   relating	   to	   Japan,	   the	  U.S.	   in	   Congress	   is	   characterized	   as	   taking	  
trade	  policy	  as	  foreign	  policy	  to	  help	  other	  countries	  get	  back	  on	  their	  feet	  (after	  WWII)	  (P198:8),	  or	   in	   terms	   of	   being	   the	   generous	   rebuilder	  of	   Japan	   (P49:15),	   which	   –	   again	   laid	   out	   in	  more	  detail	   under	   the	   category	   of	   perspectivation	   –	   refers	   to	   the	  U.S.	   articulating	   itself	   as	   not	   being	  treated	  in	  a	  suitable	  manner	  by	  its	  ally,	  Japan.	  	  Relating	   to	   Japan	   as	   ‘entity’,	   the	  U.S.	   is	   articulated	   as	   free	   and	   fair	   trader	   (e.g.	   P40:13;	  P42:33;	  P73:127;	  P80:2)	  and	  the	  world’s	  only	  military,	  economic,	  and	  political	  superpower	  (P112:1),	  or	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  284	  For	  the	  year	  1985	  on	  Japan	  only	  the	  coded	  passages,	  not	   the	  whole	  documents	  were	   included,	  as	  atlas.ti	  was	  not	  able	   to	   perform	   a	  word	   count	   for	   the	   documents	   from	   the	   bound	   Congressional	   Record.	   The	   coded	   passages	  were	  exported	  into	  MS	  Word,	  and	  then	  the	  words	  were	  counted.	  For	  the	  frequencies	  see	  the	  tables	  five	  to	  eight	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  summary	  of	  the	  analysis.	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world’s	   only	   complete	   superpower	   (P120:7,	   more	   examples	   follow	   under	   the	   topics	   in	   the	  following	  chapters).	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  articulating	  the	  difference	  to	  China,	  the	  U.S.	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  nominated	  as	  the	  preeminent	  political,	  economic,	  military	  and	  ideological	  power	  in	  the	  world,	  or	  as	  (economic)	  
superpower	   of	   the	   world	   (e.g.	   143:3;	   P209:23),	   and	   the	   world’s	   strongest	   democracy	   (P149:6;	  P124:2).	  With	  no	  other	  country	  [having]	  the	  same	  heritage	  about	  freedom	  and	  liberty	  (P162:5),	  the	  U.S.	   is	   articulated	   as	   having	   the	  best	  opportunity	   in	  history	   to	  promote	  human	  rights,	   the	  rule	  of	  
law,	  free	  markets,	  and	  democracy	  […]	  in	  the	  far	  corners	  of	  the	  globe	  (P146:107;	  P175:10;	  P195:14;	  P143:3;	  218:1).	  The	  U.S.	  in	  this	  line	  of	  articulation	  first	  and	  foremost	  stands	  for	  freedom	  (P125:67;	  P186:1),	   free-­‐market	   economics	   (P174:12;	   P132:54;	   P136:5;	   P143:9)	   and	   (global)	   leadership	  (P125:89;	  P174:11f.,	  17;	  P189:4).	  These	  and	  also	  the	  more	  specific	  nominations	  and	  predications	  not	  treated	  here	  are	  picked	  up	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  under	  the	  respective	  topics	  and	  subtopics.	  	  
	  
Summary	  of	  Nominations	  and	  Predications	  
	  The	   nominations	   and	   predications	   attributed	   to	   Japan	   and	   China	   point	   to	   the	   ‘different	  difference’,	   or	  different	   articulation	  of	  difference,	   between	   the	  U.S.	   and	   Japan,	   and	   the	  U.S.	   and	  China.	   What	   in	   the	   case	   of	   China	   could	   be	   called	   ‘master	   difference’	   lies	   in	   ideology	   (liberal	  democracy	   versus	   –	   illiberal	   by	   definition	   –	   communism),	   and	   is	   thus	  more	   obvious	   and	   self-­‐evident.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  nomination	  and	  predication	  ‘Communist	  China’	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  stand	  for	  itself,	  as	  it	  conveys	  the	  major	  feature	  of	  China’s	  otherness	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘illiberalism’,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  evaluation	  in	  terms	  of	  depreciation	  for	  it,	  as	  hardly	  anyone	  in	  Congress	  –	  or	  beyond	  –	  would	  associate	   anything	   positive	   with	   communism.285	  However,	   as	   will	   become	   clear	   under	   the	  categories	   that	   follow,	   the	   degree	   of	   otherness	   and	   othering	   –	   i.e.	   how	   ‘different’	   communist	  China	   is	   or	  will	   be	   –	   has	   a	   lot	   to	   do	  with	  whether	   one	   still	   expects	   China	   to	   evolve	   towards	   a	  (more)	  liberal	  form	  of	  government.	  	  With	   Japan,	   there	   is	  no	  (obvious)	  difference	   in	   the	   form	  of	  government	  or	   ideology	  –	  at	  least	  not	  at	   the	   first	  sight	  –	  so	  there	  has	  to	  be	  another	   ‘explanation’	   for	   them	  not	  behaving	   like	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  285	  On	   congressional	   ‘antipathy’	   towards	   communism	   see	   for	   example	   Xie	   (2009,	   111).	   On	   ‘antipathy’	   towards	  communism	  in	  the	  U.S.	  more	  generally	  see	  for	  instance	  Turner	  (2014,	  4,	  97ff.),	  Doyle	  (1983a,	  328),	  and	  Gries	  (2014,	  i.e.	  page	  326),	  who	  argues	  that	  while	  this	  accounts	  for	  negative	  views	  on	  China	  in	  general,	  it	  has	  more	  impact	  among	  U.S.	  conservatives	  than	  liberals	  (his	  survey	  was	  conducted	  among	  “Main	  Street	  Americans”,	  hence	  the	  broader	  public,	  but	  Peter	  H.	  Gries	  in	  his	  conclusion	  does	  consider	  effects	  on	  U.S.	  China	  policy	  in	  Congress	  as	  well	  (ibid.,	  17).	   Jie	  Chen	  for	  instance	  focuses	  on	  ‘anticommunism’	  as	  ‘ideology’	  in	  U.S.	  China	  policy	  from	  1949-­‐1982	  (Chen	  1992).	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Table	  1:	  Summary	  of	  Nominations	  and	  Predications287	  
	  	   inclusive	   exclusive	  
Japan	   friend;	  ally;	  trading	  partner;	  economic	  power	   arrogant,	  intransigent,	  selfish,	  greedy	  Japanese	  
China	   great	  power;	  economic	  power;	  regional	  power;	  emerging	  superpower	  
communist	  China;	  Red	  China;	  communist/dictatorial	  regime	  	  
U.S.	  vs.	  Japan	   “we”	  as	  a	  nation,	  Americans,	  generous,	  open	  minded,	  idealistic	  people;	  	  complete	  superpower	  
debtor,	  Uncle	  Sam,	  Uncle	  Sucker,	  Uncle	  Sugar,	  patsy,	  losers;	  	  complete	  superpower;	  free	  and	  fair	  trader	  
U.S.	  vs.	  China	   our	  Nation;	  the	  American	  people;	  liberal	  democracy;	  democratic	  superpower	  	  
Uncle	  Sam,	  Uncle	  Sugar;	  liberal	  democracy,	  democratic	  superpower;	  free	  and	  fair	  trader	  	  
5.	  ARGUMENTATION	  ON	  THE	  MAIN	  TOPICS:	  THE	  TRADE	  DEFICIT	  AND	  
THE	   CHALLENGE	   TO	   U.S.	   WORLD	   LEADERSHIP	   –	   LAYING	   OUT	   THE	  
CHAINS	  OF	  EQUIVALENCE	  AND	  DIFFERENCE	  	  
	  Through	  the	  analytic	  category	  of	  argumentation	  the	  purpose	  is	  to	  show	  through	  what	  arguments	  and	   argumentation	   schemes	   claims	   containing	   specific	   nominations	   and	   predications	   are	  attempted	  to	  being	  justified	  or	  delegitimized.	  Furthermore,	  in	  my	  reading	  of	  RPA	  within	  the	  PDT	  framework,	   the	  arguments	   link	   the	  nominations	  and	  predications	   to	   chains	  of	   equivalence	  and	  difference,	   which	   in	   turn	   are	   further	   sustained	   through	   articulating	   them	   from	   a	   certain	  perspective	  (see	  chapter	  six).	  The	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  are	  aimed	  at	  establishing	  or	  sustaining	  a	  collective	   identity	   through	   differentiation	   from	   an	   outside	   of	   this	   collective,	   i.e.	   in	   this	   study	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  287	  Some	  of	  the	  nominations	  and	  predications	  appear	  in	  both	  columns,	  as	  –	  depending	  on	  the	  ‘context’	  –	  they	  appear	  in	  both,	  inclusive	  and	  exclusive	  articulations,	  or	  in	  both,	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference.	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another	   institution	  or	  proponents	  of	  different	  policies	   (within	  Congress	  or	   the	  U.S.)	  or	  another	  country,	  people	  or	  society	  (i.e.	   Japan,	  the	  Japanese,	  China,	  the	  Chinese	  people).	  The	  collective	  is	  articulated	   in	   terms	   of	   equivalences	   or	   resemblances	   between	   its	  members,	   that	   are	   however	  only	  maintained	  through	  the	  common	  difference	  they	  share	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  what	  is	  articulated	  to	  be	  the	  excluded	   outside.	   In	   this	   sense,	   through	   the	   chains	   of	   equivalence,	   the	   difference	   towards	   the	  outside	  is	  articulated	  in	  a	  way	  aimed	  at	  overweighing	  internal	  differences,	  hence	  cancelling	  them	  out	  or	  making	  them	  equivalent.	  This	  ultimately	  happens	  via	  the	  empty	  signifier,	  which	  stands	  for	  the	   lack	   or	   ‘problem’	   within	   or	   for	   the	   in-­‐group,	   and	   that	   the	   out-­‐group	   in	   turn	   is	   made	  responsible	   for.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   emphasize	   the	   exclusive	   or	  confrontational	   features	   of	   U.S.	   identity	   in	   terms	   of	   American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	  theory	  of	  history.	  The	  chains	  of	  difference	  in	  contrast	  are	  aimed	  at	  weakening	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	   out-­‐group	   as	   so	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   the	   in-­‐group,	   by	   emphasizing	   the	   internal	  differences	   as	   well	   as	   giving	   other	   reasons	   for	   the	   problem	   or	   lack.	   The	   chains	   of	   difference	  account	   for	   the	   inclusive	   and	   accommodating	   traits	   of	   U.S.	   ‘liberal’	   identity.	   However,	   in	   my	  reading	   and	   in	   terms	  of	   being	   a	   ‘defensive	  hegemonic	   strategy’	   (see	   chapter	   two),	   the	   internal	  differences	   can	   also	   be	   articulated	   into	   ‘internal	   chains	   of	   equivalence’,	   when	   for	   instance	  Congress	  posits	  itself	  against	  the	  executive,	  or	  the	  ‘free-­‐traders’	  set	  themselves	  against	  the	  ‘hard-­‐liners’.	  This	  does	  not	  necessarily	  weigh	  out	  the	  differences	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  outside,	  but	  it	  accounts	  for	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  lines	  of	  argumentation.	  How	  these	  dynamics	  play	  themselves	  out	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  	  
5.1.	  The	  trade	  deficit	  with	  Japan	  –	  the	  most	  competitive	  economy	  versus	  the	  
most	  protectionist	  country	  on	  earth	  	  
	  The	  main	   line	  of	  argumentation	   towards	   Japan	   from	  1985	  until	  1995	   is	  dominated	   first	  by	   the	  articulation	   of	   the	   trade	   deficit	   as	   ‘root	   cause’	   for	   the	   economic	   problems	   of	   the	  U.S.	   (see	   also	  what	   follows	   with	   respect	   to	   China),	   and	   second	   by	   a	   search	   for,	   and/or	   putting	   forward	  explanations	  for	  origins	  and	  solutions	  of	  the	  deficit	  (cf.	  also	  Cohen,	  Paul,	  and	  Blecker	  1996,	  175).	  This	   is	  an	   issue	  also	  with	  China,	  however,	   the	  question	  here	   lies	   less	  on	   the	  origins,	   as	  China’s	  ‘unfairness’	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  obvious,	  as	  it	  is	  still	  transforming	  its	  economy,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  also	  simply	  because	  China	  is	  ‘communist’,	  i.e.	  ‘unfair	  per	  definition’.	  	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   trade	   deficit	   (here	  with	   Japan)	   and	   its	   consequences	   account	   for	   the	  central	   challenge	   to/dislocation	  of	  U.S.	   identity	   as	   the	  world’s	  most	  competitive	  nation/economy	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(e.g.	   P105:10,	   238),	   leader	   of	   the	   free	   world	   (in	   the	   realm	   of	   trade)	   (P30:10;	   P73:29;	   P93:39;	  P132:18)	   and	   the	   advocator	   of	   free	   trade	   (P40:13;	   P42:33;	   P73:127;	   P80:2;	   P95:20;	   P120:7;	  P132:54f.;	  P140:2)	  and	  free	  competition	  (P83:9;	  P105:15,	  234,	  238;	  P107:2).	  Because	  of	  the	  trade	  deficit	   the	  U.S.	  now	  sees	   itself	  as	  a	  dumping	  ground	   (P10:12;	  P22:11;	  P28:2;	  P41:23)	  and,	  more	  severely,	   as	   having	   become	   the	   (worlds	   largest)	   debtor	   (P4:5;	   P10:12;	   P27:12;	   P39:48;	  P53:8;P40:23;	   P77:4,	   11;	   P68:6;	   P82:1;	   P83:22;	   P93:24;	   P100:5,	   8;	   P109:2;	   132:50).288 	  In	  consequence	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   throughout	   the	   years	   the	   U.S.	   is	   experiencing	   job	   losses,	   and	   a	  decline	   in	   competitiveness	   and	   productive	   capacity	   mainly	   because	   of	   the	   trade	   deficit	   (P4:4;	  P17:35;	  P27:8,	  12,	  50;	  P66:16,	  P71:36;	  P71:152;	  P74:1;	  P95:45;	  P115:1;	  P115:4;	  P121:3;	  132:44,	  87;	  cf.	  also	  Nanto	  1992),	  the	  same	  consequences	  and	  reasons	  that	  are	  brought	  up	  with	  China	  in	  the	  coming	  years.289	  One	  crucial	  aspect	  in	  this	  regard,	  that	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  main	  dividing	  lines	  between	  the	  ‘free	  traders’	  and	  ‘hardliners’	  (see	  in	  what	  follows),	  is	  the	  vital	  question	  of	  whether	  the	   trade	  deficit	   is	   actually	   the	   cause	  of	  problems,	  or	   rather	   the	  effect	   (cf.	   i.e.	  Cohen,	  Paul,	   and	  Blecker	  1996,	  177).	  
	  
Japan	  as	  ‘unfair’	  	  Contrastingly	   to	   the	  U.S.	   as	   free	   trader,	   Japan	   –	   sometimes	  denoted	   in	   terms	  of	   Japan	  Inc.	   (e.g.	  P:28:4;	   P85:1;	   P87:2),	  which	  mostly	   critically	   refers	   to	   Japan’s	   economic	  policies,	   but	  was	   also	  used	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  Japan’s	  success290–	  is	  articulated	  as	  protectionist(s)	  (e.g.	  P:68:46;	  P29:35),	  
most	   protectionist	   country	   on	   earth/in	   world	   history	   (e.g.	   P42:28;	   P130:1),	   (closed)	   mercantile	  
country/nation/society	   (e.g.	  P95:37f.;	  P121:5),	  and	  unfair	  trader	  (e.g.	  P69:7;	  P30:10).	  Thus,	   it	   is	  argued	   that	   the	   major	   reasons	   for	   the	   deficit	   throughout	   the	   years	   are	   Japan’s	   unfair	   trade	  practices	   (also	   further	   specified	   under	   the	   category	   of	   perspectivation).291	  The	   ‘unfairness’	  throughout	   the	   years	   is	   first	   and	   foremost	   seen	   in	   Japan	   not	   playing	   by	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   free	  market	  and	  an	  open	   trading	  system	  (P25:46;	  P26:1;	  P27:11f.;	  P38:21;	  P39:48;	  P42:34;	  P64:34;	  P68:7,	  22;	  P71:39;	  P71:63,	  117;	  P73:142;	  P80:5;	  P107:1;	  P135:2;	  P198:9),	  while	  itself	  benefitting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  288	  Relating	   to	  both	   Japan	  and	  China	   the	  U.S.	  was	  also	  nominated	  as	  a	  $	  1	  trillion	  debtor	   or	   contrastingly	   the	  world’s	  
largest	  creditor	  into	  the	  1970’s	  (P133:78).	  289	  While	   the	   trade	  deficits	  certainly	  contributed	  to	   these	  economic	  problems	  of	   the	  U.S.,	   they	  were	  not	   the	  sole	  and	  only	  reason,	  see	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis,	  overviews,	  summary	  and	  conclusion.	  	  290	  The	   expression	   ‘Japan	   Inc.’	   occasionally	   came	   up	   already	   in	   the	   1930s,	   but	   became	  more	   frequent	   in	   the	   1970s.	  ‘Western’	  commentators	  generally	  used	  it	  as	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  Japan’s	  economic	  success,	  referring	  to	  what	  was	  seen	   as	   cooperative	   structure	   between	   Japanese	   companies,	   as	   well	   as	   their	   ‘protection’	   through	   the	   government,	  especially	  the	  Ministry	  of	  International	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  (MITI).	  ‘Japan	  Inc.’	  also	  referred	  to	  what	  was	  discerned	  as	  Japan’s	  strategy	  or	  pursuit	  of	  economic	  success	  as	  first	  priority	  (cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  23,	  152).	  291	  On	  whether	  the	  frequency	  of	  ‘fairness/unfairness’	  references	  in	  the	  print	  media	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  trade	  deficit,	  see	  Hummel	  who	  points	  to	  different	  findings	  of	  studies	  in	  this	  regard	  (cf.	  Hummel	  2000,	  187).	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from	   it	   (P2:3;	  P18:42;	  P65:7;	  P66:16;	  P67:28;	  P69:2ff.;	  P73:143).	   Japan	   is	   seen	  as	  purposefully	  restricting	  the	  access	  of	  American	  products	  to	  Japanese	  markets	  (P6:36;	  P13:30;	  P28:4;	  P34:7,	  33;	  P68:9;	  P68:21;	  P105:112;	  P121:4;	  P129:1)	  and	  enabling	  not	  only	  more	  Japanese	  imports	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  but	  also	  unfair	  marketing	  prices	  by	  Japanese	  companies	  in	  the	  U.S.	   (P13:30;	  P68:20;	  P73:32;	  P85:2;	  P89:16;	  P101:2;	  P105:19;	  P151:11ff.).	  This	  is	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  nominations	  of	  the	  U.S.	  as	  
dumping	   ground.	   Referring	   to	   its	   ‘unfairness’,	   Japan	   is	   called	   the	   worst	   case	   example	   of	   being	  
unfair	   (P69:3;	   P71:161,	   122;P72:1;	   P73:82;	   P84:10;	   P102:2f.;	   P107:1),	   protectionist	   (P42:40;	  P68:21;	   P92:28,	   P95:21,	   26)	   and	  mercantilist	   (P73:127;	   P95:21),	   which	   are	   the	  most	   common	  predications.292	  ‘Unfair	  appears	  255	  times	  (see	  table	  five)	  and	  protectionist	  102	  times.	  Moreover,	   as	   already	   pointed	   to	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   more	   general	   nominations	   and	  predications,	  throughout	  the	  years	  Japan	  is	  referred	  to	  on	  a	  more	  personal	  level	  for	  instance	  as	  
greed-­‐filled	   (power	   elite)	   (P85:5),	   bureaucrats	   (P27:50;	   P40:13;	   P42:30;	   P63:19;	   P104:3f.;	  P122:2),	   as	   having	   a	   style	   of	  agreeing	   in	  principle	   to	  an	   issue	  and	   then	  seeking	   to	  renegotiate	   it	  
until	  [getting]	  what	  [it]	  want[s]	  (P22:11),	  as	  offering	  lame	  excuses	  (P27:50),	  screwing	  us	  (P31:37),	  
not	  giving	  up	  anything	   (P47:47),	  engaging	   in	  one-­‐way	  trade	   (P56:8),	   cheating	  (their	  consumers)	  (P68:43;	   P132:14),	   capitalizing	  on	  our	  generosity	   (P71:83),	   being	   single	  minded	   (P71:104)	   and	  
not	  interested	  in	  fair	  trade	  (P71:48).	  In	  addition,	  Japan	  is	  characterized	  as	  taking	  advantage	  of	  us	  (P71:	   122),	   all	   take	   and	   no	   give	   (P:72:1),	   refusing	   to	   trade	   on	   an	   equal	   playing	   field	   (P73:31),	  
adept	  at	  finding	  opportunities	  to	  deviate	  from	  agreements	  (P84:13),	  obsessed	  with	  money	  (P85:1),	  as	  an	  equal	  opportunity	  protectionist	  (P92:28),	  insensitive	  to	  the	  relationship	  with	  us	  […	  and]	  with	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  (P93:7),	  and	  as	  employing	  a	  double	  standard	  (P103:1).	  In	  an	  intensified	  way,	  it	   is	   even	  claimed	   that:	  The	  Japs	  even	  have	  a	  word	  […]	  called	  HARAGE	  (pronounced	  Ha-­‐Rah-­‐Gay)	  
which	  […]	  means	  saying	  one	  thing	  when	  you	  really	  mean	  the	  opposite	  (P28:2).	  These	  lines	  of	  argumentation	  stand	  for	  the	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  towards	  Japan,	  that	  aim	  at	   articulating	   Japan	   in	   its	   ‘unfairness’	   as	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   the	   U.S.	   ‘Fairness’	  becomes	  the	  central	  empty	  signifier,	  and	  the	  ‘lack	  of	  fairness’	  the	  central	  ‘problem’.	  The	  signifier	  is	   literally	  empty,	  as	  when	  referring	  to	   Japan	   it	   is	   literally	  present	  only	  through	   its	  absence,	   i.e.	  being	  articulated	  through	  its	  opposite,	   ‘unfairness’,	  and	  the	  other	  characterizations	  that	  equally	  stand	   for,	   or	   evoke	   unfairness	   (i.e.	   protectionist,	   mercantilist,	   greedy	   etc.).	   Meanwhile,	   these	  attributions	  also	  reflect	  a	  degree	  of	  frustration	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  with	  not	  being	  successful	  in	  the	  trade	  negotiations	   with	   Japan,	   which	   will	   be	   addressed	   under	   the	   category	   of	   perspectivation	   in	  chapter	  six.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  292	  Like	  with	  the	  trade	  deficit,	  most	  assessments	  of	  Japan’s	  economic	  policies	  do	  regard	  some	  practices	  as	  detrimental	  to	  the	  U.S.	  and	  to	  ‘free	  trade’,	  however	  the	  picture	  was	  not	  as	  black	  and	  white	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  direct	  consequences	  for	  the	  U.S.	  economy.	  See	  in	  what	  follows,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  conclusion.	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On	   the	   other	   side,	   there	   are	   voices	   building	   chains	   of	   difference	   aiming	   at	   weakening	   the	  potential	  antagonisms.	  Japan	  is	  frequently	  referred	  to	  as	  friend(s)	  (e.g.	  P71:10,	  38),	  (strong/great)	  
ally	   (e.g.	   P71:11,	   38;	   P71:45;	   P73:149),	   and	   (trading)partner	   (e.g.	   P25:46;	   P97:3).	   The	  relationship	   with	   Japan	   is	   seen	   as	   endangered	   (P17:35;	   P25:47;	   P27:7;	   P28:3;	   P34:7;	   P38:33;	  P68:13;	   P73:145;	   P106:1)	   because	   of	   the	   trade	   deficit,	   and	   also	   because	   of	   growing	   public	  resentment	  towards	  Japan	  (P2:17;	  P79:2,	  5;	  P140:2),	  that	  partly	  results	  from	  the	  trade	  deficit.	  (cf.	  also	  Nanto	  1992,	  2,	  and	  the	  ‘emotional’	  aspects	  of	  the	  congressional	  debates	  under	  the	  category	  of	  perspectivation).	  Already	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s	  warnings	  about	  U.S.	  protectionism	  (P30:10;	  P40:13)	  and	   the	   return	   of	   Smoot-­‐Hawley	   (P21:11f.)293	  as	   response	   to	   the	   trade	   deficit	   were	   brought	  forward,	   in	   line	   with	   cautions	   about	   making	   Japan	   a	   single	   scapegoat	   (P27:9).	   Instead	   these	  expressions	   called	   for	   ‘putting	   the	   own	   house	   in	   order’	   and	   for	   not	   seeking	   to	   externalize	  
problems	   through	   trade	  protectionism,	  and	   the	  mistaken	   impression	   in	  Congress	   that	   changes	   in	  
the	  trade	  policy	  would	  turn	  around	  the	  deficit	  (P52:30)	  (see	  also	  perspectivation).	  	  The	  latter	  statement	  is	  an	  important	  argument	  on	  the	  balanced	  side	  of	  the	  debates,	  and	  it	  is	   also	   voiced	   with	   China:	   even	   if	   Japan,	   and	   later	   China,	   would	   fundamentally	   alter	   its	   trade	  practices	   –	   regardless	   of	   whether	   they	   were	   actually	   ‘unfair’	   or	   not	   –	   it	   would	   not	   have	   a	  significant	   impact	   on	   the	   trade	   deficit,	   unless	   the	   U.S.	   did	   not	   engage	   in	   reforms	   in	   economic	  policies	  on	  a	  broader	  scale.294	  Invoking	  Smoot	  Hawley	  in	  this	  context	  was	  the	  negative	  metaphor	  for	  protectionism	  at	   the	   time,	   it	  was	   likened	   to	   “an	   image	  as	  powerful	   in	   the	   foreign	  economic	  sphere	  as	  that	  of	  Munich	  in	  the	  political-­‐military	  sphere”	  (cf.	  Mastanduno	  1992,	  239).295	  	  
Self-­‐criticisms	  –	  putting	  the	  own	  house	  in	  order	  	  The	  calls	  for	  ‘putting	  the	  own	  house	  in	  order’	  however	  have	  two	  sides:	  criticizing	  Congress	  itself	  in	   terms	   of	   partly	   giving	   in	   to	   the	   dislocation,	   or	   blaming	   the	   executive	   (and	   sometimes	   the	  advocates	  of	   free	  trade	  also	  within	  Congress	  more	  generally)	   for	   its	   inadequate	  handling	  of	  the	  issue,	   in	   terms	   of	   articulating	   internal	   chains	   of	   equivalence.	   Especially	   in	   the	   mid	   1980s	   the	  executive	   is	   held	   responsible	   for	   its	   allegedly	  poor	  handling	  of	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   economic	  policy	  issues.	  So	  it	  is	  argued	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  that	  the	  administration	  is	  not	  standing	  up	  to	  Japan	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  293	  The	   so-­‐called	   Smoot-­‐Hawley	  Tariff	  Act	   of	   1930	   (named	  after	   its	   sponsors)	   raised	   tariffs	   on	   imports	   into	   the	  U.S.	  significantly,	   over	   52	   per	   cent	   on	   average.	   It	   was	   and	   is	   attributed	   with	   being	   one	   major	   cause	   of	   the	   economic	  depression	   of	   the	   1930s	   –	   as	   the	   trading	   partners	   of	   the	   U.S.	   retaliated	   –	   and	   even	   the	   ensuing	   political	   climate	  ultimately	  taken	  to	  have	  lead	  up	  to	  WWII	  (J.	  Goldstein	  1993,	  125f.;	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  37;	  Kunkel	  2003,	  28).	  	  294	  See	  for	  instance	  Kunkel,	  and	  also	  in	  	  what	  follows	  on	  ‘free	  traders	  versus	  hardliners’	  (Kunkel	  2003,	  53,	  71).	  	  	  295	  ‘Munich’	   in	   this	  sense	  stands	  negatively	   for	  a	  policy	  of	  appeasement,	   referring	   to	   the	  Munich	  Conference	  of	  1938	  where	  Britain	  and	  France	  did	  not	  challenge	  Germany’s	  partial	  annexation	  of	  Czechoslovakia,	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  preventing	  a	  major	  war	  in	  Europe.	  See	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  under	  ‘appeasement’	  in	  chapter	  seven	  on	  intensification.	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(P1:3;	   P3:4;	   P4:6;	   P11:19;	   P40:13;	   P42:38,	   40;	   P50:40;	   P61:19;	   P68:7f.;	   P71:66,	   117;	   P73:125;	  P82:4;	  P84:5;	  P95:47;	  P127:1)	  and	  thus	  was	  practically	  inciting	  Japan	  to	  continue	  with	  its	  ‘unfair	  trade’	   (P13:12;	   P16:44;	   P27:50;	   P29:35;	   P46:49;	   P68:21).296	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   trade	   deficit	   is	  (partly)	   also	   articulated	   as	   a	   result	   of	   substantially	   failed	   domestic	   and	   trade	   policies	   (P8:3;	  P9:11;	  P68:29;	  P89:18),	  like	  neglecting	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  high	  exchange	  rate	  of	  the	  dollar	  (P2:17;	  P6:36;	  P16:45;	  P21:11;	  P24:1;	  P25:47;	  P50:3;	  P68:11,	  15),	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  seen	  as	  resulting	  from	  the	  rising	  federal	  deficit	  and	  spending	  (P2:17;	  P6:36;	  P8:3;	  P27:7;	  P30:10;	  P50:3;	  P52:30;	  P53:7;	  P77:4;	  P109:4).297	  As	  the	  Plaza	  Accords	  of	  1985	  did	  not	  show	  the	  desired	  long-­‐term	  effects	  on	  the	  value	   of	   the	   dollar,	   this	   discussion	   persisted	   well	   beyond	   that	   year	   and	   also	   the	   immediately	  following	  ones.	  	  In	  the	  mid	  1990s	  one	  of	  the	  central	  arguments	  of	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  trade	  deficit	  with	  Japan,	  was	  on	  whether	  numerical	  targets298	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  ‘results	  oriented	  trade	  policy’	  (Reifman	  1989;	   cf.	   i.e.	   Schoppa	   1997,	   258)	   would	   be	   the	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   (P106:2;	   P107:1),	   or	  whether	  this	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  U.S.	  in	  fact	  managing	  trade	  or	  being	  credibly	  accused	  of	  doing	  so	  (P106:4),	  which	   conflicted	  with	  U.S.	   identity	   as	   a	   free	   trader.299	  The	   1992	  CRS-­‐report	   on	   trade	  points	  to	  the	  central	  difference	  between	  the	  philosophies	  of	  ‘free	  market’	  vs.	  ‘managed	  trade’,	  as	  in	  a	   ‘free	  market’	  view	  “as	   long	  as	  the	  rules	  for	  entry	  and	  subsequent	  market	  activities	  are	  fair,	  the	  outcome	  must	  be	  fair”.	  For	  ‘managed	  trade’	  “an	  outcome	  can	  be	  unfair	  even	  if	  the	  process	  is	  fair,	   because	   results	   are	   affected	   not	   only	   by	   market	   access	   and	   rules	   but	   by	   past	   practices,	  perceptions,	  or	  advantages	  of	  existing	  position”	  (Nanto	  1992,	  14).	  The	  three	  main	  observations	  behind	  the	  ‘managed	  trade’	  approach	  cited	  by	  the	  report	  are	  basically	  in	  line	  with	  the	  revisionist	  positions:	   (1)	   Japan’s	   economy	   and	   society	   are	   different	   from	   those	   in	   other	   industrialized	  nations	   in	   the	   world,	   from	   which	   it	   follows	   that	   Japan	   requires	   different	   policies;	   (2)	   Japan’s	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  See	   introduction	   and	   the	   introduction	   to	   the	   analysis	   for	   references	   to	   congressional	   pressure	   towards	   the	  administration	  especially	  in	  and	  since	  1985.	  297	  See	  footnote	  on	  the	  Plaza	  Accords	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis.	  298	  The	  precedent	   or	   first	   step	   away	   from	  a	  process-­‐	   towards	   a	   results-­‐oriented	  market	   access	   approach	  was	   taken	  with	  the	  Semiconductor	  Agreement	  in	  1986,	  while	   it	  had	  already	  been	  advocated	  by	  the	  Commerce	  Department	  and	  the	  United	  States	  Trade	  Representative	  (USTR)	  prior	  to	  the	  MOSS	  talks	  in	  1985	  (cf.	  Schoppa	  1997,	  71).	  Concerning	  the	  negotiations	  on	  semiconductors,	  the	  U.S.	  side	  maintained,	  that	  Japan	  had	  agreed	  to	  the	  concrete	  numerical	  target	  of	  20	  per	   cent	   share	   of	   the	   Japanese	   semiconductor	  market,	  while	   Japan	   denied	   having	   ever	  made	   a	   concession	   like	   that	  (Hummel	  2000,	  147;	  cf.	  Kunkel	  2003,	  83).	  The	  Clinton	  administration’s	  goal	  in	  the	  Framework	  Talks	  in	  1994	  again	  was	  focused	  on	  setting	  ‘objective	  criteria’	  for	  evaluating	  whether	  the	  market	  share	  had	  increased	  or	  not,	  what	  was	  opposed	  by	   the	   Japanese	  as	   they	   interpreted	   these	  as	   ‘numerical	   targets’	   that	   they	   rejected,	   also	  based	  on	   the	  1986/87	   (and	  similar	  ones	  in	  1992)	  experiences.	  299	  See	  also	  what	  follows	  on	  ‘free	  traders’	  vs.	  ‘hard-­‐liners’.	  	  Within	  the	  executive	  there	  was	  a	  debate	  on	  ‘managed	  trade’	  already	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s	  (that	  continued	  under	  Bush	  in	  the	  1990s),	  when	   the	  Reagan	   administration	  was	  becoming	  more	   assertive	   towards	   Japan,	   as	   it	  was	   facing	  harsher	  attitudes	  from	  Congress,	  see	  introduction	  (cf.	  Schoppa	  1997,	  67,	  71).	  	  Furthermore	   the	  CRS	   report	   on	   Japanese	   investment	   also	   pointed	   to	   the	   argument	   by	   some	   analysts,	   “that	   concern	  over	   Japanese	   investments	   in	   the	   U.S.	   businesses,	   whether	   warranted	   or	   not,	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   undermine	   the	  historical	  U.S.	  position	  as	  the	  champion	  of	  the	  free	  international	  flow	  of	  investment	  and	  goods”	  (J.	  K.	  Jackson	  1990,	  30).	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government	   plays	   a	   greater	   role	   in	   the	   operations	   of	   individual	   companies	   than	   does	   the	   U.S.	  government;	   (3)	   the	   style	   of	   negotiations	   and	   pressures	   at	   that	   time	  was	   harming	   the	   overall	  relationship	  with	  Japan,	  calling	  for	  other	  ways	  to	  resolve	  bilateral	  differences	  (Nanto	  1992,	  16).	  The	   third	  point	  however	  was	  not	  of	  primary	  concern	   to	   the	  revisionists	  who	  advocated	  a	  hard	  line	   approach	   towards	   Japan.	   The	   1992	   report	   concludes	   that	   “although	   managed	   trade	   is	  presented	  as	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  trade	  disputes,	  it	  essentially	  would	  be	  a	  system	  of	  government-­‐administered	   trade	   targets	   and	   quotas”,	   and	   points	   out	   that	   most	   economists	   believed	   that	   it	  could	  lead	  to	  inefficiencies	  and	  distortions	  of	  	  trade	  with	  third	  countries	  (Nanto	  1992,	  16).	  	  In	   this	   sense,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   debates	   on	   possible	   sanctions	   on	   Japanese	  auto(parts)-­‐imports	   in	   1995,	   from	   the	   free-­‐trade	   perspective	   plenty	   of	   criticism	   is	   voiced	  towards	  the	  administration.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  sanctions	  would	  violate	  the	  U.S.	  commitment	  to	  free	  trade	  (P120:2,	  6),	  threaten	  jobs	  in	  the	  country	  (P120:3),	  and	  –	  while	  being	  politically	  popular	  –	  might	  create	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  very	  serious	  trade	  war	  (P120:4,	  6;	  P127:1f.),	  and	  make	  the	  U.S.	  
stand	  against	  our	  allies	  and	  trading	  partners	  (P120:6).	  In	  this	  line	  of	  argumentation	  the	  ultimate	  ‘superiority’	  of	   the	  U.S.	   is	  emphasized,	   for	   instance	  by	  arguing	  that,	  provided	  that	   there	   is	  truly	  
free	   trade,	   American	   industries	   don’t	   need	   protection,	   they	   need	   competition	   (P174:10).	   On	   the	  other	  hand	  –	  and	  this	  is	  a	  parallel	  to	  the	  debates	  on	  ‘free	  trade’	  with	  China	  –	  free	  trade	  as	  policy	  and	  principle	   is	   criticized	   in	   terms	  of	  being	  articulated	  as	   a	  Western	  myth	   that	  does	  not	   fit	   the	  
New	  World	  Order	  anymore	  (P166:1;	  also	  already	  called	  ‘an	  ideology’	  earlier,	  see	  P20:37),	  because	  in	  this	  line	  of	  argumentation	  economic	  policies	  should	  relate	  less	  to	  broader	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  (like	   after	   WWII),	   but	   follow	   American	   interests	   (P173:3;	   P174:13).	   From	   this	   view,	   the	  promotion	   of	   free	   markets	   is	   articulated	   as	   in	   America’s	   interests,	   but	   not	   as	   absolute	   goal	  (P174:13).	  	  The	   dividing	   line	   between	   what	   John	   Kunkel	   for	   instance	   calls	   the	   ‘free	   trade	   –	   good	  relations’	   and	   the	   ‘hardline	  –	   Japan	   is	  different’	   coalitions300	  from	  an	  economic	  perspective	   ran	  along	   the	   free	   traders’	   view	   that	   the	   ‘Japan	   problem’	   was	   either	   a	   political	   problem,	   or	   a	  macroeconomic	   problem	   ensuing	   from	   U.S.	   economic	   policies,	   that	   was	   not	   caused	   by	   Japan’s	  trade	  barriers.	  In	  any	  case	  free	  trade	  was	  seen	  as	  best	  policy,	  as	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  lose	  from	  restrictive	  actions	  against	  Japan	  (while	  any	  Japanese	  barriers	  in	  the	  end	  were	  to	  their	  own	   disadvantage),	   and	   that	   the	   bilateral	   trade	   deficit	   actually	   did	   not	   impact	   U.S.	   economic	  prosperity.	  According	   to	   this	  view,	  even	  an	  opening	  of	   the	   Japanese	  market	  would	  have	  only	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  300	  In	  other	   terms	   those	  advocating	  an	  accommodating	  approach	   towards	   Japan	  were	  at	   their	   time	  also	   for	   instance	  	  called	  ‘Japan	  lobby’	  or	  ‘Chrysanthemum	  Club’	  vs.	  ‘Japan	  bashers’	  (Kunkel	  2003,	  55;	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  50).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  China	   the	   ‘equivalent’	   terms	   are	   for	   example	   ‘China	   lobby’	   or	   ‘Panda	   huggers’	   versus	   ‘China	   bashers’	   or	   ‘Dragon-­‐Slayers’	  (cf.	  i.e.	  P.	  Gries	  2014,	  331).	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minimal	   impact	   on	   the	   trade	   deficit,	   if	   it	   did	   not	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   changes	   in	   U.S.	  macroeconomic	  policies	   such	  as	   the	   savings,	   investment	   and	  exchange	   rates.	  The	  hardliners	   in	  turn	  argued	  that	   ‘free	  trade’	  with	  Japan	  would	  not	  work,	  as	  in	  its	  structural	  barriers	  to	  imports	  Japan	   was	   seen	   as	   different	   from	   other	   advanced	   economies.	   Furthermore,	   they	   argued	   that	  Japan’s	   low	   domestic	   demand	   and	   consumption	   rate,	   external	   surpluses	   and	   import	   barriers	  were	  not	  compatible	  with	  its	  increasing	  international	  economic	  responsibilities,	  given	  the	  size	  of	  its	  economy.	  Japan’s	  protectionism	  was	  seen	  first	  in	  tariffs,	  then	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers,	  and	  finally	  its	  industrial	   policy	   (Kunkel	   2003,	   53,	   71).301	  However,	   the	   conciliatory	   voices	   to	   this	   argument	  added,	  that	  trade	  disputes	  should	  be	  handled	  more	  carefully	  with	  a	  partner	  that	  is	  also	  a	  strategic	  ally	   (P174:14).	   On	   the	   other	   side	   this	   also	   connects	   to	   the	   debates	   on	   the	   relation	   between	  security	  and	  economics	  during	  the	  détente	  in	  the	  1980s,	  and	  especially	  after	  the	  Cold	  War,	  that	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  next	  subchapter	  on	  ‘Japan	  as	  competitor’.	  	  A	  few	  years	  later,	  in	  1997,	  and	  connected	  to	  the	  slow-­‐down	  of	  the	  Japanese	  economy	  (in	  the	   wake	   of	   the	   Asian	   financial	   crisis)	   and	   to	   the	   debates	   about	   giving	   so-­‐called	   ‘fast	   track	  negotiation	   authority’	   (since	   2002	   called	   Trade	   Promotion	  Authority,	   TPA)	   to	   the	   President302,	  free	  trade	  as	  key	  American	  principle	  is	  however	  praised	  again	  in	  Congress.	  Coming	  close	  to	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history-­‐arguments	  and	  perspective	  in	  relation	  to	  China,	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  world	  trade	  was	   not	   only	   the	  most	   important	  contribution	  of	  America	   in	   the	  post-­‐World-­‐War	   II	  period,	  but	  that	  it	  also	  stopped	  communism	  in	  Europe,	  […]	  rebuilt	  Japan	  […],	  won	  the	  cold	  war	  […],	  and	  set	  
more	  people	  free	  than	  any	  victory	  in	  any	  war	  in	  the	  history	  of	  mankind	   (P132:11,	  18).	  America	   is	  seen	  as	  dominating	  the	  world	  markets	  (P132:13)	  and	  the	  Japanese	  economy	  as	  on	  its	  back	  (cf.	  also	  Uriu	   2009,	   242),	   as	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   government-­‐dominated	   trade	   fails	   and	   the	   marketplace	  
succeeds	   (P132:14).	   Other	   voices	   still	   criticizing	   the	   free	   trade	   approach	   argue	   against	   being	  labeled	  as	  protectionists	   themselves	  when	  opposing	   fast	   track,	  because	  of	   the	  still	  existing	  and	  growing	  trade	  deficits	  with	  both	   Japan	  and	  China	  (P132:44,	  46).	  Moreover,	   the	  question	  comes	  up,	   whether	   the	   U.S.	   will	   have	   the	   same	   problems	   with	   China	   as	   it	   had	   with	   Japan	   (P155:7;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  301	  This	   view	   was	   rooted	   in	   broader	   theories	   on	   the	   changing	   structure	   of	   international	   trade	   since	   the	   1980s,	  according	   to	   which	   it	   was	   for	   instance	   argued	   that	   the	   government	   should	   intervene	   in	   markets	   and	   economic	  processes	   to	   enhance	   competitiveness	   and	   to	   counter	   what	   were	   articulated	   as	   ‘unfair’	   trade	   practices	   by	   other	  countries	  like	  Japan.	  ‘Free	  trade’	  would	  only	  work	  if	  it	  was	  ‘fair’	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘reciprocal’.	  (cf.	  Paulsen	  1999,	  34,	  37,	  40,	  53;	  see	  also	  Schoppa	  1997,	  70).	  	  Most	  authors	  classify	   the	   ‘free	   trade’	  view	  as	   ‘hegemonic’	   (i.e.	  Hummel	  2000,	  190)	   in	  guiding	  American	   trade	  policy	  since	   the	  Great	  Depression,	   i.e.	   in	   terms	  of	   	   being	   “orthodox”	   (Schoppa	  1997,	   70),	   a	   “shared	  belief	   system”	   (Kunkel	  2003,	  24),	  a	  “consensus”	  (J.	  Goldstein	  1993,	  247).	  See	  also	  introduction	  for	  the	  ‘free	  trade	  inclination’	  of	  the	  executive.	  302	  According	  to	  the	  Trade	  Act	  of	  1974	  the	  Fast	  Track	  mechanism	  granted	  the	  president	  with	  the	  right	  to	  negotiate	  and	  conclude	   trade	   agreements	   while	   keeping	   Congress	   and	   the	   respective	   committees	   informed.	   Congress	   then	   could	  approve	  the	  agreement	  without	  any	  changes,	  or	  reject	   it	  as	  such	  within	  60	  days.	  Until	   the	  1990s	  Congress	  regularly	  granted	  and	  extended	  Fast	  Track	  for	  the	  prescribed	  three	  years,	   in	  1994	  however	  Clinton	  failed	  to	  get	  congressional	  approval	  (cf.	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  40).	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  was	  granted	  TPA	  from	  2002	  until	  2007,	  while	  President	  Obama	  has	  announced	  pursuing	  it	  in	  and	  since	  2012.	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P132:79,	  87;	  P133:17ff.;	  P135:4)303,	  as	  the	  trade	  deficit	  with	  China	  is	  also	  growing:	  If	  the	  United	  
States	  simply	  accepts	  Japanese	  intransigence,	  how	  will	  it	  succeed	  in	  opening	  markets	  in	  China	  –	  […]	  
–	  or	   in	  other	  mercantilist	  countries?	   (P108:3)	   and	   if	   the	  United	  States	   insists	  on	  open	  markets	   in	  
Japan,	  how	  about	  China?.	  We	  have	  the	  same	  circumstance	  with	  China	  […]	  Exploding	  trade	  deficit,	  
but	  no	  decisive	  action	  by	  the	  United	  States	  (P164:2).304	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  relating	  to	  the	  ambiguities	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference	  in	  Congress,	  the	  U.S.	  in	  general	  is	  also	  characterized	  as	  paper	  tiger	  (P4:5),	  naive	  (P29:34)	  and	  (therefore)	  not	  very	  
daring,	   decent	   and	   fair	   to	   our	   own	   people	   (P29:33),	   weak	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   trade	   issues	   (as	  opposed	  to	  used	  to	  being	  known	  as	  a	  bunch	  of	  shrewd	  Yankee	  traders	  (P71:77-­‐119)).	  It	  is	  claimed	  that	   in	   consequence	   the	  U.S.	   is	  being	  taken	  for	  a	  ride	  again	  by	  the	  Japanese	   (P93:40),	   is	   inept	  in	  
handling	  our	  trade	  relations	  with	  Japan	  (P95:48),	  and	  that	  the	  U.S.	  suffered	  from	  a	  decline	  in	  self	  
esteem	  [that]	  puzzles	  both	  our	  allies	  and	  rivals	   (P109:2).	  The	  most	   intense	  expressions	  however	  articulate	  the	  U.S.	  not	  only	  as	  victims	  of	  unfair	  trade	  (P108:	  2;	  P115:2)	  but	  even	  as	  having	  become	  an	   economic	   colony	   (P115:4,	   this	   is	   taken	   up	   under	   the	   category	   of	   intensification	   in	   chapter	  seven).	  On	   the	   one	  hand	   it	   is	   argued	   in	   this	   respect	   that	   these	   consequences	  were	   the	   fault	   of	  
wimpy	  diplomats	   (P73:55),	  but	  also,	  more	  self	  critically,	   that	  Congress	   itself	  has	  been	  a	  bunch	  of	  
wimps	  (P130:1),	  and	  that	   it	  has	  not	  had	  the	  courage	  and	  the	  guts	  to	  stand	  and	  say	  to	  our	  friends,	  
‘Do	  what	   is	   right’	   (P92:30,	   33).	   These	   articulations	   are	   connected	   to	   arguments	   about	   having	  emphasized	  safeguarding	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  broader	  political	  picture	  to	  an	  overwhelming	  extent,	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  field	  of	  trade	  policy	  (see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  next	  subchapter	   on	   Japan	   as	   competitor,	   and	   there	   in	   the	   footnote	   on	   ‘economic	   security’).	  Contrastingly	   Japan	   is	   articulated	   as	   the	  only	  country	   in	  the	  world	  that	  will	  come	  away	  from	  the	  
negotiating	   table	   with	   us	   100	   percent	   of	   the	   time	   with	   100	   percent	   of	   what	   was	   on	   the	   table	  (P93:31).	  	  	  As	   the	   previous	   two	   subchapters	   show,	   there	   remain	   ambiguities	   in	   both,	   the	   external	   and	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  arguments	  about	  the	  unfairness	  of	  Japan	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   role	   of	  U.S.	   policies	   in	   the	   trade	   deficit.	   An	   attempt	   to	   deal	  with	   these	  ambiguities	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  argument	  on	  Japan	  being	  ‘different’	  in	  a	  cultural	  and	  societal	  sense.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  303	  The	   other	   countries	   contributing	   to	   the	   U.S.	   trade	   deficit	   are	   cited	   as	   Mexico,	   Canada,	   (and	   to	   some	   extent	   the	  European	  Union).	  304	  While	  the	  trade	  deficit	  with	  Japan	  had	  fallen	  from	  $65.7	  billion	  in	  1994	  to	  $47.6	  billion	  in	  1996,	  China’s	  surplus	  was	  steadily	   rising,	   from	  $10	  billion	   in	  1990	   to	  $83.8	  billion	   in	  1999	  (see	   figure	   five),	  which	  was	  also	   the	   first	  year	   that	  China’s	  surplus	  surpassed	  that	  of	  Japan	  (Uriu	  2009,	  242).	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Japan	  as	  ‘different’	  	  Relating	   to	   the	   arguments	   about	   ‘unfairness’	   and	   ‘Japan	   playing	   by	   different	   rules’	   are	  characterizations	  of	  Japan	  not	  only	  as	  economically,	  but	  also	  as	  culturally	  and	  societally	  ‘different’	  in	   character	   (P73:135,	   here	   referring	   to	   Clyde	   Prestowitz),	   which	   in	   turn	   in	   this	   line	   of	  argumentation	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  economic	  realm	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘causing’	  them.	  Some	  of	   these	   characterizations	   come	  up	   already	   in	   the	  1980s,	   before	   the	   ‘high	   tides’	   of	   revisionism	  within	  the	  Clinton-­‐administration	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.305	  In	  my	  reading,	  these	  arguments	  serve	  to	  weaken	  the	  internal	  differences	  and	  build	  up	  and	  strengthen	  the	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Japan.	   Referring	   to	   differences	   in	   the	   economy	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	   Japanese	   are	   playing	  by	  a	  
different	  set	  of	  rules	  (P25:46;	  P27:11;	  P69:3),	  planning	  their	  economy	  (P71:39),	  or,	  more	  explicitly,	  
not	   playing	   by	   the	   same	   rule	   book	   as	   Western	   nations	   (P121:5).	   The	   Japanese	   system,	   with	   its	  
structural	  barriers	  and	  government	   intervention	   is	   articulated	   as	  different	   from	  any	  other	   in	   the	  
world	  (P86:1).	  The	  Keiretsu-­‐system	  […]	  incompatible	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  free	  international	  trade	  (P122:1,	   3)306	  is	   emphasized,	   and	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   in	   general	   is	   characterized	   as	   a	   cozy,	  
interlocking	   system	   of	   cartels	   that	   excludes	   others	   (P80:3),	   and	   equally	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  
Japanese	   economy	   is	   described	   as	   facilitating	   horizontal	   agreements	   and	   cartel-­‐like	   behavior	  (P34:9)	  and	  as	  completely	  export	  oriented	  (P74:2,	  7;	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  Japanese	  consumers,	  see	  in	  what	  follows).	  It	  is	  also	  maintained,	  that	  although	  Japan	  in	  general	  was	  viewed	  as	  part	  of	  ‘the	  West’,	   that	   if	   Japan	   were	   a	   normal	   capitalist	   nation,	   it	   would	   not	   view	   its	   trade	   surplus	   as	   an	  
indication	  of	  its	  superiority	  over	  the	  West	  (P93:14).	  	  Furthermore	   it	   is	  pointed	  out	   frequently	   that	   Japan	  does	  not	  have	  a	   ‘consumer	  culture’	  like	  the	  U.S.,	  but	  that	  in	  Japan	  the	  customer	  comes	  last	  (P73:49;	  P88:1ff.;	  P93:16;	  P93:37;	  P104:4),	  as	   they	   are	  measuring	   the	   strength	   of	   a	   nation	   not	   by	  what	   it	   can	   consume	   but	   by	  what	   it	   can	  
produce	   (P132:52).307	  In	   a	   debate	   under	   the	   topic	   The	   Lack	   of	   Japanese	   Consumer	   Culture	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  305	  See	   introduction	   and	   chapter	   one	   for	   the	   central	   arguments	   of	   the	   revisionists.	   See	   also	   i.e.	  N.	  Morris	   (2010,	   27,	  31ff.).	  	  306	  See	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis.	  The	  1992	  CRS	  report	  points	  to	  an	  exaggeration	  on	  the	  U.S.	  side,	  when	  it	  came	  to	  perceptions	   of	   keiretsus,	   as	   having	   “conjured	   images	   in	   the	   American	   psyche	   of	   giant	   monopolies	   or	   cartels	   long	  outlawed	  in	  the	  United	  States”	  (Nanto	  1992,	  1).	  	  	  307	  This	  argument	  is	  also	  put	  forward	  for	  instance	  by	  Huntington,	  who	  speaks	  of	  Japan’s	  “producer	  dominance”	  as	  one	  component	  of	  its	  “strategy	  of	  economic	  power	  maximation”	  (Huntington	  1993,	  73).	  He	  further	  argues	  that	  “among	  the	  industrialized	  nations	  Japan	  is	  unique	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  gives	  priority	  to	  economic	  power	  over	  economic	  well-­‐being”	  (ibid.),	  which	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  ‘Japan	  is	  different	  from	  the	  West’	  -­‐arguments.	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America’s	  tradition	  has,	  at	  least	  in	  this	  century,	  been	  one	  where	  those	  obtaining	  wealth	  are,	  and	  feel	  
obligated,	  to	  insure	  the	  welfare	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  Japan,	  a	  country	  with	  vastly	  different,	  if	  not	  
contrary	   ideas,	   this	   is	   simply	   not	   the	   case.	   […]	   It	   results	   in	   an	   intricate	  web	   of	   price	   supports,	   tax	  
subsidies,	   special	   benefits,	   targeted	   incentives,	   discretionary	   guidelines,	   and	   the	   like.	   In	   short,	   a	  
perfect	  environment	  for	  favoritism,	  patronage,	  influence	  peddling,	  bribery	  and	  extortion	  (P88:1f.).	  	  	  	  Additionally,	  when	  speaking	  about	  Japan’s	  aggressive	  export	  expansion	  and	  […]	  resolute	  resistance	  
to	   imports	   other	   than	   raw	   materials	   into	   its	   own	   domestic	   market,	   it	   is	   put	   forward	   that	   the	  
strategy	  is	  deeply	  infused	  into	  the	  procedures	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Government	  and	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  
Japanese	  people	  (P68:9).	  This	  relates	  to	  the	  arguments	  about	  differences	  in	  Japanese	  society	  and	  culture	   that	   again	  were	  made	   already	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1980s:	   the	   Japanese	  at	  home	   […]	  have	  a	   very	  
different	   structured	   society.	   I	   do	   not	   know	   that	   we	   anymore	   would	   like	   the	   structured,	   planned,	  
highly	   controlled	   society	   of	   an	   out	   and	   out	   Socialist	   economy	   (P18:47).	   For	   example,	   import	  barriers	  are	  viewed	  as	  government-­‐imposed	  but	  also	  as	  cultural	  (P76:2),	  as	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  Japanese	  have	  a	  different	  mentality	   and	  cultural	  constraints	   (P58:3),	   or	   that	   Japan	  has	   resistant	  
cultural	  attitudes	  (P32:38),	  and	  a	  self-­‐image	  that	  allows	  imports	  of	  raw	  materials,	  but	  of	  the	  fewest	  
foreign	  manufactures	  possible	   (P32:38),	  with	  a	  cultural	  background	  and	  history	  [that]	  it	  has	  long	  
been	  understood	  that	  they	  must	  trade	  to	  survive	  (P42:30).	  	  A	   common	   allegation	   is	   also	   the	   ‘collectivism’	   of	   the	   Japanese,	   as	   when	   Japan	   is	  articulated	   as	   an	   adversary	   whose	   people	   are	   conservative,	   traditional,	   homogenous	   and	  
emphasizing	  the	  group	  rather	  than	  the	  individual	  (P73:49).308	  Likewise,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Americans,	  the	   Japanese	   are	   characterized	   as	   worried	   about	   the	   future	   and	   wary	   of	   risk,	   cautious	   about	  
spending	   (P58:3),	   but	   also	   as	   focusing	   on	   the	   long	   term,	   and	   not	   the	   short	   term	   like	   the	   U.S.	  (P73:12).	  In	  this	  context	  it	  is	  maintained	  that	  Americans	  do	  not	  think	  the	  way	  the	  Japanese	  think.	  
We	   do	   not	   take	   the	   long-­‐range	   view	   (P73:154,	   see	   also	   P69:2;	   P166:1)	   and	   –	   according	   to	   a	  Japanese	   professor	   cited	   in	   the	   debates,	   referring	   to	   the	   ‘fairness’	   argument	   –	   the	   American	  
predisposition	   to	   view	   things	   in	   simplistic	   black-­‐and-­‐white	   terms	   is	   antithetical	   to	   [the	   Japanese	  
mindset]	  (P69:2).	  The	  Japanese	  however	  in	  turn	  are	  criticized	  for	  not	  having	  a	  sense	  of	  absolute	  
right	   or	   wrong	   (P69:3).	   In	   consequence	   it	   is	   argued	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   that	   these	   differences	  require	  new	  approaches	  to	  a	  unique	  problem	  (P31:38),	  or	  that	  it	  is	  the	  overall	  policy	  of	  Japan	  that	  
has	  to	  be	  changed	  (P56:2).	  In	  this	  respect	  –	  and	  this	  is	  a	  similarity	  with	  the	  debates	  on	  free	  trade	  with	   China	   –	   it	   is	   argued	   that	  Western	   misconceptions	   concerning	   the	   Nature	   of	   the	   Japanese	  
challenge	   have	   to	   be	   realized	   by	   the	  U.S.	   in	   order	   not	   to	   continue	   the	   self-­‐imposed	  handicap	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  308	  ‘Collectivism’	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  attributions	  also	  in	  the	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  Japan	  at	  that	  time,	  see	  the	  references	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  Gilpin,	  Kennedy,	  and	  Lipset.	  For	  a	  criticism	  see	  for	  instance	  Campbell	  (1994).	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doctrinal	   adherence	   to	   inapplicable	   free-­‐trade	   theories	   (P69:2;	   P71:8;	   P73:153f.).	   On	   the	   other	  hand	   it	   is	  also	  emphasized	   that	   the	   Japanese	  side	   itself	  was	  using	   the	   ‘difference	  argument’	   for	  maintaining	  trade	  barriers,	  so	  it	  is	  demanded	  that	  they	  should	  stop	  coming	  up	  with	  explanations	  
for	  why	  their	  system	  is	  unique	  (P42:33),	  and	  with	  using	  the	  uniqueness	  argument	  for	  a	  long	  time	  to	  
keep	  out	  our	  commercial	  goods	  (P73:82;	  P73:127;	  P42:31).309	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  these	  characterizations	  of	  Japan	  and	  ‘the	  Japanese’,	  the	  U.S.	  are	  described	  as	  
willing	  to	  take	  risks,	  being	  spenders	  (P58:3),	  treating	  the	  customer	  as	  king	  (P73:49),	  and	  as	  having	  
a	   sense	  of	   right	  and	  wrong	   that	   the	   Japanese	   allegedly	   lack	   (P69:3).	   On	   the	   other	   (self-­‐critical)	  side	   other	   U.S.-­‐characteristics	   are	   voiced	   as	   not	   favorable,	   like	   always	   looking	   at	   short	   term	  
advantages	  and	  in	  the	  worst	  case	  just	  giving	  up	  the	  oven	  (P73:12),	  through	  placing	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  
concern	  on	  the	  diplomatic	  impact	  [of	   trade	  policies]	  (P71:61),	  while	  –	   in	  contrast	   to	   Japan	  –	  not	  having	  realized	  that	  our	  economic	  strength	  is	  our	  national	  security	  and	  that	  trade	  is	  a	  major	  pillar	  
of	  our	  economic	  well-­‐being	  (P73:50)	  (again,	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  on	  ‘economic	  security’	  in	  the	  next	  subchapter).	  	  	  By	  articulating	  Japan	  as	  ‘different’	  not	  only	  from	  the	  U.S.,	  but	  from	  ‘the	  Western	  world’	  in	  general,	  the	  ground	  the	  U.S.	  is	  purportedly	  standing	  on	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Japan	  is	  extended,	  while	  also	  augmenting	  the	  range	  of	  the	  problem	  to	  not	  only	  concerning	  the	  U.S.	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  universalizing	  a	  particular	  claim	   or	   demand.	   This	   was	   for	   instance	   a	   central	   argument	   of	   the	   negotiators	   of	   the	   Bush	  administration	   during	   the	   SII.	   They	   articulated	   Japan	   as	   ‘different’	   and	   out	   of	   step	   with	   the	  advanced	  industrialized	  economies	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  GATT-­‐based	  trading	  system	  (cf.	  Mastanduno	  1992,	  255).	   Furthermore,	   this	   kind	  of	   argumentation	   is	   intended	   to	   foster	   the	  chains	  of	  equivalence	   in	   terms	  of	  essentializing	   Japan’s	  difference	  as	   there	   ‘being	  nothing	  to	  be	  done	  about	  it’,	  as	  in	  this	  view	  the	  difference	  is	  cultural	  and	  societal,	  hence	  too	  deeply	  infused	  to	  possibly	  change.310	  This	  was	  an	  important	  argument	  of	  the	  revisionists,	  as	  the	  consequence	  they	  put	  forward	  was	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  to	  change	  its	  policies	  to	  being	  more	  confrontational,	  concretely,	  demanding	  for	  and	  insisting	  on	  ‘objective	  criteria’	  or	  ‘numerical	  targets’.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  emphasizing	  the	  ‘difference’	  of	  Japan	  is	  in	  line	  with	  articulating	  an	  exclusive	  U.S.	  identity	  that	  does	  not	  give	  room	  of	  manoeuver	  or	  change	  for	  the	  other.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  309	  See	  footnote	  on	  ‘Japanese	  uniqueness’	  in	  the	  introduction.	  310	  While	  differences	   for	   instance	   in	  negotiation	  style	  and	   in	  business	  conventions	  certainly	  existed,	   it	   is	  about	   their	  inscription	   as	   fixed	   and	   essential	   characteristics	   with	   negative	   or	   adversarial	   connotations	   that	   renders	   the	  argumentation	  into	  ‘othering’.	  	  
149	  
	  
Connected	   to	   this	   line	   of	   argumentation	   is	   the	   perspective	   the	   U.S.	   articulates	   itself	   from	  (addressed	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   six),	   as	  well	   as	   the	   question	   on	   the	   consequences	   for	   the	   U.S.-­‐Japanese	  relationship	  and	  the	  global	  standing	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  that	  is	  addressed	  in	  what	  follows.	  	  Overall,	   the	  articulations	   for	  both	   the	  U.S.	   and	   Japan	  are	  not	  unambiguous,	  whereas,	   as	  will	   become	   more	   obvious	   under	   the	   following	   topic	   as	   well	   as	   under	   the	   categories	   of	  perspectivation	   and	   intensification	   (chapters	   six	   and	   seven),	   the	   overall	   dislocation	   of	   U.S.	  identity	  stems	  from	  seeing	  itself	   in	  a	  disadvantageous	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   Japan,	  that	   in	  this	  view	  first	  and	  foremost	  results	  from	  Japan’s	  ‘unfairness’	  through	  its	  difference.	  	  	  
5.2.	  Japan	  as	  competitor	  –	  and	  world	  (economic)	  power?	  
	  This	  topic	  stands	  for	  the	  main	  consequence	  of	  the	  dislocation	  or	  challenge	  to	  the	  U.S.	  through	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  Japan:	  the	  question	  what	  this	  might	  mean	  for	  the	  U.S.	  not	  only	  in	  the	  economic	  realm,	  but	  also	  on	  a	  broader	  scale	  as	  a	  ‘global	  power’.	  Again,	  also	  with	  this	  topic,	  there	  are	  accommodating	  or	  inclusive	  voices	  articulating	  chains	  of	  difference,	  and	  confrontational	  and	  exclusive	  ones	  constructing	  equivalences.	  	  On	   the	   accommodating	   side,	   relating	   to	   this	   topic	   ‘rising	   Japan’	   is	   nominated	   as	  
(big/world)	   economic	   power	   (e.g.	   P72:1;	   P97:4;	   P115:4),	  maturing	   economy	   (P68:43),	   a	   world	  
leader	  [and]	  economic	  and	  financial	  superpower	  (P77:8;	  see	  also	  P83:12;	  P91:1;	  P118:2,	  P63:19),	  and	  the	  newest	  superpower	  (P100:4),	  sometimes	  specified	  as	  second	  largest	  Free-­‐World	  economy	  (P27:7),	  second	  largest	  economic	  power	  in	  the	  free	  world	  (P32:38;	  P56:8)	  or	  one	  of	  the	  three	  super	  
powers	   (P71:157).	   In	   this	   sense	   of	   resemblance	   with	   the	   U.S.,	   Japan	   is	   also	   articulated	   as	  
crucial/important/valuable/good	  ally	  (of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  Pacific)	  (P2:17;	  P38:20;	  P42:38,	  P83:9,	   12;	   P86:1),	   friendly	   neighbor	   (P4:5),	   (important)	   friend	   (P71:10;	   P84:3),	   a	   democratic	  
success	  story,	  a	  nation	  of	  hard-­‐working,	  talented	  people	  who	  can	  bring	  progress	  to	  all	  Asia	  (P31:37;	  P83:9),	   as	   smart,	   tough	  and	  patient	   (in	   negotiating	   on	   trade,	   P42:31;	   P29:35),	  America’s	  major	  
economic	  partner	  (P97:3;	  P127:1),	  as	  one	  of	  the	  two	  engines	  (China	  being	  the	  other	  one)	  driving	  
the	   economic	   future	   of	   the	   Asia-­‐Pacific	   region	   (P113:3),	   and	   as	   seeking	   appropriate	   world	  
responsibilities	   (P91:1).	   In	   terms	  of	   further	  commonalities	  between	  Japan	  and	  the	  U.S.,	   they	  are	  both	  praised	   for	   standing	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   free	  nations	   and	   free	   economies	   of	   the	  world	  (P67:28)	   after	   the	   flower	   of	   friendship	   between	   our	   countries	   blossomed	   upon	   a	   battlefield	  (P67:29),	  hence	  in	  spite	  of	  and	  in	  contrast	  to	  their	  past	  as	  adversaries.	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The	   dislocation,	   or	   ‘root	   cause’	   of	   the	   dislocation	   (on	   the	   ontical	   level!)	   with	   Japan	   however	  emanates	  from	  the	  economic	  realm,	  in	  Japan	  evolving	  from	  being	  conceived	  ‘only’	  as	  a	  competitor	  (P44:170	  in	  1985),	  then	  the	  principal	  economic	  rival	  (P64:35	  in	  1985),	  progressing	  to	  the	  second	  
greatest	   industrial	  power	   (P65:7	   still	   in	   1985),	  a	  technological	  superpower	  (P73:8	   in	  1989),	   the	  
wealthiest	   nation	   in	   the	   world	   (P77:6	   in	   1989),	   and	   finally	   to	   being	   the	   most	   technologically	  
advanced	   nation	   with	   seemingly	   unlimited	   horizons	   (P100:4	   in	   1989).	   In	   this	   line	   of	  argumentation	   this	   is	   first	   and	   foremost	   also	   connected	   to	   Japan	   having	   become	   the	   worlds	  
largest	   creditor/number	  one	   creditor	   country	   (P93:24;	   P97:1;	   P100:1,	   4),	   and	   a	  potential	  world	  
power	  because	  of	  the	  foreign-­‐policy	  leverage	  of	  its	  overwhelming	  financial	  strength	  (P118:2).	  Japan	  is	   seen	   as	   a	   (tightfisted)	   economic	   giant	   (P83:28;	   P63:19),	   the	   fiercest	   competitor	   on	   the	   globe	  (P93:23),	   and	   a	   new	   economic	   enemy	   (P91:8;	   on	   competition	   being	   the	   major	   driving	   force	  behind	  the	  trade	  frictions	  cf.	  also	  Nanto	  1992).	  	  The	  confrontational	  voices	  see	  Japan	  as	  having	  an	  export-­‐or-­‐die	  mentality	   (P85:3),	  as	  an	  
economic	   imperialist	   (P88:1),	   and	   determined	   to	   have	  market	   dominance	   (P92:24;	   P79:2).	   It	   is	  argued	  that	   Japan	   is	  pursuing	  political	  aims	   through	   its	  economic	  endeavor,	  as	  administrators	  in	  
industry	  and	  government	  take	  it	  for	  granted	  that	  Japan	  should	  become	  ever	  more	  invincible	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  a	  potentially	  hostile	  world	   (P79:5,	   7).	   Japan	   is	   attributed	  with	   being	   aware	   of	   economic	  
impacts	   and	   economic	   power	   –	   contrary	   to	   the	   U.S.	   who	   is	   articulated	   as	   considering	   the	  
diplomatic	   impact	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	  military	   power	   on	   the	   other	   (P71:61,	   63)	   –	   while	   the	  Japanese	   are	   defining	   their	   national	   security	   in	   terms	   of	   industrial	   competitiveness	   (P73:12;	  P83:28),	   and	   rightly	  associating	  economic	   strength	  with	  national	   security	   (P73:50).	   This	   line	   of	  reasoning	   is	   again	   in	   line	  with	   the	   revisionist	   view	   of	   Japan	   that	  maintained	   that	   Japan	   had	   a	  particular	   strategy	   to	   build	   up	   its	   overall	   standing	   through	   its	   economic	   policies	   (see	  assessments	   cited	   earlier,	   i.e.	   by	  Huntington,	   that	   Japan	  was	   acting	   in	   line	  with	   realism	   in	   the	  economic	  field)	  through	  targeting	  certain	  industries	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  U.S.311	  	  This	   line	   of	   argumentation	   in	   turn	   has	   consequences	   for	   U.S.-­‐Japanese	   relations,	   which	   are	  addressed	  in	  what	  follows.	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  While	  Japan’s	  economic	  rise	  especially	  in	  the	  early	  years	  was	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  building	  on	  its	  strength	  in	  exporting,	  it	  was	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  not	  as	  ‘closed’	  as	  argued	  by	  the	  hardliners,	  see	  for	  instance	  the	  CRS-­‐report	  by	  Dick	  Nanto,	  who	  (in	  1992)	  argues	   that	   “while	   Japan	  still	  maintains	   some	  notorious	  border	  barriers,	  particularly	   the	   import	  quota	  on	  rice,	  most	  of	  the	  rest	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  other	  industrialized	  nations	  of	  the	  world”	  (Nanto1992,	  summary).	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U.S.	  relations	  with	  Japan	  	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  consequences	  of	  Japan’s	  economic	  rise,	  given	  the	  size	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  Japanese	   economy,	   and	   –	   according	   to	   the	   view	   aimed	   at	   articulating	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   –	  contrary	   to	   what	   Japan	   is	   seen	   as	   making	   out	   of	   it,	   Japan’s	   special	   responsibility	   to	   open	   its	  markets	  is	  frequently	  voiced	  (P34:7;	  P42:29;	  P91:4,	  6;	  P92:27).	  So	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  Japan	  should	  act	  as	  the	  No.	  2	  economic	  power	  in	  the	  world	   (P92:27)	  according	   to	  an	  enlightened	  role	  in	  global	  
leadership	  more	  generally	   (P97:4;	   P113:3).	   Japan	   is	   criticized	   for	   failing	   to	   live	   up	   to	   its	  world	  responsibility	   (P42:29;	   P56:8;	   P65:7),	   and	   accused	   of	   nurturing	   a	   semi-­‐dependent	   attitude	  
towards	   the	   United	   States	   (P52:30).	   This	   is	   regarded	   as	   unfair,	   as	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   no	   other	  country	   has	   benefitted	   more	   from	   the	   international	   economic	   system	   (P65:7):	   as	   a	   long-­‐time	  
beneficiary	  of	  the	  free-­‐trading	  system	  maintained	  largely	  by	  the	  United	  States	  […]	  Japan	  ought	  to	  be	  
taking	  leadership	  in	  […]	  opening	  its	  markets	  and	  its	  business	  practices	  so	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  
can	   benefit	   from	   the	   Japanese	   miracle	   as	   well	   (P77:8).	   But	   Japan	   allegedly,	   only	   pursuing	   its	  commercial	   advantage	   (P71:40),	   takes	   advantage	   of	   the	   international	   marketplace,	   [while]	  
protecting	  its	  own	  industries	  (P107:2).	  And	  all	  this	  is	  happening	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  Japanese	  being	  no	  
fragile	  flower	  anymore	  but	  big	  boys	  (P93:42)312,	  at	  times	  however	  presenting	  themselves	  as	  the	  victim	  of	  ‘U.S.	  protectionism’	  or	  critique	  (P119:1).	  	  This	   line	  of	   reasoning	   is	   also	   related	   to	   ‘historical	   arguments’	   about	   the	  U.S.	   paying	   for	  Japan’s	  defense	  (P73:53,	  see	  also	  perspectivation)	  and	  thus	  enabling	  its	  economic	  success313,	  and	  about	   Japan	   in	   this	   sense	  not	  behaving	   like	  a	  proper	  ally	   (P73:55f.;	  P92:30)314,	   as	   expressed	   in	  statements	   like	   Japan	   is	   supposed	  to	  be	  an	  ally	   –	  meaning	  not	   acting	   like	  one	   (P73:55,	   see	   also	  P73:122:	   if	   the	   Japanese	   had	   been	   fair	   and	   cooperative	   allies/had	   done	   the	   fair	   and	   cooperative	  
thing)	  or:	  Since	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  we	  have	  done	  everything	  possible	  to	  help	  rebuild	  Japan’s	  
economy	  and	  transform	  her	  into	  a	  world	  economic	  power,	  and	  she	  has	  become	  the	  worst	  offender	  in	  
fair	   trading	   practices	   of	   any	   nation	   today	   (P72:1).	   This	   in	   turn	   is	   also	   linked	   to	   Japan	   being	  articulated	   as	   the	  world’s	   first	  economic	  superpower	  without	  military	  power	   (P91:6),	  which	   also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  312	  The	  ‘fragile	  flower‘	  alludes	  to	  portrayals	  of	  Japan	  as	  ‘feminine‘	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  weak	  and	  vulnerable	  after	  WWII,	  especially	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  ‘Communist	  China’	  (cf.	  Dower	  2001,	  311).	  313	  See	  also	  e.g.	  Kennedy	  (1988,	  459).	  However,	  a	  counter	  argument	  was	  that	  Japanese	  investment	  in	  the	  U.S.	   in	  turn	  helped	  finance	  the	  defense	  expenditures	  (cf.	  Gilpin	  1987,	  332).	  	  314	  See	   also	   N.	   Morris	   (2010,	   25).	   Connecting	   to	   the	   ‘historical	   arguments’	   about	   Japan’s	   defense	   (that	   are	   mostly	  brought	  up	  in	  the	  debates	  on	  the	  FSX-­‐fighter	  plane	  in	  1989)	  is	  also	  a	  different	  line	  of	  argumentation	  that	  also	  figures	  in	  the	  debates	  on	  China,	  although	  relating	  to	  a	  different	  context:	  the	  U.S.	  as	  ‘guide’	  for	  Japan	  (and	  China)	  towards	  ‘liberal	  democratic	   capitalism’:	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   because	   of	   Japan’s	   history	   in	   Asia,	   it	   would	   be	   better	   that	   the	   U.S.	   stayed	  involved	  and	  that	  Japan	  did	  not	  develop	  the	  capabilities	  to	  become	  a	  military	  power	  again	  (P92:10;	  P93:3,	  8ff.).	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does	  not	  fit	  with	   ‘general	  expectations’	  or	  understandings	  about	  a	   ‘great	  power’	  (see	  i.e.	  Berger	  1993).	  	  In	  terms	  of	  articulations	  attempted	  at	  sustaining	  U.S.	  identity,	  the	  U.S.	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  relating	  to	  this	   topic	   is	   first	   and	   foremost	   articulated	   as	   world	   power	   (P13:12;	   P47:48;	   P97:4;	   P100:4;	  P174:12),	  the	  world’s	  only	  military,	  economic,	  and	  political	  superpower	   (P112:1),	  the	  world’s	  only	  
complete	   superpower	  (P120:7),	  healthier	  and	  better	  prepared	   to	  move	   into	   the	  21st	   century	   than	  
the	  Japanese	  economy	  (P120:3)	  and	  as	  a	  great	  promise	  [and]	  the	  leading	  nation	  (P143:2).	  	  In	   this	   context,	   by	   the	  end	  1980s	   it	   is	  however	  argued	   that	   in	   and	   for	   the	  U.S.	  national	  security	   should	   also	   be	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   economic	   security	   (P71:63,	   105,	   161)	   and	  economics	   and	   trade	   as	   equivalent	   to	   power	   and	   influence	   (P74:8;	   see	   also	   P77:5;	   P96:3;	  P132:52),	   i.e.	   in	   terms	   of	   financial	  power	   (P77:5f.),	   and	   that	   for	   these	   aspects	   the	  U.S.	   needs	   a	  proactive	  economic	  and	  commercial	  strategy	  (P73:148)	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  a	  dramatic	  erosion	  of	  
our	  economic	  standing	  in	  the	  world	  (P71:152;	  P74:1),	   and	   jeopardizing	  U.S.-­‐leadership	   in	  world	  affairs	  (P77:16;	  P78:3).	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  debates	  emerging	  after	  1989	  (cf.	  also	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  42)	  –	  not	  only,	  but	  in	  this	  context	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  Japan	  –	  as	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  the	  U.S.	  could	  and	  should	  stop	  prioritizing	  the	  political	  or	  security	  related	  aspects	  in	  the	  relationship	  with	  Japan,	  and	  focus	  on	  economic	  issues	  that	  were	  causing	  trouble.	  This	  line	  of	  argumentation	  became	  especially	  prominent	  with	  the	  Clinton	  presidency	  since	  1992	  –	  but	  had	  its	  precedents	  already	  during	  the	  Bush	  presidency	  (cf.	  Schoppa	  1997,	  70)	  –	  as	  Clinton	  	  was	   placing	   the	   importance	   of	   economic	   policies	   and	   issues	   in	   general	   at	   the	   center	   of	   his	  political	  agenda	  (cf.	  i.e.	  Paulsen	  1999).	  315	  	  The	  pessimistic	  outlook	  is	  once	  more	  connected	  to	  the	  U.S.	  losing	  its	  creditor	  status	  and	  having	  become	  a	  debtor	  (P77:4;	  P132:50),	  and	  according	  to	  some	  a	  second	  class	  power	  (P109:2),	  and	  in	  this	  respect	  also	  to	  the	  increasing	  ownership	  of	  foreigners	  in	  the	  United	  States	  [that]	  is	  likely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  315	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  broader	  lines	  of	  reasoning	  on	  international	  relations	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  was	  embedded	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ideological	  competition	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  economic	  competition	  would	  become	  the	  main	  issue	  in	  international	  relations,	  which	  is	  why	  ‘national	  security’	  had	  to	  be	  redefined	  in	  economic	  terms.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  this	  meant	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  economic	  sector	  and	  performance	   in	  general	  (in	  terms	  of	  GDP,	  exports	  and	  employment	  rates),	  as	  well	  as	  on	  seeing	   industrial	  and	   technological	   capabilities	   as	   foundation	   for	   defense	   and	   security	   related	   matters.	   In	   this	   sense,	   economic	  performance	   was	   articulated	   as	   basis	   for	   a	   continuous	   U.S.	   worldwide	   leadership	   (cf.	   Paulsen	   1999,	   32f.,	   46).	   For	  instance,	  the	  controversy	  around	  the	  FSX-­‐fighter	  plane	  (see	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis	  and	  in	  what	  follows)	  evolved	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  these	  debates	  (cf.	  Schoppa	  1997,	  71).	  How	  these	  issues	  connect	  to	  the	  arguments	  about	  a	  potential	  U.S.	   decline	   because	   of	   Japan’s	   economic	   success,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   arguments	   against	   ‘free	   trade’,	   is	   treated	   under	   the	  category	  of	  perspectivation.	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to	  result	  in	  some	  loss	  of	  control	  over	  our	  own	  destiny	  (P77:16;	  P82:2ff.).316	  This	  view	  is	  addressed	  further	  under	  the	  category	  of	  perspectivation.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  maintained	  (in	  1994)	  that	  the	  U.S.	  is	  still	  the	  world’s	  only	  military,	  economic,	   and	   political	   superpower,	   that	   therefore	   must	   lead	   (P112:1),	   for	   instance	   when	   it	  comes	   to	   transforming	   a	   command	   economy	   into	   a	   free	   market	   economy	   (in	   this	   particular	  example	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Russia,	   P112:2f.),	   and,	   to	   a	   different	   extent	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Japan,	   as	   the	  
Japanese	  domestic	  industry	  [is]	  virtually	  closed	  to	  foreigners	  and	  will	  remain	  closed	  unless	  we,	  as	  a	  
nation,	  force	  them	  to	  open	  it	  (P121:4).	  	  What	  will	  also	  become	  clearer	  under	  the	  category	  of	  perspectivation	  is	  the	  self-­‐criticism	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  which	  is	  partly	  directed	  towards	  the	  executive.	  So	  it	  is	  argued,	  that	  many	  of	  us	  search	  
for	  a	  scapegoat	  to	  blame	  for	  our	  manifold	  ills.	  But	  the	  bitter	  truth	  is	  that	  we	  have	  no	  one	  to	  blame	  
for	  our	  condition	  but	  ourselves.	  For	  the	  wounds	  to	  our	  economic	  health	  and	  to	  our	  national	  pride	  
have	  been	  largely	  self-­‐inflicted	  (P109:2),	  as	  in	  this	  view	  the	  United	  States	  government	  is	  refusing	  to	  compete	  for	  commercial	  success	  (P125:2).	  
	  
Summary	  of	  argumentations	  towards	  Japan	  
	  The	  main	  line	  of	  argumentation	  towards	  Japan	  from	  1985	  until	  1995	  is	  led	  by	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  trade	  deficit	  as	  origin	  for	  the	  economic	  problems	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  attempts	  to	  explain	  and	   resolve	   the	  deficit.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   trade	  deficit	   is	  diagnosed	  as	   ‘the	  problem’,	   and	   the	  ‘reasons’	  are	  first	  and	  foremost	  seen	  in	  Japan’s	  unfairness.	  ‘Fairness’	  becomes	  the	  empty	  signifier,	  the	  signifier	  of	  the	  deficiency	  or	  lack	  that	  stands	  for	  its	  own	  absence.	  (The	  attempts	  at	  filling	  the	  empty	   signifier	   and	   hegemonizing	   the	   discourse	   are	   addressed	   under	   the	   following	   categories	  and	  chapters).	  The	  absence	  is	  ‘literal’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  voiced	  through	  the	  articulation	  of	  its	  denial	  through	  ‘unfair	  Japan’.	  In	  view	  of	  Japan’s	  unfairness,	  all	  internal	  differences	  are	  supposed	  to	  become	  equivalent,	  hence	  sustaining	  an	  exclusive	  or	  confrontational	  U.S.	  identity	  that	  does	  not	  give	   room	   for	   ‘unfair	   traders’.	   	   However,	   the	   voices	   that	   emphasize	   the	   non-­‐action	   or,	   in	   their	  view	   inappropriate	   approach	   of	   the	   own	   executive	   towards	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   trade	   deficit,	  articulate	   themselves	   in	   terms	   of	   chains	   of	   difference	   towards	   Japan	   (yet	   not	   necessarily	   as	  inclusive),	  as	  they	  see	  own	  policies	  as	  (part	  of)	  the	  problem.	  Leading	  up	  to	  1985	  –	  the	  year	  of	  the	  Plaza	  Accords	  –	  another	  possible	  reason	  for	  the	  disadvantageous	  standing	  of	   the	  U.S.	   is	  seen	   in	  the	   high	   value	   of	   the	   dollar,	   but	   this	   again	   is	   partly	   connected	   to	   a	   criticism	  of	   the	   executive’s	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  See	  footnote	  on	  investment	  in	  what	  follows	  under	  perspectivation	  in	  chapter	  six.	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(lacking)	  policies.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  chains	  of	  difference	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  what	  I	  call	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  that	  articulate	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  executive	  as	  responsible	  for	  the	  ‘problem’.	  	  	  While	   it	   becomes	   visible	   from	   looking	   at	   the	   category	   of	   argumentation,	   or	   initial	  articulation	  of	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference,	  that	  the	  U.S.	  first	  and	  foremost	  sees	  itself	  in	  a	  disadvantageous	   position	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   economic	   competition	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   Japan,	   there	   are	  attempts	   at	   ‘explaining’	   this	   disadvantage	   through	   Japan’s	   unfairness	   that	   is	   claimed	   to	   be	  cemented	  in	  its	  cultural	  and	  societal	  differences.	  This	  kind	  of	  argumentation	  is	  intended	  to	  foster	  the	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   and	   exclusivity	   in	   terms	   of	   essentializing	   Japan’s	   difference	   as	   there	  ‘being	  nothing	  to	  be	  done	  about	  it’,	  thus	  it	  being	  too	  deeply	  infused	  to	  possibly	  change.	  However,	  it	   is	   not	   yet	   clear	   from	   this	   category	  what	   this	  means	   for	   the	  question	  of	   consequences	   to	  U.S.	  global	  leadership.	  It	  is	  seen	  as	  potentially	  endangered,	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  –	  especially	  after	  1989	  –	  the	  U.S.	  is	  called	  upon	  not	  to	  treat	  economic	  issues	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  security	  (anymore),	  but	  to	  assess	  economic	  questions	  as	  security-­‐related	  ones.	  This	  aspect	  is	  further	  addressed	  under	  the	  category	   of	   perspectivation	   in	   chapter	   six,	   where	   the	   topics	   in	   the	   debates	   analyzed	   become	  connected.	  	  
	  	  
5.3.	  The	  trade	  deficit	  with	  China	  –	  free	  trade	  versus	  unfairness	  	  With	  China	  as	  well,	  the	  trade	  deficit	  accounts	  for	  the	  major	  dislocation	  to	  U.S.	  identity	  in	  terms	  of	  American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history,	   for	   mainly	   three	   reasons:	   as	   with	  Japan	  for	  the	  consequences	  for	  the	  U.S.	  economy,	  but	  also	  going	  beyond	  the	  economic	  realm	  and	  relating	  to	  the	  global	  standing	  of	  the	  U.S.	  (as	  explored	  under	  the	  next	  topic	  and	  subchapter)	  –	  for	  the	   fact	   that	   according	   to	   American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   China’s	  system	  should	  not	  be	  economically	  more	  successful	  than	  the	  U.S.	  (cf.	   i.e.	  Friedberg	  2011;	  Layne	  2014)	  –	  and	  finally	  but	   importantly	   for	  the	  missing	  political	   liberalization	  also	  according	  to	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history.	  	  Concretely,	  the	  dislocation	  to	  U.S.	  identity	  occurs	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  U.S.	  articulating	  itself	  as	  the	   most	   powerful	   economy	   (P137:32;	   P195:40;	   P209:1;	   P210:2)	   and	   the	   world’s	   free	   trade	  
leader/model	  for	  free	  and	  fair	  trade	   (e.g.	  P146:5;	  P136:5),	  that	  plays	  by	  the	  rules	  and	  is	  the	  most	  




China	  as	  unfair	  	  Generally,	   the	   economic	   relationship	   between	   the	  U.S.	   and	   China	   in	   itself	   is	   first	   and	   foremost	  criticized	  for	  ‘economic’	  reasons,	  namely	  the	  deficit	  (P114:5;	  P115:4;	  P125:51;	  P132:44;	  P133:78;	  P176:5,	  50;	  P201:5;	  P141:34;	  P214:1)	  and	  China’s	  ‘unfairness’	  (P115:1;	  P125:63,	  72;	  P132:87,	  99;	  P133:19;	   P175:14;	   P176:38;	   P202:4;	   P142:34;	   P207:3,	   7)	   (cf.	   also	   Gagliano	   2014,	   136)	   and	   –	  since	  around	  2000,	  especially	   since	  2005	  –	   the	  manipulation	  of	   its	   currency	   (P136:39;	  P141:2;	  P142:34f.;	  P205:8ff.;	  P207:7,	  17;	  P208:1f.;	  P212:1).317	  As	  already	  pointed	  out	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  chapter	   5.1,	   with	   China	   the	   question	   on	   its	   ‘unfairness’	   (‘unfair’	   comes	   up	   154	   times	   in	   the	  documents	  on	  China,	  see	  table	  seven)	  lies	   less	  on	  the	  origins,	  as	  China’s	   ‘unfairness’	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  seems	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  more	  obvious,	  as	  it	  is	  still	  transforming	  its	  economy,	  but	  on	  the	  other	   hand	   also	   because	   China	   is	   ‘communist’,	   i.e.	   ‘unfair	   per	   definition’.	   Because	   of	   the	   trade	  
deficits,	   China	   is	   regarded	  as	  one	  of	  [the	  U.S.’]	  most	  difficult	  trade	  policy	  challenges	   (P169:2).	  As	  with	   Japan,	   China	   as	   an	   ‘unfair	   trader’	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   manipulation	   of	   trade	   (P113:14),	   its	  
discriminatory	  and	  unfair	   trade	  practices	  (P126:4;	   P172:2)	   […]	   that	  make	   the	   Japanese	   look	   like	  
proponents	  of	  Adam	  Smith	  and	   free	   trade	   (P125:65),	   is	   articulated	   as	   a	  major	   problem	   and	   the	  actual	  reason	  for	  the	  trade	  deficit	  (cf.	  also	  Gagliano	  2014,	  136).	  Like	  Japan,	  allegedly	  all	  they	  want	  
is	   the	   money	   (P126:4,	   9),	   while	   they	   consistently	   fail	   to	   live	   up	   to	   the	   terms	   of	   [their]	   trade	  
agreements	   (P178:2;	   P136:86,	   100),	   frustrate	  U.S.	   companies	   (P136:100),	   are	   cheating	   and	   not	  
keeping	   [their]	   word	   with	   trade	   obligations	   (P205:5),	   as	   Chinese	   leaders	   say	   one	   thing	   and	   do	  
another	  (P137:18),	  and	  as	  China	  is	  a	  country	  that	  manipulates	  its	  currency	  (P211:1f.).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  nominations	  and	  predications	  on	  Japan	  under	  this	  topic,	  the	  ones	  on	  China	  stay	  within,	  or	  at	   least	   closer	   to	   the	   ‘economic	   vocabulary’,	   whereas	   those	   on	   Japan	   are	   voiced	   on	   a	   more	  personal	   level,	   i.e.	   relating	   to	   a	   person’s	   character.	   As	   with	   Japan	   however,	   it	   is	   furthermore	  argued	   that	   China	   is	   making	   promises	   that	   it	   does	   not	   keep	   (P145:11;	   195:5),	   and	   that	   it	  maintains	   trade	  barriers	   (P146:4;	  P175:21;	  P183:1;	  P188:5;	  P193:6),	  while	  being	   the	  source	  of	  cheap	   imports	   into	   the	   U.S.	   (167:66;	   P133:18;	   P207:17).	   China	   is	   thus	   seen	   as	   conducting	  
mercantilist	   policies,	   that	   are	   anti-­‐American	   and	   predatory	   (P186:1ff.),	   and	   –	   already	   more	  intensely	  –	   that	  China	  (in	  this	  statement	  along	  with	  New	  Zealand,	   the	  European	  Union,	  and	  the	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  In	  general,	  the	  currency	  issue	  with	  China	  did	  figure	  less	  prominently	  in	  the	  debates	  analyzed	  than	  expected,	  which	  also	  might	  be	  due	  to	  the	  broader	  keyword	  search	  on	  “China	  economy”.	  “China	  currency”	  however	  would	  have	  been	  too	  specific	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study.	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  evaluating	  whether	  the	  Chinese	  currency	  was	  or	  is	  undervalued	  or	  not,	  most	  scholars	  agree	  that	  it	  was	  the	  case	  (albeit	  to	  a	  different	  extent	  with	  remaining	  disputes),	  but	  also	  –	  like	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  trade	  deficit	  –	  that	  the	  negative	  consequences	  for	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  were	  not	  as	  straight	  forward	  as	  maintained	  by	  hardliners	  calling	  for	  retaliation,	  but	  that	  they	  had	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  connection	  with	  structural	  and	  macro-­‐economic	  factors	  as	  well	  (Evenett	  2010;	  Keidel	  2011;	  Moran	  2015;	  cf.	  i.e.	  Morrison	  and	  Labonte	  2011),	  see	  also	  Nymalm	  (2013).	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old	  Soviet	  Union)	  poses	  a	  tremendous	  threat,	  as	  all	  of	  these	  nations	  are	  trying	  to	  take	  a	  piece	  of	  our	  
economy.	  They	  want	  our	  jobs	  and	  our	  well-­‐being	  to	  transmit	  to	  their	  country	   (P144:10),	  which	   is	  why	  we	  must	  be	  accurate	   in	  how	  we	  assess	  the	  current	  threats	  to	  our	  economy,	  or	  we	  will	  not	  be	  
able	  to	  sustain	  the	  American	  way	  of	  life	  (P144:11).	  	  	  	   Like	   in	   the	   case	   with	   Japan,	   these	   arguments	   on	   China’s	   unfairness	   serve	   to	   build	   up	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  around	   the	  empty	  signifier	   ‘fairness’	  –	  as	  with	   Japan,	  present	   through	   its	  literal	   absence	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   ‘unfairness’	   –	   by	   articulating	   the	   lack	   of	   fairness	   and	   its	  consequences,	   first	   and	   foremost	   the	   trade	   deficit,	   as	   problem	   that	   has	   to	   be	   dealt	   with.	   To	  emphasize	  its	  urgency,	  arguments	  like	  the	  one	  on	  not	  being	  able	  to	  sustain	  the	  American	  way	  of	  life	   are	   brought	   forward,	   and	   the	   ‘bad	   example’	   of	   Japan	   is	   invoked,	   while	   claiming	   that	   the	  situation	  with	  China	  was	  even	  more	  critical.318	  	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  there	  are	  also	  attempts	  at	  sustaining	  U.S.	  identity	  in	  terms	  of	  denying	  the	   challenge.	   When	   it	   comes	   to	   dealing	   with	   ‘unfair	   China’,	   the	   U.S.	   is	   articulated	   as	   having	  leverage	  over	  China,	  not	  least	  because	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  American	  purse,	  that	  everybody	  wants	  to	  do	  business	  with	   (P145:3).	   In	   this	   line	  of	   argumentation,	  U.S.	   trade	  policy	   could	   and	   should	  also	  work	  as	  a	  stick	  in	  the	  form	  of	  section	  301	  investigations	  (P149:10).319	  Likewise,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	   the	   U.S.	   had	   the	   task	   to	   make	   sure	   in	   all	   international	   forums	   that	   China	   has	   to	   play	   by	  
western	  rules	   if	   it	  wants	   to	  be	  a	  global	  player	   (P169:6).	  Meanwhile	   it	   is	   also	   emphasized	   that	   –	  referring	  to	  China’s	  possible	  membership	  in	  the	  WTO	  –	  only	  the	  U.S.	  itself	  could	  protect	  American	  interests	  (P174:9ff.),	  and	  that	  trade	  with	  America	  is	  not	  just	  a	  right	  but	  a	  privilege	  (P76:44).	  As	  the	  
most	   powerful	   nation	   the	   U.S.	   is	   called	   upon	   not	   to	   give	   in	   to	   bad	   trade	   deals	   (P189:4).	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  take	  up	  the	  challenge	  to	  energize	  itself	  in	  order	  to	   maintain	   its	   place	   in	   the	   world	   (P143:3),	   and	   see	   the	   challenge	   posed	   by	   the	   economic	  development	  in	  China,	  India	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  to	  create	  a	  political	  consensus	  in	  favor	  of	  change	  and	  growth	  (P143:9).	  This	  bears	  similarity	  to	  the	  argument	  about	  taking	  up	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	   Japan	   rethink	   the	   relationship	  between	   economic	   and	   security	   policy.320	  However,	   potential	  U.S.	   leverage	   over	   China	   is	   noticeably	   not	   seen	   as	   unambiguously	   given,	   as	   will	   become	   clear	  under	  what	  follows.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  318	  Like	  with	  these	  arguments	  towards	  Japan,	  while	  China’s	  policies	  were	  not	  always	  and	  at	  every	  instance	  ‘following	  the	  rules	  of	  free	  market	  policies’,	  the	  picture	  especially	  regarding	  the	  consequences	  for	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  is	  not	  as	  clear	  or	   as	   black	   and	   white	   as	   argued	   by	   the	   confrontational	   voices	   in	   Congress.	   See	   introduction	   to	   the	   analysis	   and	  conclusion.	  319	  See	  footnote	  in	  overview	  on	  Section	  301	  of	  the	  Trade	  Act	  of	  1974,	  or	  Super	  301	  like	  it	  was	  legislated	  in	  1988.	  	  320	  On	  the	  articulation	  of	  these	  developments	  as	  ‘Sputnik-­‐shocks’,	  referring	  to	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  Soviet	  satellite	  in	  1957,	  see	  Thorsten	  (2012,	  Introduction).	  	  
157	  
	  
Self-­‐criticisms	  –	  values	  versus	  commercial	  interests	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  	  In	   terms	   of	   self-­‐criticisms	   –	   as	   with	   Japan	   –	   a	   strand	   of	   self-­‐characterizations	   seems	   to	   some	  extent	  to	  be	  giving	  in	  to	  the	  dislocation,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  internal	  differences	  are	  also	  partly	  dealt	  with	  through	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  versus	  the	  executive,	  as	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  it	  does	  not	  act	  in	  an	  adequate	  way	  to	  solve	  ‘the	  problems’	  with	  China.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  in	  general	  terms,	  economic	  and	  foreign	  policies	  are	  repeatedly	  declared	  an	  overall	   failure	   (P164:2;	   125:10;	   P133:17;	   P176:4,	   51)	   and	   the	   administration	   as	   lacking	  toughness	  (P125:53;	  P133:19;	  P186:2).	  As	  with	   Japan	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  national	  security	  should	  include	   and	   be	   tied	   to	   economic	   issues	   (P207:16).	   However,	  more	   prevalent	   than	   the	   security	  question	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan,	  are	  criticisms	  of	  the	  executive,	  that	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  broader	  question	  of	  ‘values’	  versus	  ‘commercial	  interests’	  (see	  in	  what	  follows),	  hence	  the	  impact	  of	  free	  trade	  beyond	  the	  economy	  according	  to	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history:	  in	  this	   vein,	   in	   concretely	  mentioning	   the	   president,	   it	   is	   criticized	   that	   for	   example	  George	  Bush	  was	  bailing	  out	  China’s	   leaders	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  Congress	  revoking	  MFN	  (P149:4),	  and	   that	  he	  did	  not	   stand	  up	  for	  American	  workers	  who	  wither	  against	  illegal	  dumping	  practices	  
and	   an	   undervalued	   Chinese	   currency	   (P207:17).	   It	   is	   claimed	   that	   only	   his	   inaction	   in	   turn	  provoked	  Congress	  to	  force	  annual	  showdowns	  (P162:7,	  see	  also	  Dumbaugh	  1998,	  4).	  Clinton	  in	  turn	  is	  blamed	  for	  having	  crumbled	  like	  a	  cookie	  on	  MFN	  (P145:22),	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  he	  is	  said	  to	  have	  abandoned	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘America-­‐policy’	  (P146:9),321	  as	  he	  seemed	  to	  be	  more	  responsive	  to	  financial	  interests	  (P163:2),	  and	  had	  no	  clearly	  and	  coherently	  articulated	  foreign	  policy	  (P124:1;	  P176:43;	  P125:6).	   	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  criticisms	  of	   the	  executive	  are	  also	  voiced	  as	  part	  of	   the	  chains	  of	  difference,	  when	  the	  linkage	  of	  MFN	  and	  human	  rights	  is	  critiqued	  as	  a	  failure	  and	  not	  an	  ideal	  lever	  (P160:1f.),	  as	  more	  moderate	  voices	  argue	  against	  hinging	  the	  entire	  Sino-­‐American	  
relationship	  on	   this	   issue	   (human	   rights	   in	   China,	   P112:3)	   in	   terms	   of	  moral	   commitments	   (cf.	  Paulsen	   1999,	   157),	   and	   in	   consequence	   treating	   China	   as	   an	   enemy	   in	   our	   trade	   relations	  (P136:127).	  	  As	  was	   the	  case	  with	   Japan,	   the	  U.S.	  are	  criticized	  overall	  as	  being	  naïve	   (P136:39,	  here	  directed	  against	   the	  executive)	  and	  a	  paper	  tiger	   (P162:10,	  referring	  to	  Mao	  Zedong	  calling	   the	  U.S.	  a	  paper	  tiger),	  and	  still	  conducting	  trade	  policy	  as	  largely	  focused	  on	  foreign	  policy,	  in	  spite	  of	  
the	  large	  deficits	  with	  China	  or	  Japan	  (P198:8),	  and	  as	  […]	  [like]	  most	  democracies,	  being	  unwilling	  
to	   confront	   the	   harsh	   realities	   of	   nature	   (P201:2).	   In	   this	   sense	   –	   but	   even	   more	   critically	   as	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  This	  refers	   to	  Clinton’s	  speech	  on	   ‘America	  policy’	   in	  1993,	  when	  he	  –	  referring	  to	   the	   linkage	  between	  MFN	  and	  human	  rights	  that	  he	  had	  proclaimed	  back	  then	  –	  had	  stated	  that	  “We	  no	  longer	  have	  an	  executive	  branch	  policy	  and	  a	  congressional	  policy.	  We	  have	  an	  American	  policy”	  (J.	  Yang	  2000,	  123).	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becomes	  apparent	  under	  the	  ‘values’	  versus	  ‘commercial	  interests’	  debates	  that	  are	  addressed	  in	  what	  follows	  –	  the	  U.S.	  (in	  terms	  of	  “we”)	  are	  also	  criticized	  for	  being	  blindly	  devoted	  to	  trade	  at	  
all	  costs	  (P189:11),	  acting	  like	  shopkeepers	  […]	  listening	  to	  the	  cash	  register	  (P138:21),	  and	  being	  
driven	   by	   money.	   Furthermore	   the	   U.S.	   are	   characterized	   as	   accustomed	   to	   quick	   fixes	   and	  expecting	   to	  be	  able	   to	   fix	  problems	  overnight	   (P136:6),	  which	   bears	   resemblance	   to	   long-­‐term	  versus	  short-­‐term	  thinking	  in	  relation	  to	  Japan.	  	  The	   ‘values’	   versus	   ‘commercial	   interests’	   debates	   (see	   passage	   on	   relations	   in	   chapter	  5.4)	   are	   not	   only	   about	   the	  possible	   impact	   of	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history,	   but	   also	   about	   the	  question	  of	  who	  in	  the	  U.S.	  actually	  benefits	  from	  economic	  relations	  with	  China.322	  This	  points	  to	  further	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalences	  additionally	  to	  the	  ones	  articulated	  against	  the	  executive.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  question	  is	  posed	  as	  how	  important	  China	  as	  an	  economy	  and	  market	  is	  for	  the	  U.S.	   and	   its	   interests	   (P159:1;	  P125:84,	   89;	  P126:5;	  P136:30f.;	   P195:8;	  P196:1;	  P197:1).	   In	  this	  context	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  MFN	  removal	  would	  hurt	  U.S.	  consumers,	  […]	  be	  a	  disaster	  to	  the	  U.S.	  
business	   community	   and	   […]	   place	   as	   many	   as	   200,000	   direct	   American	   jobs	   at	   risk	   (P145:11;	  P148:2;	  P149:8;	  P176:4;	  P178:1;	  P185:1f.;	  P188:6;	  P200:12),	  as	  China	  is	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  fastest	  
growing	  markets	  for	  U.S.	  exports	  (P146:2).	  In	  line	  with	  these	  arguments	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  lose	  market	  share	  in	  China	  that	  might	  be	  taken	  up	  for	  example	  by	  the	  Europeans	  (P146:76;	  P160:1;	  P125:49;	  P176:4,	  35),	  denying	  MFN	  is	  articulated	  as	  cutting	  off	  our	  nose	  to	  spite	  our	  face	  (P177:2)	  or	  the	  economic	  equivalent	  of	  saying	  ‘Lift	  up	  a	  rock	  and	  drop	  it	  on	  your	  own	  foot’	  (P178:1).	  Within	  this	   line	   of	   reasoning	   there	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   build	   up	   internal	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   between	  those	  claiming	   to	  protect	   the	  U.S.	  economy	  through	  maintaining	  MFN	  versus	   those	   insisting	  on	  using	  MFN	  as	  leverage	  in	  the	  issue	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  China.	  	  On	  the	  other	  side	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  although	  domestic	  jobs	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  MFN-­‐debates,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  not	  sacrifice	  its	  values	  in	  terms	  of	  not	  falling	  all	  over	  ourselves	  in	  trying	  to	  justify	  a	  policy	  of	  appeasement	  (P161:1;	  P176:30,	  see	  intensifications	  in	  chapter	  seven),	  and	  not	  kowtow	  to	  Chinese	  bullying	  (P162:7),	  as	  it	  is	  argued	  that	   only	   U.S.	   businessmen	   [were]	   reaping	   handsome	   profits	   in	   a	   low-­‐wage	   economy	   (P165:3;	  P175:8;	  P138:5).	  In	  this	  sense	  what	  are	  called	  the	  believers	  in	  the	  theology	  of	  total	  free	  trade	  are	  criticized,	   because	   in	   consequence	  U.S.	  workers	  have	  to	  compete	  with	  Chinese	  workers	  who	  earn	  
twenty	  cents	  an	  hour	   (P166:5)	  and	  corporations	  are	  moving	  jobs	  to	  low-­‐wage	  developing	  nations	  (P189:2;	   P138:55;	   P215:6)	   to	   export	   back	   here	   to	   the	   United	   States	   (P136:38).	   This	   line	   of	  argumentation	  criticizes	  the	  focus	  on	  U.S.	  business	  interests	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  people	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  (P176:31;	  P189:8ff.;	  P195:6;	  P138:6,	  40;	  P200:6;	  P204:8;	  P209:2ff.;	  P132:16)	  who	  were	  held	  hostage	  by	  the	  business	  community	  (P180:4),	  as	  expressed	  in	  statements	  like:	  some	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  322	  See	  also	  for	  instance	  Xie	  (2009,	  112,	  152).	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my	  friends	  love	  capitalism	  more	  than	  they	  hate	  communism	  (P182:2),	  and	  we	  sold	  [the	  Soviet	  Union]	  
‘just	   about	   anything	   they	   could	   not	   shoot	   at	   us’	   (P136:26).	   The	   extension	   of	   these	   arguments	  maintains	   that	   the	   Soviet	   military	   machine	   should	   not	   be	   replaced	   with	   another	   military	  
superpower	  built	  with	  American	  trade	  dollars	   (P138:57).	   In	   this	   sense	   it	   is	  argued	   that	  granting	  
PNTR	   now	   is	   a	   signal	   of	   abject	   weakness.	   It	   is	   a	   signal	   of	   greed	   (P136:42),	   the	   almighty	   dollar	  (P137:126)	  and	  money,	  money,	  money	  (P195:51).	  	  In	   sum,	   the	   internal	   chain	   of	   equivalences	   is	   articulated	   between	   ‘the	   business	  community	  that	  sacrifices	  values	  over	  profits’	  and	  ‘the	  believers	  in	  the	  theology	  of	  total	  free	  trade’	  versus	  those	  standing	   in	   for	  human	  rights.	  This	   issue	   is	  addressed	  further	   in	  chapter	  5.4	   in	  the	  subchapter	  on	  U.S.-­‐relations	  to	  China.	  	  The	  ‘values	  versus	  interests’	  issue	  is	  the	  red	  line	  of	  the	  question	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  trade	  deficit	  and	  China’s	  growing	  economy.	  	  It	  is	  addressed	  also	  under	  the	  other	  categories.	  	  	  As	   with	   Japan,	   the	   argument	   of	   China	   being	   ‘different’	   also	   figures	   within	   the	   chains	   of	  equivalence	  and	  difference.	  However,	  it	  is	  articulated	  differently	  from	  the	  difference	  of	  Japan,	  as	  the	  following	  subchapter,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  other	  categories	  will	  show.	  	  
China	  as	  different	  –	  reason	  for	  engagement?	  
	  As	  with	  Japan,	  China	  is	  also	  articulated	  as	  (culturally)	  different	  (e.g.	  P136:2),	  but	  –	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  obvious	   ideological	   difference	   –	   generally	   in	   a	   more	   inclusive	   and	   potentially	   accommodating	  way	  than	  Japan:	  China	  is	  seen	  having	  existed	  as	  a	  self-­‐contained	  society	  for	  many	  centuries,	  [that]	  
did	   not	   move	   easily	   into	   a	   cooperative	   relationship	   with	   the	   nations	   of	   the	   West	   (P114:1).	  
Throughout	   its	   4000	   year	   history,	   China	   has	   resisted	   outside	   influences	   (P136:6).	   As	   for	   the	  question	   of	   how	   to	   deal	   with	   China’s	   difference,	   one	   frequent	   assertion	   –	   and	   this	   is	   also	   a	  ‘culturalistic’	  argument	  –	  is	  that	  the	  Oriental	  people,	  the	  Chinese	  in	  particular,	  are	  very	  sensitive	  to	  
face.	  If	  they	  determine	  in	  any	  way	  that	  we	  are	  applying	  any	  kind	  of	  pressure,	  covert	  or	  overt,	  we	  will	  
be	   totally	   unsuccessful	   (P146:37;	   P178:2;	   P137:57),	   as	   their	  wounds	   are	   still	   fresh	   from	   [their]	  
harried	  humiliation	  by	  the	  Western	  powers	  (P137:57,	  here	  referring	  to	  the	  Opium	  Wars).	  Therein	  allegedly	   lies	  the	  psyche	  of	  the	  Chinese	  civilization	  and	  of	  many	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people,	  and	  China’s	  yearning	  to	  be	  a	  global	  superpower	  (P137:57).	  This	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  China	  being	  one	  of	  the	  
oldest	   civilizations	   in	   the	   world,	   one	   of	   the	   most	   developed	   civilizations	   in	   the	   world	   (P159:2;	  P195:14),	  a	  great	  nation	  with	  an	  ancient	  culture	  and	  a	  proud	  tradition	  (P188:4),	  that	  is	  motivated	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by	   concerns	   about	   pride	   and	   stability	   (P159:4),	   but	   that	   for	  much	   of	   the	   20th	   century,	   has	   been	  
playing	  catch	  up	  with	  the	  West	  (P137:57).	  	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  emphasized	  that	  China	  has	  never	  experienced	  the	  types	  of	  freedoms	  that	  
we	  in	  the	  Western	  world	  have	  developed	  so	  torturously	  over	  so	  many	  thousands	  of	  years	   (P125:8),	  and	   that	   it	   is	  not	  a	  free	  country	   (P189:4).	   In	   this	   line	  Confucianism	   is	   associated	  with	  persistent	  
feudalism,	  that	  mixes	  in	  with	  decaying	  socialism	  and	  rapid	  capitalism	  (P169:13),	  and	  China	  is	  seen	  as	   having	   a	   Marxist	   superstructure,	   superimposed	   on	   a	   capitalist	   substructure	   […]	   a	   recipe	   for	  
tension,	  dislocation	  and	  conflict	  in	  the	  long	  term	   (P169:5).	   In	  this	  sense	  China	   is	  also	  pictured	  as	  giving	   an	   unparalleled	   view	  of	   a	  nation	   in	   the	   constant	  grip	   of	   absolutism,	   in	  which	   the	  Chinese	  
people	  have	  been	  treated	  as	  disposable	  resources	  of	   the	  state	   (P201:2).	   This	   again	   shows	   that	   in	  distinction	  to	  the	  difference	  of	  Japan,	  China’s	  difference	  is	  mostly	  articulated	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  form	  of	  government	  and	  less	  in	  terms	  of	  personalized	  individual,	  or	  societal	  characteristics.	  The	   more	   negative	   articulations	   of	   China’s	   difference	   point	   to	   China’s	   long	   history	   of	  
aggressive	  behavior,	   […]	  activated	  by	   […]	  actual	  and	  perceived	  grievances	   (P201:1).	   China’s	   long	  history	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  unbroken	  international	  internalization	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  externally	  expanding	  
power	  as	  a	  guiding	  principle	  of	  foreign	  policy	  (P201:2),	  and	  China	  as	  willing	  to	  do	  whatever	  it	  takes,	  
regardless	  of	   ruling	   ideology,	   to	  become	  a	  global	   superpower	   (P137:57).	   It	   is	   argued	   that	  China,	  
despite	   its	  communist	  roots	  and	  totalitarian	  regime,	  realizes	  that	   in	  the	  modern	  world	   it	  not	  only	  
takes	  military	  strength	  to	  become	  a	  superpower,	  it	  also	  takes	  economic	  strength	  (P137:57).	  	  In	  line	  with	   this	   reasoning	   one	   of	   the	   important	   questions	   becomes	  whether	   the	   U.S.	   can	   really	   trust	  
China	   (P137:58),	  and	  where	  China	   is	  evolving.	  On	   the	  one	  hand	   it	   is	  maintained	   that	   it	  is	  not	  a	  
society	   that	   is	   evolving	   toward	   freedom	   (P202:1)	   –	   hence	   contradicting	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	  history	   and	  being	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   the	  U.S.	   –	   and	   that	   the	  regime	   in	  China	   is	  more	  
powerful,	  more	  belligerent	   to	   the	  United	   States	   and	  more	   repressive	   than	   ever	   before	   (P202:10).	  Contrary	   to	   this	  view,	  China	   is	  on	   the	  other	  hand	  depicted	  as	  evolving	  into	  a	  more	  open	  society	  
with	  a	  government	  that	  is	   increasingly	  sensitive	  to	  international	  opinion	  and	  willing	  to	  work	  with	  
fellow	   nations	   and	   the	   United	   States	   (P190:3),	   and	   as	   a	   case	   for	   economic	   engagement	   as	   a	  
mechanism	   for	   affecting	   political	   change	   (P136:60).	   This	   is	   the	   central	   debate	   over	   the	   liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  that	  plays	  out	  and	  is	  addressed	  the	  subchapter	  on	  U.S.	  relations	  with	  China	  (in	  chapter	  5.4),	  as	  well	  as	  under	  the	  other	  categories.	  On	  the	  other	  side	  however,	  China’s	   ‘difference’	   is	  articulated	  as	  reason	   for	  engagement:	  according	  to	  this	   line,	  China	  has	  allowed	  gradual	  economic	  liberalization	  […]	  while	  maintaining	  a	  
politically	  authoritarian	  system	   (P155:6).	   It	   is	  emphasized	   that	  Western	  and	  Asian	  societies	  have	  
different	  understandings	  and	  expectations	  of	  human	  rights	   (P157:3),	   and	   that	   China,	   as	   a	   proud	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nation,	   will	   not	   be	   pushed	   around	   and	   let	   the	   U.S.	   impose	   their	   system	   as	   they	   have	   no	  background	  of	  democracy	  (P159:2f.).	  But	   it	   is	  also	  acknowledged,	  that	  the	   ‘difference’	  might	  be	  an	  excuse	  on	  both	  sides,	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  business	  circles	  for	  trading	  with	  China	  regardless	  of	  its	  human	  rights	  situation	  (P162:9),	  and	  on	   the	  Chinese	  side	  by	  claiming,	   that	   for	  cultural	  reasons,	  
historical	  reasons,	  they	  don’t	  have	  to	  abide	  by	  intellectual	  property	  rules	  or	  anything	  else	  (P132:87),	  which	  bears	  resemblance	  to	  the	  criticism	  of	  Japan	  for	  bringing	  forward	  their	   ‘uniqueness’	  as	  an	  excuse	   for	  restricting	   trade	  or	   imports.	  Also,	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  China’s	  difference	  might	  preclude	  
the	  kind	  of	  relationship	  we	  have	  with	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  such	  as	  Japan	  (P124:3).	  In	  many	  statements,	   for	   example	   in	   the	   debates	   on	   Unocal	   (see	   in	   what	   follows	   on	   perspectivation	  towards	   China),	   the	   difference	   is	   emphasized	   implicitly	   by	   reiterating	   the	   nomination	   and	  predication	  Communist	  China	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  every	  sentence	  of	  a	  longer	  statement	  on	  China	  (e.g.	  P:207).	  For	  further	  arguments	  on	  China’s	  ‘difference’	  see	  the	  following	  passage	  on	  China	  as	  world	  (economic)	  power.	  	  	  In	   terms	   of	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   and	   difference,	   China’s	   difference	   is	   not	   articulated	   as	  unambiguously	   as	   Japan’s	   as	   accounting	   for	   the	   equivalential,	   or	   confrontational	   and	   exclusive	  arguments.	  This	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  proponents	  of	   the	   inclusive	  and	  accommodating	  features	  of	  the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   and	   the	   ‘end	   of	   history’-­‐strand	   of	   American	   exceptionalism	   (see	  chapter	  1.3),	  that	  still	  have	  hope	  for	  change	  in	  China.	  Further	  arguments	  for	  and	  against	  this	  view	  are	  treated	  under	  perspectivation	  in	  chapter	  six,	  but	  also	  under	  intensification	  in	  chapter	  seven.	  	  	  
5.4.	  China	  as	  world	  (economic)	  power	  –	  and	  challenger	  of	  the	  U.S.?	  	  As	  with	   Japan,	   under	   this	   topic	   the	   consequences	   of	   China’s	   economic	   rise	   for	   the	  U.S.	   and	   it’s	  standing	  as	  a	  global	  power	  are	  debated.	  It	  becomes	  clear	  that,	  compared	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  Japan	  that	   lies	   in	   economic	   competition	  not	  only	   referring	   to	   ‘quantity’	   in	   terms	  of	   Japanese	   imports	  flooding	   the	  U.S.,	   but	   also	   in	   ‘quality’	   (i.e.	   due	   to	   the	   technological	   level	   of	   Japan,	  which	  might	  supersede	  the	  U.S.),	  with	  China	  it	  is	  rather	  the	  size	  of	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  and	  its	  impact	  beyond	  this	  sphere.	  	  The	  rather	  neutral	  or	  positive	  predications	  concerning	  China’s	  rise	  are	  the	  most	  populous	  
country	  in	  the	  world	  (e.g.	  P114:7;	  P125:76),	  big	  economic	  power	  (e.g.	  P115:4),	  economic	  giant	  (e.g.	  P150:1),	   a	   regional	   power	   (P112:3),	   an	   emerging	   superpower	   (e.g.	   P176:54)	   and	   even	   nuclear	  
(super)	  power	  (e.g.	  P112:3;	  P125:55).	   	  Relations	  with	  China	  are	  seen	  as	  important	  for	  economic	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reasons	   (P136:32)	   –	  with	   China	   articulated	   as	   economic	  partner	   (P143:6)	   and	   trading	  partner	  (P205:1)	   –	   but	   also	   beyond	   the	   economic	   sphere	   (P188:2;	   P190:1)	   as	   in	   following	   exemplary	  statement:	   no	   country	   figures	   to	   have	   a	   greater	   impact	   on	   the	   United	   States	   than	   the	   People’s	  
Republic	  of	  China.	  The	  emergence	  of	  China	  as	  a	  major	  world	  power	  is	  one	  of	  the	  historic	  events	  of	  
the	   late	   20th	   century	   (e.g.	   P190:1).	   In	   this	   line	   of	   argumentation,	   rejecting	   MFN/PNTR	   is	  articulated	   as	   having	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	   all	   aspects	   of	   the	   relationship	   (P136:16).	   When	   it	  comes	   to	   assessing	   China’s	   character	   as	   a	   ‘power’,	   it	   is	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   articulated	   as	   rapidly	  
becoming	   a	   great	   and	   complete	   power	   (P113:4;	   P123:1;	   P176:63;	   P182:1),	   as	   a	  major	   regional	  
actor/key	   country	   in	   Asia	   (P147:2;	   P188:2;	   P137:46)	  with	   the	   potential	   to	   be	   an	   international	  
superpower	   (P149:5),	   and	   as	   the	   strongest	   military	   power	   in	   Asia	   and	   an	   independent	   nuclear	  
power	  (P149:5).	  Furthermore,	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  future	  development,	  China	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  country	  
whose	  power	  and	  influence	  will	  grow	  not	  only	  in	  Asia	  but	  in	  the	  world	  at	  large	  (P149:6),	  the	  chief	  
economic	  and	  political	  tiger	  that	  will	  dominate	  Asia	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come	  (P124:1),	  one	  of	  the	  two	  
or	  three	  most	  important	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  early	  in	  the	  next	  century	  (P125:7),	  a	  pivotal	  nation	  
in	  the	  Pacific	  rim	  (P125:89),	  and	  a	  trading	  power/superpower	  in	  trade	  (P169:2;	  P215:3).	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  more	  inclusive	  voices	  point	  to	  China	  as	  an	  engine	  driving	  the	  economic	  
future	  of	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region	  (together	  with	  Japan)	  (P113:3),	  potentially	  being	  the	  first	  example	  
of	  a	  Communist	  system	  that	  will	  succeed	  in	  meeting	  the	  economic	  needs	  of	  her	  people	  (P113:2),	  and	  a	  driver	  for	  global	  economic	  growth	  (P150:1).	  In	  this	  line,	  China	  is	  also	  seen	  as	  important	  for	  the	  U.S.	   economy	   in	   terms	   of	   offering	   a	   growing	   and	   potentially	   large	  market	   for	   American	   goods,	  
services	  and	   technology	   […	  and]	  as	  a	   [potential]	  partner	   in	  writing	   the	  new	  rules	  of	   trade	   in	   this	  
new	  world	  market	  place	   (P149:6),	   as	  a	   fertile	  market	  with	   tremendous	  possibilities	   (P125:89),	  a	  
nation	   whose	   economy	   is	   increasingly	   free	   and	   open	   (P125:64)	   and	   as	   an	   economic	   partner	  (P143:6).	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   China	   over	   the	   course	   of	   time	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   a	   country	   that	   could	  
overtake	   the	   U.S.	   as	   the	   world’s	   largest	   economy	   within	   the	   next	   decades	   (P114:3),	   as	   the	   one	  
country	   in	   the	  world	  that	  can	  be	  our	  rival	   in	   the	  21st	  century	  (P132:11),	  and	   increasingly	   [as	  an]	  
economic	  competitor,	  however	  […]	  not	  an	  adversary	  (P137:46),	  but	  finally	  also	  as	  the	  largest	  single	  




U.S.-­‐relations	  with	  China	  
	  Those	  who	  argue	  for	  engaging	  China	  articulate	  it	  as	  too	  big,	  and	  too	  dynamic,	  and	  too	  strategically	  
important	  to	  ignore	  or	  push	  to	  an	  enemy	  status	  (P125:7),	  as	  it	  can	  ill	  afford	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  
United	   States	   continues	   to	   bully	   and	   dictate	   to	   her	   at	   will	   (P113:4).323	  In	   this	   context,	   the	  relationship	  is	  thus	  seen	  as	  important	  not	  only	  for	  economic	  reasons	  (P113:3),	  but	  also	  because	  of	   the	   broader	   picture	   of	   U.S.-­‐policies	   in	   East	   Asia	   (P145:38)	   and	   worldwide,	   as	   China	   is	  articulated	   as	  a	  major	  actor	   in	   important	   international	  efforts	  we	  undertake.	   […]	  We	  cannot	  slap	  
China	  in	  the	  face,	  and	  then	  turn	  around	  and	  expect	  that	  country’s	  help	  in	  achieving	  success	  in	  other	  
foreign	   policy	   initiatives	   (P146:2),	   as	   in	   this	   view	   the	   United	   States-­‐China	   relationship	   will	  
probably	  be	  the	  most	  important	  relationship	  that	  the	  United	  States	  will	  have	  for	  the	  next	  20	  years.	  
That	   is	   whether	   China	   is	   viewed	   by	   this	   country	   as	   our	   enemy,	   or	   […]	   as	   an	   ally,	   or	   perhaps	  
something	  in	  between	  (P125:9;	  P175:10).	  	  It	   is	  also	  argued	   that	   if	  we	  treat	  China	  –	  our	  World	  War	  II	  ally	  (P190:2)	  –	  as	  an	  enemy,	  it	  
will	   become	  our	   enemy	   (P188:8;	   P184:2),	   and	   that	   how	  China	   evolves	  will	   profoundly	  affect	   our	  
economic,	  political	  and	  security	  interests	  (P184:1;	  P188:16)	  around	  the	  world	  (P188:2).	  Moreover,	  a	  general	  self-­‐criticism	  is	  implied	  in	  statements	  such	  as	  [Taiwan	  and	  South	  Korea]	  were	  our	  allies,	  
and	  we	   did	   not	   talk	   about	  MFN	  with	   [them].	   But	   their	   human	   rights	   record	  was	   no	   better	   than	  
China’s.	   We	   stuck	   with	   them	   because	   they	   were	   our	   allies	   in	   the	   cold	   war	   (P159:4),324	  or	   as	   in	  
America	   cannot	   afford	   a	   trade	   policy	   that	   opens	   Vietnam	   and	   shuts	   down	   China	   (P165:1),	  
rescinding	  MFN	  would	  deny	  China	  the	  trade	  status	  that	  we	  grant	  to	  virtually	  every	  other	  nation	  in	  
the	  world	   (P125:83).	   These	   kinds	   of	   arguments	   are	   further	   addressed	  when	   dealing	  with	   ‘U.S.	  hypocrisy’	  in	  chapter	  seven	  under	  the	  category	  of	  mitigation.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  rest	  
of	  the	  world	  does	  not	  agree	  with	  us	  on	  China.	  We	  cannot	  even	  force	  change	  in	  Cuba,	  a	  tiny	  country	  
with	  an	  aging	  dictator	  and	  a	  population	  about	  the	  size	  of	  Michigan	  (P195:14).	  More	  explicitly	  and	  farsightedly	  it	  is	  even	  reasoned	  that	  the	  main	  fear	  in	  China	  with	  regard	  to	  U.S.	  attitude	  is	  that	  the	  
U.S.	  looking	  for	  a	  boogie	  man	  or	  looking	  for	  an	  enemy,	  after	  Russia,	  to	  settle	  on	  China	  (P169:9).	  	  	  	  The	  questions	  of	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  China	  as	  a	  rising	  power	  are	  more	  obviously	  than	  with	  Japan	  connected	  to	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  the	  impact	  on	  U.S.	  identity	  in	  its	  role	  as	  promoter	  of	  free	  trade	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  323	  I	   address	   the	   tension	   between	   the	  more	   negative	   view	   of	   the	   Chinese	   government	   as	   a	   brutal	   and	   anachronistic	  
regime	  […]	  under	  [whose]	  repression	  flourishes	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  and	  most	  rapidly	  growing	  economies	  (P125:88)	  under	  the	  categories	  of	  perspectivation	  and	  intensification	  in	  chapters	  six	  and	  seven.	  324	  See	   articulation	  of	  Taiwan	  and	  South	  Korea	   as	   ‘good	   examples’	   in	   line	  with	   the	   liberal	   theory	  of	   history	   in	  what	  follows.	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and	   liberal	   democratic	   capitalism	   also	   beyond	   the	   immediate	   economic	   realm.	   The	   constant	  argument	   of	   those	   in	   favor	   of	   expanding	   trade	   relations	   with	   China	   –	   through	   making	   MFN	  permanent	  and	  ultimately	  agreeing	  to	  China’s	  membership	  in	  the	  WTO	  –	  is	  that	  free	  trade	  would	  ultimately	   result	   in	   political	   reform	   and	   opening	   in	   China	   (LTH-­‐argument).	   For	   these	   reasons,	  argumentation	  and	  perspectivation	  are	  also	  more	  intertwined	  than	  with	  Japan.	  	  With	  MFN	  the	  central	  argument	  unfolds	  around	  the	  question	  on	  whether	  granting	  them	  actually	  improves	  the	  human	  rights	  situation	  in	  China,	  or	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  is	  just	  acting	  according	  to	   commercial	   interests:	  The	  debate	  […]	  is	  not	  just	  about	  China	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Government	  […].	  
This	   debate	   is	   also	   about	   our	   own	   country,	   about	  what	  we	  are	  willing	   to	   stand	  up	   for	   […]	   about	  
whether	  or	  not	  we	  as	  a	  Nation	  put	   trade	  before	  people	  and	  profits	  above	  principles	   (P176:8;	   see	  also	   49,	   52;	   P137:126).	   The	   most	   frequently	   voiced	   statements	   evolving	   around	   the	   ‘values	  versus	  interests’	  argument	  in	  this	  vein	  are	  for	  example:	  	  
What	  does	  our	   rhetoric	  mean?	  What	  do	  we	   really	   stand	   for?	  What	   in	   fact	  drives	  American	   foreign	  
policy?	  Is	  it	  human	  rights,	  is	  it	  respect	  for	  individuals,	  is	  it	  the	  values	  we	  cherish,	  or	  is	  the	  bottom	  line	  
the	  bottom	   line,	  pure	  economics,	  pure	   trade,	  pure	  opportunities	   for	  profits?	   I	   call	  upon	   this	  Nation	  
and	  this	  Congress	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  debate	  as	  to	  what	  we	  believe	  in	  as	  a	  nation,	  what	  we	  stand	  for	  as	  a	  
nation	  […]	  (P113:14f.)	  and	  to	  being	  true	  to	  our	  roots,	  true	  to	  our	  heritage	  (P162:5;	  P193:6).	  
	  	  It	  is	  also	  argued	  that	  	  
	  
if	   we	   do	   nothing	   […]	   our	   credibility	   as	   a	  world	   leader	   and	   as	   a	   defender	   of	   human	   rights	   will	   be	  
devastated	  and	  that	  if	  we	  do	  nothing	  today,	  we	  will	  be	  saying	  it’s	  OK	  to	  get	  tough	  with	  Cuba	  –	  it	  is	  a	  
small	   country	   –	   or	   Afghanistan	   –	   or	   Laos	   or	   Montenegro.	   It	   does	   not	   cost	   us	   much	   to	   stand	   on	  
principle	  with	  them.	  They	  are	  little	  and	  their	  potential	  trade	  is	  not	  significant.	  […]	  we	  will	  be	  saying	  
we	  do	  not	  stand	  on	  principle	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  big	  boys	  –	  like	  China-­‐	  because	  it	  costs	  too	  much.	  […]	  
We	   should	   not	   […]	   trade	   away	   our	   commitment	   to	   human	   rights	   and	   freedom	   (P146:5,	   8),	   as	  
freedom	  is	  not	   free	   (P187:4),	   and	  not	  be	  hypocrites	  with	   a	  market	   in	   sight	   to	   exploit,	   and	   let	  the	  
principles	  of	  Jefferson	  and	  Madison	  go	  out	  of	  the	  window	  (P162:5).	  	  	  Hence,	   in	   line	   with	   this	   reasoning,	   U.S.	   identity	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   liberal	   values	   is	   articulated	   as	  ‘unfulfilled’	   if	   there	  was	   no	   decisive	   action	   against	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   China.	   China	  (and	  the	  world)	  would	  perceive	  this	  as	  weakness	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  that	  might	  be	  viewed	  as	  
the	  ‘paper	  tiger’	  (P162:8f.,	  see	  also	  subchapter	  on	  U.S.	  hypocrisy	  under	  the	  category	  of	  mitigation	  in	  chapter	  7.4).	  Here,	  the	  dislocation	  manifests	  itself	  through	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalences	  that	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are	  articulated	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  those	  allegedly	  using	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  as	  a	   ‘fig	  leaf’	  for	  furthering	  their	  commercial	   interests	  versus	  those	  holding	  up	  the	  traditional	  values	  the	  U.S.	  purportedly	   stands	   for.	   As	  will	   be	   shown	   under	  what	   follows,	   and	   also	   under	   the	   category	   of	  mitigation,	  there	  are	  also	  accommodating	  or	  inclusive	  voices	  aiming	  at	  reconciling	  these	  internal	  differences	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history.	  Additionally,	  the	  central	  line	  of	  argumentation	  with	  regard	  to	  trade	  relations	  with	  China	  evolves	  not	  only	  around	  the	  deficit	  and	  the	  role	  of	  China	  for	  the	  U.S.	  economy,	  but	  –	  in	  connection	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  ‘values’	  versus	  ‘commercial	  interests’	  –	  also	  around	  the	  question	  of	  the	  potentially	  transformative	   impact	   of	   U.S.	   trade	   policy	   on	   China’s	   political	   system,	   most	   concretely	   in	   the	  congressional	   debates	   on	   the	   human	   rights	   situation.	   Those	   in	   line	   with	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	  history	   argue	   for	   the	   interconnectedness	   of	   economic	   and	   political	   liberty	   that	   can	   be	   made	  effective	   through	   free	   trade.325	  This	   becomes	   apparent	   in	   statements	   like	   the	   erosion	   of	   state	  
control	  over	  the	  economy	  and	  erosion	  of	  the	  dependence	  of	  individuals	  and	  families	  on	  the	  state	  for	  
basic	  necessities	  will	  open	  the	  door	  to	  peaceful	  political	  change	  in	  China	  (P122:3;	  P125:50),	  and	  	  	  
the	  best	  foreign	  policy	  tools	  available	  to	  us	  to	  encourage	  political	  and	  civil	  reform	  abroad	  are	  policies	  
that	   promote	   capitalism,	  market	   reform,	   and	   free	   trade.	   All	   three	   are	   powerful	   levers	   for	   political	  
change,	   precisely	   because	   they	   are	   powerful	  mechanisms	   for	   economic	   change	   (P145:15;	   P157:2;	  179:2f.).	  	  The	   free	   market	   is	   articulated	   as	   the	   greatest	   liberator	   known	   to	   man!,	   and	   even	   though	   the	  process	   in	   China	   might	   be	   slow	   (P154:4;	   P176:2),	   and	   although	   China	   might	   be	   moving	   to	   a	  different	  kind	  of	  capitalism,	  there	  is	  no	  alternative	  to	  capitalism	  as	  the	  market	  economy	  is	  the	  way	  
of	   the	   future	  (P171:3).	   It	   is	  maintained	   that	   the	   free	  exchange	  of	   commerce	  and	   ideas	  offers	   the	  
best	  hope	  we	  have	  to	  project	  the	  light	  of	  freedom	  into	  Communist	  China	  (P176:2;	  P178:2),	  and	  that	  
the	   road	   to	  democracy	   is	   paved	  with	   free	  markets	  as	   free	   trade	   is	   the	  bridge	   to	   reach	  out	   to	   the	  
Chinese	   (P136:129).	  Trade	  and	   investment	  are	  articulated	  as	  part	  of	  a	  greater	  effort	  to	  promote	  
long-­‐term	   progress	   toward	   political	   pluralism	   and	   democracy	   in	   China	   (125:53)	   as	   greater	  
economic	  ties	  not	  only	  benefit	   the	  United	  States,	  but	  will	  help	  bring	  social	  and	  political	  change	   in	  
China	   (P195:29),	   even	   though	   it	   is	   conceded	   that	   Clinton’s	   decision	   [to	   delink	  MFN	  and	  human	  
rights]	  was	  in	  part	  based	  on	  pure	  commercial	  interests	  (P125:76).	  	  Against	  those	  voices	  who	  uphold	  that	  the	  argument	  was	   just	  about	  trade,	   it	   is	  reasoned	  that	  our	  greatest	   export	   is	  not	  our	  products	  and	  our	   services,	   our	  greatest	   exports	  are	  our	   ideals	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  (2009,	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and	  our	  values	  (P137:35;	  P195:2,	  53).	  In	  this	  context	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan	  are	  now	  referred	  to	  as	  positive	  examples	  (P157:2;	  P125:85;	  P176:3,	  40;	  P179:3)	  where	  the	  theory	  actually	  worked	  (see	   also	  Dumbaugh	  1998,	  33).	  Referring	   to	   the	  debate	  on	  MFN	  and	  human	   rights	   it	   is	   argued	  that	  it	   is	  precisely	  the	  exposure	  to	  Western	  values	  and	  the	  king	  of	  economic	  improvement	  […]	  that	  
have	   improved	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   China	   or	   will	   (further)	   improve	   it	   (P145:19,	   39;	  P146:6f.,	  P120:1;	  P125:48,	  54;	  P126:3;	  P194:1).	  According	   to	   this	  view	  history	  has	  shown,	  ideas	  
follow	  trade	   (P146:66)	   and	  as	  economic	  growth	  is	  the	  most	  effective	  catalyst	   for	  political	  change	  (P176:42),	  developments	  come	  as	  natural	   results	  of	  economic	  reform	  rather	   than	   from	  American	  
pressure	   (P147:2).	   For	   China,	   it	   is	   argued,	   trade	   is	   the	  opening	   force	  behind	   [its]	  opening	   to	   the	  
world	   (P150:2),	   and	   as	   such,	   figuratively	   put,	   it	   is	   the	   fax	  machine,	   not	   the	   trade	   sanction	   that	  
freed	   Eastern	   Europe,	   and	   it	   is	   the	   fax	   machine,	   not	   the	   trade	   sanction,	   that	   will	   free	   China	  (P167:54;	   P195:21).	   The	   connection	   between	   economic	   and	  political	   development	   is	   taken	   for	  granted,	  because	  according	  to	  the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history,	  an	  economic	  democracy	  cannot	  exist	  
long	   term	   without	   a	   social	   democracy	   following,	   and	   according	   to	   this	   view,	   as	   capitalism	  penetrates	   Chinese	   society,	   the	   push	   for	   greater	   democracy	   will	   inexorably	   follow	   (P170:3;	  P136:94).	  China’s	  membership	   in	   the	  WTO,	  and	   the	  extension	  of	  PNTR,	   could	  only	   further	   this	  development,	   as	   trade	   is	   the	   engine	   of	   the	   21st	   century	   (P136:6,	   31ff.;	   P137:90;	   P195:149;	  P197:1ff.;	   P138:2ff;	   P200:2),	   and	  with	   China	   being	   a	  WTO	  member	   its	   practices	   that	   harm	   its	  trading	  partners	  could	  also	  be	  taken	  care	  of	  efficiently	  (P197:3;	  P203:2).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  and	   the	  U.S.	   role	  according	   to	   it,	   is	   articulated	  as	  not	  being	  dislocated,	  but	  as	  having	  already	  produced	  positive	  change	  and	  as	  still	  producing	  it.	  For	   these	   reasons	   the	   proponents	   of	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   also	   argue	   for	  engagement	  with	  China	   (P184:1f.;	  P185:1),	  as	   it	   is	   reasoned	   that	   this	  is	  the	  only	  way	  the	  United	  
States	  can	  hope	  to	  influence	  the	  direction	  of	  change	  and	  help	  ensure	  a	  positive	  outcome	  –	  a	  market-­‐
oriented	  economy	  paired	  with	  a	  more	  open	  and	  free	  society	  (P114:3;	  P176:51;	  P138:14,	  18).	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  U.S.	  –	   in	   line	  with	   its	  self-­‐understanding	  as	  a	  role	  model	  –	  articulates	   itself	  (like	  with	  Japan,	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  under	  perspectivation)	  as	  a	  ‘guide’	  for	  China:	  	  	  
through	   American	   influence,	   positive	   changes	   can	   be	   made	   in	   other	   societies,	   including	   China	  (P125:89;	   P176:36),	  Americans	  doing	  business	   in	  China	  have	  contributed	   to	  prosperity	  and	  at	   the	  
same	  time	  are	  continually	  able	  to	  transfer	  the	  values	  and	  ideals	  of	  freedom	  and	  democracy	  through	  
direct	  contacts	  (P176:3).	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In	  line	  with	  American	  exceptionalism,	  the	  U.S.	  is	  seen	  as	  sole	  facilitator	  of	  China’s	  liberalization:	  
without	  our	   influence,	  how	  will	  democratic	  values	  come	  to	  be	  accepted	   in	  China?	   	   […]	  We	  have	  a	  
duty	  here	  in	  this	  body	  to	  make	  sure	  we	  are	  an	  influence	  in	  China	  (P176:8),	  America	  can	  be	  a	  shining	  
example	  to	  the	  world	  (P176:39,	  46),	  as	  we	  can	  help	  to	  change	  the	  world.	  […]	  We	  can	  be	  on	  the	  right	  
side	  of	  history	  (P194:5).	  For	  these	  reasons	  it	  is	  broadly	  claimed	  that	  in	  the	  vote	  on	  PNTR	  for	  China	  
history	   demands	   a	   ‘yes’	   vote	   (P195:9).	   The	   way	   we	   engage	   the	   Chinese	   Government	   will	   help	  
determine	  whether	  China	  assimilates	  into	  the	  community	  of	  nations	  or	  becomes	  more	  isolated	  and	  
unpredictable	  (P138:12),	  as	  once	  more	  China	  will	  likely	  not	  initiate	  the	  decisive	  measures	  toward	  
more	   meaningful	   economic	   and	   political	   reform	   without	   substantial,	   sustained,	   and	   increased	  
pressure	  from	  the	  United	  States	  (P213:11).	  Moreover,	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  broader	   lines	  of	   liberal	   thinking,	   it	   is	  argued	   that	   the	  
best	   way	   to	   avoid	   conflict	   is	   to	   engage	   each	   other	   in	   trade	   and	   closer	   economic	   ties	   (P176:64;	  P137:71;	  P195:1,	  18;	  P196:2;	  P197:6;	  P199:13).	  	   Those	   opposing	   MFN,	   because	   according	   to	   their	   argumentation	   there	   has	   been	   no	  improvement	  in	  China	  (P180:3)	  –	  which	  is	  why	  they	  call	  China	  a	  disfavored	  nation	  (P180:5)326	  –	  	  often	  argue	  contra	  the	  whole	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history-­‐approach	  or	  view.	   	  Hence,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	   in	   spite	  of	   this	   line	  of	   thinking	  having	  been	  very	  prominent	   already	  before	  Clinton’s	  WTO	  campaign,	   there	   has	   also	   always	   been	   an	   opposition	   or	   internal	   differences	   towards	   it.	   For	  instance	   it	   is	  maintained	   that	   trade	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  weapon	  available	   to	  stand	  up	   to	  China	  (P145:43),	   and	   that	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   was	   not	   about	   political	   reform,	   but	   about	  commercial	  interests	  (P146:28),	  and	  –	  most	  importantly	  –	  that	  the	  whole	  theory	  was	  actually	  not	  correct:	  the	  line	  of	  argument	  runs	  from	   it	  would	  be	  incautious	  to	  assume	  that	  it	  [social	  change	  in	  
China	  through	  rapid	  economic	  growth]	  will	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  democracy	  (P160:2)	  in	  the	  Western	  
sense	   (P163:3),	   to	   that	   the	   trade	   relationship	   only	   bolsters	   those	   in	   power	   and	  does	   nothing	   to	  
further	  the	  cause	  of	  democracy	  (P125:59;	  P187:1).	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  only	  economic	  sanctions	  affect	  
totalitarian	  governments	  (P167:57).	  The	  claim	  that	  trade	  would	  improve	  human	  rights	  is	  called	  a	  
myth	   (P176:6),	   as	   in	   this	   view	   economic	  prosperity	  does	  not	  bring	  about	   ‘automatic’	  democracy	  (P176:22;	   P189:3;	   P195:15),	   which	   is	   why	   trade	   should	   not	   be	   taken	   as	   panacea	   (P138:4;	  P200:4).	  Furthermore	  it	  is	  maintained	  that	  capitalism	  does	  not	  bring	  democracy	  as	  the	  historical	  cases	   always	   cited	   are	   not	   so	   clear,	   for	   instance	   because	   not	   every	   capitalist	   economy	   has	  
produced	  a	  democratic	  government	  (e.g.	  Germany	  and	  Japan,	  P138:44ff.).	  Clinton’s	  mantra	  in	  line	  with	   the	   liberal	   view,	   and	   also	  Bush’s	   earlier	   arguments	   for	   it	   (P138:25)	   are	   also	   criticized,	   as	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  the	  analysis.	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developments	   in	  China	  would	  point	   into	  another	  direction	  (P138:25ff.):	  The	  commercialist	  view	  
of	  China,	  by	  contrast,	  rests	  on	  no	  historical	  foundation;	  it	  is	  a	  libertarian	  fantasy	  (P138:31).	  	  
Summary	  of	  argumentations	  towards	  China	  
	  One	  of	  the	  main	  lines	  of	  argumentation	  towards	  China	  over	  the	  whole	  time	  frame,	  as	  with	  Japan,	  centers	  on	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  trade	  deficit	  as	  main	  cause	  for	  the	  economic	  problems	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Like	  with	   Japan,	   according	   to	   this	   line	   of	   argumentation,	   the	   trade	   deficit	   is	   diagnosed	   as	   ‘the	  problem’,	   and	   the	   ‘reasons’	   are	   first	   and	   foremost	   seen	   in	   China’s	   unfairness.	   ‘Fairness’	   again	  becomes	  or	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  central	  empty	  signifier,	  the	  signifier	  of	  the	  deficiency	  or	  lack	  that	  stands	   for	   its	  own	  absence.	  With	  China	   too,	   the	  absence	   is	   ‘literal’	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  being	  voiced	  through	   the	   articulation	   of	   its	   denial	   through	   ‘unfair	   China’,	   in	   view	   of	   which	   all	   internal	  differences	   are	   supposed	   to	   become	   equivalent.	   However,	   as	   in	   the	   case	  with	   Japan	   there	   are	  voices	   that	   emphasize	   the	   non-­‐action	   or,	   in	   their	   view	   inappropriate	   approach	   of	   the	   own	  executive	   towards	   the	   issue	  of	   the	   trade	  deficit.	   In	   terms	  of	   internal	   chains	  of	   equivalence	   it	   is	  also	   argued	   that	   the	   executive	   should	   stand	   up	   to	   China’s	   unfairness,	   but	   this	   debate	   also	  becomes	   to	  a	   large	  extent	   intertwined	  with	   the	  question	  on	  MFN,	   the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  promoting	  potential	  (political)	  change	  in	  China.	  The	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  are	  articulated	  between	  the	  supporters	  of	  the	   liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  that	  hold	  an	  inclusive	  and	  accommodating	  view	  of	  China,	  and	  the	  exclusivist	  opponents	  that	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  change	   in	  China	  through	   free	   trade.	  When	   it	  comes	  to	   the	  question	  of	   ‘difference’,	  China	   is	  also	  seen	   as	   culturally	   and	   historically	   different,	   however	   in	   a	   more	   ‘contextualized’	   and	  accommodating	   way	   than	   Japan.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   question	   on	   the	   consequences	   of	   China’s	  growing	  economic	  power	  are	  mostly	  depending	  on	  whether	  one	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	   history,	   or	   not.	   Those	   in	   line	  with	   it	  mostly	   support	   a	   policy	   of	   engagement	   towards	   China,	  where	  the	  U.S.	  can	  act	  as	  a	  guide.	  They	  also	  emphasize	  the	  positive	  aspects	  of	  China’s	  rise	  and	  see	  China	  in	  a	  potentially	  constructive	  role	  in	  the	  region	  and	  beyond,	  if	  there	  is	  cooperation	  with	  the	  U.S.	  Those	  arguing	  against	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history-­‐perspective,	  see	  it	  as	  a	  myth	  that	  has	  not	  worked	  in	  the	  past	  and	  will	  not	  work	  with	  China	  in	  the	  future,	  as	  it	  has	  not	  moved	  into	  the	  right	  direction	  so	  far,	  i.e.	  has	  not	  liberalized	  (enough)	  politically.	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Summary	  of	  Argumentations	  	  
	  
The	  trade	  deficit	  
	  With	   both,	   Japan	   and	   China,	   the	   trade	   deficit	   is	   seen	   as	   the	   major	   problem	   in	   the	   economic	  relationship,	  as	  it	  is	  articulated	  as	  a	  cause	  for	  the	  disadvantageous	  economic	  standing	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  as	   well	   as	   the	   negative	   consequences	   of	   this	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   U.S.’	   global	   standing.	  With	  Japan,	  this	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  manifest	  in	  Japan	  becoming	  the	  major	  creditor.	  With	  China,	  this	  became	   the	   case	   in	   2008,	  while	   the	   trade	   deficit	  with	   China	   had	   surpassed	   that	  with	   Japan	   in	  2000.	   While	   in	   the	   case	   of	   China,	   this	   of	   course	   has	   a	   dislocatory	   impact	   especially	   as	   it	   is	  ‘Communist	  China’	   the	  U.S.	   is	   indebted	  to.	  However,	  because	   it	  occurred	  for	  the	  first	   time	  since	  WWI	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  indebted	  to	  anyone	  when	  it	  happened	  with	  Japan	  in	  1985,	  it	  was	  voiced	  a	  lot	   more	   frequently	   with	   Japan	   than	   with	   China	   later	   on.	   For	   both,	   Japan	   and	   China,	   their	  ‘unfairness’	  –	  and	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  meaning,	  their	  ‘illiberalness’	  –	  is	  articulated	  as	  root	  cause	  of	   the	   trade	   deficit,	   meaning	   that	   if	   it	   was	   not	   for	   this	   ‘difference’	   and	   Japan’s	   and	   China’s	  unfairness,	   they	  would	   probably	   not	   have	   been	   able	   to	   challenge	   the	  U.S.	   at	   all.	   Stronger	  with	  Japan	   than	   with	   China	   in	   this	   respect	   are	   the	   self-­‐critical	   voices,	   that	   aim	   at	   dissolving	   the	  potential	  antagonism	  through	  pointing	  at	  the	  own	  policies’	  role	  in	  the	  economic	  situation.	  In	  both	  cases,	  this	  leads	  to	  building	  up	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  versus	  the	  executive,	  in	  both	  cases	  because	   of	   its	   allegedly	   inadequate	   dealings	   with	   Japan	   and	   China	   and	   for	   not	   being	   ‘tough	  enough’.	  In	  Japan’s	  case,	  occasionally	  the	  Congress	  itself	   is	  also	  criticized	  for	  not	  standing	  up	  to	  Japan,	   but	   also	   for	   making	   Japan	   a	   scapegoat	   instead	   of	   addressing	   problems	   with	   the	   own	  economy.	  In	  China’s	  case,	  the	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history-­‐debate	  on	  ‘values	  versus	  commercial	  interests’,	  and	  both,	  the	  executive	  as	  well	  as	  those	  in	  Congress	  supporting	  the	  LTH-­‐view	  are	  criticized	  for	  ‘putting	  commercial	  interests	  first’.	  	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   question	   of	   ‘difference’,	   Japan	   is	   articulated	   as	   ‘different’	   in	   a	  ‘cultural’	  sense,	  referring	  to	  personal	  and	  cultural	  characteristics	  that	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  the	  economic	  realm,	  as	  was	  one	  of	  the	  major	  arguments	  of	  the	  revisionists.	  Japan’s	  ‘difference’	  is	  thus	  articulated	   into	   otherness,	   as	   it	   stands	   against	   ‘liberal	   universals’	   such	   as	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	  individual	   and	   –	   for	   the	   economic	   realm	   –	   the	   absolute	   adherence	   to	   free	   trade.	   With	   China,	  difference	   is	   articulated	   ‘differently’,	   and	   in	   this	   context	   finally	   in	   a	  more	   accommodating	  way	  compared	  to	  Japan.	  It	  mostly	  stays	  on	  the	  ‘China’s	  type	  of	  government	  is	  different,	  i.e.	  communist	  and	   illiberal’	   level,	  while	   also	   pointing	   to	   some	   ’cultural’	   characteristics	   like	   the	   importance	   of	  ‘face’,	  but	  there	  are	  also	  attempts	  at	  explaining	  these	  differences	  through	  China’s	  history	  and	  the	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violent	  encounters	  with	  Western	  powers.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  accommodating	  features	  are	  stronger	  with	   China,	   as	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   (still)	   provides	   a	   means	   for	   dealing	   with	   these	  differences	   and	   (still)	   gives	   hope	   for	   ultimately	   changing	   them.	   One	   reason	  might	   be	   that	   the	  experiences	   on	   the	   U.S.	   side	   with	   China	   (i.e.	   in	   trade	   negotiations)	   had/have	   not	   been	   as	  ‘instructive’	  in	  terms	  of	  frequent	  as	  with	  Japan,	  so	  that	  there	  is	  no	  seemingly	  ‘sedimented’	  pattern	  in	  negotiations	  with	  China	  yet,	  contrary	  to	  Japan,	   in	  which	  case	   ‘difference’	   is	  essentialized	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  seems	  impossible	  to	  change,	  as	  was	  the	  ultimate	  ‘message’	  of	  revisionism.	  	  
	  
The	  leadership	  challenge	  
	  The	  challenge	  with	  Japan	  first	  and	  foremost	  stems	  from	  the	  economic	  realm,	  where	  the	  U.S.	  fears	  for	  losing	  its	  status	  through	  having	  become	  a	  major	  debtor,	  but	  also	  through	  Japanese	  qualitative	  competition,	   especially	   in	   the	   high-­‐technology	   sector	   (cf.	   i.e.	   Uriu	   2009,	   42ff.).	   While	   it	   is	  emphasized	   that	   the	  U.S.	   still	   is	  a	   ‘complete	  superpower’,	   referring	   to	   Japan’s	   lack	  of	  a	  military	  component,	  it	  is	  pointed	  out	  that	  Japan	  should	  act	  more	  responsibly	  as	  the	  number	  two	  economy,	  especially	  as	  the	  U.S.	  was	  paying	  for	  its	  defense.	  The	  U.S.	  potentially	  losing	  its	  ‘superpower	  status’	  is	   thus	   clearly	   connected	   to	   economic	   underperformance.	   U.S.	   relations	  with	   Japan	   are	  mostly	  seen	   as	   dependent	   on	   the	   trade	   issue,	   while	   there	   are	   constant	   complaints	   about	   Japan	  ‘freeriding’	   on	   the	  U.S.	   defending	   it.	   The	   accommodating	   voices	   emphasize	   Japan	   being	   an	   ally	  and	  part	  of	  the	  ‘free	  world’,	  and	  argue	  against	  letting	  the	  trade	  frictions	  disturb	  an	  important	  and	  close	  relationship.	  With	  China,	  the	  challenge	  is	  articulated	  as	  ‘rooted’	  in	  the	  economic	  realm	  too,	  however	  it	  is	  also	  linked	  to	  China’s	  overall	  potential	  as	  a	  (regional)	  power	  in	  Asia	  and	  beyond.	  U.S.	  relations	  with	  China	  in	  this	  regard	  center	  very	  much	  around	  the	  question	  of	  China’s	  ‘difference’	  in	  terms	  of	  being	   ‘communist’	   and	  not	  being	  an	  ally,	   and	  whether	   this	   should	   lead	   to	  engagement	   –	  as	   the	  proponents	   of	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   argue	   –	   or	   to	   containment	   or	   something	   else,	   as	  maintained	   by	   its	   critics.	   However,	   except	   for	   the	   intensified	   arguments	   and	   views	   that	   are	  treated	   in	   the	   following	   respective	   chapters,	   the	   U.S.-­‐Chinese	   relationship	   is	   in	   general	  articulated	  as	  having	  the	  potential	  of	  not	  evolving	  into	  an	  antagonism,	  which	  –	  compared	  to	  the	  heated	  debates	  on	  Japan	  –	  seems	  almost	  surprising	  given	  China’s	  more	  obvious	  difference.	  This	  again	  might	  be	  linked	  to	  there	  still	  being	  enough	  hope	  for	  change	  in	  China,	  while	  in	  the	  situation	  with	  Japan	  this	  perspective	  had	  already	  given	  way	  to	  revisionism	  and	  essentialism.	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Table	  2:	  Summary	  of	  Argumentations	  
	  	   chains	  of	  difference	   chains	  of	  equivalence	  
Japan	   Japan	  =	  second	  largest	  free	  world	  economy,	  economic	  power,	  America’s	  major	  economic	  partner;	  seeking	  appropriate	  world	  responsibilities	  
Japan	  =	  unfair	  and	  culturally	  different,	  economic	  imperialist,	  protectionist	  and	  mercantilist	  à	  trade	  deficit	  as	  root	  cause	  of	  economic	  problems	  
China	   China	  =	  potential	  economic	  partner,	  too	  important	  (market)	  to	  antagonize	  or	  ignore;	  major	  power	  (in	  Asia/worldwide)	  
China	  =	  unfair	  and	  ideologically	  different	  (communist),	  illiberal	  à	  trade	  deficit	  as	  root	  cause	  of	  economic	  problems	  
U.S.	  vs.	  Japan	   U.S.	  needs	  to	  put	  own	  house	  in	  order,	  deal	  with	  causes	  of	  high	  dollar,	  high	  spending;	  against	  making	  Japan	  a	  scapegoat;	  partly	  also	  blame	  on	  executive	  for	  inadequate	  economic	  policies;	  should	  not	  be	  remedied	  through	  ‘managing	  trade’	  
U.S.	  as	  most	  competitive	  nation,	  free	  and	  fair	  trader,	  suffers	  from	  unfair	  Japanese	  practices,	  becomes	  debtor	  and	  dumping	  ground;	  	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence:	  U.S.	  executive	  not	  tough	  enough;	  free	  trade	  does	  not	  work	  with	  Japan	  à	  for	  results	  oriented	  policy	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U.S.	  vs.	  China	   U.S.	  should	  not	  hinge	  whole	  relationship	  on	  MFN;	  China’s	  long	  ‘different’	  history	  and	  grievances	  suffered	  through	  ‘West’;	  	  U.S.	  can	  positively	  influence	  China	  through	  economic	  interaction,	  i.e.	  free	  trade	  
	  U.S.	  as	  preeminent	  superpower,	  needs	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  its	  values;	  China	  is	  not	  evolving	  towards	  a	  ‘free	  society’;	  	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence:	  values	  vs.	  interests,	  free	  trade/LTH	  will	  not	  change	  China	  
	  
6.	   PERSPECTIVATION	   TOWARDS	   JAPAN	   AND	   CHINA	   –	   THE	   U.S.	   AS	  
VICTIM	  OF	  UNFAIR	  AND	  ILLIBERAL	  POLICIES	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  Through	  the	  analytic	  category	  of	  perspectivation,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  look	  at	  what	  perspective	  or	  point	  of	  view	  the	  nominations,	  predications	  and	  argumentations	  are	  expressed	  from.	  Read	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  PDT	  key	  concepts,	  in	  order	  to	  differentiate	  the	  in-­‐group	  from	  the	  out-­‐group	  –	  the	  self	  from	  the	  other	  –	  the	  speakers	  articulate	  themselves	  from	  a	  certain	  perspective,	  thus	  they	  relate	  themselves	  to	  nodal	  points	  that	  are	  eventually	  turned	  into	  an	  empty	  signifier,	  first	  and	  foremost	  through	  intensification	  (that	  will	  be	  treated	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  seven).	  The	  empty	  signifier	  then	   makes	   the	   cancellation	   of	   differences	   within	   the	   self	   possible,	   by	   equalizing	   its	  characteristics	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  other.	  In	  terms	  of	  identity,	  what	  follows	  from	  the	  perspectivation	  can	  be	  an	  accommodating	  inclusive	  relating	  to	  the	  other,	  or	  a	  confrontational	  exclusivist	  one.	  	  
	  
6.1.	  Perspectivations	  towards	  Japan	  –	  the	  cart	  is	  before	  the	  horse	  and	  the	  U.S.	  
is	  left	  with	  faded	  flowers	  	  The	  main	  perspective	  the	  U.S.	  articulates	  itself	  from	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Japan	  throughout	  the	  whole	  period	  of	  time	  –	  while	  the	  attention	  starts	  shifting	  towards	  China	  from	  1995	  onwards	  –	  is	  that	  of	  being	  
constantly	  on	  the	  short	  end	  of	  the	  stick	  (P1:3;	  with	  occasional	   exceptions	   in	  1997	  when	   the	  U.S.	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economy	  seems	  to	  be	  back	  ‘on	  top’,	  P:132).	  The	  dominant	  U.S.	  economic	  perspective	  –	  the	  major	  topic	  and	  issue	  still	  being	  the	  trade	  deficit	  –	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  inferiority	  towards	  Japan,	  of	  being	  a	  victim	  of	  ‘unfair’	  Japanese	  policies,	  of	  being	  forced	  to	  retaliate	  –	  simply	  because	  Japan’s	  policies	  leave	  no	  other	  possibility	  –	  and	  of	  being	  dependent	  on	  Japan.327	  All	  this	  is	  articulated	  against	  the	  background	  of	   the	  U.S.	   still	  being	   the	  provider	  of	  defense	  and	  security	   towards	   Japan,	  which	   is	  captured	  metaphorically	  by	  the	  impression	  of	  the	  cart	  [being]	  before	  the	  horse	  (P73:50).	  	  The	  perspective	  of	  economic	  inferiority	  is	  expressed	  in	  statements	  like	  Americans	  need	  to	  
improve	   their	   export	   capabilities.	   We	   often	   fail	   to	   match	   the	   Japanese	   skill	   and	   determination	  (P2:17).	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   the	   organization	   of	   U.S.	   economic	   policy	   in	   terms	   of	   trade	   policy	   is	  criticized	  compared	  to	  Japan:	  there	  is	  absolutely	  no	  single	  agency	  that	  is	  accountable	  for	  our	  trade	  
policy.	  How	  different	  from	  our	  neighbor	  Japan	   [referring	   to	   the	  MITI]	   (P4:4;	  cf.	  also	  Nanto	  1992,	  21,	   who	   in	   his	   CRS	   report	   characterizes	   U.S.	   trade	   policy	   towards	   Japan	   as	   “fragmented	   and	  coordinated	  (or	  uncoordinated)	  as	  any	  other	  U.S.	  policy”).328	  It	   is	  for	  example	  also	  claimed	  that,	  
that	  we	  have	  no	  competitive	  strategy	  for	  our	  auto	  sector	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  we	  are	  losing	  (P19:31).	  Quoting	  a	  speech	  by	  the	  Chrysler	  President	  Lee	  Iaocca	  in	  1985	  (given	  his	  position,	  an	  outspoken	  critic	  of	  Japan	  and	  its	  policies),	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  “getting	  whipped”	  
by	  foreign	  competition	  (P39:48).	  In	  a	  similar	  vein	  are	  statements	  like	  we	  still	  have	  not	  learned	  the	  
difference	  between	  being	  a	  partner	  in	  a	  trade	  deal	  and	  the	  patsy	  of	  one	  (P5:37),	  and	  we	  are	  going	  
down	   the	   tubes	   internationally	   in	   this	   particular	   competition	   (P13:11).	   Congress	   articulates	   the	  U.S.	  as	  being	   left	  with	  faded	  flowers	  (P81:1),	  with	  our	  competitiveness	  in	  many	  industries	  already	  
mortally	   wounded	   (P83:30),329 	  as	   the	   Japanese	   are	   beating	   America	   in	   many	   aspects	   of	   the	  
international	   trade	   race	   (P84:4),	   and	  we	   have	   failed	   to	   stand	   up	   to	   the	   Japanese	   and	   insist	   on	  
fairness	   (P92:31),	   so	   they	  have	  been	  eating	  our	  lunch	  for	  decades	   (P93:25).	  The	  perspective	   that	  the	  U.S.	  could	  and	  should	  learn	  from	  Japan	  (cf.	  Vogel,	  1979),	  that	  was	  also	  prominent	  among	  both	  critics	   (i.e.	   also	   the	   revisionists)	   and	   ‘friends’	   of	   Japan	   was	   expressed	   in	   statements	   like:	   The	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  Cf.	  for	  instance	  also	  Huntington	  (1993,	  78f.).	  328	  The	   Japanese	  Ministry	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry	   (MITI,	   replaced	  by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Economic	  Trade	   and	   Industry	  –	  METI	   –	   in	   2001),	   was	   largely	   considered	   “the	  most	   powerful	   link	   of	   the	   Japanese	   government	   and	   linchpin	   of	   the	  Japanese	   economic	  miracle”	   (Thorsten	  2012,	   42,	   149),	   a	   view	   that	  was	  most	  prominently	  put	   forward	  by	  Chalmers	  Johnston	   in	   his	  MITI	   and	   the	   Japanese	  Miracle	   in	   1982.	   The	   MITI	   was	   seen	   as	   pursuing	   and	   orchestrating	   Japan’s	  industrial	   policy	   by	   directing	   resources,	   structuring	   markets	   and	   influencing	   enterprise	   decisions,	   and	   as	   such	   it	  became	  the	  ‘indicator’	  for	  Japan	  as	  a	  ‘developmental	  state’	  versus	  the	  U.S.	  as	  ‘capitalist	  regulatory	  state’	  (Kunkel	  2003,	  136f.).	  	  	  329	  This	   is	   an	   example	   of	   ‘war	   rhetoric’	   (cf.	   also	   Zeiler	   2001,	   224)	   that	   is	   very	   prevalent	   under	   the	   category	   of	  intensification,	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  chapter	  seven.	  In	  the	  same	  vein	  is	  following	  statement:	  an	  American	  negotiating	  
team	  […]	  was	  defeated	  last	  month	  and	  is	  now	  in	  Tokyo	  to	  receive	  its	  second	  humiliation	  (P102:1).	  	  Thinking	  of	  politics	  or	  political	  campaigns	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘war’	  is	  not	  uncommon	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  for	  instance	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  presidential	   campaign	  management	  center	  and	   team	  became	  called	   ‘The	  War	  Room’	   (which	   is	  also	   the	  title	  of	  a	  documentary	  film	  on	  the	  campaign).	  This	  nomination	  was	  then	  also	  used	  for	  the	  campaign	  center	  and	  group	  on	  PNTR	  in	  2000	  (cf.	  Kolkmann	  2005,112ff.).	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lesson	  we	   can	   learn	   from	   Japan	   is	   that	   aggressive	   government	   economic	   development	   and	   trade	  
policies	  can	  be	  effective	  […]	  (P95:36),	  the	  United	  States	  would	  have	  a	  much	  better	  trade	  policy	  if	  we	  
followed	  many	  of	  Japan’s	  historic	  practices	  (P105:126).	  	  Furthermore,	   it	   is	  maintained	  that	   Japan	  is	  becoming	  superior	   in	  terms	  of	   technological	  innovation	  (cf.	  also	  for	  instance	  Cohen	  et	  al.	  1996,	  176,	  who	  speak	  of	  Japan	  as	  “challenge	  to	  U.S.	  preeminence	  as	  an	  economic	  and	  technological	  superpower”):	  	  	  
American	   business	   executives	   no	   longer	   patronize	   the	   Japanese	   as	   “imitators”,	   end	   “copiers”	   of	  
American	   technology.	   […]	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   Japan’s	   drive	   for	   technological	   supremacy,	   they	   are	  
scrambling	   to	   keep	   up	   with	   the	   new	   scientific	   research	   in	   Japan	   […]	   American	   scientists	   find	  
themselves	  hard-­‐pressed	  to	  learn	  of	  Japanese	  breakthroughs	  (P66:17).330	  	  	  Again,	   it	   is	   also	   pointed	   out	   that	   Japan	   does	   not	   separate	   security	   related	   questions	   from	   an	  economic	   perspective:	   we	   viewed	   this	   deal	   [FSX]	   from	   a	   military	   point	   of	   view,	   while	   Japan	  
considered	  the	  economic	  implications	  (P71:63),	  they	  kept	  their	  eyes	  on	  the	  ball.	  They	  know	  that	  the	  
strongest	  economic	  system	  is	  the	  strongest	  base	  for	  a	  strong	  national	  security	  (P73:52).331	  	  Adding	   to	   the	   impression	  of	   inferiority,	  what	   comes	  up	   in	  a	   few	  debates	   is	   the	   issue	  of	  Japanese	   investment	   in	   businesses	   and	   real-­‐estate	   in	   the	  United	   States,	  which	   is	   articulated	   as	  Japan	  ‘buying	  up	  the	  U.S.’:332	  the	  Japanese	  are	  buying	  up	  Columbia	  Pictures,	  Rockefeller	  Center,	  half	  
of	  downtown	  Los	  Angeles	  and	  much	  else	  […]	  do	  the	  Japanese	  have	  a	  money	  machine?	  (P79:3).	  Japan	  
owns	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   America.	   They	   own	   […]	   a	  majority	   of	   the	   office	   buildings	   in	   places	   like	   Los	  
Angeles,	  New	  York,	  Chicago,	  Washington,	  DC,	  […].	  Once	  more	   it	   is	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	  U.S.	   itself	  bears	  some	  responsibility	  for	  the	  situation,	  as	  in	  we	  have	  not	  discouraged	  that	  kind	  of	  investment	  (P80:2;	   see	   also	   P89:3),	   so	   that	   Japan	   has	   succeeded	   in	   buying	   large	   segments	   of	   this	   country	  (P100:5).	  A	   report	   from	  the	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	   (CRS)	   in	   January	  1990	  categorizes	  Japanese	  investment	  in	  the	  U.S.	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  more	  visible	  signs	  of	  Japan’s	  emerging	  role	  as	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  330	  See	  also	  i.e.	  N.	  Morris	  and	  Uriu	  (N.	  Morris	  2010,	  24;	  Uriu	  2009,	  42ff.).	  	  331	  For	  details	  on	  the	  FSX	  see	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis	  and	  for	  instance	  Spar	  (1992),	  who	  points	  out	  that	  commercial	  interests	  were	  not	  absent	  on	  either	  side.	  332	  Japanese	   investment	   happened	   in	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   U.S.	   and	   in	   various	   sectors,	   but	   purchases	   of	   ‘iconic’	  industries	  or	  ‘landmark’	  buildings	  drew	  most	  of	  the	  attention.	  Those	  were	  for	  instance	  Sony’s	  purchase	  of	  CBS	  Records	  (1988)	   and	   Columbia	   Pictures	   (1989),	  Matsushita	   acquiring	   the	  MCA-­‐Universal	   Film	   Studios	   (1990),	   as	  well	   as	   the	  attainments	  of	   the	  Radio	  City	  Music	  Hall	  and	  Rockefeller	  Center	   in	  New	  York	  by	  Mitsubishi	  Estate.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  these	   investments	  were	  welcomed,	  on	   the	  other	  hand	  also	  articulated	  as	   ‘economic	   invasion’,	  as	  a	   result	  of	  which	   it	  was	   reasoned	   that	  New	  York	   could	  as	  well	  be	   renamed	   ‘New	  Tokyo’,	   L.A.	  Tokyo’s	   ‘twenty-­‐fourth	  ward’	   and	  Hawai’i	  Japan’s	  ‘forty-­‐eighth	  prefecture’	  (cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  24).	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  Japan	  had	  become	  the	  second	  largest	  investor	  in	  U.S.	  businesses	  and	  in	  real	  estate	  (cf.	  Kunkel	  2003,	  42)	  after	  Great	  Britain,	  see	  	  J.K.	  Jackson	  (1990,	  4)	  and	  Hodges	  (1989).	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international	  financial	  power”,	  and	  points	  out	  that	  it	  has	  incited	  a	  negative	  reaction	  amid	  parts	  of	  the	  American	  public,	  that	  arises	  from	  	  “a	  feeling	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  declining	  as	  an	  international	  economic	  power	  as	  well	  as	  a	  world	  power	  and	  that	  Americans	  view	  the	  economic	  strength	  of	  industrial	  competitors	  such	  as	  Japan	  as	  a	  greater	  threat	  to	  U.S.	  security	  than	  the	  military	  strength	  of	  such	  countries	  as	  the	  Soviet	  Union.”	  	  	  Furthermore,	  in	  spite	  of	  Japanese	  investment	  being	  only	  half	  that	  of	  Great	  Britain’s,	  78	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  public	  (in	  1988)	  saw	  Japan	  as	  number	  one	  (J.	  K.	  Jackson	  1990,	  2).333	  	  In	   line	  with	   the	   perspective	   of	   inferiority	   is	   that	   of	   being	   a	   victim	   of	   unfair	   Japanese	   policies,	  which	  also	  runs	  as	  a	  red	  line	  through	  the	  debates	  over	  the	  entire	  range	  of	  time.	  This	  is	  articulated	  through	   statements	   like	   everyone	   seems	  prepared	   to	  blame	   the	  United	  States	   for	   its	  problems	   in	  
trade	   (P10:9),	   however	   in	   this	   view	   discrimination	   against	   every	   American	   manufacturer	   and	  
every	   American	   commodity	   is	   rampant	   in	   Japan	   and	   in	   most	   of	   our	   trading	   partners	   (P18:42).	  Especially	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  automobile	   industry	   it	   is	  claimed	  that	  U.S.	  auto	  firms	  are	  not	  on	  a	  
level	   playing	   field	   with	   their	   Japanese	   counterparts	   (P19:32),	   they	   are	   targeting	   American	  
industries	   and	   victimizing	   the	   United	   States.	   Most	   Americans	   don’t	   even	   understand	   that	   a	   new	  
game	   is	   being	   played,	   let	   alone	   that	   they	   are	   losing	   (P20:37),	   we	   are	   […]	   suffering	   from	   the	  
Japanese	  style	  of	  negotiations	  (P22:10).	  The	  argument	  of	  Japan	  ‘targeting’	  certain	  technologically	  advanced	   industries	   in	   the	   U.S.	   in	   terms	   of	   strategically	   competing	   against	   them,	   but	   also	   for	  acquisition,	  was	  put	   forward	  prominently	  by	   the	  revisionists.	   In	  part,	   the	  critics	  of	  acquisitions	  feared	  that	  the	  company	  in	  the	  U.S.	  would	  be	  stripped	  from	  its	  technology	  that	  would	  be	  used	  by	  the	  parent	  company	  in	  Japan	  (J.	  K.	  Jackson	  1990,	  6).	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  U.S.	  ‘openness’	  is	  contrasted	  with	  Japan	  taking	  advantage	  of	  it:	  	  	  
America	  greets	  Japanese	  investment	  with	  encouragement	  and	  open	  arms	  […]	  Japan	  greets	  American	  
investment	  with	  discouragement,	   closed	  doors	  and	   silent	   ‘cultural	   barriers’.	  Our	   trade	   relationship	  
with	   Japan,	   the	   world’s	   second	   largest	   economy,	   is	   a	   one-­‐way	   street.	   […]	   the	   Japanese	   will	   do	  
everything	   in	   their	   power	   to	   keep	   it	   that	  way	   (P80:2),	   industry	   after	   industry	   is	   taken	   from	  us	   in	  
world	  competition:	  cars,	  computers,	  cameras	  (P83:22).	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  The	  report	  also	  points	  out	   that	   from	  1980	   to	  1988	   Japanese	   investment	   increased	  more	   than	  eightfold	   from	  $35	  billion	  to	  $285	  billion,	  and	  that	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  that	  investment	  was	  in	  U.S.	  Treasury	  securities	  (J.	  K.	  Jackson	  1990,	  3,	  14).	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In	  line	  with	  this	  perspective,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  in	  consequence	  the	  United	  States	  is	  […]	  being	  flooded	  
by	  goods	  (P22:11).	  It	  is	  further	  emphasized	  that	  the	  international	  trade	  crisis	  between	  the	  United	  
States	  and	  Japan	  […]	  threatens	  our	  economic	  recovery,	  our	  industries,	  and	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  
American	  jobs	   (P25:46).	  While	   Japanese	  businesses	  get	  rich	  and	  American	  workers	  lose	  their	  jobs	  
by	   the	   thousands	   (P28:3),	   Japan	   has	   not	   sought	   to	   strengthen	   but	   to	  weaken	   our	  world	   trading	  
system	  (P29:7),	  and	  consequently	  those	  countries	  that	  practice	  free	  trade	  are	  penalized	  (P37:34).	  While	   we	   are	   trying	   to	   be	   good	   citizens	   in	   the	   world	   market	   […]	   yet	   we	   do	   not	   see	   a	   similar	  
willingness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Japanese	   (P42:39).	  On	   the	  contrary,	   the	   Japanese	  are	  described	  as	  ‘enjoying’	   the	   situation	   in	   statements	   like	   the	   Japanese	   are	   laughing	   all	   the	   way	   to	   the	   bank	  (P42:42).	  Japanese	  protectionism	  is	  said	  to	  be	  constantly	  hurting	  the	  United	  States	  badly	  (P68:21),	  as	   again	  with	   the	   help	   of	   unfair	   trade	   practices	   Japan	   has	   already	   taken	   advantage	   of	   us	   to	   the	  
disadvantage	  of	  our	  economy	  in	  general	  and	  to	  our	  auto	  and	  semiconductor	  industries	  in	  particular	  (P71:37).	   It	   is	   also	   generally	   maintained	   that	   the	   more	   open	   an	   economy	   is	   […],	   the	   more	  
vulnerable	   its	   industries	  are	  to	  dumping,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  unquestionably	  has	  the	  most	  open	  
market	  of	  any	  country	  in	  the	  world	   (P151:15).	  This	  allegedly	  results	   in	  a	  situation	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
temptation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  many	  nations	  to	  think	  that	  we	  will	  be	  the	  dumping	  ground	  of	  last	  resort	  –	  
much	  as	  we	  have	  been	  in	  the	  past	  (P151:20),	   as	   the	  rules	  of	  trade	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  








U.S.	  decline	  through	  Japanese	  economic	  hegemony?	  	  From	  the	  predominant	  perspective	  of	   inferiority,	   the	  assessment	  of	   the	  situation	  goes	  as	   far	  as	  predicting	   an	   actual	   decline	   of	   the	   U.S.334 	  on	   the	   economic,	   and	   also	   broader	   scale	   as	   a	  consequence,	   and	   this	   starts	   already	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1980s	   through	   statements	   like:	   the	   economic	  
health	  of	  the	  United	  States	  is	  threatened	  by	  continuing	  increases	  in	  the	  Nation’s	  trade	  deficits	  with	  
Japan	  and	  other	  foreign	  countries	   (P8:4).	   It	   is	   explicitly	   stated	   that	   the	  Japanese	  will	  continue	  to	  
prevail,	   take	   over	   the	   international	   market,	   destroy	   the	   American	   standard	   of	   living	   and	   our	  
capacity	   as	   a	   world	   power.	   That’s	   the	   threat	   we	   face	   (P13:12).	   Meanwhile	   this	   scenario	   is	  described	   as	   an	   unacceptable	   erosion	   of	   traditional	   leadership	   in	   the	   international	  marketplace	  (P24:1).	   In	   this	   vein	   it	   is	   asked	   how	   much	   longer	   can	   we	   continue	   to	   subjugate	   United	   States	  
interests	   to	   Japanese	  economic	  hegemony?	   (P73:73).	   The	   possibility	   of	   a	   change	   in	   course	   from	  earlier	  history	  until	  the	  1980s	  is	  articulated	  through	  statements	  like:	  We	  all	  know	  where	  Japan’s	  
economy	  was	  after	  the	  end	  of	  WWII	  […]	  then,	  the	  United	  States	  produced	  goods	  for	  the	  world.	  Now,	  
Japan	  does	   (P73:133).	  The	  belief	   in	  Japan’s	  technological	  superiority	   is	  expressed	  in	  statements	  like	   if	  Japan	  would	  say	  no	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  sell	  semiconductors	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  instead,	  
‘It	  would	   instantly	  change	  the	  balance	  of	  power’	   (P82:2).	   In	   the	  not-­‐too-­‐distant	   future	  the	  United	  
States	  would	  begin	  to	  slide	   into	  a	  second-­‐rate	   international	  power	   (P82:5),	   and	   it	   is	   emphasized	  that	  there	  was	  indeed	  	  	  
a	  deepening	  belief	  that	  America	  is	  an	  ebbing	  power	  (P82:8):	  Just	  44	  years	  ago	  […]	  the	  United	  States,	  
conqueror	  and	  ruler	  of	   Japan,	   fully	  emerged	  as	   the	  world’s	  preeminent	   superpower.	  Now,	   the	  roles	  
have	  been	  reversed.	  Japan	  has	  managed	  history’s	  most	  spectacular	  comeback.	  It	  stands	  today	  as	  the	  
newest	  superpower	  (P100:4).	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  This	  kind	  of	  ‘declinist’	  line	  of	  reasoning	  was	  especially	  prominent	  in	  the	  context	  of	  and	  when	  referring	  critically	  to	  economic	  policies	  under	  President	  Reagan,	  the	  trade	  deficit,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  having	  turned	  from	  a	  creditor	  to	  a	  debtor.	  In	  a	  nutshell	   the	  main	  arguments	  were	  that	  after	  the	  Cold	  War	  U.S.	  military	  power	  had	  or	  would	  become	  less	   important,	  that	   it	   would	   suffer	   from	   ‘imperial	   overstretch’	   while	   losing	   its	   technological	   competitiveness,	   and	   that	   the	  individualistic	  style	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  capitalism	  was	  countered	  by	  a	  ‘communal’	  style	  capitalism	  in	  Europe	  and	  Japan	  that	  was	  perceived	  as	  deviating	  from	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  liberal	  trading	  regime,	  and	  posing	  the	  U.S.	  at	  disadvantage.	  In	  this	  sense	   it	  was	  argued	   that	   Japan	  was	  pursuing	  power	  not	   through	  military,	  but	   through	  economic	  means	   (cf.	  Paulsen	  1999,	  28–31).	  	  For	   schools	   of	   ‘declinism’	   in	   a	   broader	   historical	   perspective	   and	   also	   related	   to	   the	   Rise	   of	   China	   see	   for	   example	  Beckley	  (2011).	  See	  also	  Patrick	  Thaddeus	  Jackson	  (2010).	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  critical	  theory,	  Robert	  Cox	  maintained	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s	  that	  it	  was	  not	  necessarily	  an	  actual	  ‘objective’	  decline	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  material	  capacities	  that	  indicated	  a	  weakening	  of	  the	  ‘hegemonic	  order’,	  but	  the	  debate	  on	  decline	  itself,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  problematization	  of	  and	  discussions	  on	  the	  leadership	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  (cf.	  Hummel	  2000,	  51).	  	  	  	  
178	  
	  
Contrastingly,	   the	   new	   situation	   is	   articulated	   as	   grim:	   the	   huge	   deficits	   weaken	   our	   country	  (P164:2),	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  United	  States	  [is]	  deteriorating	  (P133:78).	  They	  are	  beating	  
us	   in	   trade	   […]	   that	  world	   power	   that	   loses	   its	  manufacturing	   capacity	  will	   cease	   to	   be	   a	  world	  
power	  (P136:18),	  and	  the	  question	  for	  the	  future	  in	  this	  vein	  is	  articulated	  as	  whether	  we	  want	  
the	  Europeans	  or	  the	  Japanese	  to	  be	  the	  economic	  model	  other	  nations	  look	  to	  emulate	   (P209:42),	  hence	   possibly	   not	   anymore	   the	   U.S.,	   which	   would	   be	   an	   outright	   contradiction	   to	   its	   self-­‐understanding	  as	  global	  role	  model	  according	  to	  American	  exceptionalism.	  	  One	   of	   the	   main	   reasons	   for	   the	   inferiority	   and	   the	   possible	   decline	   is	   articulated	   in	  having	   become	   a	   debtor	   –	  which	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	  most	   frequent	   nominations	   for	   the	   U.S.	   in	  relation	  to	  Japan	  (see	  chapter	  five	  and	  table	  six)	  –	  and	  in	  this	  respect	  dependent	  on	  Japan,	  which	  becomes	  apparent	  in	  following	  perspectivations:	  Japan	  is	  financing	  our	  debt	  (P4:5),	  we	  [are	  doing	  
anything]	  to	  make	  the	  Japanese	  happy,	  so	  they	  won’t	  foreclose	  on	  the	  mortgages	   (P71:55),	  maybe	  
they	  will	  stop	  buying	  our	  debt,	  our	  government	  loans,	  and	  our	  securities.	  Maybe	  they	  will	  teach	  us	  a	  
lesson	   (P71:69).	   In	   a	   broader	   perspective	   of	   the	   U.S.-­‐Japan	   relationship	   it	   is	   seen	   as	   an	   ironic	  
situation	   in	  which	   the	  world’s	   largest	   creditor	   is	   defended	   by	   the	  world’s	   largest	   debtor,	   and	   the	  
debtor	  borrows	  from	  the	  creditor	  and	  pays	  interest	  on	  the	  moneys	  borrowed.	  The	  cart	  is	  before	  the	  
horse	  (P73:50).	  Referring	  to	  Clyde	  Prestowitz’	  book	  Trading	  Places	  (published	  in	  1988)	  with	  the	  subtitle	  How	  we	  allowed	  Japan	  to	  take	  the	  lead,335	  it	   is	  emphasized	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  the	  
biggest	   creditor	   nation	   in	   the	   world.	   Now	   Japan	   is,	   and	   the	   United	   States	   is	   the	   biggest	   debtor	  
nation	  in	  the	  world.	  Then	  we	  were	  the	  economic	  leaders,	  the	  technological	  innovators,	  now	  Japan	  is.	  
The	   phenomenon	   has	   been	   called	   ‘Trading	   Places’	   (P73:134).	   The	   felt	   dependency	   on	   Japan	   is	  further	   expressed	   in	   statements	   like:	   Our	   United	   States	   Treasury	   turns	   to	   Japan	   with	   knees	  
trembling	  when	  we	  go	  out	   to	   sell	   our	  bonds.	  Will	   they	  buy?	   (P73:50).	   In	   this	   sense	   some	   voices	  express	  that	  they	  have	  	  	  
become	  convinced	  that	  America	  is	  in	  decline	  and	  will	  increasingly	  need	  Japanese	  capital	  so	  badly	  that	  
we	   will	   accept	   it	   on	   whatever	   terms	   it	   comes,	   the	   Japanese	   believe	   that	   they	   can	   get	   away	   with	  
constructing	  a	  more	   tightly	   controlled,	  more	  profitable,	  more	  mercantile,	   and	  of	   course,	  more	   self-­‐
interested	  method	   of	   exercising	  world	   leadership	   than	   the	  American	   post-­‐war	  model	   of	   leadership	  (P77:8;	  in	  1989).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  335	  This	  was	   one	   of	   the	   ‘core’	   revisionist	  works	   in	  which	   Prestowitz	   argued	   that	   Japan	   deviated	   from	   the	   ‘Western	  model’	  and	  that	  the	  U.S.	  itself	  not	  only	  failed	  to	  understand	  this,	  but	  also	  lacked	  the	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  strategic	  economic	  power	  (cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2011,	  37).	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The	   CRS-­‐report	   on	   Japanese	   investment	   addresses	   the	   concern	   of	   some	   observers	   about	   the	  possible	   leverage	  of	   Japanese	   investors	  over	   the	  U.S.	   –	   for	   instance	   a	  pullout	   should	   the	  dollar	  decline	   too	   much	   or	   too	   rapidly	   –	   	   but	   concludes	   that	   Japan	   was	   actually	   not	   more	   prone	   to	  withdrawing	  its	  funds	  than	  any	  other	  foreign	  or	  even	  American	  investor	  (J.	  K.	  Jackson	  1990,	  13f.)	  Still,	   in	   line	  with	  these	  concerns,	   in	  Congress	  the	  U.S.	   is	  potentially	  seen	  as	  being	  on	  the	  short	  end	  globally,	  and	  not	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  Japan,	  as	  in	  following	  statements:	  the	  United	  States	  
is	  now	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  debtor	  nation	  […]	  and	  foreign	  ownership	  of	  U.S.	  assets	  […]	  is	  rising	  very	  
rapidly	  (P77:11;	  in	  1989),	  and	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  	  	  
there	   is	   a	   danger	   to	   U.S.	   debt	   and	   dependence	   on	   foreign	   capital.	   That	   danger	   is	   a	   real	   loss	   of	  
American	   economic	   and	   political	   independence	   […]	   how	   long	   before	   our	   foreign	   creditors	   pull	   on	  
America’s	  debt	  chain	  to	  command	  obedience?	  (P82:1),	  as	  our	  debt	  grows,	  we	  are	  losing	  our	  capacity	  
to	  control	  our	  destiny	  (P89:3).	  	  The	  loss	  of	  control	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  dependence	  on	  foreign	  investments:	  we	  anticipate	  […]	  that	  the	  
Japanese	   will	   purchase	   […]	   a	   good	   part	   of	   our	   domestic	   deficit	   week	   by	   week	   […]	  We	   count	   on	  
Japanese	  and	  European	  friends	  (P93:6),	  we	  simply	  have	  placed	  ourselves	  in	  the	  vulnerable	  position	  
that	  we	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  good	  will	  of	  investors	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world	   (P93:10).	  And	  again,	  the	  U.S.	  being	  indebted	  first	  and	  foremost	  to	  Japan	  and	  China	  is	  emphasized:	  America’s	  private	  debt	  is	  
held	  by	  foreign	  countries,	  53	  per	  cent	  […]	  Japan	  first,	  and	  China	  second	  […]	  I	  think	  that	  is	  not	  good	  
for	   our	   country,	   for	   our	   grandchildren	   […]	   give	   America	   back	   to	   Americans	   (P207:15;	   in	   2005).	  	  Accordingly,	   in	   1988	   Zbigniew	   Brzezinski	   (the	   former	   security	   adviser	   of	   President	   Carter)	  argued	  referring	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  dollar	  and	  the	  debt	  that	  “the	  United	  States	  will	  be	  hard	  put	  to	  exercise	   effective	   economic	   leadership,	   and	   its	   capacity	   to	   sustain	   its	   role	   as	   the	   principal	  defender	  of	  the	  free	  world	  will	  be	  severely	  undermined”	  (cited	  in	  Kataoka	  1995,	  10).	  Importantly,	  the	  question	  on	  how	  the	  United	  States	  should	  respond	  is	  also	  articulated	  as	  ‘depending	  on	  Japan’,	   in	   the	  sense	  of	   Japan	   leaving	  no	  other	  choice,	  as	   it	   is	  maintained	  that	   the	  U.S.’	  means,	  but	  also	  its	  patience	  have	  simply	  been	  exhausted,	  as	  for	  example	  in	  statements	  like:	  	  	  
If	  this	  continues,	  I,	  as	  a	  free	  trade	  advocate,	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  introduce	  legislation	  which	  will	  mandate	  
that	  we	  put	  quotas	  on	  the	  Japanese	  […]	  (P41:20),	  no	  open	  world	  trading	  system	  can	  exist	  if	  a	  major	  
trading	   nation	   bases	   its	   economy	   on	   exporting	   goods	   […]	   while	   adamantly	   refusing	   to	   import	  
virtually	  anything	  […]	  (P41:27).	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In	  this	  sense,	  for	  instance	  steel	  import	  talks	  with	  Japan	  in	  1985	  are	  labeled	  as	  a	  lesson	  in	  futility	  (P22:10)	   already,	   and	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	   trade	   honeymoon	   is	   over	   for	   all	   of	   those	   in	  Western	  
Europe	  and	  Japan,	  and	  elsewhere,	  who	  will	  not	  abide	  by	  some	  fair	  rules	  of	  the	  game	   (P8:25).	   It	   is	  contended	  that	  it	  is	  Japan’s	  willingness	  […]	  [that]	  will	  determine	  whether	  protectionist	  sentiment	  in	  
the	  Congress	  and	  across	  the	  Nation	  will	  increase	  or	  subside	   (P26:40),	  as	  allegedly	  everything	  has	  been	   tried:	   our	   negotiators	   […]	   have	   knocked	   on	   every	   door	   (P27:50),	   hence	  we	   can	   no	   longer	  
tolerate	   the	   one-­‐way	   street	   […]	   that	   have	   characterized	   past	   Japanese-­‐American	   trade	   relations	  (P28:4).	  Japan	  is	  repeatedly	  accused	  of	  making	  ‘empty	  promises’:	  They	  must	  understand	  that	  we	  
have	  long	  passed	  the	  period	  when	  we	  will	  be	  mollified	  by	  smiles	  and	  promises	  (P28:4),	  we	  are	  tired	  
of	  playing	  on	  a	  field	  tilted	  heavily	  in	  their	  direction	  (P30:14),	  as	  it	  is	  claimed	  that	  the	  Japanese	  have	  
so	  far	  successfully	  disregarded	  warnings	   (P37:33).	  According	  to	  this	  perspective,	   the	  U.S.	   ‘has	  to’	  react:	  The	  United	  States	  deserves	  equal	  treatment	  by	  the	  Japanese;	  and	  if	  we	  do	  not	  get	  it,	  we	  will	  
act	  to	  retaliate	  (P42:28),	  as	  it	  is	  again	  argued	  that	  the	  days	  of	  talk	  are	  over	  and	  the	  days	  of	  action	  
are	   beginning	   (P42:29).	   The	   trade	   discussions	   with	   Japan	   are	   articulated	   as	   complicated,	  
generally	  polite-­‐	  and	  usually	  unproductive	  (P42:34),	  but	  still	  –	  upholding	  U.S.	  identity	  as	  fair	  and	  free	   trader	   –	   it	   is	   claimed	   that	  we	  have	  never	  retaliated	  against	   Japan	  for	  unfair	   trade	  practices	  (P56:3).	  	  Accordingly,	   the	   U.S.	   is	   also	   seen	   as	   ‘unselfish	   victim’,	   which	   again	   resonates	   with	   the	  feature	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  of	  seeing	  oneself	  ‘surrounded	  by	  a	  hostile	  world’:	  if	  we	  do	  not	  
promote	  this	  country’s	  economic	  interests	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  a	  free	  and	  fair	  market,	  other	  people	  will	  
successfully	  promote	  their	  own	  selfish	  interests	  (P56:4).	  Or	  as	  in:	  It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  be	  critical	  
of	  Japan	  […]	  [it]	  is	  the	  reality	  that	  Japan	  must	  open	  its	  markets	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Let	  me	  remind	  
our	   Japanese	   friends	   that	  no	  American	  politician	  can	  stand	   idly	  by	  and	  watch	  our	   industrial	  base	  
deteriorate	   (P61:24).	   Repeatedly	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   nothing	   has	   changed	   over	   time	   (see	   also	   in	  what	  follows	  on	  ‘frustration’),	  but	  that	  the	  same	  old	  patterns	  of	  behavior	  by	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
Japan	  are	  being	  repeated	  (P69:1),	  as	  	  	  
for	  decades	  now,	  American	  business	  has	  met	  a	  Japanese	  market	  closed	  in	  all	  sorts	  of	  sectors.	  We	  have	  
negotiated	   over	   semiconductors,	   glass,	   insurance,	   apples,	   oranges,	   medical	   equipment,	  
supercomputers,	  wood	  products,	  beef	  and	  more	  (P119:1),	  and	  we	  have	  watched	  a	  30-­‐year	  parade	  of	  
Presidents	  and	  administration	  official	  disturbed	  about	  our	  unequal	  relationship	  with	  Japan.	  Leaders	  
wrung	  their	  hands	  […]	  but	  didn’t	  make	  serious	  changes	  […]	  (P164:5,	  in	  1994).	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Through	   the	  perspectives	   of	   being	   on	   the	   short	   end	   and	  being	   the	   victim,	   being	  dependent	   on	  Japan	  and	   finally,	   Japan	   leaving	  no	  other	   choice,	  basically	   two	  arguments	   in	   terms	  of	   chains	  of	  equivalence	  are	  put	  forward:	  the	  perspective	  is	  articulated	  as	  contradicting	  U.S.	  identity	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  economic	  and	  global	  power	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  the	  U.S.	  has	  no	  other	  choice	  but	  to	  react	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  possible	  decline.	  Furthermore,	   if	   it	  does	  react	   in	  a	  way	  that	  stands	  against	  its	  identity	  as	  a	  free	  trader,	  this	  is	  also	  ‘Japan’s	  fault’,	  as	  after	  a	  long	  period	  of	  the	  U.S.	   trying	   every	   strategy,	   the	   situation	   leaves	   no	   other	   choice.	   In	   this	   sense,	   via	   the	   empty	  signifier	   ‘(un)fairness’,	  everything	  the	  U.S.	  does	  serves	  only	  to	   ‘restore’	  fairness,	  and	  is	  hence	  in	  line	  with	  its	  self-­‐understanding	  .	  	  
	  
	  Is	  Japan	  still	  an	  ally?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Another	  reason	  articulated	  for	  the	  ‘exhaustion	  of	  patience’	  is	  the	  disappointment	  in	  the	  behavior	  of	   Japan	   as	   an	   ally	   (P73:28,	   56,	   117),	   as	   in	   statements	   like	   the	  world’s	   largest	  debtor	  nation	   is	  
providing	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  creditor	  (P93:24).	  In	  this	  sense	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  
intolerable	   for	   us	   	   to	   be	   […]	   the	   guarantors	   of	   Japanese	   security	   interests	   and	   have	   Japan	   still	  
reluctant	  to	  give	  a	  fair	  deal	  on	  the	  economic	  front	   (P73:117).	   	  Already	   in	  1985	   this	   argument	   is	  expressed	   in	  a	  more	   intensified	  manner:	   I'm	  no	  communist,	  folks,	  but	  it's	  not	  Russia	  that's	  laying	  
waste	  to	  my	  business,	  and	  to	  most	  of	   the	  rest	  of	  business	   in	   this	  country.	   It's	   Japan	   	   ...	   	  our	   friend.	  
While,	  by	  the	  way,	  we	  pay	  to	  defend	  him	  against	  our	  enemy!	  (P29:34).	  	  A	  particular	  case	  of	  discontent	  was	  seen	  in	  the	  Toshiba	  technology	  and	  chemical	  weapons	  issue:	   I	   share	   those	   frustrations	   over	   Japanese	   carelessness	   in	   exporting	   technology	   to	   the	   Soviet	  
Union	  in	  the	  Toshiba	  case	  and	  to	  Libya	  in	  the	  chemical	  weapons	  case,	  and	  over	  Japanese	  reluctance	  
to	  take	  on	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  our	  common	  defense	  and	  on	  third	  world	  debt	  (P73:1).336	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	   FSX-­‐fighter	   plane,	   exasperation	   is	   expressed	   in	   opinions	   like	   let	   them	  go	   to	   the	  French	  and	  
British.	   Let	   the	  French	  and	  British	  protect	   Japan.	  Let	   them	   look	   to	   the	  French	  and	  British	   for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  336	  In	   1987	   it	   was	   revealed	   that	   the	   Japanese	   Toshiba	   Machine	   Company	   had	   violated	   regulations	   set	   by	   the	  international	   Coordinating	   Committee	   for	   Multilateral	   Export	   Controls	   –	   of	   which	   Japan	   was	   a	   member	   –	   through	  selling	   computer-­‐guided	  propeller	  milling	  machines	   to	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  between	  1982	  and	  1984,	  what	  purportedly	  improved	   the	   capabilities	   of	   Soviet	   submarines	   to	   evade	   detection.	   Norway	   and	   France	   had	   also	   acted	   against	   the	  regulations,	  but	  most	  critique	   in	   the	  U.S.	  was	  directed	  against	  Toshiba.	   In	   this	  context,	   in	   July	  1987	  nine	  Republican	  Congress	   members	   publicly	   destroyed	   a	   small	   Toshiba	   radio-­‐cassette	   player	   with	   a	   sledgehammer	   at	   a	   press	  conference	  on	  Capitol	  Hill	  (cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  57).	  	  The	  Libya	  chemical	  weapons	  case	  refers	  to	  a	  revelation	  by	  Toshiba	  in	  1989,	  that	  in	  late	  1985	  it	  had	  provided	  electrical	  equipment	  for	  a	  plant	  in	  Libya	  that	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  suspected	  by	  the	  U.S.	  to	  be	  producing	  containers	  and	  shells	  for	  chemical	  weapons.	  Toshiba	  company	  officials	  insisted	  however,	  that	  they	  acted	  only	  as	  a	  subcontractor	  and	   that	   to	   their	   knowledge	   the	   plant	   was	   intended	   for	   manufacturing	   equipment	   for	   desalting	   seawater.	   The	  shipments	  at	  the	  time	  were	  not	  considered	  to	  have	  violated	  export	  control	  laws	  (Sanger	  1989).	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protection	  that	  they	  get	  from	  the	  United	  States	  (P73:56)	  and	  in	  it	  is	  a	  golden	  opportunity	  for	  Japan	  
to	  show	  their	  good	  faith	  […]	  the	  Japanese	  are	  missing	  that	  opportunity	  (P71:67).337	  	  Because	   of	   all	   these	   reasons,	   there	   are	   calls	   to	   finally	   take	   action,	   again	   following	   the	  argumentation	   that	   Japan	   leaves	   no	   other	   choice:	  we	  should	  do	   two	   things:	   […]	  not	   to	  have	  our	  
markets	  open	  at	  all	   to	  the	   Japanese	  unless	  their	  markets	  are	  reciprocally	  open	  to	  us.	  Second,	  stop	  
subsidizing	  dumped	  goods	  coming	  from	  Japan	  […]	  (P42:30).	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  what	  we	  have	  to	  do	  is	  
stand	  up	  and	  have	  a	  little	  bit	  of	  backbone	  […]	  controlling	  the	  largest	  and	  freest	  market	  in	  the	  world,	  
we	  have	  to	  open	  markets	  abroad,	  if	  we	  have	  the	  resolve	  (P71:69;	  P83:27).	  Again	  referring	  to	  past	  experiences	   it	   is	   argued	   that	  we	   have	   learned	   from	   previous	   administrations,	   who	   have	   backed	  
down	   in	   the	   face	   of	   Japanese	   intransigence,	   that	   only	   firm	   and	   consistent	   pressure	   will	   make	  
sustained	  progress	  (P107:1),	  while	  finally,	  during	  Clinton’s	  time	  as	  president	  it	  is	  emphasized	  that	  
this	   [the	   Clinton]	   administration	   has	   stood	   up	   and	   said:	   we	   are	   not	   going	   to	   put	   up	   with	   this	  (P164:1).	  The	  (in)	  famous	  1989-­‐poll	  by	  BusinessWeek-­‐Harris	  is	  also	  cited,	  with	  its	  results	  of	  68	  
percent	   of	   the	   public	   [feeling]	   that	   the	   economic	   threat	   posed	   by	   Japan	   outweighs	   the	   military	  
threat	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  nearly	  70	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  respondents	  [feeling]	  that	  Japan	  imposes	  
unfair	  trade	  barriers	  on	  American	  products	  (P86:1).	  It	  is	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  a	  large	  percentage	  
of	   Americans	   [are]	   saying	   ‘no’	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   question	   whether	   any	   other	   country	   or	  
nationals	  of	  any	  other	  country	  should	  own	  factories,	  stores,	  land	  in	  our	  States	  (P93:6).338	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   are	   also	   voices	   expressing	  worries	   about	   being	   on	   a	   collision	  course	  with	   Japan	   (P25:47,	   P31:37,	   P67:27,28,29;	   P82:3),	   and	   about	   protectionism	  as	   reaction	  (P4:5):	   the	  United	  States	   led	   the	  way	   to	  a	  protectionist	  world	  after	   the	   first	  world	  war	   (P38:32),	  
with	   some	  300	  protectionist	   bills	   now	  before	  Congress,	  we	  are	   indeed	   seeing	   the	   ghost	   of	   Smoot-­‐
Hawley.	   If	   we	   toy	   with	   protectionism,	   we	   will	   be	   toying	   with	   another	   depression	   (P67:16).	  Conciliatory	  voices	  claim	  that	  all	  we	  ask	  for	  […]	  is	  equity	  (P56:5),	  we	  all	  wish	  to	  avoid	  a	  trade	  war	  (P56:8),	  and	  referring	  to	  both	  sides,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan:	  we	  must	  accept	  Japan’s	  increased	  presence	  
in	  the	  world	  market,	  so	  must	  Japan	  accept	  the	  responsibility	  of	  her	  role	   (P97:4).	  This	  perspective	  will	  be	  addressed	  further	  under	  the	  category	  of	  mitigation	  in	  chapter	  7.2.	  	  A	   frequent	   perspective	   in	   seeking	   to	   explain	   the	   situation	   once	   more	   focuses	   on	   the	  ‘differences’	  of	   Japan,	  again	  economic	  and	  cultural	  arguments	  being	   intertwined	   in	  many	  cases.	  While	   some	   voices	   are	   pointing	   for	   instance	   to	   the	   missing	   tactfulness	   of	   the	   U.S.-­‐trade	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  The	  1992	  CRS-­‐report	  characterizes	  the	  linking	  of	  trade	  frictions	  with	  security	  issues	  in	  Congress	  as	  instrumental,	  as	  it	  was	  also	  about	  “compelling	  Japan	  to	  provide	  local	  support	  of	  about	  $50,000	  per	  year	  per	  U.S.	  soldier	  stationed	  there”	  (Nanto	  1992,	  1).	  338	  Michael	  Hodges	  aims	  at	  putting	  the	  results	  of	  the	  poll	  in	  a	  critical	  perspective	  by	  mentioning	  another	  poll	  from	  the	  same	  year	  that	   found	  that	  “77	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  Americans	  responding	  believe	  that	   there	   is	  a	  heaven,	  76	  per	  cent	  that	  they	  have	  a	  good	  or	  excellent	  chance	  of	  getting	  there”	  (Hodges	  1989,	  375,	  FN	  5).	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representative	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  dealing	  with	   the	   Japanese	  (P8:22;	  see	  also	  P39:48,	  P69:4	  on	  a	  similar	  matter),	   otherwise	   it	   is	  more	   commonly	   argued	   that	  excessive	  politeness	  prevents	   Japan	  
and	  the	  United	  States	  from	  facing	  the	  conflict	  […],	  as	  the	  relationship	  had	  a	  fragile	  walking-­‐on-­‐eggs	  
quality	   (quoting	   James	   Fallows,	   P93:11,	   42).	   This	   statement	   is	   explicitly	   referring	   to	   the	  revisionist	  arguments	  in	  what	  are	  called	  	  	  
three	  very	  excellent	  books	  aimed	  at	   this	  particular	  point,	  where	  are	  we	  going?	  One	   is	  by	  Karel	  van	  
Wolferen,	   a	   Dutchman,	   `The	   Enigma	   of	   Japanese	   Power.'	   Another	   is	   written	   by	   Chalmers	   Johnson,	  
`MITI,	   the	  Organization	  of	  Trade,	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Trade,	  and	  the	   Japanese	  Miracle,'	  And	  the	  third	   is	  
written	  by	  James	  Fallows,	  entitled	  `Containing	  Japan.'	  (ibid.).	  	  Again,	  in	  this	  view	  the	  Japanese	  system	  with	  its	  structural	  barriers	  and	  Government	  intervention	  is	  articulated	  as	  different	  from	  any	  other	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  it	   is	  emphasized	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  also	  proud	  of	  that	  fact	  (P86:1).	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  what	  exists	  here	  is	  a	  clash	  in	  perspective	  over	  the	  
role	  of	  business	  in	  society	  and	  that	  must	  be	  recognized,	  and	  once	  more	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  the	  Japanese	  would	  not	  worry	  about	  consumer	  welfare,	  which	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  U.S.	  had	  very	  sad	  
results	   for	   the	   Japanese	   people	   (P88:1f.).	   According	   to	   this	   view,	   the	   U.S.	   was	   following	  Adam	  
Smith	   and	  David	   Ricardo,	   competitive	   advantage,	   free	  markets,	   open	  markets,	   open	   competition.	  
The	   Japanese	   […]	   follow	   the	   federalist	   Alexander	   Hamilton	   of	   closed	  markets	   (P105:20).	   In	   this	  sense	   it	   is	   maintained	   that	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Japanese	   markets	   [in	  
automotive	   trade]	   could	   not	   be	   more	   dramatic	   and	   more	   symbolic	   of	   our	   troubled	   trade	  
relationship	  (P122:2).	  	  	  
Self-­‐criticism	  –	  or	  the	  search	  for	  an	  ‘internal’	  culprit?	  	  While	  the	  main	  blame	  for	  the	  disadvantageous	  standing	  of	  the	  U.S.	  is	  thus	  obviously	  laid	  on	  Japan,	  self-­‐criticisms	   reflecting	   the	   internal	   differences	   of	   different	   kinds	   are	   articulated	   again	   as	  directed	  broadly	   towards	   the	  U.S.	   in	  general	   terms,	  but	  also	   internally	  as	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  against	  the	  executive	  and	  ‘free	  trade	  policy’	  at	  large.	  	  The	  self-­‐critical	  perspective	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  imputes	  the	  U.S.	  for	  its	  naïveté,	  but	  also	  for	  its	  ‘bad	  habits’:	  once	  again,	  the	  voices	  of	  sirens	  […]	  are	  lulling	  us	  into	  believing	  that	  calm	  waters	  lie	  
ahead,	  even	  though	  we	  know	  the	  sky	  will	  turn	  dark,	  the	  seas	  will	  boil	  and	  we’ll	  be	  pushed	  onto	  the	  
rocks	   of	   disaster	   (P10:9,	   referring	   to	   the	   announcement	   by	   Japan	   to	   import	   more	   American	  manufactured	  goods	  in	  	  1985).	  Or,	  less	  figuratively:	  I	  do	  not	  say	  this	  to	  bash	  the	  Japanese.	  I	  say	  it	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to	   salute	   them	   […]	   I	   say	   it	   to	   bash	   ourselves	   (P73:50).	   And	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   ‘bad	   habits’	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  	  	  
America	  is	  now	  paying	  the	  piper	  […]	  depending	  on	  the	  thrift	  of	  the	  Japanese	  and	  other	  nations	  to	  pay	  
for	   its	   extravagances	   […]	   The	   malaise	   is	   now	   so	   deeply	   rooted	   in	   American	   customs	   […]	   without	  
forceful	   leadership	   at	   the	   top	   levels	   of	  Washington,	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   it	  may	   not	   get	   done	   in	   time	   to	  
preserve	  U.S.	  control	  of	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  (P90:2).	  	  In	   this	  respect	   Japan	   is	  even	  given	  a	  point	   in	  criticizing	   the	  U.S.:	   the	  Japanese	  rightly	  argue	  that	  
the	  United	  States	  lacks	  a	  responsible	  fiscal	  policy	  and	  adequate	  savings	  rate	  (P91:6),	  why	  do	  we	  on	  
Capitol	  Hill	  not	  understand	  what	  the	  working	  men	  and	  women	  of	  this	  country	  understand	  very	  well?	  (P92:2).	  The	  U.S.	  is	  articulated	  as	  not	  thinking	  about	  its	  own	  future,	  as	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  inclined	  to	  buy	  
and	  wear	  Chinese	  shirts,	  Mexican	  shorts	  […]	  buy	  cars	  made	  in	  Japan,	  and	  then	  wonder	  where	  all	  the	  
jobs	  went	  (P173:1).	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence,	  there	  remains	  enough	  criticism	  also	  for	  the	  own	  executive:	  	  	  
For	  the	  last	  4	  years	  the	  president	  has	  labeled	  as	  “protectionists”	  those	  of	  us	  in	  Congress	  working	  for	  a	  
reform	  of	   our	   trade	   laws.	  He	  has	   told	  us	   to	   let	   the	  administration	   solve	  our	   trade	  difficulties	   […]	   I	  
don’t	  want	   to	  pick	  on	   the	   Japanese.	  They	  are	  guilty	  of	  nothing	  more	   than	  being	   the	  most	  adept	  at	  
exploiting	  the	  President’s	  trade	  program,	  which	  seems	  to	  have	  as	  its	  goal	  the	  deindustrialization	  of	  
America	  (P3:4,	  this	  was	  in	  1985	  and	  the	  President	  was	  Reagan).	  	  The	   executive	   is	   repeatedly	   criticized	   for	   not	   taking	   the	   ‘warning	   voices’	   seriously:	   those	  of	  us	  
who	   early	   recognized	   the	   danger	   […]	   were	   ignored	   or	   ridiculed.	   We	   were	   called	   protectionists,	  
isolationists,	  and	  even	  “trade	  warmongers”	   (P40:32).	   In	   this	   sense	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	  different	  
bills	   […]	  reflect	   legitimate	   frustration	  with	  the	  trade	  deficit	  and	  with	  the	  Reagan	  administration’s	  
apparent	   indifference	   to	   the	   problem	   (P50:47).	   In	   1989	   the	   argument	   is	   that	   our	   leaders	   and	  
economists	  have	  been	  telling	  us	  all	  along	  that	  we	  can	  always	  give	  up	  the	  high-­‐labor,	  low	  technology	  
industries	   to	   Japan.	  That	  will	   free	  us	  to	  pursue	  high-­‐tech	   industries	  –	   like	  computers	  and	  aviation	  (P71:56),	  whereas	  in	  1995	  it	  is	  still	  maintained	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  massive	  vote	  of	  no-­‐confidence	  
in	   the	   political	   and	   cultural	   leadership	   elites	   in	   the	   West	   who	   have	   steered	   us	   into	   decline	   […]	  (P166:7),	  and	  until	  2000	   it	   is	  also	  criticized,	   that	   too	   few	  people	  were	  working	  on	   trade	   issues	  (P198:5).	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The	  internal	  criticisms	  are	  also	  directed	  against	  the	  principles	  and	  policies	  of	  ‘free	  trade’	  and	  its	  advocates	  more	  broadly:	  they	  treat	  the	  notion	  of	  “free	  trade”	  as	  an	  article	  of	  faith,	  despite	  the	  fact	  
that	  there	  is	  no	  true	  free	  trade	  in	  the	  world	  today	  […]	  and	  leave	  [...]	  the	  American	  people	  at	  a	  great	  
disadvantage	   (P20:37),	   as	   allegedly	   in	   the	  United	   States	   nothing	  must	   stand	   in	   the	  way	   of	   free-­‐
market	   efficiency,	   very	   narrowly	   defined	   to	   exclude	   any	   and	   all	   social	   consequences	   (P104:4).	   In	  this	  context,	  American	  companies	  are	  also	  blamed	  for	  wrapping	  themselves	  in	  the	  American	  flag	  and	  asking	   the	  government	   to	  help	   them,	  but	   in	   the	  end	   they	  were	  either	  not	  doing	  enough	   to	  stay	  competitive	  (P132:14)	  –	   for	  example	  the	  own	  auto-­‐industry	   in	  1985	  was	  criticized	   for	  not	  having	  used	  the	  VER’s	  to	  improve	  their	  quality	  and	  productivity	  (P46:29)	  –	  	  or	  they	  were	  moving	  their	  production	   to	  more	  profitable	   locations.	  This	  kind	  of	   reasoning	  comes	  up	  more	  pointedly	  with	  China,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  question	  of	  who	  actually	  (still)	  profits	  from	  economic	  relations	  despite	  of	  the	  trade	  deficit.	  	  Furthermore,	  throughout	  the	  statements	  the	  ‘emotional’	  aspect	  of	  this	  ‘short	  end’	  perspective	  is	  emphasized	  (cf.	  also	  Packard	  1987,	  4),	  with	  the	  outbursts	  being	  directed	  against	  Japan,	  but	  again	  also	   against	   the	   own	   policies.	   While	   the	   following	   statements	   show	   a	   certain	   reflection	   on	  emotional	   aspects,	   in	   terms	   of	   self-­‐characterizing	   them	   as	   frustration	   or	   anger,	   other	   ones	  treated	  under	  the	  category	  of	  intensification	  simply	  express	  anger.339	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Stephen	  Cohen	   et	   al.	   (however,	   without	   attempts	   at	   an	   explanation)	   with	   respect	   to	   Japan,	   in	   their	  assessment	   “no	   other	   country	   has	   generated	   as	  much	   anger	   and	   frustration	   among	   its	   trading	  partners	   for	   allegedly	   not	   opening	   its	  markets	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   other	   countries’	  markets	   are	  open	  to	  Japanese	  goods”	  (Cohen	  et	  al.	  1996,	  176).	  	  What	  is	  explicitly	  called	  ‘frustration’	  (the	  terms	  ‘frustration’,	  ‘frustrated’,	  ‘frustrate’	  figure	  67	  times	  in	  the	  documents	  on	  Japan)	  is	  literally	  described	  in	  statements	  like	  this	  body	  voted	  92	  to	  
0	  on	  a	  resolution	  expressing	  its	  frustration	  with	  our	  friendly	  neighbor,	  Japan,	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  trade	  
imbalance	   (P4:5),	   accumulated	   frustrations	   from	   years	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   action	   has	   led	   to	   sharp	  
congressional	  reaction	  this	  year	  (P8:3,	  in	  1985),	  the	  bill	  […]	  is	  the	  result	  of	  years	  of	  frustration	  with	  
Japan	   (P34:6),	   and	  momentum	  for	  Congress	  to	  do	  something	  on	  the	  trade	  problem	  has	  reached	  a	  
fever	  pitch.	  We	  currently	   face	  over	  300	  bills	   […]	   they	   reflect	   legitimate	   frustration	  with	   the	   trade	  
deficit	  (P50:47,	  in	  1985).	  	  The	   perspective	   is	   articulated	   as	   reflecting	   the	   frustration	  with	   the	   “glacial	  pace”	  of	   the	  
trade	  talks	   (P68:9),	  the	  frustration	  of	  dealing	  with	  persistent	  trade	  imbalances	   (P71:104),	  with	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  339	  For	   the	   importance	   of	   differentiating	   between	   “conscious	   and	   non-­‐conscious”	   emotions	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  analysis,	   see	   Solomon	   (2015,	   53).	   For	   a	   criticism	   of	  mainstream	   approaches	   that	   depict	   emotions	   as	   irrational,	   see	  Hagström	  and	  Gustafsson	  (2015).	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very	  high	  potential	  for	  this	  issue	  to	  become	  a	  lightening	  rod	  for	  broader	  frustrations	  in	  the	  United	  
States-­‐Japan	   relationship	   (P73:1,	   referring	   to	   the	   FSX-­‐issue),	   as	   frustration	   and	   anger	   toward	  
Japan	  is	  growing,	  endangering	  a	  special	  friendship	  with	  a	  good	  ally	  (P86:1),	  and	  the	  United	  States	  
is	  growing	  increasingly	  frustrated	  (P91:6).	  	   Other	  statements	  explicitly	  articulate	  anger	  both	  directed	  towards	   Japan,	  but	  again	  also	  internally	  against	   the	  executive:	   I	  know	  that	  I	  will	  be	  accused	  of	  “Japan	  bashing”	  but	  I	  can	  accept	  
that.	   But,	   really,	  my	   anger	   is	   less	   directed	   at	   the	   Japanese	   […]	   than	   it	   is	   at	   our	   own	  Government	  (P10:9).	  The	  perspective	  of	  the	  broader	  population	  is	  characterized	  as	  reflecting	  the	  outrageous	  
treatment	  by	  Japan	  of	  American	  goods	  and	  services	  (P25:46),	  and	  while	  from	  this	  view	  the	  anger	  is	  apparently	   not	   always	   taken	   seriously,	   as	   for	   instance	   the	   Asian	  Wall	   Street	   Journal	   read	   “[…]	  
American	  outrage	   fades	  as	  quickly	  as	   it	   rises”	   (P59:43),	   it	   is	   emphasized	   throughout	   the	  whole	  timeframe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  anger	  out	  there	  in	  the	  hills	  and	  valleys	  and	  plains	  and	  plateaus	  and	  
mountains	   of	   America	   (P73:70).	   Furthermore,	   some	   voices	   point	   to	   the	   internal	   stresses	   and	  
anxieties	  –	  and	  anger	  –	  provoked	  by	  economic	  policies	  and	  tendencies	  (P166:7),	  or	  to	  exasperation	  and	  tiredness	  as	  in	  statements	  like:	  the	  citizens	  of	  this	  country	  are	  sick	  and	  tired	  of	  seeing	  the	  trade	  
imbalance	  grow	  (P4:5),	  we	  are	  tired	  of	  playing	  on	  a	  field	  tilted	  heavily	  in	  their	  direction	   (P30:14),	  
our	  patience	  has	  worn	   thin	   (P42:29),	   I	  am	  very	  disappointed	  by	   this	   lack	  of	   results	   (P96:3).	   It	   is	  argued	   that	   there	  was	   every	   reason	   to	  be	  disappointed	   (P102:2),	  many	  people	  have	   tired	  of	   the	  
struggle	  […]	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  people	  are	  weary	   (P107:1),	  we	  are	  upset	  about	  Japan	   (P163:1),	  and	   the	  United	   States	   complains	   endlessly	   about	   the	   Japanese	   deficit	   (P163:3)	   without	   anything	  happening.	  	  	  More	  balanced	  views	  articulate	  the	  emotional	  aspects	  as	  ‘explanation’	  for	  the	  frustration:	  	  	  
The	   Japanese	   appear	   to	   be	   underestimating	   the	   emotional	   wallop	   this	   issue	   carries	   in	   Congress	  (P14:30),	   what	   is	   important	   is	   that	   the	   Japanese	   fully	   appreciate	   the	   depth	   of	   feelings	   about	   our	  
trade	  problems	  (P28:4),	  people	  are	  upset,	  rightly	  or	  wrongly	  […]	  we	  may	  be	  wrong	  about	  it	  but	  that’s	  
the	  general	  feeling	  (P38:21).	  	  	  Other	  ones	  point	  to	  the	  danger	  this	  in	  their	  view	  poses	  to	  the	  relationship:	  […]	  an	  issue	  that	  has	  
few	   rivals	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   potential	   to	   poison	   trade	   relations	   with	   the	   United	   States:	   whether	   to	  
extend	  quotas	  on	  exports	  of	  automobiles	   (P14:30),	  and	  on	  general	   terms	   it	   is	  acknowledged	  that	  
trade	   threatens	   to	   become	   this	   Congress’	   most	   divisive	   political	   issue	   (P21:11),	   the	   Japanese	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government	  […]	  worries	  about	  a	  severe	  reaction	  from	  us	  here	  in	  this	  country	  if	  their	  auto	  companies	  
flood	  our	  market	  (P22:12).	  	  As	   for	   Japanese	   reactions,	   from	   the	   U.S.	   perspective	   they	   are	   seen	   for	   instance	   in	  following	  differing	  ways:	  Japanese	  cynics	  are	  hoping	  that	  the	  American	  outcry	  will	  go	  away	  soon	  so	  
they	   can	   get	   back	   to	   real	  work.	  More	   thoughtful	   Japanese	  worry:	   “I	   am	   seriously	   concerned	   that	  
there	  is	  too	  much	  emotion	  and	  impatience	  in	  Congress	  […]”	  (P59:42).	  But	  equally	  the	  disputes	  are	  also	  seen	  as	   ‘dangerous’	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  affecting,	  but	  also	  going	  beyond	  the	   trade	  relationship:	  
the	  results	  of	  the	  deterioration	  in	  our	  international	  trade	  and	  investment	  balances	  have	  created	  a	  
political	  crisis	   in	  Congress	   that	   threatens	  our	  good	  political	  relations	  with	   Japan	   (P61:24).	  While	  
the	   sentiment	   for	   trade	   protectionism	   is	   growing	   rapidly	   in	   the	   United	   States	   (P67:28),	   more	  generally	   the	  mutual	   animosity/resentments	   in	   the	   relationship	   […]	  may	   be	   reaching	   dangerous	  
levels	  (P79:5;	  P91:10).	  The	  situation	  is	  characterized	  as:	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  mistrust	  of	  the	  Japanese	  
on	  occasion,	  antipathy	  toward	  the	  Japanese	   (P93:5),	  at	  least	  ripples	  of	  anxiety	  about	  the	  Japanese	  (P93:7),	  people	  understand	  that	  this	  trade	  deficit	  with	  Japan	  is	  far	  beyond	  anything	  this	  Nation	  has	  
ever	  experienced	  (P95:46).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  1990	  report	  by	  the	  CRS	  points	  to	  economic	  disputes	  with	  Japan	  at	  times	  arising	  from	  “accumulated	  frustration	  over	  trade	  negotiations	  [that]	  take	  the	  form	   of	   measures	   aimed	   at	   Japan	   or	   Japanese	   companies”	   (J.	   K.	   Jackson	   1990,	   26).	   The	   1992	  report	   speaks	   of	   “two	   decades	   of	   constant	   wrangling	   with	   Japan”,	   and	   of	   “the	   constant	  recriminations	  [having]	  taken	  their	  toll”	  (Nanto	  1992,	  13).	  	  	   While	  a	  few	  scholars	  do	  remark	  that	  ‘emotions’	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  debates	  on	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  (trade)	  issues,	  they	  often	  only	  just	  mention	  it	  (e.g.	  Packard),	  or	  explain	  it	  by	  the	  long	  timeframe	  of	  difficult	  negotiations	  that	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  desired	  outcomes	  (e.g.	  Uriu,	  Nanto,	  Schoppa).	  Uriu	  characterizes	   especially	   the	   framework	   talks	   as	   having	   come	   at	   a	   certain	   price	   –	   “a	   degree	   of	  resentment,	   anger,	   and	  distrust	   of	   Japan,	   even	   among	  U.S.	   traditionalists,	   that	  was	  not	   present	  before”	   (Uriu	   2009,	   240).	  As	   a	   consequence,	   he	   points	   to	  what	   apparently	   at	   the	  White	  House	  since	  1996	  (during	  the	  Clinton	  presidency)	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘Japan	  fatigue’:	  	  	   “Simply	   put,	   the	   nastiness	   of	   the	   Framework,	   and	   Japan’s	   complete	   intransigence,	   made	   any	  attempt	  at	  negotiations	  painful,	  fruitless,	  and	  simply	  not	  worth	  it	  […]	  many	  officials	  now	  wanted	  to	  have	  as	  little	  to	  do	  with	  Japan	  as	  possible,	  in	  any	  realm”	  (ibid.).	  	  	  	  From	  a	  PDT	  perspective,	  these	  kinds	  of	  articulations	  of	  an	  emotional	  perspective	  can	  be	  read	  as	  reflecting	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  dislocation	  of	  U.S.	  identity	  through	  the	  economic	  rise	  of	  Japan	  in	   terms	   of	   preventing	   the	   U.S.	   from	   living	   under	   what	   it	   claims	   to	   be	   ‘the	   normal	   course	   of	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(economic)	  development’.	  In	  other	  words,	  and	  here	  only	  in	  a	  nutshell,	  the	  emotional	  perspective	  can	  possibly	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  profound	  experience	  of	  a	   ‘lack’	  or	   ‘theft	  of	  enjoyment’,	  as	   it	  has	  been	   termed	   for	   instance	   by	   the	   Essex	   School	   authors	   Jason	   Glynos	   and	  Wei-­‐Yuan	   Chang.	   By	  enhancing	   PDT	   through	   the	   categories	   of	   enjoyment	   and	   fantasy	   –	   derived	   first	   and	   foremost	  from	  Lacanian	  psychoanalysis	  –	   they	  argue	   that	   feelings,	  or	   the	  expression	  of	   feelings	  of	   anger	  can	   be	   understood	   as	   experience	   of	   a	   ‘theft	   of	   enjoyment’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   the	   other	   being	  responsible	  for	  it,	  and	  the	  other	  still	  enjoying	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  self	  (Chang	  and	  Glynos	  2011,	  111f.).	  As	  phrased	  by	  Slavoj	  Žižek:	  “we	  always	  impute	  to	  the	  ‘other’	  an	  excessive	  enjoyment:	  he	  wants	  to	  steal	  our	  enjoyment	  (by	  ruining	  our	  way	  of	   life)	  and/or	  he	  has	  access	  to	  some	  secret,	  perverse	   enjoyment”	   (cited	   in	   Solomon	   2015,	   47).	   From	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   subject	   as	  (fundamentally)	   lacking	   and	  never	  being	   able	   to	   achieve	   the	   fullness	   it	   is	   seeking	   (see	   chapter	  two),	  it	  follows	  that	  it	  “continually	  experiences	  both	  frustration	  and	  satisfaction	  […]”	  ,	  which	  are	  transformed	  into	  emotional	  expression	  in	  discourse	  (Solomon	  2015,	  53,	  58).	  In	  this	  case	  it	  would	  be	   Japan	   ‘enjoying’	   its	   economic	   success	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   U.S.,	   or	   in	   other	   words	   (of	   a	  different	  approach),	  that	  Japan	  was	  gaining	  too	  rapidly	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  as	  its	  (relative,	  but	   relating	   to	   the	   ‘global	   leadership	   question,	   also	   absolute)	   economic	   position	   was	   being	  compromised	  by	  Japan’s	  economic	  success	  (cf.	  Spar	  1992,	  283).	  	  
Summary	  of	  perspectivations	  towards	  Japan	  
	  Whereas	  with	  Japan	  the	  central	  challenge	  to	  U.S.	  identity	  comes	  from	  the	  possible	  perspective	  of	  losing	   its	   global	   leadership	   through	   being	   outperformed	   economically,	   it	   also	   seems	   to	   be	  connected	   to	   a	   profound	   disappointment	   about	   Japan	   that	   is	   expressed	   in	   statements	   of	  frustration.	   In	  my	   reading,	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   this	   is	   due	   to	   unfulfilled	   expectations	   of	   Japan	   to	  adhere	  to	  the	  economic	  model	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  capitalism	  –	  and	  still	  being	  (more)	  successful	  –	  as	  practiced	  by	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  instead	  to	  stick	  to	  a	  ‘different	  style	  of	  capitalism’	  as	  argued	  by	  the	  revisionists.	  This	  contradicts	  or	  dislocates	  U.S.	  liberal	  identity	  as	  role	  model	  and	  guide	  according	  to	   American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history.	   Adding	   to	   the	   dislocation	   is	  furthermore,	  that	  the	  proposed	  measures	  of	  retaliation	  against	  Japan	  additionally	  challenge	  and	  conflict	  with	  U.S.	  identity	  as	  a	  proponent	  of	  free	  trade.	  As	  the	  category	  of	  perspectivation	  shows,	  one	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  contradictions	  is	  to	  articulate	  Japan	  as	  leaving	  ‘no	  other	  choice’	  to	  act	  for	   the	   U.S.	   Partly,	   the	   same	   argument	   is	   used	   against	   the	   executive:	   because	   it	   does	   not	   do	  anything,	  Congress	  needs	  to	  act.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  this	  kind	  of	   ‘adversarial	  behavior’	  seems	  to	  ‘hurt’	  even	  more	  when	  practiced	  by	  an	  ally	  that	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  U.S.	  for	  its	  military	  security	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(see	  debates	  on	  the	  FSX-­‐plane).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  emotional	  reactions	  to	  the	  trade	  questions	  with	  Japan	   in	   Congress	   reflect	   not	   only	   a	   certain	   exasperation	   due	   to	   the	   long	   timeframe	   of	  negotiations	   with	   unsatisfying	   long	   term	   outcomes,	   but	   also	   the	   experience	   of	   a	   ‘lack	   of	  enjoyment’	  by	  the	  U.S.,	  while	  Japan	  is	  seen	  as	  thriving	  on	  the	  U.S.’	  expense.	  	  	  
6.2.	  Perspectivations	  towards	  China	  –	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  China?	  	   	  	  The	  perspective	  towards	  China	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  more	  ambiguous	  than	  towards	  Japan,	  especially	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  question	  of	  what	   to	  do	  about	   the	  economic	   issues	  and	   their	   implications	  beyond	  that	  field	  (cf.	  also	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  68).	  The	  main	  constant	  in	  the	  perspectivations	  is	  the	  liberal	   theory	   of	   history-­‐	   (and	   American	   exceptionalism)	   perspective,	   and	   the	   opposition	   in	  different	  forms	  and	  nuances	  to	  it,	  that	  reflect	  the	  challenges	  to	  U.S.	  identity:	  the	  U.S.	  has	  economic	  interests	  and	  stakes	  in	  trade	  with	  China,	  while	  it	  also	  articulates	  itself	  –	  through	  being	  a	  trading	  partner	  –	  	  as	  facilitator	  and	  guide	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  liberalization	  in	  China.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   it	  needs	  and	  wants	  to	  stay	  committed	  to	  its	   identity	  and	  “instinct”	  as	  promoter	  of	  human	  rights: 340 	  Linking	   trade	   and	   human	   rights	   was	   an	   instinctive	   American	   response	   to	   Chinese	  
repression	  in	  1989	   (P149:4).	  Human	  rights	  are	  articulated	  as	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  and	  
trade	   policy	   (P172:1),	   as	   it	   is	   repeatedly	   emphasized	   that	   the	   United	   States’	   interests	   in	  
maintaining	   engagement	   and	   dialogue	  with	   China	   are	   not	   limited	   to	   jobs	   and	   trade.	  We	   have	   a	  
strong	  interest	  in	  seeing	  China	  treat	  its	  people	  according	  to	  international	  human	  rights	  standards	  (P125:64,	  51).	  	  The	  economic	  perspective	  is	  mostly	  articulated	  as	  the	  U.S.	  having	  become	  dependent	  on	  China	  as	  a	  market	  place	  (P149:3;	  P167:47;	  P132:49;	  P167:47,	  64)	  and,	  like	  with	  Japan,	  as	  being	  in	  a	  disadvantageous	  position	  mainly	  because	  of	  China’s	  unfairness	  (P176:30,	  58;	  P186:3;	  P137:137;	  P198:4;	  P204:11;	  P205:4,	  16;	  P208:4;	  P209:21),	  currency	  manipulation	  (P208:3;	  P212:4;	  P216:1;	  P217:3)	  and	  the	  trade	  deficit	  (P125:56,	  72;	  P173:3;	  P132:45,	  48;	  P133:71,	  77;	  P136:19,	  P189:1,	  10;	  P209:3,	  22;	  P212:1),	  which	  –	  once	  more	  like	  with	  Japan	  –	  from	  this	  perspective	  figures	  as	  the	  root	  cause	  for	  the	  economically	  disadvantageous	  situation.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  China	  is	  regarded	  as	   being	   important	   for	   the	   exporting	   industry	   and	   especially	   the	   job	  market	   in	   the	  U.S.:	   in	   the	  
economic	   front,	   American	   exports	   and	   American	   jobs	   are	   dependent	   upon	   sound	   relations	   with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  340	  Cf.	   also	   Kolkmann	   (2005,	   70),	   Gagliano	   (2014,	   101f.).	   According	   to	   Gagliano	   congressional	   legislative	   activity	  concerning	   human	   rights	   and	   China	   remained	   “relatively	   consistent”	   and	   “unaffected	   by	   China’s	   increasing	  military	  and	  economic	  power	  or	   the	  expanding	  Sino-­‐U.S.	   trade	  relationship”	   (2014,	  114).	  However,	  he	  also	  notes	   that	   “trade	  interests	   in	   Congress	   frequently	   outweighed	   other	   congressional	   interests,	   such	   as	   those	   in	   the	   human	   rights	   and	  proliferation	  issue	  areas”	  (ibid.,	  141).	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China	   (P188:2).	   It	   is	  maintained	   that	   if	   the	  next	   century	  will	  be	   the	  Asian	  century	  […]	  American	  
companies	  need	  to	  gain	  foothold	  in	  [China’s]	  market	  early.	  Our	  competition	  is	  already	  poised	  if	  we	  
retreat	   (P167:64).	  Being	  unfairly	   treated	  by,	  having	  a	  deficit	  with,	  as	  well	  as	  being	   indebted	   to	  
Communist	  China	  (P175:13;	  P207:4)	  adds	  to	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  perspective.	  As	  with	  Japan,	  this	  is	  also	   connected	   to	   an	   overall	   negative	   impact	   on	   the	   U.S.	   (economic)	   standing,	   resulting	   from	  continuing	  to	  be	  a	  debtor,	  being	  indebted	  to	  foreign	  governments	  and	  corporations	  with	  Japan	  at	  the	  first	  and	  China	  being	  at	  the	  second	  place	  (P207:7,	  15,	  in	  2005),	  that	  is	  articulated	  as	  having	  led	  to	  the	  deteriorating	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (P133:78;	  P216:2).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  
single	   largest	   merchandise	   trade	   deficit	   in	   the	   history	   of	   the	   world	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   serious	   crisis	  (P173:3),	   as	   for	   example	   instead	   of	   buying	   from	   America,	   China	   could	   suggest	   moving	   the	  manufacturing	  to	  China	  (P132:49).	  The	  U.S.	   is	  also	  articulated	  as	  a	  victim	  of	  globalization	  more	  generally	   (P189:12):	  America	  has	  lost	  her	  independence	   (P207:9),	  also	   in	   terms	  of	  economically	  depending	  on	  China’s	  investment	  in	  U.S.	  debt	  (P166:5;	  P207:7)	  as	  expressed	  in:	  they	  are	  holding	  
a	  financial	  guillotine	  over	  the	  neck	  of	  our	  economy,	  and	  they	  will	  let	  it	  drop	  if	  we	  do	  things	  […]	  that	  
are	   not	   well	   considered	   (P207:5).	   In	   2005	   the	   debate	   extended	   over	   the	   question	   of	   energy	  (in)dependence	   connected	   to	   national	   security,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   bid	   of	   the	   China	  National	  Offshore	  Oil	  Corporation	  (CNOOC)	  for	  the	  Union	  Oil	  Company	  of	  California	  (Unocal)	  (see	  P207).	  Unocal	  had	  already	  accepted	  a	  bid	  by	  Chevron,	  which	  however	  lay	  $2	  billion	  under	  the	  Chinese	  offer,	  and	  Chevron	  subsequently	   increased	   its	  offer	   for	  half	  a	  billion.	  The	  vote	  was	  regarded	  as	  uncertain,	  because	   the	   final	  decision	  was	   to	  be	  made	  by	   the	  shareholders.	  The	  House	  passed	  a	  resolution	  urging	  the	  president	  to	  review	  the	  deal	  based	  on	  his	  powers	  according	  to	  the	  Defense	  Production	  Act	  of	  1950	  (of	  which	  the	  Exon-­‐Florio	  provision,	  see	   introduction	  to	  the	  analysis,	   is	  an	   amendment),	   which	   authorized	   him	   to	   suspend	   or	   prohibit	   a	   foreign	   acquisition	   if	   it	  threatened	  or	  impaired	  national	  security.	  Finally,	  it	  did	  not	  come	  to	  the	  vote	  as	  CNOOC	  withdrew	  its	  bid	  after	  heated	  political	  discussions	  in	  the	  U.S.	  (cf.	  Gagliano	  2014,	  149).	  	  Otherwise,	   the	   dependency	   is	   mostly	   articulated	   because	   of	   China	   being	   the	   (second)	  biggest	  investor	  in	  U.S.	  treasury	  bonds,	  hence	  financing	  U.S.	  government	  debt	  (see	  chapter	  five).	  In	  this	  context	  the	  concern	  is	  even	  raised,	  as	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  problems	  with	  China	  will	  become	  the	  same	  as	  with	  Japan:	  	  	  
Is	   China	   going	   to	   become	   another	   Japan,	   the	   capitalist	   but	   closed	   market	   [?]	   (P169:12).	   Our	  
economic	  relationship	  with	  Japan	  is	  beginning	  to	  change	  as	  China	  becomes	  a	  more	  important	  factor	  
and	   as	   Japan’s	   own	   economic	   and	   political	   problems	   force	   a	   reassessment	   of	   their	   own	   situation	  (P155:7,	  in	  1994).	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Also	  in	  1994	  the	  situation	  is	  described	  as:	  we	  are	  upset	  about	  Japan	  and	  have	  expressed	  ourselves	  
with	  some	  effect.	  But	  we	  have	  heard	  very	  little	  about	  the	  trade	  deficit	  with	  China	  (P163:1,	  see	  also	  P164:1ff.),	  that	  is	  pictured	  as	  a	  worsening	  trade	  problem	  that	  is	  bleeding	  U.S.	  economic	  strength	  by	  
the	  buckets.	  That	  problem	  is	  our	  spiraling	  bilateral	  trade	  deficits	  with	  two	  big	  economic	  powers	  –	  
Japan	   and	   China	   (P164:4)	   In	   1997	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   they	   have	   nontariff	   barriers	   that	  make	   the	  
Japanese	  nontariff	  barriers	  look	  like	  the	  work	  of	  amateurs	  (P176:58).	  	  	  Hence	   the	   question	   of	   how	   to	   deal	   with	   China,	   especially	   given	   the	   experiences	   with	   Japan,	  becomes	  the	  crucial	  concern.	  
	  
How	  to	  deal	  with	  China	  (to	  prevent	  decline)?	  	  The	  approach	  ‘to	  take	  action’	  and	  in	  what	  form	  is	  to	  some	  extent	  less	  unified	  than	  towards	  Japan,	  as	   ‘the	   Rise	   of	   China’	   still	   triggers	   many	   open	   questions	   as	   to	   how	   to	   deal	   with	   it	   (cf.	   also	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  68;	  Paulsen	  1999,	  153),	  as	  expressed	  in:	  	  	  
How	  should	  America	  deal	  with	  it	  [a	  potential	  Chinese	  threat]?	   (P123:3,	   in	  1995);341	  Where	  is	  China	  
going?	  (P188:1,	  in	  1997).	  The	  truth	  is	  none	  of	  us	  know	  what	  to	  do	  to	  get	  China	  to	  change.	  We	  do	  not	  
want	  it	  to	  be	  another	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  we	  do	  not	  want	  a	  40-­‐year	  cold	  war	  with	  the	  largest	  country	  in	  
the	  world	  (P126:6,	  in	  1995).	  Could	  we	  live	  with	  a	  Singapore-­‐style	  China?	  (P169:5,	  in	  1995).	  	  	  And	   in	  broader	   terms	   it	   is	  asked:	  What	  is	  the	  position	  and	  role	  of	  the	  western	  world?	  How	  is	  this	  
important	   process	   linked	   to	   the	   western	   world	   in	   general	   and	   the	   U.S.	   in	   particular?	   […]	   is	   this	  
nation	   seen	  as	   relevant	   around	   the	  world	   these	   days?	   (P169:8,	   9).	  What	   can	  we	  do	  as	   a	   nation?	  (P218:2,	  in	  2008).	  These	  questions	  in	  turn	  are	  connected	  to	  that	  of	  a	  changing	  world	  and	  the	  U.S.	  role	   in	   it:	  The	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  communism	  in	  Europe	  […]	  have	  created	  a	  
new	   historical	   reality.	   Never	   before	   has	   the	   competition	   among	   the	  world’s	   leading	   powers	   been	  
concentrated	  on	  economic,	  as	  opposed	  to	  military	  and	  ideological,	  realities	  (P155:2).	  Interestingly,	  this	   sounds	   more	   like	   describing	   the	   situation	   with	   Japan,	   than	   with	   China,	   that	   is	   still	  predominantly	  articulated	  as	  ‘ideologically	  different’.	  Moreover,	  because	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  actually	  not	  the	   first,	   but	   the	   second	   time,	   although	   the	  Rise	   of	   Japan	  was	  happening	  during	   the	  Cold	  War.	  However,	  in	  1994	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  341	  And	   this	   question	   continues	   to	   persist	   for	   Congress	   (and	   beyond)	   in	   the	   2010s:	   “Can	   the	   United	   States	   compel	  better	  behavior	  from	  China	  via	  quiet	  diplomacy	  or	  public	  confrontation?”	  (Morrison	  2014,	  37).	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it	   is	   clear	   that	  no	  one	  Western	  country,	   such	  as	  Germany,	   Japan	  or	   the	  U.S.	   is	   capable	  of	  being	   the	  
locomotive	   to	   generate	   sufficient	   economic	   growth.	   For	   the	   first	   time	   in	   modern	   history,	   the	  
locomotive	   for	  the	  West	  must	  come	  from	  new	  growth	   in	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  world.	  Nonetheless,	   the	  U.S.	  
must	  take	  the	  lead	  to	  achieve	  its	  objective	  (P155:26).	  	  In	   this	   respect	   the	   task	   is	   described	   as	   challenging:	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   the	   task	   of	   bringing	  
Western	  Europe	  back	  from	  the	  catastrophe	  of	  WWII	  was	  easier,	  politically	  and	  economically,	  than	  
the	   task	   facing	   the	   FSU	   [the	   former	   Soviet	   Union]	   and,	   possibly,	   China	   today	   (P155:5).	   In	   this	  context	  warnings	  against	  being	  outperformed	  by	  China	  are	  expressed:	  As	  before	  2020,	  China	  may	  
surpass	   America	   as	   the	  world’s	   largest	   economy.	   Superpower	   America	   has	   competition,	   after	   all.	  
And	  we	  had	  better	  hustle,	  too,	  or	  the	  Chinese	  will	  eat	  our	  lunch	  (P143:3,	  in	  2005).	  And,	  after	  a	  few	  years,	   China’s	   global	   role	   is	   seen	   as	   going	   beyond	   the	   economic	   sphere:	  Many	   believe	   the	   21st	  
century	  will	  be	  the	  century	  of	  the	  communist	  Chinese	  regime;	  that	  their	  economy	  will	  pass	  ours;	  that	  
their	   rival	  model	   of	   governance	  will	   be	   adopted	   throughout	   the	  world	   of	   the	   corporate	   structure	  
where	  one	  can	  make	  money	  (P218:2,	  in	  2008).	  	  The	   perspective	   on	   the	   question	   of	   ‘how	   to	   deal	   with	   China’,	   as	   well	   as	   how	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  China	  will	  look	  like,	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  depends	  again	  on	  whether	  it	   is	   seen	   through	   the	   prism	   of	   the	   accommodating/inclusive	   or	   confrontational/exclusive	  features	  of	  U.S.	  identity	  in	  terms	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  as	  will	   become	   apparent	   under	   the	   following	   passages,	   as	   well	   as	   through	   the	   categories	   of	  intensification	  and	  mitigation	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  	  
	  Relations	  to	  China	  –	  the	  role	  of	  	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  assessing	  the	  consequences	  for	  U.S.-­‐relations	  with	  China,	  those	  in	  line	  with	  the	  differential,	   inclusive	  and	  accommodating	   features	  of	   the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history	   argue	   (often	  very	   figuratively)	   from	   this	   perspective:	   Sunshine	   is	   the	   best	   disinfectant	   for	   repressive	  
governments.	  And	  that	  is	  what	  trade	  brings.	  It	  is	  a	  new	  world	  out	  there,	  the	  Iron	  Curtain	  is	  drawn	  
open,	  and	  international	  companies	  are	  chipping	  away	  at	  the	  Iron	  Rice	  Bowl	  in	  China	  […]	  But	  let	  us	  
not	  kid	  ourselves,	  nations	   like	  Russia	  and	  China	  are	  still	   in	   transition	   (P146:12).	   In	   this	   line	   it	   is	  maintained	   that	   with	   the	   end	   of	   the	   cold	   war	   […]	   and	   the	   transformation	   of	   Russia	   into	   a	  
democratic	   government	   with	   an	   open	   market	   economy	   […]	   we	   must	   now	   turn	   our	   attention	   to	  
China	  with	   the	   intent	  of	  achieving	   the	   same	  results	   (P167:55).	   As	   according	   to	   this	   view,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  China:	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China's	  economic	  growth,	  with	  its	  associated	  opening	  to	  the	  outside	  world,	  is	  also	  the	  primary	  engine	  
of	  China's	  continuing	  social	  and	  political	  transformation.	  […]	  In	  a	  Marxian	  irony,	  Communist	  social	  
and	  governmental	   structures	  have	  become	  a	  constraint	  on	  China's	   continued	  development	  and	  are	  
changing	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  China's	  economic	  dynamism	  (P150:1).	  	  From	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history-­‐perspective	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   China	   should	   be	   granted	  MFN/PNTR	  (P136:87;	  P137:63),	  and	  that	   it	  should	  become	  a	  member	  of	   the	  WTO,	  as	  economic	  
freedom	  often	  precedes	  other	   freedoms	  as	  well	   (P125:7)	   hence	   the	  best	  way	   to	  promote	  positive	  
change	  in	  China	  is	  to	  grant	  China	  permanent	  normal	  trade	  relations	  status	  (P136:12).	  In	  this	  sense	  it	  is	  upheld	  that	  	  	  
trade	   is	   the	   future.	  Make	  no	  mistake	  about	   it:	   trade	   can	  open	  up	   the	   exchange	  of	   ideas-­‐-­‐ideas	   like	  
democracy,	   freedom	   of	   speech,	   freedom	   to	   worship,	   and	   freedom	   of	   association	   (P136:24).	   China	  
entering	  the	  WTO	  […]	  [is]	  pushing	  China	  toward	  more	  liberal	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  policies	  (P136:32).	  	  	  And,	   in	   line	   with	   the	   believe	   in	   ‘the	   end	   of	   history’	   it	   is	   claimed	   that:	   […]	  we	  had	   a	   cold	  war.	  
Communism	  lost,	  capitalism	  won.	  Now	  our	  economic	  and	  political	  system	  will	  help	  deliver	  freedom,	  
peace	  and	  prosperity	  throughout	  the	  world	  because	  free	  markets	  cannot	  prosper	   in	  authoritarian	  
regimes	  (P137:63).	  And,	  importantly,	  it	  is	  emphasized	  –	  in	  line	  with	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  –	  that	  there	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  a	  contradiction	  between	  economic	  interests	  and	  values,	  but	  that	  these	  are	  interconnected:	  	  	  
America	  was	  built	  not	  only	  on	  the	  ideal	  of	  freedom	  and	  democracy,	  but	  on	  the	  economic	  base	  of	  free	  
enterprise	  from	  which	  such	  ideals	  flow	  […]	  Only	  by	  opening	  our	  minds	  and	  our	  markets	  can	  we	  help	  
China	   reform	   its	   human	   rights	   policies,	   its	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   infringements,	   and	   its	   arms	  
sales	  (P177:1).	  	  According	  to	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  economic	  and	  political	  freedoms	  share	  deep	  roots	  (P194:4).	  This	  is	   an	   example	   for	   articulating	   chains	   of	   difference	   aimed	   at	   weakening	   internal	   differences	  between	  the	   ‘values’	  and	  ‘interests’	   factions	  through	  articulating	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  as	  providing	  a	  common	  ground	  for	  both	  sides.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  order	  to	  hegemonize	  the	  discourse,	  there	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   incorporate	   opposing	   views	   by	   re-­‐articulating	   them	   as	   in	   line	  with	   the	  ‘common	  good’.	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In	  this	  view	  the	  U.S.	  sees	  itself	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  guiding	  China	  (P136:1;	  P199:13;	  P203:1)	  through	  engagement	  (P136:7;	  P123:2,	  P124:2;	  P188:3)	  and	  as	  a	  world’s	  leader	  in	  promoting	  free	  trade	  (P136:1),	  as	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  since	  1980	  […]	  our	  engagement	  has	  helped	  to	  change	  China	  for	  
the	   better	   (P136:7)	   and	   that	   in	   general	   –	   in	   line	   with	   American	   exceptionalism	   –	   pressure	   for	  
democratization	  […]	  usually	  comes	  from	  the	  United	  States	  or	  from	  nowhere	  at	  all	  (P138:31).	  	  
	  
Self-­‐criticisms	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  criticisms	  of	  the	  whole	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  approach	  and	  the	  role	  of	  free	  trade	  are	  also	  articulated	  prominently	  (P176:35).	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  repeatedly	  criticized	  for	  just	  being	  a	   ‘fig-­‐leaf’	   for	  American	  companies	   to	  move	   their	  production	   to	  China	   (P136:42;	  P200:3;	  P209:24).	   This	   again	   points	   to	   the	   internal	   differences	   or	   dividing	   lines	   between	   ‘values’	   and	  ‘interests’,	  here	  articulated	  as	   ‘business	   interests’	  versus	   ‘basic	  values’	  but	  also	  as	  the	   ‘business	  community’	  versus	  ‘ordinary	  workers’.	  Contra	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  it	  is	  pointed	  out	  that	  capitalism	  does	  not	  necessarily	  rule	  out	  illiberalism:	  philosophical	  communism	  is	  indeed	  a	  rotting	  
corpse,	   but	   totalitarian	   communism	   is	   alive	   and	   well	   in	   the	   PRC.	   In	   fact,	   throughout	   the	   world,	  
political	   oppression	   can	   and	   does	   coexist	   quite	   comfortably	  with	   various	   iterations	   of	   capitalism	  (P201:4).	   The	   U.S.	   is	   accused	   of	   being	   blindly	   devoted	   to	   free	   trade	   with	   nations	   like	   China	  (P189:10),	   and	   that	   corporate	  America	   is	   doing	   business	   for	   profits	  with	  Red	  China	   (P189:16).	  	  Over	   the	   years	   it	   is	  maintained	   that	   the	  administration	  and	   the	  business	   community	  have	  made	  
granting	  PNTR	  to	  China	  their	  single-­‐minded	  trade	  focus	  (P136:2;	  162:11),	  while	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  
American	  people	  oppose	  MFN	  for	  China	  (P191:1,	  i.e.	  61	  per	  cent	  in	  1997).	  Even	  as	  China’s	  slide	  into	  
tyranny	   and	   militarism	   continued	   in	   these	   last	   12	   years	   [i.e.	   since	   1989],	   the	   United	   States	  
Government	   has	   permitted	   a	   totally	   indefensible	   economic	   rules	   of	   engagement	   to	   guide	   our	  
commercial	   ties	  with	   the	  mainland	   of	   China	   (P202:3).	   Furthermore,	   from	   this	   perspective	   free	  trade	  is	  repeatedly	  articulated	  as	  having	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  job-­‐market	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘good’	  jobs	  going	  to	  China,	  in	  terms	  of	  giving	  our	  kids	  jobs	  at	  Wal-­‐Mart,	  jobs	  at	  McDonald’s,	  
while	  the	  General	  Motors	  jobs,	  the	  General	  Electric	  jobs	  are	  going	  to	  China	   (P209:4).	   In	   this	  view,	  
the	  economists’	  free	  trade	  policy	  (without	  reciprocity)	  has	  caused	  a	  hemorrhaging	  of	  American	  jobs,	  
production,	  research,	  technology,	  investment	  and	  development	  to	  China	  and	  India	  (P215:6).	  	  More	  general	  self-­‐criticisms	  directed	  not	  only	  at	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history-­‐perspective	  yet	  again	  point	  to	  an	  extent	  of	  naïveté	  when	  dealing	  with	  China:	  We	  need	  to	  take	  note	  of	  the	  words	  
of	  these	  Chinese	  officials.	  We	  need	  to	   listen	  more	  carefully.	  Beautiful	  words	  do	  not	  mean	  promises	  
kept.	   Sometimes	   when	   we	   in	   the	   United	   States	   hear	   ``yes''	   the	   Chinese	   are	   only	   saying	   ``maybe''	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(P136:40).	   This	   comes	   close	   to	   the	   statement	   on	   there	   being	   a	  word	   in	   Japanese	   standing	   for	  ‘saying	  one	  thing	  while	  meaning	  the	  opposite	  (harage)’	  (cf.	  P28:2).	  And	  like	  in	  relation	  to	  Japan	  and	  the	  trade	  deficit,	  the	  U.S.	  is	  criticized	  for	  its	  ‘bad	  habits’:	  if	  the	  United	  States	  has	  one	  weakness	  
going	  into	  the	  future,	  it	  is	  our	  savings	  rate,	  and	  that	  rate	  generally	  is	  about	  1	  percent	  […]	  people	  [in	  
China]	   […]	   save	   almost	   60	   per	   cent	   of	   their	   income	   (P210:2).	   America	   can’t	   keep	   running	   on	   its	  
China	  credit	  card	  to	  buy	  foreign	  manufactured	  goods	   (P219:2).	   In	   this	   sense	   it	   is	  asked:	  Number	  
one,	  what	  is	  going	  on?	  […]	  our	  trade	  policy	  is	  almost	  by	  definition	  a	  disaster	  (P204:8).	  	  In	  this	  context	  the	  executive	  is	  also	  criticized	  for	  not	  taking	  care	  of	  the	  trade	  deficit	  issue	  (P132:45,	  72;	  P198:4;	  P205:4,	  16;	  P209:14,	  33),	  nor	  the	  currency	  question	  (P212:4),	  but	  also	  for	  having	   maneuvered	   itself	   into	   the	   MFN-­‐dilemma:	   The	   administration	   is	   faced	  with	   a	   dilemma:	  
Grant	  MFN	  and	  confirm	  that	  bullying	  the	  administration	  works,	  or	  deny	  MFN	  out	  of	  embarrassment	  
and	  lose	  billions	  of	  dollars	  of	  U.S.	  exports	  and	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  U.S.	  jobs	  (P165:1;	  P180:7).	  	  Like	   with	   Japan,	   there	   is	   an	   emotional	   perspective,	   for	   instance	   frustration,	   expressed	  with	   China’s	   alleged	   intransigence,	   in	   this	   case	   on	   both,	   the	   issues	   of	   political	   and	   economic	  liberalization.	  However,	   the	  debates	  are	  not	  as	  heated	  as	  with	   Japan	  (except	   for	   the	   intensified	  expressions	  that	  follow	  in	  the	  next	  chapter):	  […]	  the	  trade	  problem	  we	  have	  with	  Japan,	  China,	  and	  
other	  countries	  […]	  is	  a	  frightening	  picture	  in	  red	  (P164:3),	  we	  are	  all	  horribly	  frustrated	  that	  this	  
country	  does	  not	   seem	   to	  be	  able	   to	   change,	   to	  give	   its	  people	  human	  rights	   (P126:6),	   and,	   once	  more	  like	  the	  ‘individual’	  perspectives	  voiced	  towards	  Japan:	  perhaps	  I	  am	  a	  bit	  sensitive	  because,	  
first	  and	  foremost	  […]	  I	  consider	  myself	  a	  free	  trader	   (P202:3).	  Pointing	  into	  the	  more	  intensified	  direction	   are	   statements	   like:	   Do	   you	   know	   how	   much	   debt	   China	   owns	   of	   ours?	   Is	   that	   not	  
embarrassing	   enough?	   (P205:10).	  We	  should	  not	  have	   to	   kneel	   down	   in	   front	  of	   the	  Chinese,	   the	  
Communist	  Chinese,	  vegetarians	  as	  Mr.	  Watt	  referenced,	  or	  anyone	  else	  (P207:10).	  Sometimes	  the	  ‘emotional’	  aspect	  is	  however	  also	  meant	  rather	  positively	  as	  in:	  	  	  
China	   has	   always	   held	   a	   special	   intrigue	   for	   Westerners	   […]	   But	   this	   special	   fascination	   has	   not	  
translated	   into	   a	   smooth	   and	   predictable	   relationship	   […]	   But,	   our	   fascination	   persists,	   perhaps	  
because	  we	  have	  a	   sixth	   sense	  about	  –	  and	  emotional	   reaction	   to	  –	   the	  huge	   sleeping	  giant	  on	   the	  
other	  side	  of	  the	  world	  (P114:1).	  	  	  A	   possible	   explanation	   for	   the	   lower	   degree	   of	   vehemence	   expressed	  with	   China	   compared	   to	  Japan	   (and	   also	   under	   the	   category	   of	   intensification),	   might	   be	   that	   ‘the	   lack	   of	   enjoyment’	  caused	  by	  what	  was	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  close	  ally,	  and	  initially	  a	  country	  quite	  close	  to	  ‘the	  self’	  in	  the	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case	   of	   Japan	   is	   experienced	   as	   more	   severe.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   dislocating	   impact	   of	   failed	  expectations	  was	  greater,	  as	  more	  unexpected,	  with	  Japan	  than	  with	  China.	  	  
	  
Summary	  of	  perspectivations	  towards	  China	  
	  As	  with	  Japan,	  in	  the	  perspectivations	  towards	  	  China	  the	  economic	  challenge	  is	  very	  present	  as	  well,	   and	   –	   even	  more	   strongly	   than	  with	   Japan	  –	   the	   failed	   expectations	  pertaining	   to	  China’s	  (missing)	   political	   liberalization,	   and	   how	   to	   deal	   with	   them,	   go	   right	   into	   the	   ‘heart’	   of	   U.S.	  identity	  as	  promoter	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  capitalism	  according	  to	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history.	   In	   China’s	   case	   this	   dislocation	   is	   again	   met	   in	   two	   ways:	   the	  equivalential	   and	   the	   differential	   one,	   meaning	   that	   there	   are	   accommodating	   or	   inclusive,	   at	  times	   also	   self-­‐critical	   approaches,	   as	   well	   as	   confrontational,	   exclusive	   ones,	   where	   the	   ‘self-­‐criticism’	   is	   partly	   externalized	   and	   partly	   also	   directed	   against	   the	   executive.	   The	   U.S.	   also	  articulates	  itself	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  being	  a	  victim	  of	  unfair	  Chinese	  economic	  policies,	  and	  while	  the	  frustration	  voiced	  is	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  with	  Japan,	  it	  is	  also	  directed	  internally	  against	  the	  executive,	  but	  also	  against	  the	  supporters	  of	   ‘free	  trade’	  and	  the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history.	  From	  the	   accommodating	   perspective	   there	   are	   attempts	   at	   resolving	   or	   dissolving	   the	   dilemma	   on	  ‘values	  versus	  interests’	  or	  ‘jobs	  versus	  human	  rights’	  in	  a	  way	  that	  articulates	  these	  goals	  not	  as	  opposed,	  but	  as	  going	  hand	  in	  hand	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history.	  This	  is	  an	   example	  of	   an	   attempted	  hegemonic	   articulation:	   an	   incorporation	  of	   opposed	  views	   in	   the	  name	  of	  a	   ‘common	  good’.	  The	  question	  of	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  China	   is	  still	  more	  open	  than	  with	  Japan,	  which	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  interpretations	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  1989,	  and	  whether	  this	  actually	  signifies	  ‘the	  end	  of	  history’.	  	  	  
Summary	  of	  Perspectivations	  	  The	   purpose	   of	   the	   analytic	   category	   of	   perspectivation	   is	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   point	   of	   view	   the	  nominations,	   predications	   and	   argumentations	   as	   forming	   the	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   and	  difference	   are	   expressed	   from,	   and	   what	   mode	   of	   differentiation	   between	   self	   and	   other	   this	  entails.	  	  The	   analysis	   through	   this	   lens	   shows,	   that	  whereas	  with	   Japan	   the	  main	  perspective	   is	  quite	  obviously	  articulated	  as	  one	  of	  inferiority,	  this	  is	  not	  as	  unambiguously	  the	  case	  with	  China.	  While	   in	   both	   cases	   the	   U.S.	   mainly	   articulates	   itself	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   being	   treated	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‘unfairly’,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Japan	   it	   sees	   itself	   as	   being	   almost	   constantly	   on	   the	   short	   end,	   and	  possibly	  facing	  decline	  as	  the	  consequence	  of	  having	  become	  economically	  inferior	  and	  because	  of	  being	   indebted	  to,	  and	  thus	  dependent	  on	  Japan.	  The	  major	  dislocation	  not	  only	  through	  the	  deficit,	  but	  also	  through	  the	  debt	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  the	  first	  time	  the	  U.S.	  became	  a	  debtor	  since	  WWI.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  aim	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  dislocation	  while	  preserving	  U.S.	  identity	  as	  promoter	  of	  free	  trade,	  the	  situation	  is	  expressed	  through	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  and	  the	  empty	  signifier	   of	   Japan’s	   unfairness,	   as	   that	   Japan	   was	   leaving	   no	   other	   choice	   for	   the	   U.S.,	   than	   to	  retaliate.	  In	  this	  vein,	  Japan	  is	  articulated	  as	  not	  behaving	  like	  an	  ally,	  and	  as	  being	  ‘different’	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  U.S.	  approach	  practiced	  so	  far	  would	  not	  work.	  The	  ‘no	  choice’	  perspective	  is	  one	  way	   to	  deal	  with	   the	  dislocatory	   effect	   on	  U.S.	   identity,	   or	   the	  U.S.	   self-­‐understanding	  as	   a	  ‘free	  trader’,	  as	  the	  retaliatory	  protectionist	  measures	  contradict	  this	  feature.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  a	  more	  self-­‐critical	  perspective,	   these	  criticisms	  are	  directed	  against	   the	  U.S.	   in	  general,	   as	  being	  naïve	  and	  also	  as	  having	  ‘bad	  habits’	  (overspending	  etc.),	  but	  also	  against	  the	  executive	  and	  (its)	  free	  trade	  policies,	  as	  these	  are	  seen	  as	  not	  adequate	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  position	  of	  inferiority.	  In	   this	   sense,	   on	   the	   emotional	   side	   of	   the	   short	   end	   perspective,	   frustration	   and	   anger	   are	  expressed	  towards	  Japan,	  but	  also	  towards	  the	  own	  policies.	  They	  are	  (implicitly)	  articulated	  as	  causing	  a	   ‘lack	  of	  enjoyment’,	  hence	  of	   Japan	   ‘enjoying’	  or	  being	   in	  an	  advantageous	  position	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  U.S.	  The	  more	  balanced	  views	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  aim	  at	  explaining	  the	  emotions	  as	  stemming	  from	  the	  many	  years	  of	  accumulated	  negative	  (in	  terms	  of	  not	  leading	  to	  the	  desired	  outcomes)	   experiences	   in	   negotiations	   with	   Japan,	   as	   well	   as	   still	   criticizing	   being	   ‘over-­‐emotional’	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  With	   China,	   there	   are	   two	   main	   conflicting	   identity-­‐perspectives	   and	   nodal	   points:	  wanting	   to	  be	  an	  advocate	  and	  promoter	  of	  human	  rights	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	  having	   to	  deal	  with	  being	   (more	  or	   less)	   dependent	   on	  China’s	  markets	   and	   its	   continuing	   investment	   in	  U.S.	  treasury	  bonds	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  Like	  with	  Japan,	  the	  U.S.	  articulates	  itself	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  being	  a	  victim	  of	  ‘unfair’	  or	  ‘illiberal’	  Chinese	  policies.	  When	  speaking	  about	  China’s	  unfairness,	  the	  question	  comes	  up	  as	  whether	  the	  problem	  with	  China	  would	  evolve	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  with	  Japan	  in	  the	  past.	  The	  major	  ‘identity-­‐conflict’	  for	  the	  U.S.	  with	  China	  lies	  at	  the	  point	  of	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  should	  push	  for	  political	  liberalization	  –	  first	  and	  foremost	  in	  the	  field	  of	  human	  rights	  –	  through	  free	  trade,	  thus	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history-­‐view,	  or	  deal	  with	  the	  human	  rights	  issue	  in	  a	  direct,	  more	  confrontational	  way.	  From	   the	   inclusive	  LTH-­‐perspective	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   it	   can	  actually	   accommodate	   both,	   ‘values’	   and	   ‘interests’,	   in	   terms	   of	   aiming	   at	   dissolving	   the	  antagonism	   through	   weakening	   both	   the	   internal	   and	   external	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   through	  articulating	  chains	  of	  difference,	  or	   in	  other	  words	  re-­‐articulating	  values	  and	  interests	   in	  a	  way	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that	  they	  become	  compatible.	   In	  terms	  of	   internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence,	  as	  with	  Japan	  the	  self-­‐criticism	   in	   turn	   is	   directed	   against	   U.S.	   naïveté	   and	   ‘bad	   habits’,	   and	   –	   depending	   on	   the	  perspective	  taken	  –	  also	  against	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  and	  im-­‐	  or	  explicit	  business	  interests,	  but	  as	  well	  against	  the	  executive	  for	  either	  its	  free	  trade	  policies	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  or	  from	  the	  other	  perspective,	  for	  its	  handling	  of	  the	  MFN	  issue	  in	  an	  inadequate	  way.	  It	  seems	   that	   in	   the	   case	   of	   China	   the	   ‘lack	   of	   enjoyment’	   is	   not	   severe	   enough	   yet,	   so	   that	   the	  emotional	  side	  of	  the	  debates	  is	  less	  prominent	  than	  with	  Japan.	  However,	  the	  following	  chapter	  on	  intensification	  shows	  that	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  also	  bear	  the	  potential	  to	  articulate	  China	  into	  an	  antagonist.	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Summary	  of	  Perspectivations	  	   chains	  of	  difference	   chains	  of	  equivalence	  
Japan	   Japan	  is	  not	  to	  blame	  for	  taking	  advantage	  of	  ‘failed’	  executive	  policies	  
Japan	  =	  unfair,	  targeting	  U.S.	  industries,	  becoming	  technologically	  superior;	  buying	  up	  the	  U.S.;	  not	  behaving	  like	  an	  ally	  
China	   evolving	  in	  a	  positive	  direction	  because	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  engagement	  through	  the	  U.S.	  
China	  =	  unfair,	  manipulating	  trade	  and	  currency;	  another	  Japan	  =	  capitalist	  but	  closed	  market?	  
U.S.	  vs.	  Japan	   emphasis	  on	  own	  ‘bad	  habits’	  (overspending	  and	  not	  saving	  enough);	  against	  protectionism;	  contextualization	  of	  ‘emotions’	  BUT	  ALSO:	  blame	  on	  executive	  (i.e.	  failed	  economic	  policies)	  	  
à	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  
U.S.	  =	  inferior,	  victim,	  in	  decline,	  dependent	  on	  Japan,	  needs	  to	  act	  à	  retaliation	  because	  Japan	  leaves	  no	  other	  choice;	  free	  trade	  does	  not	  work!	  frustration	  and	  anger	  because	  of	  Japan	  (‘lack	  of	  enjoyment’)	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U.S.	  vs.	  China	   LTH-­‐arguments:	  U.S.	  can	  and	  shall	  promote	  change/liberalization	  in	  China	  BUT	  ALSO:	  values	  (i.e.	  human	  rights)	  vs.	  interests	  (i.e.	  commercial	  interests)	  à	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  
	  U.S.	  =	  dependent	  on	  China	  as	  market	  place,	  disadvantageous	  position	  because	  of	  China’s	  unfairness;	  LTH	  does	  not	  work	  =	  fig	  leaf	  for	  commercial	  interests	  
	  
	  
7.	  INTENSIFICATION	  AND	  MITIGATION	  –	  ECONOMIC	  WARFARE	  VERSUS	  
ENGAGEMENT	  	  Through	   the	   categories	   of	   intensification	   and	   mitigation	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   analysis	   is	   to	   look	   at	  whether	   the	   nominations,	   predications	   and	   argumentations	   are	   articulated	   straight	   forwardly,	  and	   if,	   in	   what	   way	   they	   are	   strengthened	   or	   alleviated	   (this	   means,	   that	   the	   topics	   and	  arguments	   stay	   largely	   the	   same	   as	   under	   the	   previous	   categories,	   only	   their	   mode	   differs).	  Linking	  these	  categories	  to	  PDT,	  the	  intensification	  of	  the	  nominations,	  predications,	  arguments,	  and	  perspectives	  endorses	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  excluded	  other	  through	  the	  attempt	  to	  fill	  the	  empty	  signifier(s)	  and	  hegemonize	  the	  discourse	  towards	  a	  confrontational	  and	  exclusive	  stance	  against	   Japan	   and	   China.	   Mitigation	   in	   turn	   stands	   for	   the	   aim	   to	   dissolve	   the	   antagonisms	  through	  articulating	   the	  accommodating	  perspective	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   logics/chains	  of	  difference	  and	  an	  inclusive	  identity.	  The	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  (i.e.	  Congress	  versus	  the	  executive	  or	  pro	   and	   contra	   free	   trade)	   are	   also	   articulated	   in	   an	   intensified,	   or	   a	   mitigated	   way.	   The	  mitigations	  aim	  at	  turning	  them	  into	  chains	  of	  difference,	  mostly	  through	  the	  (inclusive,	  but	  also	  universalist)	  perspective	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  as	  common	  ground.	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7.1.	  Intensifications	  towards	  Japan	  –	  this	  is	  Pearl	  Harbor	  without	  bombs	  	  With	  Japan	  the	  main	   line	  of	   intensified	  articulations	   in	  all	  categories	  and	  throughout	  the	  whole	  timeframe	  speaks	  of	  an	  economic	  war	  between	  Japan	  and	  the	  U.S.342,	  as	  expressed	  in	  statements	  like	  we	  are	  in	  an	  economic	  battle	  to	  keep	  the	  world	  trading	  with	  each	  other	  (P71:105),	  let	  us	  move	  
on	   the	   war	   and	   remain	   competitive	   […]	   we	   are	   in	   a	   vicious	   trade	   war	   that	   demands	   aggressive	  
action	  […]	  we	  must	  pass	  that	  war	  chase	  bill	  (P33:21).	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  Japan	  is	  practicing	  gunboat	  
economics	  (P45:22)	  and	  the	  situation	  is	  described	  as	  a	  ticking	  time	  bomb	  […]	  this	  trade	  conflict	  is	  
liable	  to	  explode	   (P20:4).	  America	   is	   articulated	   as	  being	  up	   in	  arms	  […]	  retaliation	  and	  possibly	  
full-­‐blown	  trade	  warfare	  lie	  just	  around	  the	  corner	  (P25:47).	  We	  are	  in	  a	  war.	  This	  is	  only	  the	  first	  
shot	  […]	  we	  are	  going	  to	  load	  the	  gun	  and	  put	  some	  real	  bullets	  in	  it	  […]	  We	  are	  not	  just	  pointing	  (P27:10),	   this	  is	  just	  the	  first	  salvo	  in	  a	  long	  battle	   (P27:10).	  Accordingly,	   those	  negotiating	  with	  Japan	   are	   nominated	   as	   “soldiers”:	   Today	   we	   will	   be	   hearing	   from	   the	   two	   members	   of	   the	  
administration	   most	   immediately	   involved	   in	   negotiating	   with	   the	   Japanese	   on	   trade	   issues.	   As	  
frontline	   soldiers	   in	   the	   battle	   […]	   (P44:6).	   These	   kinds	   of	   war	   allegories	   were	   also	   especially	  popular	   in	   the	  media,	   that	   used	   for	   example	   cartoons	   but	   also	   historical	   pictures	   referring	   to	  WWII	  and	  Pearl	  Harbor	  (Dower	  2001;	  cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  28;	  see	  also	  Wampler	  2001,	  254).	  	  	  	   Through	   the	   intensified	   expressions,	   Japan	   is	   frequently	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   ‘old’	  treacherous	  WWII	  enemy	  (see	  also	  Zeiler	  2001,	  223f.)	  as	   in	   following	  statements:	   I	  thought	  we	  
defeated	  the	  Japanese	  some	  30	  or	  40	  years	  ago	  (P22:13).	  It	  is	  claimed	  that	  the	  Japanese	  philosophy	  
and	  psychology	  is,	  they	  are	  still	  at	  war,	  except	  it	  is	  economic	  (P45:23).	  For	  the	  U.S.	  (and	  here	  in	  the	  second	  statement	  also	  laying	  blame	  on	  the	  executive)	  this	  is	  articulated	  to	  mean	  that	  	  	  
we	  ended	  up	  winning	  the	  war,	  losing	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  brave	  Americans,	  and	  then	  in	  the	  end	  
losing	   it	   economically	   […]	   they	   [Japan	   and	   other	   countries]	   are	   now	   taking	   away	   from	   those	  
Americans	  who	  fought	  and	  died	  for	  victory	  their	  economic	  ability	  to	  compete	  (P50:9).	  Or:	  There	  are	  
brave	  and	  valiant	  bodies	  laying	  in	  Arlington	  today	  that	  are	  rolling	  over	  in	  their	  graves	  because	  they	  
thought	   they	  won	   the	  war.	  They	  never	   thought	   they	  would	   see	   the	  government	  allow	   the	   Japanese	  
businessmen	  to	  come	  over	  and	  take	  America	  from	  under	  them	  (P71:5).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  342	  This	  articulation	  of	   Japan	  waging	  an	  economic	  war	  was	  also	  put	   forward	  by	  the	  revisionists	  (see	   for	   instance	  the	  article	  by	  Theodore	  White	   cited	   in	   the	   introduction)	  and	  other	  prominent	   scholars	   such	  as	  Huntington	  (Huntington	  1993,	  75),	  but	  also	  in	  popular	  culture,	  like	  novels	  (cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  28).	  Not	   as	   intense	   as	   the	   rhetoric	   following	   in	   this	   chapter,	   but	   still	   remarkable,	   is	   following	   characterization	   in	   the	  introduction	  to	  the	  1992	  CRS	  report	  on	  trade	  policy	  toward	  Japan:	  “U.S.	  trade	  policy	  toward	  Japan	  is	   like	  a	  machete.	  You	  can	  do	  a	   lot	  of	   things	  with	   it.	  You	  can	  use	   it	   to	  cut	  through	  a	   jungle	  of	  debate,	   to	  waive	   in	  the	  air	  to	  rally	  public	  opinion,	  to	  provide	  a	   leading	  edge	  for	  overall	  U.S.	  trade	  policymaking,	  or	  to	  cut	  off	  your	  own	  foot.	  But	  one	  thing	  you	  cannot	  do	  is	  just	  sit	  on	  it”	  (Nanto	  1992,	  1).	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A	   common	   manner	   to	   draw	   the	   parallel	   between	   the	   economic	   situation	   and	   WWII	   is	   an	  expression	   like:	   ‘Son,	  it	  sounds	  to	  me	  like	  this	  is	  Pearl	  Harbor	  without	  bombs’	  (P92:30).	  Although	  the	  WWII	  and	  Pearl	  Harbor	  references	  are	  not	  always	  explicitly	  stated,	  they	  are	  always	  implicitly	  present	  when	  speaking	  of	  war	  in	  relation	  to	  Japan.	  ‘War’	  in	  this	  context	  stands	  for	  Pearl	  Harbor	  as	   the	   ultimate	   absence	   of	   fairness,	   or	   metaphor	   for	   unfairness,	   as	   it	   alludes	   to	   the	   historical	  discourse	  of	  being	  unfairly	  attacked	  out	  of	  the	  blue	  by	  Japan.	  As	  a	  metaphor,	  Pearl	  Harbor	  thus	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  fill	  the	  equally	  empty	  signifier	  of	  ‘unfairness’,	  signifying	  the	  literal	  absence	  or	  lack	  of	  ‘fairness’.343	  Maintaining	  the	  war-­‐rhetoric,	  most	  voices	  articulate	  the	  U.S.	  as	  being	  ‘on	  the	  defensive’	  in	  an	  economic	  attack	  (P71:109),	  as	  having	  no	  other	  choice	  but	  to	  react,	  and	  again,	  as	  being	  on	  the	  short	  end:	  They	  are	  declaring	  a	  war	  on	  us,	  and	  we	  are	  hoisting	  the	  white	  flag	  (P28:3),	  hopefully	  the	  
Japanese	  will	  heed	  our	  warnings	  […]	  to	  help	  prevent	  such	  a	  trade	  war	  (P28:4).	  When	  the	  other	  guy	  
is	  shooting	  at	  you	  (taking	  your	   jobs)	  aren’t	  you	  allowed	  to	  shoot	  back?	   (P29:35).	  Again,	   the	   long	  timeframe	  of	  the	  unchanging	  situation	  with	  Japan	  is	  pointed	  out:	  American	  industry	  and	  American	  
workers	  have	  been	  at	  war	   for	  more	   than	   two	  decades	   (P40:23).	  For	  nearly	  20	  years,	   the	  U.S.	  has	  
been	  at	  war.	  A	  silent	  war.	  One	  fought	  not	  with	  weapons	  but	  with	  wares.	  The	  struggle	  is	  economic,	  
not	   military.	   It	   is	   a	   trade	   war.	   And,	   we	   are	   losing	   it	   (P40:23;	   P42:30;	   P80:4;	   P105:63).	   The	  Japanese	   are	   articulated	   as	   having	   struck	   a	   damaging	   blow	   to	   the	   cause	   of	   fair	   and	   free	   trade	  (P42:37),	   and	   in	   consequence	   the	   U.S.	   ‘has	   to’	   react:	   this	   resolution	   is	   not	   a	   first	   strike	   by	   the	  
United	   States	   in	   a	   trade	   war	   with	   Japan	   […]	   today’s	   action	   is	   the	   beginning	   of	   our	   retaliation	  (P42:41).344	  We	  have	  a	  dynamic	  situation,	  a	  real	  red-­‐hot	  trade	  war	  […]	  we	  are	  about	  20	  years	  late;	  
definitely	  10	  years	   late	   […]	  That	  war	   is	   out	   there	   (P47:47).	   And	   again,	   the	   U.S.	   is	   articulated	   as	  ‘surrounded	  by	  enemies’:	  First	  Japan,	  then	  other	  nations,	  primarily	  in	  the	  western	  Pacific,	  attacked	  
and	  penetrated	  American	  textile	  industry	  (P50:9).	  Japan	  is	  repeatedly	  accused	  of	  having	  launched	  
an	   assault	   […]	   on	   industries	   in	   America	   (P88:2).	   The	   question	   is	  whether	  we,	   including	   both	   the	  
executive	  branch	  and	  the	  Congress,	  along	  with	  American	   industry	  are	  all	  prepared	  to	  stick	  to	  our	  
guns	  and	  take	  action	  (P122:1).	  	  Being	  on	  the	  short	  end	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Japan	  is	  further	  expressed	  in	  intensified	  statements	  like:	  We	  are	  
now	  begging	  them	  for	  things.	  It	  has	  got	  to	  end.	  We	  must	  be	  the	  masters	  of	  our	  own	  fate	   (P22:13);	  
we	   have	   been	   waiting	   while	   the	   Japanese	   bureaucrats	   […]	   eat	   us	   alive	   at	   the	   negotiating	   table	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  343	  Narrelle	  Morris	  also	  points	  out	   that	   ‘Pearl	  Harbor‘	  as	  a	   term	  had	  acquired	   the	   ‘official’	  meaning	   (i.e.	   in	   form	  of	  a	  dictionary	  entry)	  of	  “any	  significant	  or	  crippling	  defeat,	  betrayal,	  loss,	  etc.,	  that	  comes	  unexpectedly”	  (N.	  Morris	  2010,	  28,	  155).	  For	  (recurring)	  historical	  images	  of	  Japan	  as	  ‘yellow	  peril’	  see	  also	  N.	  Morris	  (2010,	  14–23)	  and	  Dower	  (2001,	  304f.).	  344	  What	  was	  debated	  here	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	  "Export	  Promotion	  and	  Economic	  Growth	  Act	  of	  1985”	  introduced	  in	  the	  Senate,	  but	  finally	  not	  passed.	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(P25:46).	  U.S.	  passiveness	  is	  criticized,	  as	  in:	  American	  firms	  cannot	  continue	  to	  watch	  ships	  come	  
in	  with	  goods	  marked	  “made	  in	  Japan”,	  and	  sent	  back	  filled	  with	  “promises,	  made	  by	  Japan”	  (P28:4).	  Relating	  to	  the	  recurring	  disputes	  on	  autos	  and	  auto	  parts	  it	  is	  argued	  that:	  The	  car	  business	  will	  
go	  to	  hell	  […]	  You’ve	  got	  no	  options	  left…and	  we’re	  dead!	  (P29:34).	  Referring	  to	  the	  debates	  on	  the	  scope	  of	   the	  extension	  of	   the	  so-­‐called	  voluntary	  export	  restrictions	  (VERs)	   in	  1984/1985,	   it	   is	  claimed	   that	  we	  took	  the	  quotas	  off	   Japanese	  cars	  unilaterally,	  out	  of	   the	  goodness	  of	  our	  hearts,	  
and	  got	  nothing	  in	  return	  (P68:25).	  The	  situation	  is	  described	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  U.S.	  world	  leadership	  
and	  standard	  of	  living	  (P39:48)	  or	  in	  more	  figurative	  terms	  as	  in	  	  […]	  the	  land	  of	  the	  rising	  sun	  is	  
beginning	   to	   cast	   a	   great	   shadow	   over	   America	   […]	   (P71:5).	   The	   U.S.-­‐Japanese	   relationship	   is	  described	   in	   terms	  of	  not	  being	  a	  partnership	  anymore,	  but	  a	  boxing	  match	  in	  which	  we	  tie	  one	  
hand	   behind	   our	   backs.	   We	   are	   faced	   with	   an	   economic	   attack,	   but	   we	   have	   responded	   by	  
negotiating	  with	  Japan	  like	  greenhorns	  instead	  of	  as	  shrewd	  Yankee	  traders	  (P71:78).	  	  	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  U.S.	  is	  again	  self-­‐criticized	  as	  not	  being	  assertive	  enough	  with	  Japan:	  
	  	  
We	   seem	   to	   roll	   out	   the	   red	   carpet	  whenever	  anybody	   from	   Japan	   comes	  over.	  We	   say,	   ‘Here,	   take	  
what	  you	  want	  out	  of	  our	  country	  and	  go’.	  They	  go	  and	  take	  it	  […]	  they	  come	  in	  and	  take	  more	  […]	  we	  
are	  being	  taken	  down	  the	  road	  to	  the	  cleaners	  by	  the	  Japanese	  (P80:5).	  We	  are	  helping	  them	  bury	  us	  
technologically	  and	  economically	  […]	  we	  are	  shooting	  ourselves	  in	  our	  own	  foot	  (P83:12).	  	  	  And	  first	  and	  foremost	  this	  criticism	  is	  directed	  towards	  the	  executive:	  When	  dealing	  with	  Tokyo	  
on	   trade	   issues	   the	  United	   States	   is	   a	   pussy	   cat	   […]	   in	   our	   anxiety	   to	   offend	   the	   Japanese	  we	  are	  
giving	   away	   the	   store	   (P102:3).	   Referring	   to	   Japan	   financing	   the	   U.S.	   budget	   deficit,	   it	   is	  maintained	   that:	  We	   are	   losing.	   The	   poor	   President	   goes	   out	   […]	  with	   a	   $150	   billion	   hole	   in	   his	  
pocket	   and	   a	   tin	   cup,	   begging	   the	   Japanese	   to	   finance	   the	   debt.	   […]	   This	   is	   not	   competing,	   this	  
particular	  government	  here,	  that	  we	  are	  all	  part	  of	  (P105:21).	  The	  Japanese	  in	  turn	  are	  articulated	  as	   being	  more	   successful	   in	   statements	   like:	  We	  ought	  to	  make	  them	  our	  arms	  control	  advisers.	  
They	  do	  not	  give	  up	  anything.	  They	  are	  totally	  successful	   (P47:47),	  while	   the	  U.S.	   in	   turn	   should	  become	   more	   ‘realistic’:	   The	   Japanese	   are	   as	   good	   at	   making	   promises	   as	   they	   are	   at	   making	  
exports,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  time	  the	  United	  States	  started	  buying	  less	  of	  both	   (P68:8),	  or	  as	   in	  the	  only	  
goods	   [Japan]	   trades	   freely	   and	   fairly	   are	  words	   –	   but	   unfortunately,	   the	   Commerce	  Department	  
does	  not	  factor	  words	  into	  its	  monthly	  trade	  figures	  (P71:121).	  	  In	   the	   debates	   on	   the	   FSX-­‐plane	   the	   security-­‐relationship	   with	   Japan	   is	   even	   put	   in	  question:	  why	  do	  we	  refer	  to	   Japan	  as	  an	  ally?	  What	  military	  or	  strategic	  services	  have	  they	  ever	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performed	  for	  us?	  (P73:121);	  American	  interests	  are	  being	  sold	  for	  peanuts	  […]	  it’s	  an	  elevator	  ride	  
to	   the	   top	   for	   the	   Japanese,	   in	   our	   elevator	   (P73:125).	   And	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   Japan	   is	   taking	  advantage	   of	   the	  U.S.:	  But	   Japan	  knows	   it	  can	  count	  on	  Uncle	  Sam	  to	  keep	  the	  sea	   lanes	  open,	   to	  
keep	   the	  oil	   flowing	   from	   the	  Persian	  Gulf	   –	   so	  why	  not	   take	  another	   free	   ride	  –	  which	   is	   exactly	  
what	  they	  are	  doing	   (P71:100;	  P95:7).	  An	  extreme	  articulation	   in	   this	  vein	   is	   that	  of	  comparing	  Japanese	   business	   practices	   to	   a	   praying	   mantis	   that	   is	   described	   as	   opportunistic,	   tackling	  
anything	  that	  looks	  edible.	  The	  mantis	  fools	  its	  prey	  because	  it	  raises	  its	  front	  legs	  as	  if	  praying	  […]	  
Once	   the	  mantis	   stops	  praying	  and	  starts	  eating,	   everything	  disappears	   from	  view.	  That’s	  what	   is	  
happening	  on	  the	  FSX	  […]	   (P73:155).	  One	  of	   the	  major	  arguments	  with	   the	  FSX	  was,	   that	   Japan	  was	  benefitting	  economically	  without	  having	   to	  pay	  a	  price,	  which	   in	   turn	  provided	   them	  with	  relative	  economic	  gains	  and	  corresponding	  losses	  to	  the	  U.S.	  (cf.	  Spar	  1992,	  284).	  	  
	  Intensified	  self-­‐criticisms	  –	  forget	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  The	  enemy	  is	  us.	  	  Even	  the	  voices	  arguing	  against	  retaliatory	  measures	  towards	  Japan,	  or	  those	  being	  self-­‐critical,	  to	  a	   large	  extent	  also	  tend	  to	  employ	   ‘war	  rhetoric’	  or	  references	  to	  WWII	  as	  intensifications	  of	  their	  arguments.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  U.S.	  ‘protectionist’	  measures	  are	  articulated	  as	  posing	  a	  viable	  danger,	  starting	  already	  in	  the	  1980s	  through	  articulations	  like:	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  protectionism	  
has	  once	  again	  reared	  its	  ugly	  head	  (P21:11),	  or	  even	  more	  explicitly	  like	  in	  	  	  
protectionism	  could	  lead	  to	  WWIII	  (P38:32),	  [we]	  must	  remind	  us	  of	  the	  march	  of	  events	  which	  took	  
Japan	  from	  being	  a	  peaceful	  trader	  in	  1919	  to	  taking	  the	  road	  to	  military	  conquest	  in	  1931.	  American	  
and	  European	  protectionism	  was	  a	  major	  cause	  of	  this	  tragedy	  (P38:33).	  	  	  Describing	  the	  situation	  in	  1985,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  300	  protectionist	  bills	  in	  the	  U.S.-­‐
Congress	  may	  hold	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  which	  we	  failed	  to	  ask	  ourselves	  in	  the	  1930s	  –	  “can	  
protectionism	  lead	  to	  war”	  (P38:33),	  as	  well	  as	  that	  some	  of	  us	  remember	  the	  1930s,	  when	  the	  most	  
destructive	   trade	   bill	   in	   history,	   the	   Smoot-­‐Hawley	   Tariff	   Act,	   helped	   plunge	   this	   nation	   and	   the	  
world	  into	  a	  decade	  of	  depression	  and	  despair	  (P67:15).	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  also	  the	  intensifications	  directed	  against	  the	  U.S.	  itself	  in	  calling	  for	  action,	  use	  different	   historical	   ‘examples’.	   For	   instance,	   the	   U.S.	   is	   articulated	   as	   becoming	   a	   colony	   again	  (P68:24;	   P92:30),	   with	   a	   new	   “mother	   country”	   this	   time	   around.	   It’s	   not	   England,	   it’s	   Japan!	  (P29:33),	  England	  has	  gone	  down	  sadly,	  to	  a	  second-­‐rate	  nation	  […]	  It	  is	  “small	  Britain”	  and	  “great	  
Japan”	  (P47:50),	  or	  as	  in	  a	  statement	  like	  we	  know	  why	  the	  Indians	  roused	  themselves	  in	  rage	  and	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threw	  the	  British	  out.	  It	  is	  time	  that	  the	  United	  States	  recognizes	  that	  our	  interests	  demand	  no	  less	  (P18:43;	   P41:23).	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   inferiority	   of	   the	   U.S.	   is	   expressed	   as	   	   “definition	   of	   a	  colony”:	  Our	  three	  major	  exports	  to	  Japan	  are	  corn,	  soybeans	  and	  coal.	  Japan's	  three	  major	  exports	  
to	  us	  are	  cars,	  trucks,	  and	  video	  recorders	  (P68:24).	  	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  U.S.	  is	  also	  articulated	  as	  ‘giving	  away	  the	  game’	  in	  statements	  like:	  I	  am	  
going	  to	  look	  out	  for	  our	  capacity	  to	  maintain	  ourselves	  as	  a	  world	  power	  (P47:48),	  or	  as	  in:	  	  
Why	  do	  we	  not	  try	  and	  buoy	  up	  the	  interest	  of	  Uncle	  Sam	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  find	  ways	  of	  justifying	  
how	  we	  can	  go	  about	  giving	  our	  country	  away?	  Why	  do	  we	  not	  start	  looking	  at	  America	  and	  taking	  
care	  of	  our	  own	  business?	  Take	  care	  of	  America	  first	  (P71:5).	  	  	  Within	  these	  statements	  there	  are	  also	  again	  allusions	  made	  to	  WWII:	  Forget	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  The	  
enemy	   is	   us	   (P6:36;	   P83:11;	   P109:1),	   and:	   If	   the	   United	   States	   is	   not	   to	   be	   deindustrialized,	  
producing	   a	   situation	   comparable	   to	   […]	   the	   Morgenthau	   Plan	   […]	   U.S.	   trade	   policy	   must	   be	  
changed	   (P20:37),	   […]	  we	  are	  giving	   them	   the	   rope	  with	  which	   to	  hang	  ourselves	   (P71:36).	   The	  war	  rhetoric	  and	  allegations	  are	  also	  maintained	  in	  statements	  like:	  So	  we	  roll	  up	  our	  sleeves,	  we	  
get	  cracking,	  we	  improve	  our	  quality	  […]	  and	  the	  yen/dollar	  wipes	  it	  all	  out.	  Now,	  what	  do	  I	  tell	  the	  
troops?	  (P29:34).	  And,	  pointing	  to	  the	  internal	  disputes	  on	  trade	  policies:	  Right	  now,	  a	  lot	  of	  you	  
are	  fighting	  each	  other!	  The	  hell	  with	  “free	  trade”	  and	  “fair	  trade”	  […]	  Except	  nobody’s	  fighting	  for	  
the	  country!	  (P29:35).	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  also	  again	  maintained,	  that	  the	  U.S.	  is	  not	  well	  organized	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  dealing	  with	  trade	  issues:	  we	  have	  many	  ‘trade	  warriors’	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Government,	  
but	  no	  general	  –	  no	  department	  head	  –	  in	  charge	   (P74:3,	  once	  more	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   Japanese	  MITI).345	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  intensified	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  are	  again	  articulated	  against	  the	  executive	  that	  is	  allegedly	  not	  acting	  tough	  enough	  towards	  Japan.	  Repeatedly	  it	  is	  even	  maintained	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  trade	  policy	  at	  all	  (e.g.	  P42:39),	  or	  (only)	  a	   fundamentally	   inadequate	  one:	  The	  
new	  5-­‐year	  plan	   in	   Japan	   is:	  Yes,	  we	  are	   sorry,	  we	  will	   open	  our	  markets	   […]	  our	  mistaken	   trade	  
policies	   are	   going	   to	   ruin	   our	   country,	   wreck	   our	   economy	   (P115:2).	   The	   executive	   is	   called	   to	  ‘wake	  up	  to	  reality’	  (P73:57),	  and	  the	  U.S.	  are	  even	  nominated	  as	  a	  bunch	  of	  suckers	  that	  is	  being	  
offered	  rhetoric	  and	  platitudes	  by	  our	  Government	  (P48:26).	  What	  is	  inadequate,	  downright	  dumb,	  
is	  us,	  the	  Government,	  right	  here	  (P105:20).	   In	  this	  respect	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  our	  trading	  partners	  
are	  continuing	  to	  play	  us	  for	  the	  saps	  we	  have	  been	  in	  the	  trading	  arena	  (P50:18).	  U.S.	  policies	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  345	  See	  also	   for	   example	  book	   titles	   such	  as	   “Trade	  warriors:	  USTR	  and	   the	  American	   crusade	   for	   free	   trade”	   (Steve	  Dryden	  in	  1995)	  or	  “Trade	  Wars.	  Japan	  versus	  	  the	  West”	  (Phillip	  Oppenheim	  in	  1992),	  to	  only	  name	  a	  few.	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described	  as	  being	  in	  favor	  of	  Japan:	  In	  our	  resolution346	  it	  says	  that	  we	  are	  to	  blame;	  we	  have	  done	  
it,	  please	   forgive	  us.	   If	   I	  were	   the	   Japanese	  Trade	  Minister,	   I	  would	  write	  a	  resolution	   the	  way	  we	  
have	  written	  it	  and	  the	  way	  we	  are	  passing	  it	  tonight	   (P28:2).	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  U.S.	   are	   seen	  as	  naive:	  Should	  we	  be	  surprised,	  if	  the	  Japanese	  should	  say;	  “Look,	  our	  way	  enables	  us	  to	  beat	  you	  out”?	  
Should	  we	   be	   surprised	   that	  we	   have	   the	  monstrous	   deficit?	  What	   cupidity	   to	   even	   act	   surprised	  (P41:24).	  	  In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	   also	   claimed	   that	   the	   anger	   is	   not	  directed	   against	   Japan	   itself,	   but	  against	  the	  executive:	  We	  are	  not	  anti-­‐Japanese.	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  bash	  Washington.	  The	  Japanese	  did	  
what	   I	  would	  do	   […]	  or	  what	  any	   competitive	   country	  arising	   from	   the	  ashes	  after	  World	  War	   II	  
would	  do	   (P47:46),	   it	  is	  the	  Government	  in	  Washington	  which	  is	  not	  producing	  and	  not	  competing	  (P47:48).	   In	   this	   sense,	   ‘Washington’	   is	   made	   responsible	   for	  what	   has	   developed	   is	   what	   you	  
might	  call	  a	  trade	  war.	  And	  […]	  the	  enemy	  is	  not	  Japan.	  […]	  I	  am	  bashing	  Washington	   (P105:63).	  Which	  is	  why,	  repeatedly	  over	  the	  whole	  timeframe,	  there	  are	  calls	  for	  the	  president	  to	  take	  off	  
the	   gloves	   (P25:46),	   and	   to	   announce	   that	   the	   time	   for	   table	   talk	   negotiations	   has	   ended.	   The	  
president	   must	   tell	   our	   Japanese	   trading	   partner	   that	   this	   nation	   can	   no	   longer	   sit	   idly	   by	   […]	  (P27:12).	  	  Especially	  president	  Reagan	  is	  criticized	  for	  his	  handling	  of	  the	  issues347,	  sometimes	  in	  a	  slightly	   ‘humorous’	  way	   as	   in:	   the	  President	   is	  obviously	   looking	  at	  our	  economy	   thorough	  rose-­‐
colored	  glasses	  –	  probably	  imported	  from	  Japan	  (P50:23).	  But	  the	  overall	  tone	  is	  more	  harsh:	  	  	  
It	   was	   this	   failed	   trade	   policy	   that	   vaulted	   Japan	   to	   a	   position	   of	   world	   industrial	   and	   financial	  
leadership	  while	  making	  the	  United	  States	  the	  world’s	  greatest	  debtor	  Nation	  in	  a	  mere	  8	  years	  […]	  
Reagan	  is	  in	  Japan	  to	  receive	  chrysanthemums	  while	  we	  are	  left	  with	  the	  faded	  flowers	  of	  our	  wilted	  
economy	   and	   a	   trade	   deficit	   that	   threatens	   to	   destroy	   our	   position	   as	   leader	   of	   the	   free	   world.	  
Congratulations	  are	  due	  to	  Mr.	  Reagan	  for	  a	  job	  well	  done	  the	  Japanese	  could	  not	  have	  done	  it	  better	  
themselves	  (P81:1).	  	  	  But	  also	  for	  example	  Clinton,	  who	  then	  finally	  undertook	  a	  policy	  change,	  is	  criticized	  from	  both	  sides:	  He	  could	  emulate	  the	  Japanese	  and	  require	  their	  products	  to	  undergo	  the	  same	  Mickey	  Mouse	  
inspections	  to	  which	  American	  products	  sold	  in	  Japan	  are	  subjected	  (P108:3),	  or,	  as	  in	  for	  the	  last	  6	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  346	  H.	   Con.	  Res.107,	   1985,	   “Expressing	   Sense	  Of	   Congress	  That	  The	  President	  Take	  Action	  Relating	  To	  Trade	  Deficit	  	  And	  Unfair	  International	  	  Trade	  Practices	  Of	  Japan”.	  	  347	  As	  already	  referred	  to,	  in	  the	  year	  1985	  Congress	  debated	  more	  than	  300	  ‘protectionist’	  bills	  leading	  to	  President	  Reagan	  getting	  ‘tougher’	  on	  trade	  issues	  not	  only	  with	  Japan,	  but	  also	  with	  Europe	  and	  other	  emerging	  economies	  (cf.	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  41).	  One	  of	  the	  initiatives	  were	  the	  bilateral	  Market-­‐Oriented	  Sector-­‐Selective	  (MOSS)	  trade	  talks	  with	  Japan	   that	  were	  also	   taken	  up	   in	  1985,	  while	  however	  not	  producing	  a	   significant	   long-­‐term	  outcome	   (cf.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  56;	  Schoppa	  1997,	  66).	  See	  introduction	  and	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis.	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years	   he	   has	   pussyfooted	   with	   all	   these	   protectionists	   (P132:14).	   Also,	   in	   terms	   of	   building	   up	  further	   internal	   chains	   of	   equivalence,	   the	   Department	   of	   State	   is	   addressed	   in	   the	   internal	  criticisms:	  We	  are	  being	  taken	  for	  a	  ride,	  and	  its	  about	  time	  that	  our	  own	  State	  Department	  woke	  
up.	  Whose	  side	  are	  you	  on,	  State	  Department,	  America’s	  or	   Japan’s?	   (P71:121).	   It	   is	   claimed	   that	  
the	  United	  States	  has	  plenty	  of	  leverage	  to	  use	  in	  any	  negotiation	  but	  we	  tippy	  toe,	  tippy	  toe,	  tippy	  
toe	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  Japan	   (P73:53).	   In	   this	  respect	  State	  Department	  diplomats	  are	  repeatedly	  criticized	  as	  being	  wimpy	  and	  spineless,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  standing	  up	  for	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  of	  America	   (P73:54),	   this	  coddling	  of	  the	  Japanese	  is	  not	  the	  attitude	  that	  made	  our	  
Nation	   great	   (P73:123).	   Sometimes	   Congress	   itself	   is	   included	   as	   well	   in	   the	   criticisms	   as	   in	  
Congress	  has	  been	  a	  bunch	  of	  wimps	  (P130:1).	  	  	  
Criticisms	  of	  free	  trade–	  It’s	  right	  up	  there	  with	  “goodness”	  and	  “mercy”	  and	  “charity	  for	  all”	  	  Furthermore,	  also	  with	  the	  intensified	  articulations,	  blames	  of	  the	  executive	  again	  often	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  general	   criticisms	  of	   free	   trade	   (as	   it	   is	   also	   the	   case	  with	  China),	   as	   in	   if	  there	  is	  
anything	  free	  about	  the	  administration’s	  trade	  policy	  –	  it’s	  the	  case	  and	  freedom	  by	  which	  trading	  
partners	  around	  the	  globe	  are	  getting	  away	  with	  economic	  murder	   (P29:5).	   In	   the	   case	  of	   Japan	  free	  trade	  is	  for	  example	  articulated	  as	  myth	  and	  fairy	  tale,	  and	  ‘out	  of	  touch	  with	  reality’:	  neither	  
do	  I	  believe	  in	  myths	  or	  fairy	  tales	  –	  and	  that	  is	  what	  the	  international	  practice	  of	  free	  trade	  is	  today,	  
a	  fairy	  tale.	  We	  must	  get	  tough	  on	  trade	  (P40:23).	  Do	  not	  sit	  here	  and	  talk	  to	  us	  about	  principles	  of	  
free	  trade	  when	  the	  world	  operates	  differently	   (P50:15).	   In	  some	  statements	   it	   is	  even	  described	  almost	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  empty	  signifier:	  	  	  
Instead	  of	  a	  realistic	   trade	  policy	   in	  this	  country,	  all	  we’ve	  got	   is	   this	   lofty	   ideal	  called	  “free	  trade”.	  
Who’s	  going	  to	  argue	  against	  it?	  It’s	  right	  up	  there	  with	  “goodness”	  and	  “mercy”	  and	  “charity	  for	  all”.	  
I	  think	  it’s	  time	  to	  break	  out	  of	  our	  idealistic	  shell	  and	  look	  at	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  […]	  Free	  trade	  is	  
not	  one	  of	  the	  Ten	  Commandments.	  And	  “managed	  trade”	  is	  not	  a	  sin.	  You	  don’t	  go	  blind	  or	  get	  warts	  
from	  it	  (P68:23).	  	  	  Hence,	   the	   U.S.	   are	   again	   articulated	   as	   suffering	   from	   the	   ‘hostile	   world’:	   They	   [the	  administration]	  believe	  in	  the	  “invisible	  hand”	  that	  will	  reach	  down	  and	  right	  all	  wrongs.	  Well,	  it’s	  
become	  an	  iron	  fist,	  and	  it’s	  pounding	  us	  into	  the	  ground	  (P29:35).	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These	  intensifications,	  in	  combination	  with	  being	  further	  enhanced	  through	  the	  articulations	  of	  a	  prospective	  ‘U.S.	  decline’	  (e.g.	  P105:21)	  if	  nothing	  is	  done	  to	  change	  the	  situation,	  shall	  serve	  to	  finally	  lead	  to	  action	  towards	  Japan:	  It	  is	  time	  we	  stood	  up	  and	  got	  tough	  with	  the	  Japanese	  […]	  we	  
should	  retaliate	  […]	  we	  should	  stop	  telling	  our	  competitors	  how	  serious	  we	  are	  about	  free	  and	  fair	  
trade	  and	  start	  showing	  them	  (P29:7,	  9f.;	  P44:11).	  It	  is	  emphasized	  that	  Uncle	  Sam	  is	  tired	  of	  being	  
the	   sucker	   (P73:65),	   if	  we	   are	   to	   survive	   as	   a	   great	  Nation,	  we	  must	   take	   a	   stand	   […]	   it’s	   about	  
whether	  we	  have	  the	  courage	  to	  fight	  for	  American	  interests	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Japanese	  intransigence	  (P73:125).	  Repeatedly	   it	   is	  maintained	   that	  unless	  we	  break	  out	  of	  our	  rut	  in	  trade,	  we	  may	  find	  
ourselves	  in	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  economic	  decline	  (P74:2),	  as	  in	  this	  line	  of	  intensified	  argumentation,	  the	  stakes	  could	  not	  be	  higher:	  we	  are	  at	  a	  critical	  juncture	  in	  our	  history.	  The	  decisions	  we	  as	  a	  
people	  make	   today	   will	   decide	   whether,	   in	   the	   21st	   century,	   America	   declines	   into	   a	   second	   rate	  
power,	   or	   emerges	   as	   a	   leader	   of	   a	   freer,	  more	   prosperous	  world	   (P74:8),	   and	  more	   concretely,	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   Japanese	   imports:	  we	  cannot	  allow	  them	  to	  dump	  their	  Toyotas	   […]	  over	  here	  
while	  they	  continue	  to	  disallow	  us	  access	  to	  their	  markets	  (P80:8).	  It	  is	  even	  argued,	  that	  Japan	  in	  
America	  will	  become	  a	  way	  of	  life	  (P88:4),	  as	  our	  debt	  grows,	  we	  are	  losing	  the	  capacity	  to	  control	  
our	  own	  destiny	  (P89:3),	  and	   ‘we’re	  all	  going	  to	  wind	  up	  working	  for	  the	  Japanese’	  (P100:5,	  citing	  Lester	  Thurow	  in	  a	  Newsweek	  report	  on	  Japan	  in	  early	  March	  1989).	  Also,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  FSX-­‐question	  as	  well	   the	   concrete	   issue	   is	   elevated	   to	  a	  higher	   level	   than	   for	   instance	  airplane	  technology	  in	  this	  case:	  this	  debate	  [FSX]	  is	  about	  our	  national	  future	  (P92:5),	  as	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  if	  
we	  are	  not	  careful,	  we	  will	  have	  a	  defense	  industry	  that	  will	  be	  based	  in	  Japan	  and	  maybe	  they	  will	  
let	   us	   produce	   some	   of	   the	   things	   […]	   (P95:34).	   In	   connection	   to	   a	   debate	   on	   patent	   laws	   an	  intensified	   argumentation	   claims	   that	   if	   we	   change	   our	   laws	   to	   be	   like	   Japan’s,	   those	   economic	  
shoguns,	  those	  economic	  gangsters	  that	  run	  that	  economy	  will	  be	  right	  here	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  
America	  doing	  to	  our	  people	  what	  they	  do	  to	  their	  own	  people	  (P134:8).	  	  	   In	  this	  setting	  of	  calls	  for	  action,	  again,	  Japan	  (and	  others,	  which	  once	  more	  alludes	  to	  the	  feature	   of	   American	   exceptionalism	   of	   ‘being	   surrounded	   by	   a	   hostile	   world’)	   are	   once	   more	  articulated	  as	  leaving	  no	  choice:	  Sadly	  we	  watch	  foreign	  government	  after	  government	  manipulate	  
imports	  into	  our	  economy,	  robbing	  Americans	  from	  jobs	  (P29:5).	  The	  U.S.	  is	  articulated	  as	  sole	  fair	  player:	   You	   are	   not	   living	   in	   a	   fantasy	   world	   […]	   the	   real	   world	   is	   that	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world	   is	  
restricting	   our	   goods	   and	  demanding	  we	   leave	   our	  markets	   open	   (P50:15).	   And	   in	   the	   concrete	  case	   of	   Japan:	   I	   am	  not	   in	   favor	   of	   protectionist	   legislation,	   but	   I	   refuse	   to	   sit	   idly	   by	   and	  watch	  
important	   industries	   […]	   be	   destroyed	   by	   a	   nation	  who	   plays	   by	   its	   own	   rules	   (P44:11).	   As	   with	  China,	   it	   is	   also	   argued	   that	   the	   ‘Japan	  Problem’	   extends	  beyond	  U.S.-­‐Japan	   relations:	   […]	  other	  
parts	  of	  the	  Japanese	  system	  pose	  a	  destructive	  threat	  not	  only	  to	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  but	  to	  the	  entire	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world	  trading	  system	  (P68:10).	  In	   this	   vein,	   also	   the	   arguments	   about	   Japan	   being	   ‘culturally	   different’	   are	   once	  more	  articulated	  in	  an	  intensified	  way,	  conveying	  the	  meaning	  that	  nothing	  with	  Japan	  will	  ever	  change,	  because	   it	   is	   a	  people	   (some	  have	  used	   the	  word	   clan)	  who	  have	   lived	  by	   themselves	   on	  a	   set	   of	  
islands	  for	  nearly	  2,000	  years	  of	  recorded	  time	  do	  not	  buy	  readily	  from	  outsiders.	  There	  is	  no	  GATT,	  
there	   is	   no	   law,	   there	   is	   no	   treaty,	   there	   is	   no	  negotiation	   that	   is	   going	   to	   change	   that	   (P31:37).	  Allegedly,	  in	  this	  view	  there	  is	  an	  inbred	  predisposition	  among	  the	  Japanese	  to	  buy	  Japanese	  made	  
goods	  […]	  Culturally	  the	  Japanese	  aren’t	  moved	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  fair	  trade	  and	  open	  markets	  when	  
it	  comes	  to	  their	  own	  buying	  decisions	  […]	  I	  wish	  more	  Americans	  felt	  the	  same	  way	  about	  our	  own	  
products	  (P38:21).	  And	  historical	  allegations	  are	  made	  to	  the	  time	  prior	  to	  the	  ‘opening’	  of	  Japan:	  
in	   1816	   an	   American	   businessman	   tried	   to	   sell	   products	   in	   Japan,	   but	   failed	   […]	   Unfortunately,	  
things	  haven’t	  changed	  much	  (P42:29).	  Referring	  to	  the	  ensuing	  so-­‐called	  ‘open	  door	  policy’	  (see	  chapter	   1.3)	   it	   is	   maintained	   that	   an	   open	   door	   trade	   policy	   does	   not	  mean	   trading	  with	   Japan	  
through	   a	   crack	   in	   the	   door	   (P42:42).	   Furthermore,	   Japan	   in	   its	   ‘difference’	   is	   once	   more	  articulated	  as	  lacking	  a	  consumer	  culture	  and	  practicing	  consumer	  bashing	  (P88:3),	  while	  using	  their	  ‘uniqueness’	  argument:	  	  	  
The	  word	  they	  use	  is	  `unique.'	  Let	  us	  talk	  about	  uniqueness	  for	  a	  moment.	  This	  is	  the	  same	  argument	  
the	  Japanese	  used	  to	  exclude	  our	  commercial	  products,	  uniqueness.	  The	  mud	  in	  Kansai	  Bay	  is	  unique,	  
so	  American	  construction	  firms	  cannot	  help	  at	  Kansai	  airport.	  They	  are	  over	  here	  building	  ours.	  They	  
will	  not	  let	  us	  get	  over	  there	  because	  the	  mud	  must	  be	  unique.	  Japanese	  rice	  is	  unique,	  so	  they	  cannot	  
import	   United	   States	   rice.	   Japanese	   stomachs	   are	   unique,	   so	   they	   cannot	   eat	   United	   States	   beef	  (P92:4).	  The	  list	  is	  endless	  and	  the	  arguments	  are	  all	  bunk	  (P121:5).	  	  However,	   there	   remain	   self-­‐critical	   voices	   aiming	   at	   dissolving	   the	   antagonism,	   but	   also	   –	   in	  contrast	   to	   the	  mitigating	   self-­‐criticisms	   treated	   in	   the	   following	   subchapter	   –	  maintaining	   an	  intensified	   tone.	   For	   instance,	   they	   point	   out	   that	   for	   America,	   protectionism	   would	   now	   be	  
economic	  hari-­‐kari	  [meaning	  hara-­‐kiri],	  and	  deep	  down	  we	  know	  it.	  Looking	  beyond	  Congressional	  
rhetoric,	  moreover,	  there	  is	  a	  dwindling	  constituency	  for	  closing	  our	  borders.	  The	  United	  States	  has	  
become	  totally	  hooked	  on	  imports	  (P21:11).	  	  	  In	  1994,	  the	  situation	  is	  described	  as	  follows:	  	  	  
Today,	   the	  United	   States	   is	   the	  world's	   largest	   debtor	  nation,	   and	  many	   critics	   insist	   that	  we	  have	  
become	  a	  second-­‐class	  power.	  Our	  decline	  in	  self-­‐esteem	  puzzles	  both	  our	  allies	  and	  rivals.	  Many	  of	  us	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search	  for	  a	  scapegoat	  to	  blame	  for	  our	  manifold	  ills.	  But	  the	  bitter	  truth	  is	  that	  we	  have	  no	  one	  to	  
blame	   for	  our	  condition	  but	  ourselves.	  For	   the	  wounds	   to	  our	  economic	  health	  and	  to	  our	  national	  
pride	   have	   been	   largely	   self-­‐inflicted.	   Our	   recent	   economic	   history	   is	   a	   story	   of	   blunder,	  
mismanagement,	   stupidity,	   and	   irresponsibility	   by	   officials	   whose	   obligation	   to	   govern	   the	   nation	  
was	  betrayed	  by	  their	  embrace	  of	  policies	  misconceived	  and	  ineptly	  applied	  (P109:24).	  	  
7.2.	  Mitigations	  towards	  Japan	  –	  other	  problems	  than	  Japan	  	  The	  mitigating	  articulations	  in	  turn	  emphasize	  the	  role	  of	  the	  own	  policies	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  what	  otherwise	  is	  articulated	  as	  the	  main	  ‘problem’	  that	  has	  to	  be	  dealt	  with.	  Namely,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	   trade	   deficit,	   especially	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   value	   of	   the	   dollar	   and	   the	   fiscal	   deficit	   are	  emphasized	  (P27:10;	  P42:44;	  P46:27;	  P50:44;	  P52:30;	  P77:2f.;	  P82:3f.;	  P92:11;	  P95:48;	  P118:1),	  and	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   point	   to	   other	   ‘problems’	   than	   Japan	  by	  dissolving	   the	   chains	   of	   equivalence	  through	   chains	   of	   difference	   (i.e.	   the	   internal	   differential	   positions).	   In	   this	   sense,	   it	   is	   argued	  already	  in	  the	  1980s	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  only	  the	  dollar,	  but	  also	  the	  fiscal	  policies	  and	  even	  the	  consumer	  habits,	  in	  terms	  of	  overspending:	  	  
	  
But	   the	   real	   problem	   […]	   is	   our	   economic	   policy	   […]	  Our	   dollar	   is	   not	   overvalued;	   it	   is	   just	   highly	  
inflated	  […]	  We	  are	  living	  on	  borrowed	  capital	  […]	  flailing	  a	  foreigner	  is	  not	  going	  to	  do	  anything	  to	  
cure	  the	  basic	  problems	  of	  America	  […]	  let	  us	  not	  kid	  ourselves:	  If	  they	  open	  their	  markets	  wide	  open,	  
it	  would	  not	  solve	  the	  American	  problem	  (P28:1;	  P52:31).	  	  	  And,	   referring	   to	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   high	   dollar:	  These	   setbacks	   are	   caused	  by	   the	   strong	  dollar,	  
demanding	   domestic	   fiscal	   action,	   not	   retaliation	   against	   those	  who	  merely	   profit	   from	   our	   own	  
macroeconomic	   policies	   (P34:10).	   Once	   more	   it	   is	   emphasized	   that	   the	   real	   source	   of	   this	  
tremendous	  trade	  deficit	  is	  right	  in	  our	  own	  backyard.	  The	  United	  States	  is	  on	  a	  reckless	  course	  of	  
borrowing	  and	  spending	  (P34:10).	  Accordingly,	  it	  is	  stressed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  has	  to	  act	  domestically:	  
We	  have	  to	  […]	  get	  our	  house	  in	  order	  […]	  (P42:29),	  there	  is	  also	  a	  lot	  to	  be	  done	  right	  here	  at	  home	  (P42:39).	  And	  more	  explicitly,	  linking	  global	  and	  domestic	  politics:	  The	  country’s	  trade	  problems	  
cannot	   really	   be	   solved	   until	   we	   understand	   the	   global	   impact	   of	   our	   domestic	   policies,	   put	   our	  
economy	  on	  solid	  ground	  and	  live	  within	  our	  means	  (P52:30).	  	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  there	  are	  explicit	  arguments	  voiced	  against	  making	  Japan	  a	  scapegoat:	  	  	  
We	  must	   also	   shoulder	   our	   own	   share	   of	   blame	   (P53:7).	   It	   is	   rather	   easy	   to	  make	   the	   Japanese	   a	  
scapegoat,	  but	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  we	  have	  much	  more	  of	  a	  dollar	  problem	  than	  we	  have	  a	  yen	  problem	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(P55:34),	  the	  U.S.	  had	  permanent	  trade	  deficits	  with	  Japan	  for	  the	  past	  20	  years,	  regardless	  of	  what	  
was	  happening	  to	  the	  dollar/yen	  exchange	  rate	  during	  that	  time	  span	  (P55:138).	  	  	  In	   terms	  of	  market	  access	  to	   Japan	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  restricted	  access	  to	  the	  Japanese	  market	  is	  a	  
problem,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  a	  major	  one	  […]	  most	  of	  our	  competitive	  problems	  are	  home-­‐grown	  made	  in	  
America	   (P65:7;	  P71:104).	  Referring	   to	  own	   ‘bad	  habits’	   it	   is	  claimed	  that	  we	  need	  to	  lower	  our	  
voices	   and	   pull	   up	   our	   socks.	   ‘Japan-­‐bashing’	   is	   no	   prescription	   for	   future	   success	   in	   industrial	  
competition	   (P73:110),	   and	   as	   long	   as	  we	   consume	  more	   than	  we	   save,	  we	  will	   need	   to	   draw	   in	  
goods	  from	  abroad	  (P106:1).	  	  	  	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  especially	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1990ies	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  auto	  talks,	  and	   in	   contrast	   to	   calls	   for	   the	   executive	   to	   finally	   get	   tough	   with	   Japan,	   from	   the	   mitigating	  perspective	   the	   executive	   is	   even	   criticized	   for	   its	   ‘confrontational’	   (i.e.	   results	   oriented)	  approach	  towards	  Japan,	  and	  it	  is	  accused	  of	  managing	  trade,	  which	  contradicts	  U.S.	  identity	  as	  a	  free	   trader:	   These	   countries	   are	   all	   going	   to	   the	   Japanese	   saying,	   ‘Don’t	   give	   in.	   Don’t	   accept	  
managed	  trade’.	  […]	  they	  support	  Japan,	  which	  in	  this	  case	  ironically	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  portray	  
itself	   as	   a	   free-­‐trader	   standing	   firm	   against	   American	   efforts	   at	   managed	   trade	   (P106:4).	   The	  negotiations	   are	   described	   as	   a	   dangerous	   game	   of	   chicken	   with	   Japan.	   Tonight	   we	   will	   know	  
whether	  we	   are	   going	   over	   the	   cliff	   or	   if	   one	   or	   both	   sides	   are	   going	   to	   blink	   in	   this	   dispute	   […]	  
everyone	   knows	   that	   Japan-­‐bashing	   is	   popular	   […]	   What	   happens	   if	   the	   other	   side	   retaliates?	  (P117:1).	  It	  is	  claimed	  that	  this	  administration	  wants	  our	  Government,	  our	  Government	  to	  manage	  
the	   Japanese	   automakers	   (P120:5).	   And,	   referring	   to	   the	   results-­‐oriented	   approach	   and	  quantifiable,	  numerical	  targets:	  	  	  
I	  understand	  that	  there	  is	  a	  constituency	  here	  in	  the	  United	  States	  that	  favors	  standing	  up	  to	  Japan	  
[…]	  you	  do	  not	  pick	  needless	   fights	  with	  your	  closest	  allies	   […]	   ‘the	  most	   important	  relationship	  we	  
have	  is	  with	  Japan’.	  It	  has	  become	  a	  mantra,	  not	  a	  policy.	  Yet	  we	  see	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  policy	  that	  I	  
would	  call	  trust	  but	  quantify.	  What	  does	  that	  sound	  like?	  Trust,	  but	  verify,	  the	  Reagan	  era	  cold	  war	  





Self-­‐criticisms	  	  Once	  more,	  the	  ‘war	  rhetoric’	  is	  also	  employed	  as	  ‘intensifier’	  in	  mitigating	  articulations,	  as	  in	  it	  is	  
very	   important	  not	  to	  take	  steps	  […]	   in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  battle	   (P4:5).	   It	   is	   claimed	   that	  we	  do	  not	  
advocate	  trade	  war	  (P25:46;	  P27:12),	  and	  that	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  a	  sense	  of	  economic	  
nationalism	  here	   that	   says,	  We	  want	   to	   fire	   the	   first	   salvo	   in	  a	   trade	  war;	   the	  worst	   thing	   in	   the	  
world	  that	  could	  happen	  to	  this	  country	  is	  any	  kind	  of	  trade	  war	   (P28:3),	   as	   it	   is	   argued	   that	  the	  
trade	   wars	   […]	   are	   damaging	   the	   political	   relationship.	   It	   does	   sound	   like	   war:	   the	   Finance	  
Committee	  Chairman	  has	  said,	  “an	  eye	  for	  an	  eye”	   (P31:37).	   It	   is	   for	   example	   criticized,	   that	   the	  
American	   auto-­‐industry	   hailed	   Lee	   A.	   Iacocca	   of	   Chrysler	   as	   a	   national	   hero	   who	   had	   single-­‐
handedly	   driven	   out	   the	   villainous	   Japanese	   auto	   invaders	   (P46:29).	   And,	   self-­‐critically:	  
Protectionism	   puts	   a	   Democrat	   in	   a	   different	   posture.	   For	   once	   he	   or	   she	   sounds	   aggressive	   and	  
nationalistic.	  […]	  we’re	  telling	  the	  Japanese	  to	  take	  their	  Toyotas	  and	  …	  let	  them	  rot	  on	  the	  docks	  in	  
Yokohama	   (P47:45).	   America	   is	   wrong	   in	   today’s	   trade	   war,	   which	   is	   not	   to	   say	   Japan	   is	   right	  (P118:2).	  	  Through	  some	  statements	  however,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  employment	  of	  war	  rhetoric	  is	  also	  even	  explicitly	  criticized:	  Listening	  to	  the	  U.S.-­‐trade	  representative	  these	  days	  evokes	  sounds	  of	  
battle,	   of	   the	   adversary’s	   conning	   and	   one’s	   own	   self-­‐righteousness	   (P118:1),	   as	   is	   the	   rhetoric	  towards	  Japan	  in	  more	  general	  terms:	  	  	  
the	   rhetoric	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Japan,	   which	   has	   been	   a	   substitute	   for	   any	   kind	   of	  
effective	  action	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  real	  problem,	  has	  gotten	  inflammatory,	  overheated,	  and,	  oftentimes,	  
nasty.	  I	  think	  that	  is	  demeaning	  to	  us	  and	  insulting	  to	  Japan.	  Japan	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  friend	  and	  
ally	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (P42:38).	  	  	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  criticisms	  are	  also	  directed	  explicitly	  towards	  Congress:	  Members	  of	  this	  body	  
[…]	  engage	  in	  unrestricted	  castigation	  of	  Japan.	  There	  is	  a	  danger	  of	  going	  too	  far	  in	  our	  rhetoric	  (P42:44).	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  critically	  pointed	  out	  that	  	  	  
Asian-­‐Americans	  [see	  also	  in	  what	  follows]	  often	  become,	  also,	  a	  convenient	  scapegoat.	  Take	  Japan-­‐
bashing	  for	  example	  […]	  Americans	  are	  understandably	  feeling	  vulnerable	  […]	  But	  making	  Japan	  our	  
scapegoat	   is	   not	   the	   answer.	   Inflammatory	   rhetoric	   helps	   no	   one.	   The	   Japan-­‐bashing	   phenomenon	  
becomes	  more	  and	  more	  disturbing	  with	  each	  politician’s	  slip	  of	  the	  tongue	  and	  each	  Honda-­‐bashing	  
party	  that	  the	  media	  covers	  (P110:5,	  33).	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And,	   referring	   again	   to	   ‘Asian-­‐Americans’:	   this	   singling	   out	   of	   one	   ethnic	   group	   has	   lead	   to	   the	  
unfair	  characterization	  that	  all	  Asian-­‐Pacific	  American	  political	  contributors	  are	  ‘Asian	  foreigners	  
buying	  up	  America’	  […]	  (P190:8).	  Then,	  more	  explicitly,	  the	  anger	  towards	  Japan	  is	  also	  explained	  by	   racism:	   There	   is	   a	   little	   of	   racist	   tinge	   occasionally	   to	   some	   of	   the	   remarks	   […]	   there	   is	   an	  
understandable	  but	  not	  healthy	  response	  on	  the	  part	  of	  some:	  We	  were	  attacked	  at	  Pearl	  Harbor,	  
we	  have	   to	  get	   some	  revenge	   (P95:46,	   not	   referring	   to	   the	   Senate,	   but	   to	   voices	   “out	   there”,	   in	  1989).348	  	  	  	  	  	   The	   voices	   in	   turn	   aiming	   at	   dissolving	   the	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   through	   articulating	  chains	   of	   difference	   argue	   for	   example	   that:	   This	   House	   […]	   resolution	   does	   not	  make	   Japan	   a	  
single	  scapegoat	  […]	  the	  issue	  is	  aggressive	  competition,	  and	  not	  unfair	  trade	  practices.	  It	  identifies	  
the	  Japan	  problem	  for	  what	  it	  is:	  restricted	  market	  access	   (P27:9).	   In	   the	  sense	  of	  weakening	  the	  antagonism	  towards	   Japan,	   the	  ground	  of	  argumentation	   is	  extended:	   Japan	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  the	  
only	  trading	  partner	  with	  which	  we	  have	  had	  difficulties	  […]	  [there	  are]	  Canada	  [and	  the]	  European	  
Community	   […]	   (P27:9).	   We	   run	   trade	   deficits	   with	   Korea,	   Taiwan,	   Mexico,	   the	   European	  
Community	  –	  virtually	  every	  country	  in	  the	  world	   (P42:44).	   It	   is	  also	  argued	  that	  contrary	   to	   the	  common	  view	  of	   the	  U.S.	   as	   ‘victim’	  or	  on	   the	   short	   end,	   the	  U.S.	   in	   the	   end	  profits	   from	   these	  partners	   and	   their	   policies:	   Japan	  and	   others	   that	   have	   a	   trade	   surplus	  with	   us	   don’t	   dump	  our	  
money	   into	   some	  black	  hole.	   It	   gets	   reinvested,	  much	  of	   it	   in	   the	  United	   States	   thereby	  providing	  
more	  jobs	  for	  us	  (P35:46;	  P120:4f.,	  and	  as	  it	  is	  also	  emphasized,	  sometimes	  this	  even	  comes	  with	  great	   losses	   for	   the	   investors,	   cf.	   also	   Kataoka	   1995,	   7).	   And,	   there	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   articulate	  historical	  allegations	  in	  a	  different,	  critical	  way:	  Just	  as	  Japanese	  trade	  practices	  have	  bred	  hostility	  
toward	  Japan	  among	  some	  in	  this	  country,	  restrictive	  and	  retaliatory	  American	  trade	  measures	  will	  
likely	  breed	  similar	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  abroad	  […]	  anti-­‐Japanese	  feeling	  today	  rivals	  that	  of	  
the	  1940’s	  […]	  (P50:47).	  In	  this	  sense,	  both,	  Japan	  and	  the	  U.S.	  are	  criticized:	  	  	  
since	   World	   War	   II,	   the	   Japanese	   have	   continued	   to	   think	   of	   themselves	   as	   a	   vulnerable,	   semi-­‐
developed	   and	   resource-­‐poor	   country	   pushing	   intensely	   to	   keep	   up.	   And	   further,	   […]	   Japan	   has	  
nurtured	   a	   semi-­‐dependent	   attitude	   towards	   the	   United	   States	   that	   sacrifices	   a	   great	   deal	   in	   the	  
relationship	   in	   return	   for	   American	   tolerance	   of	   Japanese	  marketing	   successes	   […]	   America’s	   self-­‐
images	  are	  no	  less	  illusory	  […]	  we	  have	  been	  so	  impressed	  with	  our	  position	  and	  importance	  that	  we	  
have	  neglected	  the	  hard	  work	  necessary	  to	  stay	  in	  that	  position	  (P52:30).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  348	  For	  the	  issue	  of	  racism	  in	  U.S.	  policies	  towards	  Asia,	  see	  for	  instance	  Buzas	  2014.	  Cf.	  also	  Packard	  (1987,	  2),	  Dower	  (2001)	  and	  Wampler	  (2001),	  who	  quotes	  Ezra	  Vogel	  on	  the	  dangers	  of	   focusing	  on	  Japan	  as	  root	  cause	  of	  America’s	  economic	  problems:	  “For	  a	  yellow	  race	  to	  outcompete	  us	  is	  a	  wound	  to	  the	  Western	  psyche”	  (ibid.,	  252).	  In	  the	  congressional	  debates	  analyzed	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  racism	  was	  not	  brought	  up	  very	  frequently.	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And,	  referring	  to	  the	  ‘fairness’/’unfairness’	  debates	  in	  this	  context:	  	  	  
The	  term	  `unfair'	  is	  widely	  used	  to	  describe	  Japanese	  practices.	  This	  is	  a	  point-­‐	  less	  position,	  since	  it	  
will	   shock	   not	   a	   single	   Japanese	   into	   politically	   translatable	   guilt	   and	   only	   raises	   the	   level	   of	  
animosity.	  Americans	  would	  seem	  `fairer'	  toward	  their	  perplexing	  ally	  if	  they	  jettisoned	  the	  conceits	  
that	  after	  1945	   Japan	  was	  remade	   in	   the	   free-­‐market	  American	   image	  and	  that	   it	   is	  guided	  by	   the	  
U.S.-­‐inspired	  constitution.	  To	  prevent	  a	  serious	  further	  deterioration	  in	  the	  Japan-­‐U.S.	  relationship,	  a	  
major	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Americans	  view	  Japan	  is	  a	  minimum	  requirement	  (P79:7).	  	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  balanced	  views	  also	  address	  the	  ‘free	  trade	  vs.	  protectionism’	  arguments:	  	  	  
While	  the	  trade	  deficit	  soars,	  a	  somewhat	  sterile	  debate	  continues	  over	  "free	  trade	  vs.	  protectionism"	  
and	  	  the	  	  desirability	  	  of	  	  an	  "industrial	  	  policy"	  	  vs.	  	  a	  	  non-­‐interventionist	  federal	  attitude	  of	  laissez	  
faire.	  This	  debate	  is	  unhelpful	  in	  the	  task	  of	  reinvigorating	  U.S.	  trade	  efforts.	  The	  debate	  offers	  at	  one	  
extreme	  the	  myth	  of	  a	  perfectly	  free	  trading	  system,	  a	  system	  which	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  world	  today	  
where	   government	   intervention	   and	   bilateral	   marketing	   arrangements	   are	   the	   rule.	   At	   the	   other	  
extreme,	  it	  accepts	  the	  so-­‐called	  "fallacy	  of	  the	  last	  move"–	  the	  naïve	  notion	  that	  if	  America	  erected	  
more	  protectionist	  barriers	  against	  foreign	  products,	  we	  would	  not	  face	  mutually	  harmful	  retaliation	  
from	  abroad	  (68:14).	  	  	  	   	  On	  these	  terms,	  the	  U.S.	  are	  encouraged	  to	  think	  about	  the	  broader	  picture:	  I	  urge	  my	  colleagues	  
not	  to	  see	  this	  amendment	  as	  retribution	  for	  the	  Toshiba	  sale,	  for	  the	  potential	  involvement	  which	  
we	   are	   not	   even	   sure	   of	   with	  Mitsubishi	   in	   the	   Libyan	   Desert	   and	   the	   chemical	   plant,	   or	   for	   the	  
transgressions	  of	  the	  Japanese	  on	  past	  trade	  issues.	  (P71:146),	  as	  it	  is	  emphasized	  that	  times	  have	  changed:	   Let	  me	   submit	   that	   post-­‐Toshiba,	   the	   Japanese	   put	   in	   an	   export-­‐control	   system	   that	   is	  
superior	  to	  the	  Germans	  or	  the	  French	  (P73:61).	  The	  line	  of	  argumentation	  articulating	  the	  U.S.	  as	  ‘inferior’	   is	  criticized	  as	  well:	  we	  all	  know	  that	  the	  Japanese	  have	  a	  history	  of	  unfair	  practices	  and	  
protectionism	   […]	   implicit	   in	   this	   argument	   is	   that	   American	  workers	   cannot	   compete	  with	   their	  
Japanese	  counterparts	  (P73:120),	  or,	  referring	  to	  the	  skills	  of	  U.S.	  negotiators:	  these	  arguments	  […]	  
reflect	  an	  image	  of	  Japanese	  negotiators	  as	  supermen	  and	  an	  equally	  unhealthy	  view	  that	  assumes	  
America	  cannot	  hold	  its	  own	  at	  the	  negotiation	  table	  (P93:35).349	  	  Finally,	   there	   are	   attempts	   at	   articulating	   the	   ‘Japan	   problem’	   in	   relation	   with	   U.S.	  domestic	  policies	   in	  a	  balanced	  way:	  much	  of	  our	  `Japan	  problem'	  is	  really	  an	  `America	  problem'	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  349	  On	  the	  ‘image’	  of	  Superhuman	  Japan	  see	  Thorsten	  (2012).	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that	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  solving	  by	  ourselves	   (P77:8).	  However,	   it	   is	  maintained	  that	   Japan	  also	  bears	   responsibility	   for	   the	   situation	  and	  U.S.	   reactions:	  Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  an	  extremely	  
important	  `Japan'	  part	  of	  the	  `Japan	  problem.'	  In	  my	  assessment,	  forces	  within	  Japan	  today	  are	  not	  
only	  not	  helping	  the	  situation,	  but	  worsening	  it	  and	  hastening	  the	  day	  when	  an	  American	  political	  
backlash	  is	  finally	  triggered	  (P77:8).	  Japan	  is	  called	  upon	  to	  ‘understand	  the	  situation’:	  	  	  
I	  strongly	  believe	  that	  we	  do	  need	  to	  debate	  our	  economic	  and	  military	  relations	  with	  Japan.	  I	  believe	  
that	   Japan	  needs	   to	  act	   to	  help	  offset	   the	  current	   trade	  deficit,	  and	  needs	   to	  understand-­‐-­‐as	  do	   the	  
other	   newly	   industrialized	   nations	   of	   Asia-­‐-­‐that	   the	   United	   States	   cannot	   indefinitely	   finance	   the	  
economic	  growth	  of	  other	  States	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  massive	  trade	  deficit	  and	  its	  own	  economy	  (P83:8).	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  Americans	  are	  also	  encouraged	  to	  see	  the	  broader	  picture	  in	  more	  positive	  terms:	  	  	  
I	  understand	  the	  concern	  of	  those	  Americans	  who	  fear	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  growing	  economic	  reach	  of	  
Japan	   and	   other	   Pacific	   rim	   countries	   […]	   Many	   American	   observers	   interpret	   those	   figures	   as	   a	  
danger	  to	  the	  American	  economy	  […]	  But	  to	  let	  our	  legitimate	  concerns	  blind	  us	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  
clear	  benefits	  to	  the	  United	  States	  from	  her	  growing	  relationship	  with	  Japan	  would	  be	  shortsighted	  (P97:1).	  	  
Against	  U.S.	  hypocrisy	  and	  turning	  Japan	  from	  an	  ally	  to	  an	  enemy	  	  In	  the	  sense	  of	  aiming	  at	  dissolving	  the	  antagonisms,	  the	  articulation	  of	   Japan	  as	  ally	  is	  brought	  forward	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  positive	  characteristic	  of	  the	  relationship,	  for	  instance	  through	  pointing	  not	  to	  differences,	  but	  to	  similarities	  –	  standing	  against	  chains	  of	  equivalence,	  but	  for	  inclusiveness	  –	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan:	  Do	  we	  doubt	  that	  […]	  the	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  alliance	  is	  still	  the	  linchpin	  of	  East	  
Asian	  security?	  The	  two	  greatest	  industrial	  democracies	  in	  the	  world	  have	  shown	  the	  world	  the	  way	  
to	   prosperity,	   stability,	   freedom	   and	   peace	   in	   the	   region	   (P71:57).	   And	   in	   this	   sense	   it	   is	  emphasized	   that	   [this	   is]	   a	   debate	   about	   relations	   between	   friends,	   two	   countries	   which	   must	  
nurture	  that	  friendship	  and	  insure	  that	  the	  friendship	  thrives	  (P71:71,	  73;	  P84:3;	  P86:1f.;	  P91:6).	  It	  is	  repeatedly	  underlined	  that	  we	  are	  good	  friends	  with	  Japan.	  It	  is	  not	  Japanese	  bashing	  (P71:119).	  
Though	   Japan	  may	   be	   an	   economic	   competitor	   […]	   Japan	   is	   also	   one	   of	   our	   strongest	   and	  most	  
important	  political	  and	  military	  allies	  (P73:29).	  	  Hence,	  the	  similarities	  are	  first	  and	  foremost	  seen	  in	  ‘ideology’	  (in	  contrast	  to	  the	  case	  of	  China)	  as	  for	  example	  in:	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I	  have	  never,	  however,	  endorsed	  Japan	  bashing	  and	  I	  will	  not	  endorse	  it	  now.	  Japan	  has	  emerged	  as	  
one	   of	   our	   most	   important	   allies.	   It	   is	   a	   stable	   democracy	   and	   a	   major	   economic	   power.	   The	  
differences	  between	  us	  must	  be	  dealt	  with	  by	  debating	  and	  discussing	  the	  real	  issues	  involved,	  not	  by	  
using	  a	   single	  major	  negotiation	  as	  a	   foil	   for	  asking	   Japan	   to	  accept	   terms	  we	  would	  never	  accept	  
ourselves,	  and	  which	  we	  would	  never	  ask	  of	  any	  other	  ally	  (P83:9).	  	  	  Also,	  the	  common	  view	  on	  the	  unbalanced	  character	  of	  the	  relationship	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  and	  security	   issues	   is	  criticized:	   [Japan’s]	  progress	  with	  regard	  to	  burden	  sharing	  –	  both	  military	  and	  
economic	  –	  has	  often	  been	  overlooked	   […]	   contrary	   to	  popular	  assumptions,	   there	   is	   a	   surprising	  
level	   of	   mutuality	   to	   the	   United-­‐States-­‐Japan	   relationship	   (P97:2),	   as	   it	   is	   emphasized	   that	   our	  
relationship	  with	  Japan	  as	  a	  comparable	  economic	  power	  is	  new	  (P97:3).	  As	  if	  arguing	  against	  the	  deterministic	  view,	  that	  a	  rising	  and	  an	  established	  power	  ‘must’	  clash,	  it	  is	  maintained	  that	  our	  
goal	   should	   be	   to	   share	   global	   power	  with	   a	   stronger	   Japan	  and	  Germany,	   instead	   of	   concluding	  
that	  we	  must	   collide	   (P109:5),	   it	   is	   imperative	   that	   the	   United-­‐States	   start	   viewing	   Japan	   as	   an	  
equal,	  rather	  than	  continue	  the	  little	  brother	  treatment	  (P113:3),	  as	  it	  is	  pointed	  out	  that	  from	  this	  view	   the	  trading	  situation	  has	  generated	  unneeded	  frictions	   (P122:3),	   in	   terms	  of	  blaming	  solely	  Japan:	  I	  regret	  that	  there	  are	  many	  who	  are	  too	  quick	  to	  point	  a	  finger	  at	  Japan,	  to	  blame	  Japan	  for	  
all	  our	  trade	  woes	  (P73:110).	  	  In	   this	   context,	   and	   contrary	   to	   the	   internal	   chains	   of	   equivalence,	   Congress	   itself	   is	  explicitly	   criticized:	   I	   am	   aware	   that	  most	  Members	   can	   hardly	  wait	   to	   cast	   an	   anti-­‐Japan	   vote	  (P27:9).	   In	   opposition	   to	   this	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   Japan	   should	   not	   be	   blamed	   for	  our	   trading	   ills	  (P30:10),	   as	  much	   of	   the	   trade	   problem	   is	   America’s	   fault.	   We	   got	   careless	   and	   sloppy	   and	   the	  
quality	  of	  our	  products	  has	  not	  always	  been	  what	  it	  should	  (P31:37).	  In	  this	  sense,	  there	  are	  calls	  to	  	  
start	  treating	  Japan	  as	  an	  equal	  nation.	  […]	  To	  listen	  to	  many	  of	  my	  colleagues	  in	  Congress	  […]	  you	  
would	  think	  Japan	  is	  the	  same	  as	  Grenada.350	  Japan	  is	  not	  Grenada.	  Japan	  is	  a	  major	  world	  power	  […]	  
Can	  you	  imagine	  the	  reaction	  of	  Americans	  if	  a	  foreign	  nation	  wanted	  us	  to	  translate	  our	  telephone	  
regulations	  –	   say	   Judge	  Green’s	   opinions	  –	   into	   Japanese	  at	   our	   expense?	   […]	  Can	  you	   imagine	   the	  
reaction	  if	  the	  Diet	  passed	  a	  resolution	  500	  to	  zip	  threatening	  the	  United	  States	  with	  trade	  retaliation?	  
We’d	  go	  nuts.	  Yet	  that	   is	  what	  we	  are	  demanding	  of	  the	  Japanese	  […]”No	  American	  effort	  since	  the	  
Occupation	  has	  dug	  into	  the	  guts	  of	  the	  Japanese	  system	  as	  we	  have	  dome	  in	  the	  past	  year”	  […]	  Let’s	  
stop	  tearing	  apart	  the	  guts	  of	  an	  ally	  […]	  Let’s	  admit	  that	  the	  Japanese	  are	  lousy	  importers	  and	  we	  
can’t	  make	  them	  buy	  from	  us	  (P31:37).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  350	  The	  U.S.	  orchestrated	  and	  led	  an	  invasion	  to	  Grenada	  in	  1983.	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The	  U.S.	  is	  also	  criticized	  as	  hypocritical	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  free	  trade:	  as	  free	  trade	  
bastion,	  United	  States	  isn’t	  half	  as	  pure	  as	  many	  people	  think	  […]	  it	  is	  indeed	  hypocritical	  to	  preach	  
what	  we	  don’t	  practice	   (P35:48;	  P37:19;	  P40:13;	  P63:19;	  P151:15),	   and	  more	  explicitly:	   it	   is	  an	  
old	  trick	  to	  look	  at	  other	  countries	  and	  judge	  them	  by	  their	  actions	  while	  we	  judge	  ourselves	  by	  our	  
motives	  (P55:138),	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  it	  is	  even	  maintained	  that	  all	  too	  often	  in	  this	  debate	  the	  term	  
“fair”	   has	   been	   a	   code	   word	   for	   protectionism	   (P37:18)	   which	   again	   almost	   sounds	   like	  articulating	  free	  trade	  as	  an	  empty	  signifier.	  Furthermore	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  we	  tend	  to	  forget	  that	  
Americans	  buy	  Japanese	  products	  because	  they	  prefer	  them.	  We	  should	  devote	  more	  time	  to	  finding	  
out	  why	  the	  Japanese	  consumer	  […]	  does	  not	  prefer	  American	  products	  (P42:44).	  It	  is	  critiqued	  that	  
the	  United	  States	  is	  proposing	  to	  undermine	  confidence	  in	  the	  revolutionary	  world	  economic	  system	  
it	   did	   so	   much	   to	   create	   […]	   trade	   wars	   not	   only	   endanger	   the	   consumer	   […]	   but	   also	   tend	   to	  
endanger	  us	  all	  (P49:15).	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  ironic	  consequence	  of	  Japan-­‐bashing	  in	  
this	  body	  today	  [on	  the	  FSX	  issue]	  is	  in	  effect	  America-­‐bashing	  (P71:33).	  	  In	   this	   respect,	   the	  mitigating	   voices	   also	   explicitly	   criticize	   the	  WWII	   allusions,	   as	   in	  statements	   like:	  World	  War	  II	  ended	  nearly	  45	  years	  ago.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  trade	  war	  issue	  (P73:118).	  Or:	   It	   is	   so	   easy	   to	   paint	  with	  a	   broad	  brush	  and	   say	  because	   the	   Japanese	  were	  as	   they	  were	   in	  
World	  War	  II	   […]	  that	  they	  will	  always	  be	  that	  way	   (P71:65).	  Accordingly,	   references	   to	   history	  with	  Japan	  are	  also	  made	  in	  another	  way:	  Let	  us	  also	  not	  forget	  history.	  One	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  World	  
War	  II	  was	  the	  trade	  isolation	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  forced	  upon	  Japan.	  Are	  we	  not	  wise	  to	  learn	  
the	   lessons	   of	   history	   and	   draw	   the	   Japanese	   to	   us,	   instead	   of	   spurning	   them	   again	   into	  
supernationalism?	  (P71:77).	  	  The	  quite	  farsighted	  argument	  is	  even	  brought	  up,	  that	  Japan	  should	  not	  be	  turned	  into	  ‘just	  another	  enemy’:	  	  	  
Ever	   since	   that	   time	  we	  have	   known	  which	   side	  we	  were	   on.	  We	  were	  against	   Imperial	   Japan,	   the	  
Nazis,	  Communist	  China,	  and	   the	  Communist	  Soviet	  Union.	  But,	  Mr.	  President,	  what	   if	   things	  really	  
are	  changing?	  What	  if	  the	  threat	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  is	  decreasing?	  Then	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  define	  
ourselves	  by	  saying	  what	  we	  are	  not.	  We	  have	  to	  begin	  to	  say	  what	  we	  are,	  and	  I	  know	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  
of	   people	   in	   the	   political	   process	   in	   this	   country	   who	   will	   find	   that	   very	   disquieting.	   They	   will	   be	  
reaching	  for	  an	  enemy	  somewhere.	  I	  hope	  that	  they	  will	  not	  be	  looking	  at	  Japan	  (P73:62,	  in	  1989).	  	  	  On	  the	  same	  line	  it	  is	  further	  emphasized	  that	  I	  also	  know	  there	  remains	  in	  America	  strains	  of	  the	  
anti-­‐Japanese	   virus	   created	   during	  World	  War	   II	   […]	  We	  must	   be	   careful	   not	   to	   excuse	   our	   own	  
failures	  by	  laying	  them	  at	  the	  doors	  of	  competitors	  (P92:27).	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  Balanced	  views	  on	  emotions	  in	  Congress	  	  The	  most	   thoughtful	   voices	   take	   an	   introspective	   view	   on	   the	   fervor	   of	   the	   debates	   on	   Japan	  already	  in	  the	  1980s,	  and	  articulate	  Congress	  itself	  as	  overly	  emotional,	  which	  is	  criticized	  for	  its	  potential	  of	  unreasonably	  triggering	  protectionist	  measures	  and	  a	  trade	  conflict:	  	  	  
If	  we	  unleash	  protectionist	  actions	  based	  on	  emotional	  response,	  we	  will	  hurt	  ourselves	  and	  the	  world	  
trading	  system	  (P27:10).	  I	  was	  frankly	  appalled	  that	  Congress	  could	  be	  so	  hasty,	  so	  shortsighted,	  and	  
so	   irresponsible	   […]	   instead	   of	   facing	   its	   responsibilities	   and	   acting	   to	   correct	   the	   trade	   deficit,	  
Congress	   chose	   to	   lash	   out	   at	   U.S.	   allies,	   hanging	   the	   blame	   for	   our	   dilemma	   around	   their	   necks	  (P30:10).	  	  	  It	   is	  argued	  that	  this	  frustration	  is	  the	  wrong	  way	  to	  go	  […]	  we	  are	  not	  setting	  an	  example	  for	  the	  
world.	  We	   are	   following	   the	   example	   of	   Japan	   (P50:14,	   39).	   Again,	   references	   are	   made	   to	   the	  1930s:	  Yesterday’s	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  contains	  the	  best	  analysis	  […]	  of	  the	  dangers	  which	  lurk	  in	  
the	  current	  mindless	  itch	  in	  Congress	  to	  start	  a	  worldwide	  trade	  war	  […]	  “Toying	  with	  Depression”	  
[…]	  (P67:15).	  ‘Japan-­‐bashing’	  is	  explicitly	  criticized	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  FSX-­‐debates:	  If	  I	  allowed	  
my	  frustration	  […]	  to	  dictate	  opposition	  to	  the	  agreement	  [the	  FSX]	  […]	  I	  would	  simply	  be	  engaging	  
in	   the	   popular	   sport	   of	   ‘Japan	   bashing’	   (P71:70).	   Quite	   figuratively	   the	   U.S.	   is	   criticized	   as	  overreacting:	  We	  ought	  not	  to	  behave	  like	  a	  bull	  in	  the	  ring,	  charging	  mindlessly	  every	  time	  we	  see	  
the	   Japanese	   flag	   waved	   before	   us	   (P71:112).	   It	   [a	   vote	   contra	   the	   FSX-­‐agreement]	   may	   give	  
Members	   an	   opportunity	   to	   cast	   an	   anti-­‐Japan	   vote,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   do	   anything	   because	   it	   only	  
expresses	  the	  sense	  of	  Congress	  […]	  (P71:114).	  	  In	   turn,	   arguments	   are	   voiced	   for	   staying	   with	   ‘pure	   economics’:	   we	   certainly	   should,	  
under	  no	  circumstances	  in	  this	  country	  –	  we	  settled	  that	  100	  years	  ago	  –	  let	  prejudice	  enter	  into	  our	  
thoughts	  in	  our	  public	  affairs,	  or	  even	  personal	  dealings,	  this	  is	  an	  economic	  matter	  (P93:11),	  as	  it	  is	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  contentiousness	  and	  suspicion	  which	  has	  been	  brought	  in	  our	  economic	  and	  
commercial	  relations	  has	  clearly	  infected	  our	  political	  and	  security	  relationship	  (P95:2).	  On	   the	   other	   side	   there	   are	   also	   attempts	   at	   understanding	   the	   emotions,	   as	   in	   this	  exemplary	  statement	  worth	  quoting	  at	  length:	  	  	  
As	  far	  as	  Congress	   is	  concerned	  Japan	  accounts	   	   for	  virtually	   	  100%	  	  of	  the	  worry	   	  and	   	   frustration	  
prompted	  	  by	  the	  imbalance.	  The	  result	  is	  an	  increasingly	  angry	  and	  even	  	  ugly	  	  congressional	  	  mood	  	  
that	   	   threatens	   	   not	   	   only	   to	   damage	   	  U.S.-­‐Japan	   	   relations	   	   but	   	   to	   	   bring	   considerable	   	   harm	   	   to	  	  
American	  	  consumers	  as	  well.	  If	  the	  mood	  that	  these	  attitudes	  reflect	  is	  not	  entirely	  rational,	  least	  of	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all	  in	  urging	  punitive	  actions,	  neither	  is	  it	  entirely	  unprovoked.	  Japan	  has	  indeed	  stubbornly	  resisted	  
the	  kind	  of	  liberalization	  	  of	  	  its	  import	  policies	  	  that	  could	  ease	  	  the	  trade	  imbalance.	  	  That	  resistance,	  
though,	   hardly	   makes	   what	   Congress	   	   is	   	   threatening	   	   to	   	   do	   any	   more	   sensible	   	   or	   	   any	   more	  
beneficial	  	  to	  Americans.	  Congress,	  upset	  about	  the	  overall	  	  size	  	  of	  	  the	  	  trade	  	  deficit	  but	  	  unsure	  	  of	  	  
what	  	  to	  	  do	  	  about	  	  it,	  	  has	  become	  	  especially	  	  agitated	  	  by	  	  Japan's	  	  posture	  	  in	  	  trade	  	  negotiations.	  	  
But	  in	  its	  alarm	  Congress	  	  is	  	  cranking	  	  up	  	  to	  	  force	  	  measures	  that,	  while	  	  they	  would	  	  certainly	  	  harm	  
Japan,	  would	   	  be	   	  unmistakably	   	   self-­‐wounding	   to	  America.	  The	  deficit	   	  has	   swollen	   	   to	   its	   	   current	  	  
size	  mainly	  because	  	  the	  dollar	  is	  	  so	  strong.	  That	  strength	  makes	  	  American	  	  goods	  	  more	  	  expensive	  	  
abroad	  	  and	  	  foreign	  cheaper	  here.	  Bashing	  Japan	  is	  	  clearly	  	  not	  	  an	  effective	  or	  	  responsible	  way	  	  to	  
address	  	  this	  larger	  issue	  (P30:10).	  	  
	  And	  it	  is	  generally	  conceded	  throughout	  the	  whole	  timeframe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  resentment	  in	  
this	  Chamber	  about	  Japan	  (P71:103;	  P83:5),	  	  	  
many	  of	  the	  speeches	  today	  understandably	  have	  been	  filled	  with	  emotion	  […]	  I	  understand	  the	  sense	  
of	  their	  frustration	  and	  their	  emotion	  [but]	  this	  is	  not	  the	  time	  to	  reorder	  the	  entire	  relationship	  with	  
Japan	   […]	   that	   […]	   will	   be	   historically	   a	   very	   bad	   mistake	   and	   very	   shortsighted	   at	   a	   time	   when	  
Senators	  want	  to	  vent	  their	  emotions	  […]	  (P73:65f.).	  	  	  	  But	  finally,	  even	  in	  these	  quite	  balanced	  statements,	  Japan’s	  alleged	  unfairness	  is	  often	  attributed	  not	  only	  to	  the	  government,	  but	  to	  ‘the	  Japanese	  people’:	  	  	  
Congress	  is	  reacting	  more	  out	  of	  anger	  and	  frustration	  than	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  economic	  logic.	  But	  the	  
Japanese	   should	   understand	   that	   the	   true	   basis	   of	   this	   frustration	   is	   the	   sense	   that	   Japan	   as	   a	  
government	   and	   as	   a	   people	   are	   being	   unfair	   in	   their	   support	   of	   policies	   that	   restrict	   American	  
products	  from	  Japanese	  markets	  (P48:23).	  	  
	  And,	  more	  critically	  towards	  Japan,	  but	  still	  calling	  for	  negotiations:	  The	  Hill’s	  exploding	  animosity	  
is	   understandable.	   The	   Japanese	   have	   indeed	   behaved	   selfishly,	   even	   arrogantly;	   their	   bland	  
insouciance	  is	  insufferable	  […]	  Before	  we	  enact	  retaliatory	  laws,	  let	  us	  talk	  a	  little	  longer	  (P63:19).	  	  
	  
Summary	  of	  intensifications	  and	  mitigations	  towards	  Japan	  
	  The	  intensifications	  and	  mitigations	  –	   i.e.	   the	  aims	  at	  strengthening	  or	  weakening	  the	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference	  –	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan	  both	  are	  for	  the	  most	  part	  articulated	  through	  ‘war	   rhetoric’.	   The	   intensifications	   evoke	   an	   economic	  war	  with	   Japan	   being	   in	   the	   role	   of	   the	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WWII-­‐Pearl	   Harbor	   enemy,	   Pearl	   Harbor	   becoming	   both	   a	   metaphor	   for	   war,	   as	   well	   as	   for	  ‘unfairness’.	  The	  U.S.	  short	  hand	  perspective	  is	  repeated	  in	  war	  terms	  as	  well,	  like	  in	  expressions	  about	   ‘being	  on	   the	  defensive	  or	   ‘hoisting	   the	  white	   flag’’.	  The	  mitigating	  arguments	   too	  are	   to	  some	  extent	  voiced	  through	  war	  rhetoric,	  either	  by	  warning	  of	  a	  future	  	  ‘WWIII’	  as	  consequence	  of	  protectionist	  retaliation,	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  warnings	  about	  taking	  unwise	  decisions	  ‘in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  battle’	  etc.	  The	  internal	  criticisms	  both	  towards	  Congress	  itself	  and	  the	  executive	  are	  likewise	  in	   part	   voiced	   in	   an	   intensified,	   war-­‐like	   manner.	   In	   terms	   of	   content,	   as	   follows	   from	   the	  ‘definition’	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  intensification	  and	  mitigation,	  the	  arguments	  remain	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  other	  categories,	   for	   instance	  the	  executive	  is	  critiqued	  for	  not	  being	  assertive	  enough	  in	  acting	  against	  a	  U.S.	  decline,	  Japan	  in	  its	  ‘difference’	  would	  leave	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  retaliate	  etc.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	   rhetoric	   in	  U.S.-­‐Japan	   relations	   is	   also	  explicitly	   criticized	   in	  general	   for	   its	  unnecessarily	   inflammatory	   character,	   and	   there	   are	   calls	   for	   an	   end	   to	   WWII	   allusions	   and	  articulations	   of	   Japan	   as	   enemy.	   Meanwhile,	   there	   remain	   attempts	   at	   understanding	   and	  explaining	   or	   contextualizing	   this	   outburst	   of	   emotions,	   by	   calling	   for	   both	   sides	   to	   show	  understanding	  for	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  other	  one,	  and	  recognizing	  reasons	  and	  responsibilities	  for	  the	  economic	  situation	  on	  both	  sides.	  	  
	  
7.3.	  Intensifications	  towards	  China	  –	  evil	  knows	  no	  resting	  place	  
	  Towards	  China	  one	  of	  the	  major	  lines	  of	  intensifications	  is	  voiced	  in	  statements	  that	  contrast	  the	  ‘liberal’	  U.S.	  with	  ‘communist’	  China,	  as	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  following	  subchapters.	  This	  mostly	  happens	  in	  connection	  with	  a	  criticism	  of	  the	  U.S.	  itself,	  by	  emphasizing	  U.S.	  ‘liberal’	  values	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	   and	   contrasting	   them	  with	   ‘commercial	   interests’,	   and	   criticizing	   the	   latter.	  This	  not	  only	  strengthens	  the	  external	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  towards	  China,	  but	  also	  the	  internal	  ones	  in	  the	   values	   versus	   interests	   debates,	   that	   are	   aimed	   at	   critiquing	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history-­‐perspective.	   In	   line	  with	   this	  view,	  U.S.	   identity	   towards	  China	   is	  articulated	  as	  confrontational	  and	  exclusive.	  	  	  In	   the	  most	   intensified	   statements	   China	   is	   designated	   straight	   forwardly	   as	   ‘evil’	   to	   an	   extent	  that	   was	   not	   the	   case	   with	   Japan.	   However,	   again	   it	   is	   always	   the	   ‘Chinese	   regime’	   that	   is	  addressed,	   not	   ‘the	   Chinese	   people’,	   as	   when	   China	   is	   designated	   as	   a	   remorseless,	   ambitious,	  
amoral,	   self-­‐confident,	   even	   cocky,	   communist	   dictatorship	   that	   is	   bent	   on	   achieving	   regional	  
dominance	  throughout	  the	  Far	  East	  […]	  a	  China	  which	  is	  not	  at	  peace	  with	  its	  own	  people	  will	  not	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be	  at	  peace	  with	  America	  (P126:11).	  China	  is	  articulated	  as	  not	  trustworthy	  and	  potential	  change	  is	   ruled	   out:	   These	   things	   don’t	   change,	   and	   unfortunately,	   neither	   has	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	  
China.	   Despite	   all	   their	   words,	   despite	   all	   their	   promises,	   their	   actions	   speak	   louder	   (P137:58).	  Statements	   like	  they	  are	  the	  enemy	  of	  every	  freedom-­‐loving	  person	  in	  the	  world	   (P137:68)	  aim	  at	  extending	   the	   perspective	   the	   U.S.	   is	   articulating	   itself	   from,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   actual	   ‘problem’,	  beyond	  U.S.-­‐China	   relations.	  The	  Chinese	   government	   is	   nominated	   as	   these	  butchers	  of	  Beijing	  (P162:2),	   and	   this	   rogue,	   vicious	   dictatorship	   [that]	   commits	  murder	   […]	   And	   the	   proponents	   of	  
engagement	  are	  worried	  about	  us	  making	  unfriendly	  acts	  (P176:32).	  China	   is	  ascribed	   the	  desire	  
to	  wage	   economic	  warfare	   against	   America	   (P181:1).	   The	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   as	   ‘progress	   of	  liberty’	  is	  contrasted	  with	  China’s	  ‘backwardness’:	  	  	  
But	  evil	  knows	  no	  resting	  place.	  The	  cold	  war	  is	  over.	  And	  still	  how	  many	  have	  yet	  to	  taste	  the	  fruit	  of	  
freedom?	  For	  there	   is	  a	  regime	  in	  the	  world	  today	  that	  runs	  against	  the	  tide	  of	  history;	  that	  denies	  
liberty	   and	   human	   dignity	   to	   its	   people;	   a	   regime	   whose	   brutal	   repression	   at	   home	   betrays	   its	  
intentions	  abroad;	  a	   regime	   that	  aspires	   to	   superpower	   status.	   I	  am	  speaking	  of	  Communist	  China	  (P186:1).	  	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   China	   as	   an	   economic	   counterpart,	   it	   is	   articulated	   as	   the	   dragon	   stands	  
knocking	   at	   our	   door	   […]	   do	   we	   permanently	   give	   it	   free	   access	   inside,	   when	   in	   the	   past	   it	   has	  
broken	   its	   promises,	   stolen	   our	   technology,	   compromised	   our	   security?	   […]	   China	   has	   been	  
promising	  economic	  concessions	  to	  buy	  its	  way	  into	  the	  WTO	  (P137:88).	  	  The	   parallels	   to	   the	  WWII	   allegations	   with	   respect	   to	   Japan	   are	   articulations	   of	   China	  being	  like	  or	  even	  ‘worse’	  than	  the	  Nazis351,	  that	  come	  to	  stand	  as	  “universal	  symbol	  of	  evil”	  (cf.	  Hoenicke	   Moore	   2015,	   143),	   and	   more	   concretely	   as	   a	   metaphor	   for	   the	   ultimate	   absence	   of	  anything	  having	  to	  do	  with	  ‘liberalism’	  in	  connection	  to	  China:	  This	  policy	  […]	  is	  eerily	  reminiscent	  
of	  the	  Nazi	  eugenic	  program	  […]	  The	  Chinese	  Laogai	  […]	  are	  forced	  labor	  camps	  similar	  to	  the	  Nazi	  
work	   camps	   of	   another	   era	   (P145:22f.;	   P201:4).352	  There	   is	   no	   moral	   or	   practical	   difference	  
between	  trading	  with	  the	  PRC	  dictatorship	  and	  trading	  with	  the	  Nazis	  (P125:13).	  And,	   in	  an	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  351	  For	   the	  omnipresence	  of	   ‘the	  Nazis’	   in	   foreign	  policy	  debates	  and	   in	   	   ‘American	  culture’	   in	  general,	   see	  Hoenicke	  Moore	  (2015).	  	  352	  The	   issue	  of	   the	  use	  of	  prison	   labor	   for	  manufacturing	   export	   goods	  was	   frequently	   criticized	   for	  both,	   being	   an	  unfair	  trade	  practice	  –	  as	  it	  disadvantaged	  U.S.	  goods	  produced	  by	  paid	  workers	  –	  as	  well	  as	  for	  human	  rights	  concerns.	  The	  prohibition	  of	  the	  import	  of	  prison-­‐made	  goods	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  (Smoot-­‐Hawley)	  Tariff	  Act	  of	  1930	  and	  its	  Section	  307.	  The	  ‘Laogai’	  (‘reform	  through	  labor’)	  in	  China	  can	  detain	  individuals	  for	  up	  to	  three	  years	  without	  a	  trial	  or	  court	  action.	  They	  received	  considerable	  notice	  in	  the	  U.S.	  particularly	  after	  a	  prisoner	  –	  Wu	  Hongda	  who	  later	  became	  an	  American	  citizen	  under	  the	  name	  Harry	  Wu	  –	  escaped	  and	  published	  a	  book	  in	  which	  he	  compared	  the	  Laogai	  to	  the	  Soviet	   Gulags	   and	   Nazi	   concentration	   camps.	  While	   approving	   PNTR	   for	   China	   in	   2000,	   Congress	   for	   instance	   also	  mandated	  a	  task	  force	  to	  annually	  report	  on	  the	  export	  of	  prison	  labor	  goods	  (cf.	  Gagliano	  2014,	  140,	  145).	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more	  intensified	  way:	  Most	  of	  us	  have	  seen	  the	  movie,	  ‘Schindler’s	  List’.	  What	  is	  going	  on	  in	  China	  is	  
similar:	  factories	  churn	  out	  goods	  made	  with	  slave	  labor	  (P125:91).	  We	  may	  be	  seeing	  in	  China	  the	  
first	  true	  fascist	  society	  on	  the	  model	  of	  Nazi	  Germany	   (P206:1).	   In	  this	  vein	  the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history	  and	  its	  allegedly	  ‘liberalizing’	  effects,	  that	  are	  however	  missing	  with	  China,	  are	  called	  into	  question	  in	  an	  intensified	  way:	  	  
	  
[…]	  we	  do	  not	   treat	  bloody	  dictatorships	   in	   the	   same	  way	   that	  we	   treat	  democratic	  nations.	  Those	  
people	  who	  are	   suggesting	   that	  we	  continue	  MFN-­‐status	   […]	   tell	  us	   that	   something	  will	  happen	  by	  
magic,	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  we	  will	  reach	  a	  critical	  mass	  because	  there	  has	  been	  so	  much	  trade	  going	  on,	  
and	   the	   prosperity	   has	   increased	   that	   the	   people	   then	  will	   demand	   freedom,	   and	   communism	  and	  
dictatorship	  will	  crumble.	  That	  is	  absolute	  nonsense	  […]	  Nazi	  Germany	  did	  not	  have	  a	  great	  human	  
rights	  program	  simply	  because	  they	  were	  a	  prosperous	  Western	  country	  (P145:39).	  	  	  And	  parallels	  are	  also	  drawn	  not	  only	  to	  Germany,	  but	  also	  to	  pre-­‐WWII	  Japan:	  […]	  as	  Japan	  and	  
Germany	   bloodily	   illustrated	   in	   this	   century,	   nationalism	   plus	   economic	   might	   without	   human	  
rights	  is	  not	  the	  road	  to	  democracy;	  it	  is	  the	  road	  to	  fascism	  (P162:9).	  We	  do	  not	  make	  a	  liberal	  by	  
hugging	   a	   Nazi	   (P195:7).	   These	   kinds	   of	   intensified	   statements	   aim	   at	   recalling	   how	   Japan	  became	  an	  enemy	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  how	  that	  allegedly	  would	  be	  the	  course	  of	  China	  in	  the	  future:	  
Did	  this	  [becoming	  highly	  westernized]	  make	  Japan	  and	  Germany	  any	  less	  a	  threat	  to	  world	  peace?	  
No.	   Today,	   China	   is,	   yes,	   advancing	   economically,	   but	   the	  money	   is	   being	   used	   by	   the	  militaristic	  
elite	  to	  prepare	  for	  war	  and	  to	  attack	  the	  United	  States	   (P138:17).	  And	  referring	   to	   Japan	   in	   the	  1920s	  more	  concretely:	  	  
In	  many	  ways,	  we	  are	  repeating	  history.	  In	  the	  1920s,	  Japanese	  militarists	  wiped	  out	  Japan's	  fledgling	  
democratic	  movement.	   That	   it	   did.	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   set	   a	   course	   for	   Japan.	   Japan	   then	  was	   a	   racist	  
power	  which	  believed	  it,	  too,	  had	  a	  right	  to	  dominate	  Asia.	  Japanese	  militarists	  also	  knew	  that	  only	  
the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  stood	   in	   their	  way.	  This	   is	  deja	  vu	  all	  over	  again	   […].	  The	  Communist	  
Chinese,	   too,	   are	   militarists	   who	   seek	   to	   dominate	   Asia.	   They	   think	   they	   are	   racially	   superior	   to	  
everyone	  (P202:9).	  	  Another	   frequent	   intensification	   in	   terms	   of	   China’s	   ‘evilness’	   –	   besides	   comparisons	   to	   Nazi-­‐Germany	  –	   is	   to	   liken	  China	   to	   the,	   illiberal,	  and	   also	  communist,	   Soviet	  Union:	  But	  what	  is	  our	  
excuse	  now?	  Now	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  has	  collapsed,	  what	  is	  the	  urgency	  of	  maintaining	  business-­‐
as-­‐usual	  with	   the	   likes	   of	   Beijing?	   (P126:11,	   here	   also	   referring	   to	   the	   argument	   of	   China	   as	   a	  potential	  ‘ally’	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union).	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  claimed	  that	  if	  during	  the	  Reagan	  years	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we	  had	  done	  with	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  what	  we	  are	  doing	  with	  China,	  communism	  would	  still	  be	  
alive	  and	  well	  because	  we	  would	  give	  Communist	  dictators	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  the	  money	  to	  
stay	   in	   business	   (P138:9).	   As	   these	   statements	   show,	   as	   much	   as	   they	   aim	   at	   articulating	   a	  denunciation	   of	   communist	   China,	   they	   are	   also	   directed	   towards	   the	   internal	   proponents	   of	  engagement	  through	  trade,	  as	  it	  is	  brought	  up	  in	  the	  debates	  on	  MFN:	  	  
	  
[…]	   no	   MFN	   was	   given	   to	   the	   Soviets	   under	   Ronald	   Reagan	   (P176:33).	  Would	   these	   people	   have	  
wanted	   to	  give	  MFN	   to	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  when	   they	  were	  persecuting	   those	  of	   the	   Jewish	   faith	  and	  
shutting	  down	  dissidents	   and	  doing	  all	   the	   bad	   things	   they	  were	  doing?	   […]	  Yet	   they	  want	   to	   give	  
MFN	  to	  China	  when	  they	  are	  doing	  all	  these	  terrible	  things	  in	  the	  1990’s,	  in	  the	  year	  1997	  (P180:2).	  
We	  would	   never	   have	   given	  MFN	   to	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   […]	   In	   the	   1980’s,	   Ronald	  Reagan	   called	   the	  
Soviet	  Union	  the	  evil	  empire	  (P180:3).	  	  	  	  These	  issues	  are	  further	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  passages	  on	  self-­‐criticism	  and	  criticism	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history.	  	  
Intensified	  self-­‐criticisms	  –	  as	  violating	  both,	  values	  and	  interests	  
	  These	  self-­‐criticisms	  address	  the	  values	  versus	  interests	  debates	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  preserve	  U.S.	   identity	  as	  promoter	  of	  human	  rights,	  as	  well	  as	  as	  an	  economic	  power	  and	  role	  model.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  U.S.	  ideals	  are	  contrasted	  with	  China’s	  ‘evilness’:	  It	  is	  time	  for	  us	  
to	  apply	  our	  long-­‐held	  ideals	  regarding	  human	  rights	  […]	  to	  our	  relationship	  with	  this	  Communist	  
dictatorship	  whose	  deadly	  atheistic	  philosophy	  has	  no	  respect	  for	  human	  rights,	  indeed,	  no	  respect	  
even	   for	  human	   life	   itself	   (P145:3).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   U.S.	   business	   interests	   are	   criticized	   for	  betraying	   those	   ideals:	   […]	  many	  U.S.	   corporations	   collude	  with	   a	   communist	   tyranny	   to	   exploit	  
workforce	  […]	  our	  investments	  only	  serve	  to	  bolster	  a	  regime	  that	  is	   in	  direct	  contradiction	  to	  the	  
funding	   principles	   of	   our	   Nation	   (P162:6).	   In	   this	   intensified	   view,	   U.S.	   business	   practices	   are	  claimed	  to	  even	  hurt	  the	  Chinese	  people	  themselves,	  instead	  of	  helping	  them:	  We	  should	  not	  sell	  
the	   Chinese	   people	   into	   slavery	   just	   to	   bring	   trading	   profits	   into	   our	   district	   (P125:54).	   In	   this	  respect	  the	  U.S.	  is	  criticized	  for	  potential	  hypocrisy	  (see	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  under	  the	  category	  of	   mitigation	   in	   chapter	   7.4):	   We	   should	   not	   reward	   a	   totalitarian	   regime	   that	   is	   run	   by	   a	  
Communist	   party,	   a	   dictatorship	   […]	   So	   let	   us	   not	   abandon	   our	   patriotic	   morals	   in	   favor	   of	  
corporate	  profits	   (P137:56).	   In	   this	   sense	   it	   is	   asked:	   Is	   the	  United	  States	   truly	   the	   leader	  of	   the	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Free	  World?	  Or	  are	  we	  merely	  the	  ‘moneybag	  democracy’	  the	  Chinese	  rulers	  contemptuously	  call	  us?	  (P176:18).	  	  In	   relation	   to	   the	   question	   of	   MFN/PNTR	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   granting	   them	   to	   China	  contradicts	  both,	  values	  and	  interests:	  This	  whole	  idea	  of	  PNTR	  with	  China	  is	  against	  the	  interest	  of	  
the	   people	   of	   the	   United	   States,	   against	   our	   moral	   position	   (P195:6f.).	   And	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  business	   interests:	   This	   vote	   is	   whether	   we	   should	   be	   subsidizing	   big	   business	   to	   close	   down	  
American	  factories	  and	  give	  that	  subsidy	  to	  them	  to	  open	  up	  factories	  in	  Communist	  China.	  It	  is	  an	  
insult	   to	   the	   people	   of	   the	  United	   States	   (P200:6).	   In	   this	   line	   of	   intensified	   argumentation	   the	  crackdown	  on	  Tiananmen	  square	  in	  1989	  is	  also	  brought	  up:	  	  
	  
Our	  shortsighted	  policy	  of	  subsidized	  one-­‐way	  trade	  crushes	  that	  goddess	  of	  liberty	  every	  bit	  as	  much	  
as	  those	  Red	  Army	  tanks	  did	  12	  years	  ago	   (P202:11).	  Let	  us	  reexamine	  our	  souls.	  Let	  us	  reexamine	  
our	  policies	  […]	  And	  when	  we	  recognize	  that	  and	  reach	  out	  with	  honesty	  and	  not	  for	  a	  quick	  buck,	  not	  
just	  to	  make	  a	  quick	  buck	  and	  then	  get	  out	  […]	  (P202:12),	  	  	  even	   though	   and	   especially	   as	   China	   is	   also	   seen	   as	   a	   fantastic	   place	   to	   do	   business	   (P204:8).	  Hence,	   these	   articulations	   antagonize	   China,	   but	   they	   also	   foster	   the	   internal	   chains	   of	  equivalence	  against	  ‘pure	  business	  interests’.	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   like	   with	   Japan,	   the	   own	   trade	   policies	   are	   criticized	   for	   economic	  reasons,	   that	   are	   however	   rooted	   in	   ‘communist’	   China’s	   unfairness	   that	   the	   U.S.	   has	   failed	   to	  realize:	  	  	  
‘I	  have	  met	  the	  enemy,	  and	  he	  is	  us’	  […]	  I	  do	  not	  blame	  them.	  It	  is	  us,	  the	  United	  States.	  It	  is	  because	  of	  
stupid	  trade	  policy	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Congress,	  this	  administration	  and	  past	  administrations	  […]	  are	  these	  
our	   newfound	   friends?	   Are	   we	   to	   fear	   China	   or	   are	   we	   to	   	   stand	   up	   for	   the	   American	   worker?	  (P145:20).	  	  	  And	  as	  with	  Japan	  it	   is	  argued	  that	  China	  is	   ‘enjoying’	  at	  the	  U.S.’	  expense:	  Pass	  the	  Bereuter	  bill	  
and	  all	  Members	  will	  hear	  from	  the	  Communist	  will	  be	  laughs	  of	  doddering	  old	  rulers	  who	  will	  once	  
again	  have	  put	   one	  over	   on	  Uncle	   Sam	   (P125:53).353	  Likewise,	   as	  with	   Japan,	   a	   potential	   future	  WWIII	  is	  brought	  up,	  however,	  with	  China	  it	   is	  pictured	  not	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  protectionism,	  but	  of	  ‘free	  trade	  policy’:	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  353	  The	  Bereuter	  bill	  was	  aiming	  at	  an	  internal	  compromise	  in	  the	  debates	  on	  MFN	  in	  1995,	  see	  Dumbaugh	  1998,	  27.	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[…]	  the	  Congress	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  with	  American	  taxpayer	  dollars,	  is	  funding	  World	  War	  III	  […]	  
The	  last	  I	  heard,	  we	  were	  referred	  to	  around	  the	  world	  as	  Uncle	  Sam	  […]	  the	  world	  is	  beginning	  to	  
look	   at	   America	   as	   Uncle	   Sucker	   […]	   And	   what	   we	   have	   done	   in	   the	   last	   3	   years,	   we	   not	   only	  
reinvented	  Communism,	  we	  are	  now	  starting	  to	  subsidize	  it	  (P138:13).	  	  	  Also,	  more	   broadly	   speaking,	   U.S.	   overspending	   is	   scrutinized,	   as	   it	  was	   referring	   to	   the	   trade	  deficit	   with	   Japan:	   A	  Nation	   that	   buys	  more	   than	   they	   sell	   will	   go	   bankrupt,	   and	   a	   Nation	   that	  
allows	   illegal	   trade	   destroys	   all	   American	   industry	   (P139:1).	   However,	   the	   general	   emphasis	  remains	   on	   China’s	   unfairness:	   How	   can	   we	   have	   normal	   trade	   relations	   with	   the	   most	   unfair	  
trading	  nation	  on	  Earth?	  (P176:58).	  And	  this	  attribution,	  ‘the	  most	  unfair	  trading	  nation	  on	  Earth’	  –	  that	  was	  also	  frequently	  voiced	  towards	  Japan	  –	  to	  China	  is	  linked	  back	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  China	  by	  President	  Nixon:	  Nixon,	  on	  his	  death	  bed,	  told	  writer	  William	  
Safire	  that	  his	  China	  strategy	  may	  have	  created	  a	  Frankenstein	  […]	  Our	  policy	  of	  MFN	  status	  or	  NTR	  
has	   created	   a	   monster	   (P137:38).	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   and	   its	  proclamation	  of	  the	  transformative	  impact	  of	  economic	  policy	  are	  once	  more	  criticized	  (see	  also	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  next	  sub-­‐chapter):	  If	  you	  have	  capitalism	  and	  Communists	  existing	  in	  China,	  
it	   is	   the	   political	   death	   warrant	   of	   the	   Communist	   regime?	   I	   disagree	   (P137:68).	   Our	   economic	  
relationship	  with	  Communist	  China	  has	  been	  a	  disaster	  […]	  (P195:5).	  	  As	  with	  Japan,	  these	  intensified	  arguments	  are	  supposed	  to	  stand	  for	  calls	  for	  action	  (cf.	  Hoenicke	  Moore	  143),	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  doing	  something	  about	  the	  trade	  situation,	  as	  in:	  when	  are	  
we	  going	  to	  sober	  up	  and	  get	  a	  competitive	  trade	  policy?	  (P136:19).	  […]	  it	  is	  time	  to	  put	  up	  or	  shut	  
up	  (P146:4).	  	  But	  it	  is	  also	  about	  the	  challenge	  to	  U.S.	  identity:	  We	  must	  make	  a	  decision	  today	  and	  
it	  should	  be	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  history	  […]	  Are	  we	  prepared	  to	  sell	  our	  souls?	  Are	  we	  prepared	  to	  
butcher	   our	   conscience?	   Are	   we	   prepared	   to	   deny	   our	   shared	   values	   of	   freedom,	   justice	   and	  
democracy?	   (P176:67).	  Reminiscent	  of	   the	  arguments	  about	   Japan	   leaving	  no	  other	  choice	   than	  retaliation	  for	  the	  U.S.,	  it	  is	  claimed	  that:	  It	  is	  time	  for	  America	  to	  take	  a	  stand	  and	  say	  no.	  We	  have	  
suffered	  too	  much	  (P207:7).	  	  It	   is	  upheld	  that	  otherwise,	  again	  as	  with	  Japan,	  according	  to	  this	  line	  of	  argumentation,	  the	   U.S.	   might	   be	   facing	   decline	   in	   a	   ‘real’	   and	   in	   an	   ‘ideal’	   sense:	  We	   cannot	   even	   purchase	  
anything	  without	   the	   label	   ‘China’	   on	   it.	   I	   was	   offended	   July	   4	   when	   I	   took	   out	   of	  my	   pocket	   an	  
American	  flag,	  and	  on	  it	   it	  said	   ‘Made	  in	  China’.	  That	   is	  an	  outrage.	  We	  need	  to	  stop	  trading	  with	  
these	  guys	  (P125:69).	  And	  referring	  to	  the	  ‘moral	  authority	  of	  the	  U.S.	  it	  is	  claimed	  that:	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Today	  China's	  economic	  power	  makes	  United	  States	  lectures	  about	  human	  rights	  imprudent.	  Within	  
a	  decade,	  it	  will	  make	  them	  irrelevant.	  Within	  two	  decades,	  it	  will	  make	  them	  laughable.	  By	  then	  the	  
Chinese	  may	  threaten	  to	  withhold	  MFN	  status	  from	  the	  United	  States	  unless	  we	  do	  more	  to	  improve	  
living	  conditions	  in	  Detroit,	  Harlem,	  and	  South	  Central	  Los	  Angeles	  (P160:4).	  	  	  And	  the	  U.S.	  itself	  is	  seen	  as	  contributing	  to	  this	  development:	  We	  are,	  in	  fact,	  empowering	  a	  super	  
dragon	  that	  is	  powerful	  enough	  some	  day	  to	  eat	  our	  assets	  (P176:37),	  while	  it	   is	  claimed	  that	  […]	  
China	  is	  on	  record,	  according	  to	  the	  Pentagon,	  as	  referring	  to	  Uncle	  Sam	  as	  imperialist	  and,	  quote-­‐
unquote,	   “the	   enemy”	   (P200:13).	   Hence,	   China	   is	   explicitly	   articulated	   as	   an	   external	   threat:	  A	  
couple	  of	  things	  that	  I	  believe	  to	  be	  the	  most	  significant	  threats	  this	  Nation	  faces;	  one	  is	  an	  external	  
threat,	  and	  that	  threat	  is	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (P201:1).	  	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   argument	   on	   the	   U.S.	   ‘contributing’	   to	   its	   own	   decline,	   this	   is	   also	  linked	   to	   articulating	   the	   threat	   of	   the	   buildup	   of	   the	   Chinese	   military	   with	   ‘American	   trade	  dollars’:	  How	  many	  American	  jobs	  does	  this	  trade	  imbalance	  destroy,	  Mr.	  Speaker?	  And	  how	  much	  
military	  weaponry	  does	  it	  buy	  for	  the	  rogue	  dictatorship	  in	  China?	  (P145:2).	  This	  argument	  is	  also	  brought	  forward	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  debates	  on	  MFN:	  By	  granting	  MFN,	  we	  are	  granting	  China	  
a	   built-­‐in	   trade	   surplus	   with	   which	   China	   is	   embarking	   on	   a	   massive	   and	   dangerous	   military	  
buildup	  which	  could	  someday	  threaten	  the	  lives	  of	  United	  States	  soldiers	  (P145:2),	  as	  it	   is	  claimed	  that	  the	  Communist	  Chinese	  have	  used	  their	  $80	  billion	  that	  they	  have	  in	  annual	  trade	  surplus	  with	  
the	  United	  States	  to	  modernize	  their	  military	  […]	  They	  use	  that	  $80	  billion	  to	  buy	  technology	  to	  kill	  
Americans	   (P138:5).	   In	   consequence:	  We	  have	  essentially	  been	  arming	  and	  equipping	  our	  worst	  
potential	  enemy	  and	  financing	  our	  own	  destruction	  (P202:3).	  	  	  
Criticisms	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  –	  appeasement	  towards	  China?	  	  In	   line	  with	   the	   intensified	   criticisms	   of	   putting	   (commercial)	   interests	   first,	   those	   arguing	   for	  engagement	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   are	   likened	   to	   policies	   of	   appeasement	  before	   WWII	   (P213:12)354,	   which	   is	   a	   strong	   internal	   intensification	   or	   part	   of	   the	   chains	   of	  equivalence,	   as	   –	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   the	   view	   of	   China	   as	   ‘excluded	   other’	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  ultimate	  negation	  of	  U.S.	  liberal	  identity	  –	  	  it	  aims	  at	  articulating	  the	  proponents	  of	  engagement	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  354	  In	  the	  context	  of	  U.S.	  policies	  towards	  Japan,	  Samuel	  Huntington	  draws	  this	  kind	  of	  parallel	  by	  arguing	  that	  Japan	  was	  waging	   an	   economic	   cold	  war	   against	   the	   U.S.,	   and	   that	   “in	   the	   1930s	   Chamberlain	   and	   Daladier	   did	   not	   take	  seriously	   what	   Hitler	   said	   in	   Mein	   Kampf.	   […]	   Americans	   would	   do	   well	   to	   take	   […]	   seriously	   both	   Japanese	  declarations	  of	  their	  goal	  of	  achieving	  dominance	  and	  the	  strategy	  they	  are	  pursuing	  to	  achieve	  that	  goal”	  (Huntington	  1993,	  76).	  	  On	  the	  appeasement	  metaphor	  see	  also	  Hoenicke	  Moore	  (2015,	  142).	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in	   line	   with	   missing	   attempts	   at	   preventing	   the	   rise	   of	   Adolf	   Hitler	   in	   Europe:	   […]	   I	   am	   not	  
suggesting	  that	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  in	  the	  1994	  version	  of	  the	  genocidal	  Nazi	  Germany.	  
But	  […]	  [t]he	  world	  should	  not	  be	  silent	  in	  1994	  as	  it	  was	  in	  1933	  (P146:52).	  And	  arguing	  explicitly	  against	  the	  thought	  that	  free	  trade	  would	  lead	  to	  political	  liberalization:	  	  	  
Do	   I	  believe	   that	  business	   is	  necessarily	  going	   to	  change	   them?	   […]	   I	  am	  not	  a	  mercantile	  
Republican	   Cato	   libertarian	   […]355	  I	   have	   been	   to	   the	   Holocaust	   Museum	   and	   I	   saw	   the	  
people	  that	  made	  the	  same	  argument	  with	  Nazi	  Germany	  in	  1933	  and	  1935	  and	  1937.	  Do	  a	  
little	  more	  business	  and	  maybe	  it	  will	  change	  them	  (P126:12).	  	  	  The	   exemplary	   argument	   related	   to	   appeasement	   is	   usually	   put	   as	   follows	   (for	   this	   reason,	  quoted	  at	  full	  length	  from	  statements	  in	  the	  years	  2000	  and	  2001):	  	  
I	  mentioned	  at	  the	  outset	  Winston	  Churchill,	  who	  took	  his	  stand	  against	  his	  country's	  Prime	  Minister	  
Neville	   Chamberlain	   who	   had	   visited	   with	   Adolf	   Hitler	   in	   Munich,	   then	   returning	   to	   London	  
proclaiming	  there	  would	  be	  ``peace	  in	  our	  time''	  and	  that	  Britain	  need	  not	  fear	  Nazi	  Germany.	  There	  
was	  that	  one	  man	  who	  stood	  up	  and	  said	  no,	  Winston	  Churchill,	  who	  was	  to	  lead	  the	  free	  world	  into	  
combat	   in	   one	   of	   the	  worst	   tyrannies	   history	   has	   ever	   known.	  We	  must	   not	   repeat	   the	  mistake	   of	  
Britain's	  Prime	  Minister	  seven	  decades	  ago	  (P136:50).	  We	  are	  doing	  exactly	  what	  happened	  prior	  to	  
World	  War	  II	   […]	  They	  gave	  more	  commerce	  to	  Germany,	  while	  Hitler	  built	  up	  his	  military	  […]	  We	  
are	  doing	  the	  same	  thing	  with	  China	   (P137:71).	  Trade	  does	  not	  bring	   freedom	  […]	  Trade	  does	  not	  
bring	   peace.	   Before	   World	   War	   II,	   the	   largest	   trading	   relationship	   in	   the	   world	   was	   not	   Nazi	  
Germany’s	  with	  England.	  Did	  that	  stop	  totalitarianism’s	  rise?	  (P137:127).	  […]	  this	  reminds	  me	  of	  the	  
time	  when	  Winston	  Churchill	  used	  to	  rise	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  threat	  of	  Nazi	  
Germany.	  They	  did	  not	  listen	  to	  Winston	  Churchill;	  and	  frankly,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  the	  country	  is	  listening	  
today	   (P138:20).	  […]	  I	  read	  nowhere	  in	  history	  that	  if	  we	  treat	  the	  Nazis	  or	  the	  Japanese	  militarists	  
as	  anything	  but	  dictatorships	  and	  threats	  where	  it	  turns	  out	  beneficial	  to	  the	  democratic	  countries	  of	  
the	  world.	  I	  do	  not	  read	  where	  trade	  with	  dictatorships	  has	  lead	  to	  peace	  (P138:53).	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  criticizing	  the	  faith	  in	  any	  pacifying,	  democratizing	  or	  liberalizing	  effects	  of	  trade,	  the	  alleged	  strive	  for	  profits	  is	  also	  condemned	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘profits	  for	  every	  sake’:	  There	  is	  money	  
to	  be	  made	  by	  buying	  cheap	  in	  China	  and	  selling	  dear	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  Well,	   let	  us	  test	  the	  
theory	  of	   the	  modern	  day	  Chamberlains	   that	  rely	  on	   the	  accommodating	  rather	   than	  confronting	  
China	   (P201:2).	  And	  again	   it	   is	  argued	   that	  we	  will	  be	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  the	  American	  people,	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and	   we	   will	   be	   on	   the	   wrong	   side	   of	   history,	   and	   we	   […]	   will	   have	   the	   same	   feelings	   that	  
Chamberlain	  had	  when	  he	  returned	  from	  Nazi	  Germany	  and	  said,	  “We	  have	  peace	  in	  our	  times,	  go	  
home	  and	  get	  a	  good	  sleep,”	  and	  then	  the	  bombs	  began	  (P195:20).	  The	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  is	  also	  criticized	  more	  generally,	  by	  contrasting	  its	  goals	  of	  liberalizing	  China	  with	  what	  is	  articulated	  as	  ‘reality’	  of	  China:	  	  	  
We	  have	  been	   told	   that	   if	  we	  engage	  with	  China,	   that	  we	  will	   liberalize	  China.	  We	  will	  make	   them	  
more	  like	  us.	  They	  will	  become	  more	  Democratic	  […]	  It	  has	  gone	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  We	  have	  been	  
dealing	  with	  gangsters,	  and	  right	  now	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  putting	  gangsters	   into	  the	  chamber	  of	  
commerce	  (P195:6).	  	  	  As	  with	   Japan,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   time	  has	  already	  proven	   the	   ‘engagement	   theory’	   to	  be	  wrong:	  
Wake	  up,	  America	  […]	  How	  much	  proof	  do	  we	  need	  that	  the	  so-­‐called	  engagement	  theory	  is	  a	  total	  
failure?	   […]	  The	  mainland	  of	  China	   is	  controlled	  by	  a	  rigid,	  Stalinistic	  Communist	  party	   (P202:1).	  
Today,	  many	  are	  told	  that	  the	  communist	  Chinese	  regime	  will	  one	  day	  change.	  We’ve	  heard	  this	  for	  
19	  years	  (P218:1).	  	  	  While	   the	   red	   line	   of	   the	   intensifications	   towards	   China	   is	   also	   directed	   internally	   against	   the	  proponents	   of	   the	   LTH-­‐perspective,	   as	   the	   following	   subchapter	   shows,	   the	   main	   line	   of	   the	  mitigations	  in	  turn	  endorses	  this	  view	  as	  ultimately	  preserving	  U.S.	  identity	  –	  that	  is	  articulated	  as	  accommodating	  and	  inclusive	  –	  through	  eventually	  changing	  China.	  	  
7.4.	  Mitigations	  towards	  China	  –	  China	  is	  not	  the	  enemy	  
	  	  The	  mitigations	  are	  first	  and	  foremost	  articulated	  for	  or	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  hence	  calling	  for	  engagement	  and	  emphasizing	  the	  U.S.’	  inclusive	  role	   and	   ‘mission’	   in	   it.	   In	   terms	   of	   aiming	   at	   dissolving	   the	   antagonisms,	   the	  mitigations	   are	  mostly	  coupled	  with	  self-­‐criticism,	  calling	  for	  a	  fair	  treatment	  of	  China	  with	  reference	  to	  history,	  and	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐U.S.	  relationship.	  Generally	  those	  voices	  arguing	  for	  or	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  criticize	  the	  linkage	  between	  human	  rights	  and	  trade	  policy	  in	  terms	  of	  revoking	  MFN	  to	  improve	  human	  rights	  as	  counter	  productive:	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Some	  Members	   in	   Congress	   have	   pointed	   accusing	   fingers	   at	   China,	   criticizing	   her	   for	   the	   lack	   of	  
individual	  freedoms	  and	  democracy	  that	  we	  in	  the	  West	  take	  as	  God-­‐given	  rights.	  Some	  have	  moved	  
for	   economic	   punishment	   of	   China	   for	   alleged	   human	   rights	   shortfalls	   by	   withdrawing	   her	   most-­‐
favored-­‐nation	  [MFN]	  trading	  status.	  I	  join	  those	  Members	  of	  Congress	  that	  question	  the	  wisdom	  of	  a	  
China	  policy	  linking	  trade	  with	  human	  rights.	  Restricting	  trade	  and	  access	  to	  the	  United	  States	  will	  
not	   promote-­‐-­‐but	   instead,	   undercut-­‐-­‐efforts	   supporting	   democracy	   in	   China.	   It	   is	   of	   paramount	  
importance	  that	  China's	  awe-­‐inspiring	  progress	  toward	  a	  free	  market	  economy	  be	  supported	  by	  the	  
United	  States.	  History	  has	  proven	   time	  and	   time	  again	   that	   economic	   success	   is	  a	  precursor	   to	   the	  
growth	  of	  democratic	  reform,	  political	  pluralism	  and	  protection	  of	   individual	  rights.	   […]They	  know	  
that	   free	   trade	   fosters	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   superhighway	   of	   information,	   ideas	   and	   communication-­‐-­‐
whereby	  western	  values	  shall	  inevitably	  replace	  Communist	  ideology	  (P113:3f.,	  in	  1994).	  	  	  The	  necessary	   connection,	  or	   inevitability	  of	   economic	   liberalization	   leading	   to	  political	  one	  as	  well,	  is	  frequently	  articulated	  over	  the	  whole	  time	  frame,	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  the	  ‘theory’	  and	  argument:	  […]	  the	  best	  way	  to	  promote	  progress	  is	  to	  stay	  engaged,	  to	  encourage	  China’s	  economic	  
reform	   and	   integration	   into	   the	   world	   economy.	   History	   has	   shown	   that	   economic	   freedom	  
inevitably	  leads	  to	  personal	  freedom	   (P114:8,	   in	  1994).	   It	   is	  maintained	  that	   […]	  business	  plays	  a	  
positive	  role	  in	  exposing	  the	  Chinese	  people	  to	  ideas	  and	  skills	  necessary	  to	  succeed	  in	  a	  free	  market.	  
Prosperity	  and	  expanded	  contact	  with	  American	  citizens	   is	   the	  best	  way	  to	  nurture	   the	  growth	  of	  
democracy	   in	   China	   (P146:23,	   in	   1994).	   Trade	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   promotion	   of	   U.S.	   values	   in	  statements	   like:	   […]	   trade	   between	   our	   countries	   does	   more	   than	   enrich	   business	   […]	   they	   are	  
exposed	  to	  our	  political	  ideas	  and	  our	  democratic	  values	  […]	  The	  link	  between	  economic	  reform	  and	  
democratic	   progress	   is	   not	   an	   illusory	   one	   (P157:1,	   in	   1994).	   Furthermore,	   it	   is	   claimed	   that	  
economic	  success	  fires	  the	  engine	  of	  reform	  that	  inevitably	  leads	  to	  greater	  political	   liberalization	  
and	  improved	  human	  rights	  (P158:2,	  in	  1994),	  and	  trade	  is	  called	  a	  facilitator	  of	  ‘ideas’:	  Let’s	  keep	  
the	   lines	   of	   free	   ideas	   open	   through	   trade	   (P125:75,	   in	   1995).	   It	   is	   our	   belief	   that	   in	   a	  world	   in	  
which	   they	   are	   free	   to	   trade	   is	   a	   world	   in	   which	   they	   can	   find	   greater	   freedom,	   greater	   peace,	  
greater	  prosperity	   (P126:3,	   in	   1995).	   And	   in	   this	   context	   China’s	   progress	   is	   also	   linked	   to	   the	  spread	   of	   ‘U.S.	   consumer	   culture’:	   Twelve	   years	   ago,	   the	   images	   we	   saw	   from	   China	   were	   of	  
students	   standing	   in	   front	   of	   tanks.	   Now	   the	   images	   we	   see	   on	   our	   TV	   screens	   are	   of	   students	  
standing	  in	  front	  of	  Internet	  cafes	  and	  McDonalds	  (P200:7,	  in	  2001).	  	  In	   line	   with	   this	   accommodating	   argumentation	   it	   is	   maintained	   that	   the	   U.S.	   should	  further	  engage	  China	  and	  act	  as	  a	  guide	   for	   its	  development.	  This	   line	  of	  understanding	  would	  also	   preserve	   U.S.	   (inclusive	   and	   accommodating)	   identity,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	  history	  and	  American	  exceptionalism,	  beyond	  the	  Sino-­‐U.S.	  relationship:	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Rather	  than	  continue	  to	  hold	  China	  hostage	  to	  threats	  of	  isolation,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  strive	  to	  
form	   a	   closer	   relationship	   based	   upon	   mutual	   respect	   and	   mutual	   benefit.	   Forging	   stronger,	  
comprehensive	  ties	  between	  the	  West	  and	  China	  is	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  world	  community,	  and	  
is	   the	  most	  effective	  way	   to	  promote	  democracy	  and	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	   in	  China	  (P113:5;	  P145:4).	  	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  act	  as	  facilitator	  of	  China’s	  liberalization:	  	  	  
We	  need	  to	  develop	  a	  long-­‐term	  vision	  of	  what	  our	  relationship	  should	  be	  […]	  it	  has	  to	  be	  rooted	  in	  a	  
goal	   of	   being	   a	   friend,	   of	   helping	   China	   transform	   itself	   into	   a	   full-­‐fledged	   modern,	   free	   market	  
economy	   […]	   the	  U.S.	   has	   to	   stay	   engaged	   in	   China	   […]	  We	   should	   have	   an	   expanding	   commercial	  
relationship	  (P114:7).	  	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  in	  order	  to	  foster	  the	  perspective	  of	  engagement,	  the	  mitigations	  are	  sometimes	  articulated	  in	  an	  intensified	  way,	  as	  in:	  China	  is	  not	  the	  enemy.	  Instead	  of	  threatening	  Beijing	  with	  
the	  trade	  equivalent	  of	  a	  nuclear	  strike,	  we	  should	  be	  promoting	  measures	  to	  build	  confidence	  into	  
the	  relationship	  as	  well	  as	  throughout	  the	  region	  (P152:1,	  the	  ‘nuclear	  strike’	  referring	  to	  revoking	  MFN).	   And,	   in	   a	   more	   balanced	   way:	   The	   United	   States	  must	   develop	   a	   policy	   that	   encourages	  
China	   to	   be	   a	   friend	   and	   a	   valued	   trading	   partner,	   rather	   than	   an	   adversary	   isolated	   by	  
comprehensive	  economic	  sanctions	  (P176:3).	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  China	  and	  its	  future	  is	  at	  times	  also	  articulated	  as	  ‘dependent’	  on	  the	  U.S.,	  so	  as	  to	  once	  more	  maintain	  or	  preserve	  U.S.	   identity	  as	  guide	  and	  role	  model:	  A	  rising	  China	  need	  
not	   threaten	   United	   States	   interests.	   In	   fact,	   China	   cannot	   achieve	   the	   economic	   growth,	  
international	   respect,	   and	   regional	   stability	   it	   seeks	   without	   a	   workable	   relationship	   with	   the	  
United	  States	  […]	  (P182:1).	  Furthermore,	  in	  this	  view	  the	  U.S.	  should	  face	  the	  situation	  and	  make	  the	  best	  out	  of	  it:	  China	  is	  emerging	  as	  a	  great	  power.	  We	  could	  not	  halt	  that	  evolution	  if	  we	  wanted	  
to.	  But	  we	  can	  and	  should	  try	  to	  shape	  the	  kind	  of	  power	  China	  will	  become	  (P188:1).	  In	  this	  sense	  granting	   China	   MFN/PNTR	   is	   also	   articulated	   as	   ‘business	   as	   usual’:	   Granting	   China	   normal	  
trading	   status	   –	   as	   we	   have	   done	   for	   17	   years	   –	   is	   a	   natural	   consequence	   of	   our	   policy	   of	  
engagement.	  It	  is	  the	  routine	  way	  nations	  conduct	  trade	  (P188:3).	  	  In	  line	  with	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  the	  global	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  policies	  towards	  China	  is	  emphasized:	  	  	  
This	   is	  about	  America	  in	  the	  next	  century.	  As	  I	  believe	  the	  last	  century	  was	  about	  the	  United	  States	  
and	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  and	   the	  military	   powers	   that	   existed	   then,	   the	  Cold	  War,	   this	   new	   century	   is	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about	  trade	  and	  about	  our	  relationship	  with	  China,	  leading	  the	  world	  toward	  human	  rights	  through	  
openness	  and	  engagement	  (P137:56).	  	  	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   global	   importance	   of	   the	   U.S.-­‐Chinese	   relationship	   and	   the	   constructive	  potential	   of	   the	   U.S.	   role	   in	   it	   are	   underlined:	   If	   we	   alienate	   China	   today,	   we	   will	   regret	   it	   for	  
decades	   (P156:1).	   […]	   we	   can	   never	   turn	   China	   into	   a	   model	   of	   constitutional	   democracy	   if	   we	  
isolate	  them	  economically	  (P194:3),	  as	  it	  is	  maintained	  that:	  	  	  
The	  world’s	  most	  important	  relationship	  over	  the	  next	  20	  years	  will	  be	  between	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  
world’s	   greatest	   military	   power	   and	   economic	   power,	   and	   China,	   the	   world’s	   oldest	   culture	   and	  
largest	   population	   […]	  The	   forces	   of	   change	  and	   reform	  will	  win	  out	   sooner	   if	   the	  United	   States	   is	  
engaged	  […]	  (P195:14).	  	  	  Even	  the	  controversial	  case	  of	  Unocal	  (see	  chapter	  6.2)	  is	  from	  this	  perspective	  seen	  in	  line	  with	  the	  economic-­‐interdependence-­‐leading-­‐to-­‐peace-­‐argument:	  	  	  
Some	  have	  raised	  concerns	  that	  the	  purchase	  of	  Unocal	  by	  a	  company	  tied	  to	  the	  Chinese	  government	  
will	  create	  security	  problems	   for	   the	  United	  States.	   I	  would	  argue	  the	  opposite.	   International	   trade	  
and	  economic	  activity	  tends	  to	  diminish,	  not	  increase	  tensions	  between	  countries.	  Increased	  economic	  
relationships	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	   China	   make	   military	   conflict	   much	   less	   likely,	   as	   it	  
becomes	  in	  neither	  country's	  interest	  to	  allow	  tensions	  to	  get	  out	  of	  hand	  (P207:17).	  	  	  
	  Self-­‐criticisms	  	  	  From	  the	  accommodating	  perspective,	   the	  own	  policies	  are	  criticized	   in	  several	   respects,	  again	  aimed	   at	   dissolving	   the	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   by	   emphasizing	   or	   articulating	   the	   chains	   of	  difference	  and	  an	  engaging	  approach	  towards	  China:	  	  	  
We	  need	  to	  encourage,	  cajole	  and	  coax	  the	  Chinese	   forward,	   instead	  of	  blustering,	   threatening	  and	  
shouting	  at	  them	  in	  public.	  Above	  all,	  we	  need	  to	  treat	  our	  Chinese	  friends	  –	  as	  we	  would	  any	  friends	  
–	  with	  dignity	  and	  fairness	   […]	  They	  fear	  the	  U.S.	  will	  not	  be	  a	  constant	  and	  consistent	  partner	  and	  
will	  not	  treat	  them	  with	  the	  dignity	  and	  fairness	  they	  feel	  they	  deserve	  (P114:7).	  	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  trade,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  MFN-­‐debates	  in	  1994,	  it	  is	  argued	   that	   […]	  we	  are	   the	   only	   country	   in	   the	  world	   considering	   trade	   sanctions	   […]	   Could	   you	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imagine	   if	  another	  country	   sought	   to	   impose	   trade	   sanctions	  on	  us	  because	  of	  our	  nagging	  crime	  
problem?	  At	  the	  very	  last,	  we	  would	  laugh	  at	  them	  (P145:36).	  	  There	  are	  also	  attempts	  at	  differentiating	  and	  not	  seeing	  China	  as	  ‘monolithic	  communist	  regime’:	   By	   threatening	   China	   overtly,	   we	   play	   into	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   hard-­‐liners	   there	   […]	   No	  
Chinese	   leader	   could	   survive	   for	   a	   day	   if	   they	   were	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   kowtowing	   to	   United	   States	  
pressure	   (P146:6).	   In	   this	   respect,	   MFN	   is	   elevated	   to	   the	   status	   of	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   Sino-­‐American	  relations:	  This	  administration	  and	  this	  Congress	  should	  stop	  playing	  games	  with	  MFN.	  It	  
is	  time	  to	  stop	  toying	  with	  the	  linchpin	  of	  Sino-­‐American	  relations	  and	  make	  decisions	  that	  advance	  
the	  national	  interest	  of	  the	  American	  people	  as	  well	  as	  the	  humanitarian	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  Chinese	  
people	   (P146:17).	   And	   it	   is	   even	   self	   critically	   maintained	   that	   during	   the	   debate	   on	   the	  MFN	  
status	  of	  China,	  statements	  were	  made	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  House	  which	  claimed	  that	  although	  China	  
needs	  us,	  we	  don’t	  need	  them	  […]	  In	  this	  globally	  interdependent	  economy,	  it	  is	  highly	  likely	  we	  will	  
need	  China	  in	  the	  future	  (P146:74).	  	  Also,	  while	   not	   ‘bashing’	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history-­‐perspective	   and	   its	   proponents	   –	  what	  is	  also	  happening	  through	  the	  intensified	  perspective	  –	  some	  voices	  try	  to	  articulate	  it	  in	  a	  more	  moderate,	  contextual,	  and	  again	  also	  universal	  way,	  in	  terms	  of	  trying	  to	  accommodate	  for	  the	  differential	  positions	  on	  it:	  	  	  
Of	  course,	  United	  States	  policy	  on	  MFN	  will	  not	  determine	  China’s	  future,	  despite	  continuing	  illusions	  
of	   American	   omnipotence	   in	   some	   quarters	   […]	   (P147:1).	   We	   cannot	   let	   the	   extraordinarily	  
important	  and	  complex	  Chinese-­‐American	  relationship	  be	  dominated	  by	  a	  single	  factor	  […]	  [it]	  needs	  
to	   be	   placed	   on	   the	   balance	   beam,	   not	   just	   our	   commercial	   interests,	   important	   as	   those	   are	   […]	  (P147:2).	  […]	  why	  [is	  it]	  that	  most	  Asians	  take	  China’s	  side	  in	  the	  matter	  of	  human	  rights.	  Perhaps	  it	  
is	   in	   part	   because	   other	   nations	   resent	   American	   preaching	   […]	   the	   United	   States	   should	   not	   be	  
moralizing	   about	   human	   rights	   in	   other	   nations	   […]	   (P147:2).	   Revoking	   MFN-­‐status	   will	   only	   be	  
counterproductive	  to	  America’s	   long-­‐term	  interests	  and	  push	  China	  back	   into	  a	  pre-­‐Boxer	  rebellion	  
resistance	   to	  Western	   interaction	   (P148:2).	  MFN	   only	   guarantees	   China	   the	   same	   low	   tariff	   rates	  
that	  are	  enjoyed	  by	  nearly	  every	  nation	  in	  the	  world,	  including	  Iran	  and	  Iraq	  –	  not	  exactly	  the	  world’s	  
best	  practitioners	  of	  human	  rights	   (P148:2).	   […]	  let	  us	  understand	  that	  we	  can	  promote	  our	  values	  
and	   ideals	   without	   destroying	   our	   interests	   or	   disrespecting	   a	   proud	   culture	   […]	   the	   Chinese-­‐
American	  relationship	  will	  be	  the	  most	  crucial	  bilateral	  relationship	  the	  United	  States	  will	  have	  in	  the	  
21st	  century.	  We	  should	  now	  construct	  a	  policy	  worthy	  of	  both	  nations	  (P157:4).	  	  	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   intentions	  of	   those	  aiming	  at	   revoking	  MFN	   if	   there	  was	  no	   improvement	  on	  human	  rights	  are	  articulated	  as	  well-­‐meaning,	  although	  ‘outdated’:	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[…]	   the	  policy	  of	   linkage,	  although	  rooted	   in	   the	  best	  of	   intentions,	   is	  outdated	  and	   ill-­‐suited	  to	   the	  
promotion	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  our	  interests	  in	  China.	  It	  is	  […]	  principally	  a	  policy	  shaped	  by	  the	  image	  of	  
tanks	  and	  protesters	  in	  Tiananmen	  Square	  […]	  It	  ignores	  […]	  our	  need	  to	  have	  a	  viable	  relationship	  
with	  China	  in	  the	  post-­‐cold	  war	  period,	  not	  a	  cold	  war	  relationship	  (P149:5;	  P152:1).	  	  	  An	  ‘updated’	  policy	  in	  this	  view	  would	  consist	  of	  treating	  China	  as	  a	  partner:	  But	  treating	  China	  as	  
an	  equal	  partner	  of	  the	  world	  will	  give	  us	  much	  greater	  moral	  authority	  to	  improve	  their	  domestic	  
human	   rights	   that	   the	   current	   policy	   being	   proposed	   by	   many	   people	   throughout	   this	   country	  (P152:2).	   Which	   finally	   in	   this	   line	   of	   reasoning	   comes	   back	   to	   promoting	   the	   economic	  relationship:	  	  
If	   the	  United	   States	  wants	   political	   reform,	   it	   should	   promote	   Chinese	   economic	   reform.	   Economic	  
growth	  does	  not	  necessarily	  nourish	  individual	  rights	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  but	  at	  least	  it	  creates	  the	  
economic	  conditions	  in	  which	  progress	  toward	  political	  change	  might	  be	  possible.	  Reconsideration	  of	  
the	   MFN	   issue	   to	   avoid	   injuring	   U.S.	   exports	   to	   China	   oversimplifies	   these	   issues	   and	   also	   invites	  
moralizers	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  issue	  is	  one	  of	  greed	  against	  morality	  (P153:2).	  	  	  
Against	  U.S.	  hypocrisy	  and	  bashing	  China	  	  	  At	  times,	  as	  with	  Japan,	  the	  U.S.	  is	  also	  generally	  criticized	  for	  being	  hypocritical	  in	  upholding	  its	  identity	  as	  a	  free	  trader	  and	  promoter	  of	  human	  rights:	  We	  want,	  today,	  to	  target	  China,	  because	  
we	  want	  to	  have	  eight	  bills	  bashing	  China	  so	  we	  can	  achieve	  some	  political	  mileage	  out	  of	  it	  (P175:9,	  in	   1997),	   as	   on	   the	   other	   hand:	   It	   is	   just	   hard	   to	   see	   what	   our	   history	   of	   doing	   business	   with	  
dictators	  in	  South	  America	  and	  around	  the	  world,	  including	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union,	  than	  how	  with	  
China	  we	   find	   this	   new	   high	  moral	   standard	   in	   dealing	  with	   them	   (P176:45).	   Examples	   are	   for	  instance	   the	   debates	   on	   prohibiting	   the	   imports	   of	   Chinese	   goods	   produced	   in	   Laogais	   (see	  chapter	  7.3):	  	  
	  
I	  love	  all	  this	  discussion	  about	  slave	  labor,	  and	  I	  hope	  some	  of	  the	  people	  are	  listening	  to	  this.	  I	  do	  not	  
know	  of	  any	  State	  in	  the	  United	  States	  that	  does	  not	  have	  slave	  labor.	  All	  of	  us	  in	  our	  States	  produce	  
goods	  that	  are	  sold	  in	  commerce	  that	  we	  Americans	  consume	  that	  were	  made	  by	  slave	  labor	  in	  our	  
own	  prisons.	  It	  has	  been	  against	  the	  law	  so	  long	  as	  I	  can	  remember	  to	  import	  any	  of	  those	  kinds	  of	  




In	  this	  sense	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  […]	  this	  body	  and	  this	  Nation	  must	  also	  carry	  the	  same	  standards	  of	  
human	   rights	   for	   other	   nations	   with	   which	   we	   deal	   […]	   As	   a	   nation	   we	   can	   demand	   no	   less	   of	  
ourselves	   and	   with	   those	   who	   are	   members	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   with	   whom	   we	   conduct	  
business	   (P172:2).	   Another	   self-­‐criticism	   concerning	   hypocrisy	   addresses	   the	   context	   of	   the	  return	   of	   Hong	   Kong	   to	   China	   in	   1997:	  While	   China	   is	   undergoing	   accusations	   of	   undermining	  
democracy	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  I	  find	  it	  ironic	  that	  no	  one	  said	  anything	  during	  the	  150	  years	  of	  British	  
Imperial	  rule	  when	  democracy	  never	  existed	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  (P190:2ff.;	  P193:8).	  	  Furthermore,	   these	   mitigating	   voices	   call	   for	   viewing	   China’s	   development	   in	   its	  timeframe	  and	  historical	  context,	  and	  for	  not	  forgetting	  about	  U.S.-­‐history	  and	  the	  development	  of	  individual	  liberties:	  So	  when	  people	  are	  upset	  over	  a	  10-­‐	  or	  20-­‐	  or	  a	  30-­‐year	  period	  of	  the	  failure	  
of	   China	   to	   take	   a	   foreign	   concept,	   the	   inherent	   worth	   of	   the	   individual,	   and	   fundamentally	  
restructure	   their	   society,	   I	   would	   say,	   take	   a	   look	   at	   our	   history	   (P137:51,	   referring	   to	   the	  subsequent	  introduction	  of	  the	  end	  of	  slavery,	  women’s	  voting	  rights	  and	  ‘one	  man,	  one	  vote’).	  In	  this	   sense	   it	   is	   emphasized	   that	   […]	   in	  the	  land	  of	  the	  blind,	  the	  one-­‐eyed	  man	  is	  king.	  It	  does	  no	  
good	  to	  evaluate	  progress	  toward	  freedom	  in	  China	  by	  comparing	  it	  with	  the	  United	  States	  or	  any	  
other	  democracy.	  Instead,	  a	  historical	  perspective	  is	  needed	   (P179:2).	  Also,	   as	   it	  was	  argued	   that	  ‘Japan	   is	  not	  Grenada’,	  now	   it	   is	  maintained	   that	   […]	  China	  is	  not	  Cuba	  […]	  It	   is	  senseless	  for	  the	  
United	  States	  to	  treat	  the	  Asian	  colossus	  as	  anything	  else	  than	  a	  superpower	  likely	  to	  emerge	  later	  
this	  century	  (P195:38).	  	  As	  for	  the	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  in	  economic	  policies	  like	  currency	  and	  trade	  issues,	  its	   interference	   is	   also	   criticized	   as	   hypocritical,	   as	   in	   the	   earlier	   arguments	   about	   the	   Plaza	  Accords	  of	   1985	  with	   Japan:	   […]	  there	  are	  often	  unforeseen	  consequences	  when	  we	  demand	  that	  
foreign	   governments	   manipulate	   their	   currency	   to	   U.S.	   ‘advantage’	   (P142:35).	   And	   also	   in	   the	  debates	   on	  Unocal	   criticisms	   are	   voiced	   that	   remind	   of	   the	   debate	   on	   the	  U.S.	   executive	   being	  accused	  of	  ‘managing’	  the	  Japanese	  auto	  industry:	  	  	  
[…]	  Why	  is	  the	  federal	  government	  involving	  itself	  in	  the	  sale	  of	  a	  private	  American	  company?	  Do	  we	  
really	  believe	  we	  have	  this	  kind	  of	  authority?	  I	  would	  remind	  my	  colleagues	  that	  Unocal	  is	  a	  private	  
company	  with	  shareholders	  and	  a	  board	  of	  directors.	  That	  is	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  company-­‐-­‐not	  the	  
U.S.	  Congress.	  Do	  we	  really	  believe	  that	  we	  should	  be	  the	  real	  board	  of	  governors	  of	  Unocal?	  If	  in	  the	  
United	   States	  a	  private	   company	  does	  not	  have	   the	   right	   to	  be	   sold	  on	   the	   free	  market,	   should	  we	  
really	   be	   criticizing	   the	   lack	   of	   freedom	   in	   China?	   […]	   	   I	   do	   not	   support	   subsidizing	   the	   Chinese	  
government's	  economic	  activities.	  But	   I	  also	  do	  not	  support	   the	  U.S.	  Congress	   involving	   itself	   in	   the	  
private	   economic	   transactions	   of	   U.S.	   companies	   […]we	   should	   not	   criticize	   a	   lack	   of	   economic	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freedom	  in	  China	  when	  Congress,	  as	  evidenced	   in	  this	   legislation,	  attempts	  to	  restrict	   the	  economic	  
freedom	  of	  American	  citizens	  (P207:16f.).	  	  In	  terms	  of	  China’s	  WTO	  membership	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  China	  had	  to	  shoulder	  a	  big	  burden:	  Since	  
China	   joined	   the	   WTO,	   do	   my	   colleagues	   know	   how	   many	   laws	   we	   had	   to	   change	   and	   pass	   in	  
America	  to	  go	  there?	  Zero.	  Do	  my	  colleagues	  know	  how	  many	  laws	  China	  had	  to	  change,	  laws	  and	  
regulations,	  to	  enter	  the	  WTO?	  1,100.	  To	  get	  into	  the	  WTO,	  to	  join	  countries	  of	  fair	  trade,	  China	  had	  
to	  change	  1,100	   laws	   (P209:23).	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   own	   (lacking)	   policies	   are	   criticized:	   […]	  the	  
best	  that	  my	  friends	  in	  the	  majority	  can	  do	  is	  bash	  China	  a	  little	  bit	  and	  not	  do	  anything	  about	  our	  
oil	  addiction,	  not	  do	  anything	  about	  diversifying	  our	  sources	  of	  energy,	  not	  do	  anything	  about	  the	  
reckless	  fiscal	  policy	  that	  puts	  us	  at	  their	  mercy	  (P207:8).	  
	  
Balanced	  views	  on	  engagement	  and	  containment	  	  
	  The	  balanced	  voices	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  criticize	  the	  confrontational	  perspective,	  while	  again	  trying	  to	   articulate	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   as	   accommodating	   both	   aspects	   of	   U.S.	   identity:	   its	  commitment	  to	  values	  as	  well	  as	  to	  economic	  principles	  and	  goals.	  	  In	  line	  with	  this	  view,	  treating	  China	  in	  an	  antagonizing	  way	  is	  articulated	  as	  potentially	  self-­‐fulfilling	   prophecy:	   If	   we	   treat	   China	   as	   an	   enemy,	   it	   will	   react	   as	   an	   enemy	   (P167:49).	  
Americans	   are	   vigorously	   advocating	   the	   ‘China	   threat	   theory’	   (P168:1).	   In	   this	   context	   ‘the	  Americans’	   in	   general	   become	   the	   target	   of	   criticism:	   Americans	   have	   a	   tendency	   to	   tell	   China	  
what	  to	  do	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  understand	  what	  China	  needs	  and	  how	  it	  is	  to	  China’s	  interests	  to	  do	  
some	  things.	  And	  it	  is	  time	  we	  learned	  that	  this	  will	  not	  be	  the	  most	  effective	  method	  of	  encouraging	  
change	   in	   China	   (P170:3).	   In	   this	   sense	   it	   is	   argued	   against	   an	   ‘either	   or’	   policy,	   but	   for	   an	  inclusive	   one:	   The	   choice	   is	   often	   framed,	   simplistically,	   as	   one	   between	   two	  mutually	   exclusive	  
paths:	   containment	   or	   engagement.	   But	   the	   relationship	   between	   these	   two	   great	   nations	   is	   far	  
more	   complicated	   than	   that	   (P182:1).	   And	   as	   earlier	   with	   Japan,	   now	   with	   China	   the	   ‘China-­‐bashing’	  is	  explicitly	  critiqued:	  	  	  
Our	  two	  countries,	  despite	  our	  differences,	  share	  many	  interests	  […]	  This	  is	  the	  most	  difficult	  bilateral	  
relationship	  to	  understand	  and	  to	  manage,	  even	   in	  the	  best	  of	   times	  –	  and	  right	  now	  we	  are	   in	  the	  
midst	  of	  another	  China-­‐bashing	  season	  […]	  politicians	  and	  pundits	  have	  identified	  China	  as	  America’s	  
next	  adversary.	  They	  have	  concluded	  that	  China	  will	  never	  play	  by	  the	  rules,	  and	  it	  is	  useless	  to	  try	  to	  
integrate	  it	  into	  global	  political,	  security,	  and	  economic	  regimes.	  But	  is	  China	  a	  threat?	  […]	  China	  is	  
simply	  not	  in	  our	  league	  (P188:2).	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The	   latter	   statement	   is	   in	   line	  with	   attempts	   at	   preserving	   the	  U.S.	   superior	   standing,	   but	   also	  with	  a	  critique	  of	  an	  exclusive	  and	  antagonizing	  view	  on	  China	  (‘that	  will	  never	  play	  by	  the	  rules’),	  as:	  history	  is	  littered	  with	  the	  uninformed	  and	  ineffective	  responses	  of	  an	  established	  power	  towards	  
a	  rising	  power,	  and	  vice	  versa	  (P193:3).	  Should	  the	  United	  States	  look	  upon	  China	  as	  an	  enemy	  and	  
therefore	  seek	  to	  weaken	  or	  divide	   it,	   thereby	  creating	  a	  reality	  we	  seek	  to	  avoid?	  […]	  To	  move	   in	  
this	  direction	  would	  become	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy	   (P193:9).	  As	  with	   Japan,	   the	  balanced	  view	  criticizes	   the	   at	   times	   heated	   character	   of	   the	   debates:	   […]	   It	   is	   not	   to	   turn	  a	   trade	   vote	   into	  a	  
referendum	  on	  how	  we	  feel	  about	  China	   (P136:6).	  Once	  more	  as	  with	  Japan,	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  the	  picture	   is	   more	   complex:	   […]	   I	   think	   one	   of	   the	   things	   that	   really	   frustrates	   us	   is	   that	   we	   are	  
accustomed	  to	  quick	  fixes.	  In	  our	  political	  culture,	  we	  expect	  to	  be	  able	  to	  fix	  problems	  overnight	  […]	  
Throughout	  its	  4000	  year	  history,	  China	  has	  resisted	  outside	  influences.	  As	  much	  as	  we	  would	  like	  to,	  
we	  can’t	   change	  China	  overnight	   (P136:6).	   In	   this	   sense	   it	   is	   conceded	   that	  Chinese	   society	  will	  
never	   look	   just	   like	  American	  society	   (P136:11).	   Furthermore,	   like	  with	   Japan	   there	   are	   calls	   to	  stick	  to	  ‘economic	  issues’:	  	  	  
Many	  of	   these	   are	   good	   faith	   amendments.	  Many	   of	   these	   I	   agree	  with	   totally	   in	   principle.	   I	   voted	  
against	  every	  single	  one	  of	  them	  […]	  Because,	  frankly,	  they	  don’t	  belong	  on	  this	  bill.	  This	  is	  a	  trade	  bill.	  
Let	   us	   address	   the	   issues	   of	   human	   rights,	   workers,	   environmental	   concerns,	   and	   proliferation	   by	  
China	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  approaches	  (P136:31).	  	  	  And	   in	   this	   sense	   the	   view	   is	   put	   forward	   that	   […]	  we	   should	   not	   let	   our	   frustration	  with	   the	  
benefits	   of	   engagement	   lead	   us	   to	   undermine	   that	   policy	   by	   delaying	   or	   denying	   PNTR	   in	   a	   vain	  
quest	   to	   change	   China	   overnight.	   PNTR	   is	   not	   a	   “reward”	   as	   the	   opponents	   of	   PNTR	   suggest	  (P136:64,	  97,	  116).	  And	  again	  as	  with	   Japan	   it	   is	  argued	   that	  most	  of	  this	  is	  tinted	  with	  “protect	  
America”	  as	  the	  argument.	  America	  does	  not	  really	  need	  protection.	  America	  needs	  the	  opening	  of	  
markets	  around	  the	  world	  […]	  (P209:18).	  	  Like	  the	  voices	  criticizing	  drawing	  parallels	  with	  Japan	  in	  WWII,	  the	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  likening	  China	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  are	  also	  explicitly	  critiqued:	  China	  does	  not	  pose	  the	  threat	  to	  
us	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  (P149:10),	  and	  the	  U.S.	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  update	  their	  assessments	  of	  China	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War:	  	  	  
[…]	  the	  linkage	  of	  MFN	  and	  human	  rights	  […]	  embodies	  two	  aspects	  of	  what	  I	  call	  ‘old-­‐think’,	  both	  of	  
which	  should	  join	  the	  cold	  war	  on	  the	  dust	  heap	  of	  history	  […]	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  is	  gone,	  and	  Jackson-­‐
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Vanik356	  should	  have	  gone	  with	  it	  […]	  George	  Bush	  has	  left	  office,	  and	  the	  human	  rights-­‐MFN	  linkage	  
should	  have	  left	  with	  him	  (P150:2,	  in	  1994).	  	  	  In	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  the	  past	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  should	  not	  be	  invoked	  in	  the	  relationship	  with	   China:	   There	   are	   those	   in	   this	   country	   […]	   who	   are	   unconsciously	   pushing	   Sino-­‐American	  
relations	   into	   an	   adversarial	   position,	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   days	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   (P170:4).	   And	  more	  explicitly:	  	  	  
The	  argument	  du	  jour	  is	  that	  China	  is	  our	  next	  Cold	  War	  adversary,	  and	  since	  the	  United	  States	  used	  
trade	   sanctions	   against	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   in	   a	   successful	   Cold	   War	   campaign,	   the	   same	   strategy	  
should	  be	  applied	  to	  China.	  This	  line	  of	  thinking	  is	  fundamentally	  flawed	  […]	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  earned	  
the	  Ronald	  Reagan	  label,	   ‘evil	  empire’.	  Chinese	  foreign	  policy,	  even	  with	  its	  distressing	  proliferation	  
policies,	   is	   in	  a	  different	   league	  altogether	   (P179:3,	   in	   1997).	  China	   is	  not	  what	   the	   former	  Soviet	  
Union	  was	  –	  an	  ideological	  and	  military	  expansionist	  threat	  to	  democracies	  around	  the	  world,	  that	  
was	  also	  closed	  to	  external	  trade	  (P190:2).	  	  	  In	   a	   sense,	  what	   in	   the	   arguments	   against	   confrontation	  with	   Japan	   is	   the	  metaphor	   of	   ‘Smoot	  Hawley’	  is	  the	  Cold	  War	  with	  China:	  The	  last	  thing	  we	  need	  is	  a	  new	  Cold	  War	  with	  China	  (P136:59;	  P204:8).	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  […]	  I	  do	  not	  think	  the	  United	  States	  should	  be	  the	  
Big	  Brother	  of	  the	  world.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  we	  have	  all	  the	  answers	  in	  the	  world,	  as	  well	  (P138:20).	  And	  again	  it	  is	  emphasized	  that	  also	  for	  ‘technological’	  reasons,	  China	  is	  not	  the	  Soviet	  Union:	  	  	  
Those	  voices	   in	   the	  U.S.	  now	  calling	   for	  America	   to	   “stick	   it	   to	  China”	  and	  to	   “teach	   them	  a	   lesson”	  
sound	  as	  silly	  as	   the	  China	  People’s	  Daily	  hectoring	  America	   […]	  A	  cold	  war	  with	  Russia,	  a	  country	  
that	  made	  tractors	  that	  were	  more	  valuable	  as	  scrap	  steel	  and	  TV’s	   that	  blew	  up	  when	  you	  turned	  
them	   on,	   was	   one	   thing.	   A	   cold	   war	   with	   one-­‐fifth	   of	   humanity,	   with	   an	   economy	   growing	   at	   10	  
percent	  a	  year,	  is	  another	  (P203:2,	  in	  2001).	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  with	  the	  historical	  arguments	  about	  Japan,	  also	  with	  China	  there	  are	  voices	  that	  criticize	  the	  ‘use’	  of	  history	  in	  these	  debates:	  	  	  
Americans	  also	  need	   to	  use	   the	  right	  historical	  model.	  China	   is	  not	  bent	  on	   international	  conquest.	  
Beijing	  may	  wish	  to	  dominate	  the	  region,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  raise	  the	  Chinese	  flag	  over	  Jakarta	  or	  
Tokyo.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  like	  Germany	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  World	  War	  I,	  yearning	  for	  greater	  importance	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  356	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  Jackson	  Vanick	  amendment	  of	  the	  Trade	  Act	  of	  1974,	  see	  explanation	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis.	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testing	  to	  see	  what	  it	  can	  get	  away	  with.	  There	  could	  be	  a	  major	  war	  with	  China,	  but	  if	  so,	  it	  will	  be	  
because	   of	   ignorance	   and	   miscalculation	   –	   in	   substantial	   part	   on	   the	   western	   rim	   of	   the	   Pacific	  (P123:4).	   […]	  a	  new	  cold	  war,	  this	  time	  with	  the	  PRC,	  is	  not	  entirely	  impossible	  –	  but	  it	  is	  avoidable	  
[…]	  we	   […]	   should	  not	  aim	   to	   isolate	  or	  demonize	  China	  or	   foster	   the	  attitude	   in	   this	   country	   that	  
China	  is	  an	  enemy.	  They	  are	  not	  an	  enemy	  (P125:5,	  in	  1995).	  	  	  Finally,	   some	   ‘farsighted’	  mitigating	   voices	   also	   draw	  parallels	   between	   the	   reactions	   to	   Japan	  and	   to	   China:	   As	   with	   Japan,	   America	   must	   exhibit	   greater	   diplomatic	   sensitivity	   and	   learn	   to	  
negotiate	   with	   China	   as	   equal	   (P113:4).	   And	   in	   this	   context	   the	   broader	   picture	   of	   U.S.	   trade	  policies	   as	   not	   being	   isolated	   from	   global	   developments	   is	   emphasized:	   Currently,	   there	   is	   a	  
sizable	   trade	   imbalance	   between	   our	   nations.	   To	   some	   extent	   that	   reflects	   unfair	   trade	   practices	  
that	  we	  have	  to	  resolve,	  just	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  Japan	  and	  other	  nations.	  But	  to	  a	  very	  large	  extent	  
this	   is	   more	   a	   reflection	   of	   shifting	   trends	   among	   East	   Asian	   exporters	   since	   our	   overall	   trade	  
picture	  with	  the	  region	  has	  not	  dramatically	  changed	  (P146:71,	  in	  1994).	  In	  this	  sense,	  arguments	  are	   brought	   forward	   against	  misinterpreting	   the	   trade	   deficit:	  Much	  has	   been	  heard	  about	   our	  
bilateral	  trade	  deficit	  with	  China.	  It	  is	  the	  same	  argument	  that	  protectionists	  use	  as	  a	  reason	  not	  to	  
trade	  with	  Japan	  […]	  In	  the	  1980’s,	  Japan	  was	  the	  culprit.	  Today	  it	  is	  China	  […]	  (P176:60,	  in	  1997).	  Once	  more	  referring	  to	  the	  Plaza	  Accords,	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  	  	  
[…]	  we	   should	   be	   careful	  what	  we	   demand	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Government.	   Take	   the	   demand	   that	   the	  
Government	  “revalue”	  its	  currency,	  for	  example	  “[…]	  the	  Japanese	  yen’s	  value	  has	  more	  than	  tripled	  
since	   the	   breakdown	   of	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	   system,	   yet	   Japan’s	   trade	   surplus	   remains	   huge.	   Why	  
should	  the	  unpegging	  of	  the	  Chinese	  yuan	  have	  a	  greater	  impact?”	  (P142:34,	  in	  2005).	  	  	  And	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  debates	  on	  Unocal	  it	  is	  pointed	  out	  that:	  	  	  
I	  remember	  when	  Japanese	  investors	  moved	  to	  buy	  Rockefeller	  Center,	  at	  inflated	  prices,	  and	  many	  in	  
this	  body	  wanted	  to	  stop	  that	  deal.	  We	  did	  not.	  And	  only	  a	  few	  years	  later	  the	  Japanese	  sold	  it	  back	  to	  
the	  United	  States	  for	  pennies	  on	  the	  dollar.	  Bottom	  line,	  we	  made	  a	  killing.	  And	  Americans	  are	  better	  
off	   for	   letting	   the	   market	   work.	   If	   we	   take	   this	   action,	   China	   could	   rightfully	   cancel	   American	  
investments	   in	   China	   now	   totaling	   $25	   billion.	   Wal-­‐Mart,	   Conoco,	   Motorola,	   United	   Air	   Lines	   all	  





Summary	  of	  intensifications	  and	  mitigations	  towards	  China	  
	  The	   most	   outspoken	   intensifications	   towards	   China	   designate	   it	   as	   ‘evil’,	   and	   liken	   it	   to	   Nazi	  Germany	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  However,	  and	   in	  contrast	   to	   the	   intensifications	   towards	   Japan,	  with	   China	   they	   once	   more	   stay	   on	   the	   level	   of	   criticisms	   towards	   the	   ‘regime’,	   and	   not	   the	  ‘Chinese	   people’,	   who	   are	   often	   articulated	   as	   victims	   of	   their	   ‘evil’	   government	   themselves.	  Maintaining	  this	  line,	  the	  intensified	  internal	  criticisms	  articulate	  a	  non-­‐confrontational	  approach	  towards	   ‘the	   Communist	   regime’	   as	   ‘appeasement’	   like	   towards	   Germany	   before	   WWII.	   Also,	  China’s	  rise	  is	  not	  only	  compared	  to	  Nazi-­‐Germany,	  but	  also	  to	  pre-­‐WWII-­‐Japan.	  These	  parallels	  are	  also	  brought	   forward	   to	  criticize	   the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history,	   in	   terms	  of	  arguing	   that	  well	  developed	  economies	  do	  not	  necessarily	  evolve	   towards	  political	   liberalization.	  The	   intensified	  self-­‐criticisms	   are	   also	   directed	   against	   the	   executive	   and	   its	   ‘naïve’	   and	   not	   ‘tough’	   enough	  policies,	  but	  also	  against	  ‘bad	  habits’,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  with	  Japan,	  when	  for	  instance	  referring	  to	  the	  trade	  deficit	  and	  the	  tendency	  to	  live	  and	  spend	  beyond	  ones	  means.	  In	  the	  MFN-­‐debates	  those	  arguing	  for	  granting	  them	  to	  China	  are	  accused	  of	  putting	  business	   interests	  over	  values,	  while	  this	  is	  also	  articulated	  as	  standing	  against	  U.S.	  identity	  as	  promoter	  of	  human	  rights.	  The	  mitigations	  towards	  China	  in	  turn	  are	  mostly	  put	  forward	  from	  the	  accommodating	  and	  inclusive	  perspective	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  that	  in	  this	  perspective	  can	  account	  for	  both,	  values	  and	  interests,	  through	  calling	  for	  (economic)	  engagement	  through	  the	  U.S.	  as	  guiding	  example,	  which	  is	  in	  line	  with	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history.	  In	  terms	  of	  aiming	  at	  dissolving	  the	  antagonisms,	  the	  mitigations	  are	  mostly	  coupled	  with	  self-­‐criticism	  of	  U.S.	  hypocrisy,	  calling	  for	  a	  fair	  treatment	  of	  China	  with	  reference	  to	  history,	  and	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	   of	   the	   Sino-­‐U.S.	   relationship	   for	   the	   future	   of	   both	   countries.	   From	   this	   view	   the	  parallels	   to	   Nazi	   Germany	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   are	   also	   dismissed.	   Generally,	   those	   voices	  arguing	   for	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   criticize	   the	   linkage	   between	   human	   rights	   and	   trade	  policy	   in	  terms	  of	  revoking	  MFN	  to	   improve	  human	  rights	  as	  counter	  productive.	  Finally,	  a	   few	  statements	  even	  do	  draw	  parallels	   to	   the	   case	  of	   Japan,	   in	   the	   sense	  of	   taking	   the	  way	   the	  U.S.	  dealt	  with	  it	  as	  a	  negative	  example	  of	  scapegoating	  and	  distracting	  from	  domestic	  problems.	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Summary	  of	  Intensifications	  and	  Mitigations	  
	  The	   intensifications	  towards	   Japan	  and	  China	  are	  aimed	  at	  endorsing	  the	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  and	  the	  hegemonization	  of	  the	  discourses	  towards	  ‘excluding’	  Japan	  and	  China	  through	  the	  filling	  of	   the	   (absent)	   empty	   signifiers	   ‘fairness’	   and	   ‘liberty’.	   The	   intensifications	   also	   reflect	   the	  confrontational	   and	   exclusive	   features	   of	   U.S.	   liberal	   identity	   in	   terms	   of	   American	  exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history.	   The	   mitigations	   in	   turn	   aim	   at	   dissolving	  antagonisms	   with	   Japan	   and	   China	   through	   articulating	   chains	   of	   difference	   in	   line	   with	   the	  accommodating	   and	   inclusive	   features	   of	   American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	  history.	  Both	  categories	  flesh	  out	  internal	  differences	  that	  are	  dealt	  with	  in	  different	  ways,	  aimed	  at	  preserving	  or	  rearticulating	  U.S.	  identity,	  which	  in	  turn	  influences	  the	  way	  Japan	  and	  China	  are	  articulated	  as	  ‘different’,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  difference	  is	  turned	  into	  otherness.	  	  	  
Japan	  	  The	  intensified	  expressions	  towards	  Japan	  are	  dominated	  by	  war	  rhetoric,	  WWII	  allegories	  and	  articulations	   of	   Japan	   as	   enemy	   who	   attacked	   the	   U.S.	   at	   Pearl	   Harbor.	   The	   language	   used	   to	  describe	   the	   economic	   relationship	   constantly	   articulates	   it	   as	   ‘war’	   with	   the	   U.S.	   ‘on	   the	  defensive’	   (in	   line	  with	   the	   inferior	   perspective,	   see	   chapter	   6.1)	   and	   ‘losing’,	  while	   having	   no	  other	  choice	   than	   to	  defend	   itself	  against	   Japan’s	   ‘aggression’.	  Even	   though	  Pearl	  Harbor	   is	  not	  always	  directly	  mentioned,	  speaking	  of	  WWII	  in	  relation	  to	  Japan	  becomes	  the	  central	  intensified	  metaphor	  standing	  for	  ‘unfairness’	  (and	  the	  lack	  of	  fairness)	  because	  of	  Japan’s	  policies,	  as	  WWII	  invokes	   the	   memory	   of	   Pearl	   Harbor	   as	   unfair	   surprise	   attack	   by	   Japan	   on	   the	   U.S..	   The	   aim	  behind	   these	   intensifications	   is	   to	   articulate	   Japan	   as	   excluded	   other	   that	   has	   to	   be	   dealt	  with	  more	  assertively	  than	  it	  has	  been	  the	  case.	  In	  this	  view,	  because	  of	  Japan’s	  ‘(cultural)	  difference’,	  there	  has	  and	  will	  be	  no	  change	  of	  and	  in	  Japan	  towards	  a	  ‘truly’	  liberal	  economy	  (and	  society).	  In	  this	   sense,	   according	   to	   one	   line	   of	   argumentation,	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  U.S.	  might	   have	   to	  compromise	   its	   identity	  as	  a	   free	   trader	   can	  also	  be	  attributed	   to	   the	  unfairness	  of	   Japan,	   as	   it	  leaves	   the	  U.S.	   no	   other	   choice	   to	   react	   (see	   chapter	   6.1).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   also	   enables	   a	  rearticulation	  of	  U.S.	  identity	  by	  those	  voices	  that	  criticize	  ‘free	  trade’	  as	  a	  principle	  and	  call	  for	  a	  more	  ‘security’	  and	  ‘world	  order’	  oriented	  focus.	  In	  this	  context,	  even	  the	  relationship	  to	  Japan	  as	  an	  ally	   is	  put	   in	  question,	  and	   intensified	   internal	  criticisms/chains	  of	  equivalence	  are	  directed	  against	  the	  executive.	  The	  intensified	  self-­‐criticisms	  calling	  for	  questioning	  the	  own	  policies	  and	  not	  blaming	  (only)	  Japan	  also	  maintain	  the	  war	  rhetoric,	  i.e.	  when	  invoking	  Smoot	  Hawley	  and	  its	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consequences	  in	  the	  1930s	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  arguing	  that	  renewed	  U.S.	  protectionism	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  future	  WWIII.	  	   	  	   The	   mitigations	   towards	   Japan	   are	   mostly	   expressed	   via	   chains	   of	   difference	   against	  antagonizing	   Japan	   through	   making	   it	   a	   scapegoat	   for	   domestic	   problems	   or	   own	   failed	   or	  insufficient	  policies.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  U.S.	  is	  also	  criticized	  for	  being	  hypocritical	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘not	  practicing	  what	  it	  preaches’	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  free	  trade.	  Japan	  is	  articulated	  as	  an	  important	  ally	  also	   because	   of	   its	   similarities	  with	   the	  U.S.	   as	   ‘democracy’	   and	   ‘free	  world	   economy’,	   and	   the	  WWII	  allegations	  are	  condemned	  as	  short	  sighted	  and	  narrow	  minded.	  Congress	  is	  at	  times	  also	  scrutinized	   for	   the	   heated	   debates,	   hence	   for	   being	   ‘overly	   emotional’	   and	   not	   ‘rational’	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  losing	  the	  sight	  on	  ‘the	  economic	  issues’	  themselves.	  However,	  balanced	  statements	  also	  aim	  at	  explaining	  the	  emotions	  in	  a	  non-­‐intensified	  way,	  in	  terms	  of	  them	  being	  the	  result	  of	  the	  long	  period	  of	  unresolved	  trade	  issues	  with	  Japan,	  hence	  emphasizing	  also	  Japan’s	  part	  in	  them.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  war	  rhetoric	  is	  not	  completely	  absent	  from	  the	  mitigating	  statements	  either,	  as	  becomes	  clear	  from	  statements	  in	  terms	  of	  warning	  of	  taking	  action	  ‘in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  battle’,	  or	  against	  ‘firing	  the	  first	  salvo’.	  	  	  
China	  	  The	   intensified	   criticisms	   of	   China	   are	   also	   voiced	   as	  WWII	   allegories,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   likening	  China	  and	  what	  is	  articulated	  as	  its	  ‘evilness’	  –	  that	  is	  not	  brought	  up	  as	  such	  as	  a	  ‘characteristic’	  of	   Japan	   –	   to	   the	   Nazis,	   as	   metaphor	   for	   ‘illiberalism’	   or	   ultimate	   signifier	   of	   the	   lack	   of	  ‘liberalism’.	  The	  Nazi	  parallel	  being	  quite	  frequent,	  however,	  China	  is	  also	  compared	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	   In	   this	  context,	   in	   the	  most	   intensified	  statements	   that	  are	  aimed	  at	  articulating	  China	  –	  always	   on	   the	   level	   of	   the	   ‘regime’,	   not	   its	   people	   –	   as	   the	   ‘excluded	   other’	   that	   has	   to	   be	  confronted,	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	   and	   its	   proponents	   are	   articulated	   as	  appeasement/appeasers	   like	  Britain	   and	   France	   before	  WWII,	   and	   the	   ‘theory’	   is	   criticized	   for	  never	   having	   worked.	   In	   this	   sense,	   internal	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   are	   drawn	   between	   its	  proponents	  and	  opponents.	  However,	  the	  more	  general	  intensifications	  im-­‐	  or	  explicitly	  relating	  to	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  are	  more	  obviously	  than	  with	  Japan	  coupled	  with	  a	  self-­‐criticism,	  as	  it	  comes	  to	  contrasting	  the	  U.S.’	   ‘well	  meaning’	  –	  but	  ultimately	  also	  naïve	  –	  policies	  with	  the	  evilness	  of	  ‘communist	  China’.	  As	  with	  Japan,	  China	  is	  articulated	  as	  unfair	  and	  the	  U.S.	  as	  on	  the	  ‘short	   end’,	   and	   in	   self-­‐criticisms	   as	  not	   adequately	  dealing	  with	   this,	   thus	   calling	   for	   action	   to	  prevent	  U.S.	  decline.	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Table	  4:	  Summary	  of	  Intensifications	  and	  Mitigations	  
	  	   chains	  of	  difference	   chains	  of	  equivalence	  
Japan	   criticizing	  war	  rhetoric:	  U.S.	  must	  overcome	  WWII	  images	  of	  Japan;	  treat	  Japan	  like	  an	  ally	  and	  potentially	  share	  power	  with	  it	  
war	  rhetoric:	  Japan	  =	  old	  WWII	  enemy,	  Pearl	  Harbor	  and	  (economic)	  ‘war’	  stand	  for	  Japan’s	  unfairness;	  Japan	  is	  ‘different’,	  no	  change	  in	  sight	  
China	   criticizing	  Nazi	  and	  Soviet	  Union	  parallels;	  China	  not	  an	  enemy,	  but	  potential	  partner;	  China	  should	  not	  be	  made	  a	  scapegoat	  like	  Japan	  earlier;	  LTH-­‐perspective	  
China	  =	  ‘evil’,	  like	  (or	  worse	  than)	  Nazis	  (illiberal)	  and	  Soviet	  Union	  (communist);	  building	  up	  its	  military;	  no	  liberalization	  in	  sight;	  contra	  MFN	  
U.S.	  vs.	  Japan	   protectionism	  does	  not	  help;	  U.S.	  should	  not	  be	  hypocritical	  and	  practice	  what	  it	  preaches;	  balanced	  view	  on	  emotions	  	  
U.S.	  =	  victim,	  on	  defensive,	  attacked	  by	  Japan,	  needs	  to	  retaliate,	  Japan	  leaving	  no	  other	  choice	  	  BUT	  ALSO:	  intensified	  self-­‐criticisms:	  ‘the	  enemy	  is	  us’	  à	  war	  rhetoric	  maintained	  in	  mitigations	  
U.S.	  vs.	  China	   against	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophesy;	  LTH	  can	  accommodate	  values	  and	  interests	  and	  ultimately	  change	  China;	  	  	  
	  U.S.	  =	  victim,	  needs	  to	  take	  up	  challenge;	  LTH	  (and	  MFN)	  articulated	  as	  appeasement	  	  BUT	  ALSO:	  intensified	  self-­‐criticisms:	  commercial	  interests	  over	  values	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SUMMARY	  OF	  THE	  ANALYSIS	  
	  The	   analysis	   of	   the	   congressional	   debates	   on	   Japan,	   China	   and	   economic	   policies	   first	   and	  foremost	   shows	   that	   the	   economic	   rise	   of	   Japan	   and	   China	   challenges	   universalism	   as	   central	  feature	   of	   U.S.	   identity.	   This	   feature	   is	   crystallized	   in	   American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  –	  standing	  for	  the	  universality	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  American	  (political)	  values	  (within	  both	  strands	  of	  exceptionalism,	  see	  chapter	  1.3),	  with	  the	  necessary	  interrelatedness	  of	  economic	  and	  political	   liberty	  being	  part	  of	   them,	  and	  for	  a	   ‘universal	  path’	   towards	  the	   liberal	  capitalist	   political	   model	   with	   the	   U.S.	   as	   its	   ‘owner,	   ‘operator’	   and	   ‘promoter’	  –	   and	   finds	   its	  expression	   in	   the	   discourses	   on	   ‘free	   trade’	   as	   “synonymous	   with	   U.S.	   foreign	   policy	  internationalism	   and	   the	   ascendancy	   of	   the	   United	   States	   as	   a	   global	   superpower”	  (cf.	   Kunkel	  2003,	  24;	  Kolkmann	  2005,	  43).	  After	  the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War,	   free	  trade	  –	   in	  terms	  of	  bringing	  about	   the	  political	  change	  and	   liberty	  as	  predicted	  by	   the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history	  –	  seemed	  to	  have	  fulfilled	  its	  promises,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  ongoing	  challenge	  of	  its	  principles	  through	  Japan	  in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  revisionists	  and	  ‘hard-­‐liners’,	  that	  however	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  its	  immediate	  ‘dislocation’	  at	  that	  point	  in	  time	  (cf.	  Uriu	  2009,	  253).	  These	  ‘universals’	  of	  ‘free	  trade’	  and	  ‘liberty’	  were	  and	  still	  are	  generally	  articulated	  and	  understood	  as	  universal	  ‘common	  goods’,	  i.e.	  as	  ahistorical	  and	  context	   independent	   societal	   interests	   (cf.	  Wullweber	   2014,	   8).	   In	   other	  words,	   ‘free	   trade’	   as	  principle	  of	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  had	  acquired	  what	  can	  be	  called	  a	  ‘hegemonic	  status’	  (cf.	  i.e.	  Hummel	   2000,	   190;	   Schoppa	   1997,	   70;	   Kunkel	   2003,	   24;	   J.	   Goldstein	   1993,	   247),	   that	   became	  first	   challenged	   through	   the	   ‘Japan	   problem’,	   while	   the	   challenge	   through	   ‘communist	   China’	  more	   obviously	   added	   the	   component	   of	   ‘philosophical	   challenge’	   to	   the	   ‘theory’	   in	   broader	  terms.	  American	  exceptionalism	  played	  and	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  both	  cases,	  as	  broader	  framework	  of	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  but	  also	  as	  being	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  U.S.	  identity,	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  being	  always	  superior,	  in	  general.	  	  As	  laid	  out	  in	  chapter	  two,	  a	  dislocation	  (on	  the	  ontical	   level,	  as	  on	  the	  ontological	   level	  every	  identity	  always	  already	  is	  ‘structurally	  dislocated’)	  manifests	  itself	  when	  the	  self-­‐identity	  –	  always	  incomplete	  but	  in	  constant	  strive	  for	  fullness,	  see	  chapter	  two	  –	  is	  challenged	  or	  blocked	  through	   the	   encounter	  with	   an	   other,	   that	   is	   articulated	   as	   not	   adhering	   or	   responding	   to	   the	  hegemonic	   discourse.	   Here	   it	   is	   again	   important	   to	   remember,	   that	   while	   identity	   is	   always	  differential	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  only	  conceivable	  through	  differentiating	  the	  self	  from	  an	  other,	  the	  other	  not	  necessarily	  needs	  to	  be	  turned	  into	  an	  ‘excluded	  other’	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  antagonist.	  	  My	  analysis	  shows	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan	  and	  China,	  U.S.	  identity	  as	  the	  preeminent	  economic	  (and	  subsequently,	  global)	  power	  is	  challenged	  through	  the	  trade	  deficit	  and	  the	  U.S.	  becoming	  a	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debtor,	  with	  first	  Japan,	  then	  China	  as	  its	  biggest	  creditor.	  This	  dislocates	  U.S.	  identity	  conceived	  of	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  first	  and	  foremost	  for	  following	   reasons,	   that	   differ	   slightly	   in	   both	   cases:	   the	   most	   obvious	   dislocation	   is	   the	  disadvantageous	  standing	  of	   the	  U.S.	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   its	  principal	  economic	  competitor,	  as	   this	   should	  not	  happen	  to	  a	  country	  that	  is	  ‘always	  superior’.	  Hence,	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  question	  ensues,	  what	  the	  economic	  situation	  means	  for	  the	  U.S.	  as	  ‘global	  power’.	  	  Furthermore,	  through	  the	  ‘different’	  form	  of	  organization	  of	  their	  economy	  (and	  society),	  Japan	  and	  China	  challenge	  the	  universalist	  claims	  of	  U.S.	   liberal	   identity.	   In	  both	  cases,	  as	   they	  do	  not	   ‘function’	   (exactly)	  according	   to	   the	  principles	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  capitalism	  as	  held	  up	  by	  the	  U.S.,	  their	  economic	  success	  despite	  of	  their	  deviance	  becomes	  even	  more	  perplexing.	  	  To	  summarize,	  with	  Japan,	  the	  deviance	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  seen	  in	  the	  organization	  or	  ‘planning’	   of	   its	   economic	   policies	   in	   a	   way	   that	   promotes	   and	   guards	   or	   ‘targets’	   certain	  industries	  that	  focus	  on	  exporting,	  while	  allowing	  for	  very	  little	  imports,	  hence	  contradicting	  the	  principles	   of	   free	   trade	   (cf.	   i.e.	   Huntington	   1993,	   73f.)	   and	  market	   capitalism.	   In	   a	   search	   for	  ‘explanations’	  for	  Japan’s	  success	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  ‘deviance’,	  the	  ‘cultural	  difference’	  of	  ‘the	  Japanese’	  and	  their	  society	  became	  a	  point	  of	  focus,	  and	  ultimately,	  from	  the	  confrontational	  and	  exclusive	  point	   of	   view	   (resonating	   with	   the	   revisionist	   view	   on	   Japan),	   the	   major	   reason	   for	   Japan’s	  success	  was	  claimed	  to	  lie	  in	  Japan’s	  ‘unfairness’	  that	  emanates	  out	  of	  its	  ‘difference’.	  With	  China,	  the	   argument	   is	   about	   export	   promotion	   and	   import	   barriers	   (also	   in	   the	   form	   of	   ‘currency	  manipulation’)	   and	   China’s	   alleged	   unfairness	   as	   well.	   But	   what	   adds	   to	   the	   dislocation	   with	  China	   from	   the	   beginning	   on	   is	   its	   missing	   political	   liberalization	   that	   should	   have	   followed	  faster/to	  a	  larger	  extent	  according	  to	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  as	  this	  was	  a	  major	  long-­‐term	  principle	  and	  argument	  of	  the	  proponents	  of	  a	  policy	  of	  engagement	  towards	  China.	  	  However,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   way	   the	   articulated	   challenge	   or	   dislocation	   to	   U.S.	   liberal	  identity	   is	   dealt	   with,	   needs	   not	   necessarily	   to	   be	   predetermined	   by	   either	   American	  exceptionalism	  or	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  as	  leading	  to	  confrontation.	  As	  the	  analysis	  shows,	  these	   ‘frameworks’	   provide	   for	   the	   articulation	   of	   the	   self	   as	   being	   able	   to	   ‘accommodate’	   the	  other	   without	   being	   necessarily	   weakened	   –	   and	   Japan	   and	   China	   as	   ‘different’	   but	   not	  adversarial	  –	  but	  also	  for	  antagonizing	  and	  turning	  them	  into	  hostile	  and	  ‘excluded	  others’.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	   from	   looking	  at	   the	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  and	  difference	   through	   the	  categories	  of	  argumentation	  and	  perspectivation.	  	  In	  the	  discourses	  the	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  (captured	  here	  in	  the	  analysis	  through	  argumentation	  and	  perspectivation,	  while	  being	  sustained	  or	  weakened	  through	  intensification	  and	  mitigation),	  serve	  to	  uphold	  or	  preserve	  the	  self’s	  identity	  through	  articulating	  it	  as	  fundamentally	  different	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from	   the	   external	   other	   that	   in	   this	   sense	   blocks	   the	   self’s	   identity	   (in	   terms	   of	   rendering	   its	  ‘structural	  dislocation’	  visible).	  The	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  shall	  lead	  to	  the	  internal	  differences	  or	  different	  positions	  becoming	  equivalent	   towards	   the	  excluded	  other.	  The	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  are	   formed	  around	   the	  empty	  signifiers	   ‘fair’	   (and	   ‘liberal’)	  with	   Japan	  and	   ‘liberal/democratic’	  (and	   ‘fair’)	  with	  China,	   that	  are	  both	   ‘lacking’,	  and	   in	   the	  discourses	  only	  present	   through	  their	  literal	  absence	  by	  being	  articulated	   first	  and	   foremost	   through	   the	  emphasis	  on	   their	  opposite:	  ‘unfair’	  (i.e.	  mercantilist,	  protectionist,	  intransigent,	  greedy	  etc.)	  Japan	  and	  ‘communist’	  (regime,	  dictatorship,	  brutal,	  cheating,	  unfair	  etc.)	  China.	  With	  Japan,	  the	  ‘illiberalness’	  is	  equally	  present	  through	   its	   literal	   absence,	   also	   articulated	   through	   the	  opposites	  of	   ‘fairness’,	   i.e.	  mercantilist,	  protectionist	   etc.	  With	   China,	   the	   unfairness	   is	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   implicitly	   present	   in	   the	  way	  ‘communist’	  is	  articulated,	  but	  also	  in	  explicit	  attributions	  of	  the	  predication	  itself.	  Cancelling	  out	  the	   internal	   differences	   means	   that	   facing	   the	   unfairness	   (and	   illiberalism)	   of	   Japan	   and	   the	  illiberalism	   (and	   unfairness)	   of	   China,	   any	   internal	   disagreements	   are	  minimized	   to	   an	   extent	  that	   they	  are	  outweighed	  by	  the	  difference	  towards	  the	  other.	  This	  equivalential	  articulation	  of	  U.S.-­‐identity	  formulates	  it	  in	  an	  exclusive	  mode,	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  it:	  the	  U.S.	  is	  fair	  and	  liberal,	  and	  Japan	  and	  China	  are	  not,	  and	  cannot	  be	  or	  become	  so,	  because	  of	  Japan’s	  ‘cultural	  difference’	  and	  China’s	  communism.	  Hence,	  the	  only	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  lack	  –	  once	  more,	  that	  is	  ‘structural’	  on	  an	  ontological	  level,	  but	  manifests	  itself	  through	  dislocations	  on	  the	  ontical	  level	  –	  in	  this	  line	  of	  argumentation	  is	  to	  take	  a	  more	  confrontational	  approach	  towards	  Japan	  and	  China.	  In	  both	  cases,	   in	  general	   the	   intensifications	  (see	  chapter	  seven)	  are	  expressed	  through	  ‘war	  rhetoric’.	  More	  specifically,	   Japan	   is	  articulated	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  WWII	  enemy	  that	  attacked	  the	   U.S.	   at	   Pearl	   Harbor.	   In	   this	   sense,	   WWII	   becomes	   the	   central	   metaphor	   for	   the	   ultimate	  absence	  of	  fairness	  through	  the	  ‘unfairness’	  of	  Japan.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  China,	  it	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘as	  evil’	  or	  worse	  than	  WWII	  Nazi	  Germany	  or	  the	  Cold	  War	  Soviet	  Union.	  These	  articulations	  stand	  for	  the	  ultimate	  absence	  of	  ‘liberty’/’liberalism’	  through	  the	  ‘illiberalism’	  of	  ‘Nazi’	  or	  ‘Communist’	  China.	   Furthermore,	   in	   the	   Nazi	   context	   the	   U.S.	   policies	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history	  approach	  towards	  China	  are	  articulated	  as	  pre-­‐WWII	  ‘appeasement’.	  These	  are	  examples	  aimed	  at	  hegemonizing	  the	  discourse	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  establishing	  Japan	  and	  China	  as	  excluded	  others	  On	   the	   other	   side	   the	   chains	   of	   difference	   (here	   also	   read	   through	   the	   categories	   of	  	  argumentation	  and	  perspectivation,	  as	  well	  as	  mitigation)	  aimed	  at	  preserving	  or	  rearticulating	  U.S.	   identity	   through	   dissolving	   the	   antagonism	   stand	   for	   the	   ‘accommodating’	   or	   inclusive	  features	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  and	  in	  turn	  also	  allow	  for	  self-­‐criticisms	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  (sometimes	  differentiated)	  Congress	  itself.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Japan	  this	  means	  to	  point	  at	  own	  domestic	  problems	  and	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Japan	  actually	  is	  an	  ally,	  as	  well	  as	  
246	  
	  
aiming	  at	  mediating	  between	   the	  black	  and	  white	  view	  of	   ‘fair’/unfair’	   through	  acknowledging	  internal	   economic	   problems,	   but	   also	   restrictive	   economic	   policies	   on	   the	   Japanese	   side.	   The	  emotional	  mode	  of	   articulation	   towards	   Japan,	   that	   is	   not	   present	   to	   this	   extent	  with	  China,	   is	  present	   in	   both	   the	   confrontational	   and	   accommodating	   statements.	   The	   confrontational	   ones	  simply	   express	   ‘anger’	   and	   ‘frustration’	   with	   Japan,	   while	   the	   accommodating	   ones	   aim	   at	  ‘contextualizing’	   the	   expressions	   and	   point	   first	   and	   foremost	   to	   the	   long	   timeframe	   of	   not	   so	  unproblematic	  experiences	  with	   Japan	  and	  trade	  policy.	   In	  other	  words,	  with	   Japan	  the	   ‘lack	  of	  enjoyment’	   (see	   chapter	  6.1)	   is	   greater	   than	  with	  China.	  However,	   in	   some	   cases	   the	   chains	  of	  difference	  towards	  Japan	  are	  at	  the	  same	  time	  articulated	  not	  through	  real	  mitigations,	  but	  they	  become	  internal	  chains	  of	  equivalence	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  executive	  or	  proponents	  of	  ‘free	  trade’,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  them	  being	  held	  responsible	  for	  ‘the	  problem’,	  that	  Japan	  then	  is	  taking	  advantage	  of.	  	  In	  the	   case	   of	   China,	   the	   accommodating	   arguments	   are	  mostly	   voiced	   from	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	  history-­‐perspective,	  in	  terms	  of	  articulating	  it	  as	  an	  inclusive	  and	  universal	  common	  ground	  for	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  ‘values	  versus	  interests’	  debate	  (i.e.	  the	  question	  whether	  MFN	  should	  be	  given	  ‘only’	   for	   economic	   reasons,	   or	  whether	   it	   should	  be	   revoked	   to	   stand	   in	   for	  U.S.	   principles	  on	  human	   rights),	   which	   is	   an	   example	   of	   an	   attempt	   to	   dissolve	   the	   antagonisms	   and	   internal	  chains	   of	   equivalence.	   The	  main	  drive	   behind	   accommodation	   or	   inclusiveness	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history	  however,	  is	  the	  expectation	  for	  China	  to	  ultimately	  change	  and	  evolve	  to	  become	   more	   like	   the	   U.S.,	   hence	   ultimately	   inclusiveness	   falls	   back	   on	   the	   universalist	  aspirations	   or	   understandings	   of	   how	   everything	   and	   everyone	   should	   function	   ‘like	   us’.	  With	  Japan	  in	  turn,	  the	  ‘hope	  for	  change’	  seems	  to	  have	  exhausted	  itself.	  	  	  Finally,	   the	  analysis	  then	  brings	  up	  the	  question	  of	  a	   ‘limit	  of	  accommodation’	  within	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  and	  hence	  a	  ‘limit	  of	  tolerance’	  of	  liberalism,	  as	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  chapter	  1.3,	  in	  broader	  terms.	  It	  seems	  that	  ultimately	  Japan	  and	  China	  have	  to	  be	  articulated	  as	  ‘different’	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  U.S.	   ‘liberal	  identity’,	  which	  at	  the	  same	  time	  however	   contradicts	   universality	   to	   the	   extent	   U.S.	   identity	   is	   articulated	   as	   ‘exclusive’	   in	   this	  context.	  The	  ‘solution’	  might	  be,	  that	  ‘difference’	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  in	  non-­‐antagonistic	  terms	  as	  long	   as	   there	   remains	   a	   prospect	   for	   ultimately	   turning	   that	   difference	   into	   ‘sameness’.	   	   This	  would	  explain	  the	  emotional	  response	  and	  frustration	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan,	  as	  the	  possibilities	  for	  Japan	  –	  that	  originally	  had	  been	  regarded	  as	  less	  different	  than	  it	  then	  apparently	  turned	  out	  to	  be	   –	   finally	   changing	   seemed	   less	   likely	   the	  more	   time	   passed.	  With	   China,	   the	   process	   is	   still	  regarded	  as	  open	  ended.	  However,	  this	  would	  leave	  the	  question	  unanswered,	  of	  what	  ‘the	  end	  of	  hope	  for	  change’	  means	  for	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	  liberal	  theory	  of	  history,	  and	  how	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to	  deal	  with	  it	  in	  this	  ‘framework’.	  It	  might	  constitute	  the	  sort	  of	  crisis	  liberalism/liberal	  identity	  cannot	  accommodate.	  The	  question	  then	  becomes,	  if	  and	  when	  the	  relationship	  with	  China	  might	  possibly	   reach	   this	   point,	   and	   what	   the	   consequences	   for	   U.S.-­‐Chinese	   (economic)	   relations	  would	  be.	  I	  come	  back	  to	  these	  questions	  in	  the	  conclusion.	  	  
Word	  Frequencies357	  
	  As	  laid	  out	  in	  chapter	  3.4,	  the	  word	  frequencies	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  convey	  a	  meaning	  of	  their	  own,	  but	  instead	  have	  to	  be	  read	  as	  ‘only’	  illustrative,	  and	  as	  supplement	  to	  and	  in	  context	  of	  the	  analysis	  (also	  because	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  coding	  software,	  see	  footnote).	  In	  general,	  they	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  findings	  summarized	  in	  this	  chapter,	  which	  is	  why	  they	  are	  only	  briefly	  addressed	  in	  what	  follows.	  	  	  For	   instance,	   in	  the	  case	  of	   Japan	  (table	  five)	  among	  the	  most	   frequent	  expressions	  are	   ‘unfair’,	  ‘war’,	  ‘different’,	  but	  also	  ‘friend(s)’,	  which	  –	  together	  with	  the	  highest	  frequencies	  mostly	  in	  the	  year	   1989	   –	   points	   to	   the	   general	   intensity	   and	   controversial	   nature	   of	   the	   debates,	   as	  exemplified	  in	  the	  FSX-­‐fighter	  plane	  question	  in	  the	  year	  1989	  (see	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis	  and	  the	  analysis	   itself).	  The	  highest	   frequency	  of	   ‘closed’	   in	  the	  years	  1994	  and	  1995	  in	  turn	   is	  likely	   related	   to	   the	   auto-­‐talks	   during	   those	   years	   (see	   introduction	   and	   introduction	   to	   the	  analysis).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table	  5:	  Word	  frequencies	  Japan	  
	  
Japan	   unfair	   different	   creditor	   closed	   war	   scape-­‐
goat	  
ally	   partner	   friend(s)	  
1985	   49	   12	   2	   4	   71	   1	   10	   9	   16	  
1989	   86	   65	   17	   0	   76	   3	   0	   44	   188	  
1994	   50	   55	   1	   19	   73	   3	   1	   6	   45	  
1995	   25	   14	   2	   23	   29	   0	   2	   5	   21	  
1997	   15	   20	   27	   8	   44	   1	   0	   4	   11	  
2000/01	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
2005	   30	   5	   0	   3	   10	   0	   0	   1	   13	  
Total	   255	   171	   49	   58	   303	   8	   13	   69	   294	  	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  U.S.	   in	  relation	  to	  Japan	  (table	  six),	  among	  the	  most	  frequent	  expressions	  are	  ‘deficit’,	  ‘future’,	  ‘leadership’	  and	  ‘decline’,	  with	  the	  highest	  frequencies	  as	  well	  mostly	  in	  the	  year	   1989.	   The	   relatively	   high	   number	   for	   ‘retaliate’	   in	   1985	   likely	   points	   to	   the	   increasing	  congressional	  pressure	  for	  action	  in	  that	  year	  (see	  introduction	  and	  introduction	  to	  the	  analysis).	  	  	  	  








1985	   22	   6	   12	   106	   7	   13	   4	   13	  
1989	   26	   35	   5	   245	   5	   253	   0	   143	  
1994	   13	   33	   6	   106	   4	   85	   0	   70	  
1995	   0	   4	   3	   51	   1	   19	   0	   40	  
1997	   32	   24	   2	   137	   2	   59	   0	   55	  
2000/01	   0	   0	   0	   1	   0	   1	   0	   0	  
2005	   0	   0	   0	   28	   0	   29	   0	   11	  
Total	   93	   102	   28	   674	   19	   459	   4	   332	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With	  China	  (table	  seven),	  among	  the	  most	  frequent	  expressions	  are	  ‘communist’,	  	  ‘war’,	  ‘friend(s)’	  and	   ‘regime’,	  which	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   controversial	   nature	  of	   the	  question	  of	   ‘how	   to	  deal	  with	  China’.	  The	  frequencies	  within	  the	  different	  years	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  give	  a	  picture	  as	  clear	  as	  with	  Japan.	  For	  instance,	  the	  high	  numbers	  for	  ‘unfair’	  and	  ‘friend(s)’358	  in	  the	  year	  2000	  may	  be	  connected	   to	   China	   replacing	   Japan	   as	   largest	   deficit	   trading	   partner	   (see	   introduction	   to	   the	  analysis),	   as	  well	   as	   to	   the	   campaign	   and	  debates	   on	  China’s	  membership	   in	   the	  WTO	  and	   the	  granting	   of	   PNTR.	   In	   general,	   the	   highest	   frequencies	   in	   the	   most	   prominent	   expressions	   on	  China	  seem	  to	  occur	  within	  the	  timeframe	  of	  the	  debates	  on	  MFN/PNTR	  and	  the	  WTO	  between	  1994	  (the	  year	  after	  Clinton	  ‘delinked’	  MFN	  and	  human	  rights)	  and	  China’s	  WTO	  membership	  in	  2001	  (see	  overview	  on	  China).	  	  
	  
Table	  7:	  Word	  frequencies	  China	  
	  
China	   unfair	   com-­‐
munist	  
creditor	   regime	   war	   scapegoat	   super-­‐
power	  
partner	   friend	  
(s)	  
1994	   36	   48	   0	   37	   0	   0	   1	   27	   17	  
1995	   18	   34	   0	   26	   81	   0	   3	   4	   22	  
1997	   13	   97	   3	   32	   52	   2	   5	   22	   35	  
2000	   43	   79	   0	   41	   39	   0	   5	   20	   54	  
2001	   5	   137	   0	   58	   34	   0	   3	   11	   48	  
2005	   38	   23	   0	   3	   16	   0	   7	   5	   28	  
2008	   1	   10	   0	   3	   12	   0	   1	   0	   2	  
Total	   154	   428	   3	   200	   234	   2	   25	   89	   206	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  expressions	  on	  the	  U.S.	  in	  relation	  to	  China,	  among	  the	  most	  frequent	  ones	  are	  ‘leader(ship)’,	  ‘deficit’,	  ‘future’	  and	  ‘liberal’,	  with	  the	  highest	  frequencies	  of	  those	  terms	  again	  centering	   around	   the	   years	   2000/2001,	   hence	   possibly	   also	   in	   connection	   to	   the	   largest	   trade	  deficit	  and	  the	  PNTR/WTO	  debates.	  Additionally,	  the	  high	  frequency	  of	  ‘leadership’	  concurs	  with	  the	  prevalent	  open	  question	  on	  the	  future	  of	  U.S.-­‐China	  relations.	  	  












1994	   0	   4	   14	   73	   6	   42	   1	   101	  
1995	   0	   6	   1	   25	   8	   49	   3	   64	  
1997	   1	   3	   0	   61	   0	   33	   5	   38	  
2000	   0	   4	   3	   122	   7	   128	   5	   114	  
2001	   0	   1	   0	   22	   14	   22	   3	   32	  
2005	   0	   1	   1	   35	   0	   53	   7	   23	  
2008	   0	   3	   0	   15	   0	   2	   1	   1	  
Total	   1	   22	   19	   353	   35	   329	   25	   373	  




	   “The	  story	  to	  be	  told	  has	  to	  begin	  somewhere.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  begin	  at	  the	  beginning,	  if	  only	  because	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  point	  of	  origin	  depends	  on	  where	  we	  think	  we	  are	  now.	  Thus,	  a	  practical	  convenience	  is	  always	  liable	  to	  turn	  into	  a	  powerful	  myth	  of	  origin.	  Other	  points	  of	  departure	  are	  closed	  off”	  (R.B.J.	  Walker	  1989,	  26).	  
	  
	  	  The	   first	   inspiration	   for	   the	   topic	   of	   this	   dissertation	   came	   from	   the	   observation,	   that	   the	  U.S.	  discourse	  on	  ‘the	  Rise	  of	  China’	  since	  the	  1990s	  bears	  significant	  resemblances	  to	  the	  discourse	  on	  ‘the	  Rise	  of	  Japan’	  since	  the	  1970s/1980s,359	  while	  these	  parallels	  are	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  neither	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  academic,	  nor	  the	  political	  proponents	  concerning	  themselves	  with	  U.S.-­‐China	  relations.	  	  As	   surprising	   as	   this	   still	   is	   from	   my	   perspective,	   the	   answers	   I	   got	   from	   most	   U.S.	  scholars	  in	  conversations	  on	  the	  topic	  and	  the	  question	  of	  neglect,	  were	  basically	  twofold:	  either,	  the	   parallels	   were	   acknowledged	   in	   terms	   of	   conceding	   that	   the	   U.S.	   has	   always	   had	   ‘a	   short	  memory’,	  has	   ‘consciously	  forgotten	  about	  Japan’	  or	   ‘was	  in	  constant	  need	  of	  enemies’	  (i.e.	   first	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  then	  Japan,	  then	  China),	  while	  the	  explanation	  for	  these	  phenomena	  was	  mostly	  considered	   as	   exceeding	   the	   field	   of	   political	   science,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   it	   being	   seen	   rather	   as	   a	  concern	   for	   anthropologists	   or	   historians.360	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   ‘cases’	   of	   Japan	   and	   China	  were	   also	   often	   deemed	   as	   not	   being	   really	   comparable,	   as	   they	  were	   seen	   as	   too	   different	   in	  ‘substance’,	   i.e.	   in	   the	   bilateral	   relations,	   historical	   circumstances,	   and	   ‘character’	   of	   Japan	   and	  China	   themselves,	  while	   the	   similarities	   in	   the	  discourses	   from	   this	  point	   of	   view	  were	  mostly	  dismissed	  as	  ‘mere	  rhetoric’,	  that	  did	  not	  matter	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  ‘actual	  issues’	  at	  stake.	  	  Obviously,	  my	  position	  differs	   from	   these	   answers,	   as	   I	   lay	   out	   in	  what	   follows.	   In	   this	  conclusion,	  I	   first	  discuss	  and	  summarize	  the	  aims	  and	  contributions	  of	  this	  dissertation.	   In	  the	  next	   section,	   I	   then	   address	   its	   limitations,	   and	   briefly	   lay	   out	   potential	   trajectories	   for	   future	  research	  in	  this	  respect.	  Finally,	  I	  conclude	  with	  an	  outlook	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  economic	  relations	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  central	  findings	  of	  this	  study.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  359	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Marcus	  Conlé	  for	  initially	  drawing	  my	  attention	  to	  these	  parallels.	  360	  This	  was	  not	  the	  case	  for	  the	  comment	  on	  the	  U.S.	  ‘having	  consciously	  forgotten	  about	  Japan’,	  which	  was	  made	  by	  Daniel	  Dye,	  whom	  I	  also	  wish	  to	  thank	  for	  his	  comments	  given	  during	  my	  presentation	  in	  the	  faculty	  colloquium	  at	  the	  School	  of	  International	  Service	  (SIS)	  of	  American	  University	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  in	  winter	  2013.	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Aims	  and	  contributions	  	  From	   my	   perspective,	   both	   types	   of	   answers	   mentioned	   above	   point	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   conceptual,	  methodological	   and	   substantial	   ‘outside-­‐of-­‐the-­‐box’,	   i.e.	   non-­‐paradigmatic-­‐thinking	   in	   the	   fields	  of	  IR	  and	  IPE	  (see	  chapters	  one	  and	  three),	  which	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  accomplish	  in	  this	  dissertation	  in	  several	  aspects.	  	  First,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  be	  or	  become	  a	  historian	  or	  anthropologist	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  topic	  and	  to	  study	  ‘identity’,	  as	  one	  can	  draw	  from	  approaches	  (and	  methodologies)	  that	  have	  taken	  insights	  from	  other	  disciplines	  into	  account,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  poststructuralism	  in	  general	  and	  political	  discourse	   theory	   in	  particular.	  Furthermore,	   already	   looking	  at	   the	  Chinese	   case	   in	   light	  of	   the	  earlier	  Japanese	  one,	  enables	  taking	  a	  step	  back	  from	  ‘the	  topic’	  (i.e.	  China’s	  economic	  rise)	  itself,	  while	   scrutinizing	   the	   discourse	   on	   the	   topic	   (i.e.	   how	   it	   is	   constituted	   in	   the	   first	   place),	   as	  scholars	  writing	  about	  ‘the	  Japan	  problem’	  have	  already	  done	  to	  some	  extent	  (see	  chapter	  1.2).	  In	  the	  field	  of	  U.S.-­‐China	  studies	  in	  IR	  and	  IPE	  this	  kind	  of	  self-­‐reflection	  on	  the	  discipline	  is	  still	  in	  its	  very	  beginnings,	  which	  also	  partly	  explains	  the	  second	  set	  of	  answers:	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  what	   are	   considered	   as	   ‘material	   givens’	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   what	   is	   commonly	   dismissed	   as	  ‘mere	  rhetoric’.	  What	  this	  view	  misses	  or	  misunderstands	  however,	  is	  that	  we	  have	  no	  access	  to	  a	  material	  ‘given’	  or	  ‘reality’	  in	  a	  pure	  and	  unmediated	  sense	  (which	  is	  different	  from	  the	  argument	  that	   ‘reality’	   does	   not	   ‘exist’	   outside	   of	   discourse!	   See	   chapter	   two),	   as	   –	   from	   the	  poststructuralist	  perspective	  put	   forward	   in	  this	   thesis	  –	  we	  encounter	  material	  objects	  always	  already	  in	  a	  particular	  context,	  hence	  never	  as	   ‘pure	  essence’	  that	  would	  exhaust	  and	  ‘transmit’	  its	  meaning	  in	  itself.	  Without	  meaning	  attributed	  in	  discourse	  (encompassing	  linguistic	  and	  non-­‐linguistic	  elements),	  we	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  ‘make	  sense’	  of	  ‘the	  material’.	  Likewise,	  discourse	  as	  speech	  is	  not	  ‘mere	  rhetoric’,	  as	  regardless	  of	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  speakers,	  it	  has	  a	  productivity	  as	  well	  as	  constraints	  of	  its	  own,	  that	  in	  turn	  reverberates	  back	  on	  the	  speakers	  themselves	  (see	  chapters	  two	  and	  three	  and	  also	  in	  what	  follows).	  	  As	   laid	   out	   in	   chapters	   two	   and	   three,	   discourse	   in	   this	   dissertation	   is	   understood	   not	  ‘only’	  as	  social	  practice,	  but	  also	  as	  ontological	  horizon	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	   ‘coterminous	  with	  social	  life’,	  and	  the	  social	  as	  structured	  through	  difference,	  analogous	  to	  language	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  everything	   being	  meaningful,	  while	  meaning	   is	   established	   through	   systems	   of	   difference	   (see	  chapter	  2.1).	  As	  meaning	  and	  sense-­‐making	  is	  conferred	  not	  only,	  but	  primarily	  through	  language,	  a	   focus	   on	   language	   as	   a	   social	   act	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   a	   poststructuralist	   understanding	   of	  discourse	  (again,	  while	  never	  excluding	  non-­‐linguistic	  practices,	  and	  also	  conceiving	  of	  language	  as	  practice	  itself).	  The	  central	  emphasis	  on	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Ernesto	  Laclau	  and	  the	  Essex	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School,	  while	   however	   not	   providing	   a	   concrete	  method	   for	   its	   analysis,	   led	  me	   to	   draw	   from	  Rhetorical	   Political	   Analysis	   (RPA)	   to	   propose	   a	   possibility	   for	   using	   the	   PDT	   key	   concepts	   in	  research.	  Meanwhile,	  as	  pointed	  out	  in	  chapter	  three,	  I	  recognize	  that	  this	  proceeding	  is	  only	  one	  of	  many	  possibilities	  of	  how	  this	  can	  be	  accomplished.	   In	  my	  view,	   it	  enables	  the	  researcher	  to	  capture	   the	   key	   concepts	   of	   PDT	   (i.e.	   dislocation,	   chains	   of	   equivalence	   and	   difference,	   empty	  signifiers)	  through	  linguistic	  analytical	  categories	  without	  simply	  subsuming	  the	  textual	  material	  under	  them,	  but	  instead	  facilitating	  a	  reading	  of	  these	  categories	  and	  a	  structuring	  of	  the	  material	  to	  be	  analyzed,	  by	  a	  view	  through	  the	  theoretical	  lens.	  	  	  As	  problematized	  in	  the	  first	  three	  chapters	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  the	  perennial	  dualism	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  ‘Cartesian	  anxiety’	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  IR	  and	  IPE	  has	  not	  only	  lead	  to	  misunderstandings	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   differing	   (and	  mostly	   unacknowledged	   or	   neglected)	   philosophical	   premises	  between	   ‘positivist’	   and	   ‘post-­‐positivist’	   approaches,	   but	   also	   to	   narrow	   understandings	   of	  methodology	  and	  methods.	  While	  the	  concerns	  of	  PDT	  or	  Essex	  School	  scholars	  in	  this	  regard	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  correspond	  to	  arguments	  by	  poststructuralists	  in	  IR	  (see	  chapter	  one	  and	  two),	  PDT	  is	  still	  only	  rarely	   taken	   into	  account	   in	   IR	  and	  IPE,	  especially	  when	   it	  comes	  to	   its	  potential	  of	  thinking	  beyond	  the	  persisting	  dichotomies	  of	   ‘ideational’	  and	   ‘material’	  or	  also	   ‘ideational’	  and	  ‘discursive’.	   As	   laid	   out	   in	   chapters	   two	   and	   three,	   these	   common	   dichotomizations	   are	   not	  something	   ‘naturally	  given’,	  but	   internal	  to	  discourse,	  which	  in	  turn	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  ‘material	  world’,	  but	  instead	  once	  more	  that	  we	  cannot	  conceive	  of	  it	  outside	  of	  our	  aims	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  it.	  From	  this	  perspective	  it	  follows	  that	  we	  cannot	  separate	  ‘the	  material’	  from	  our	  ‘ideas’	  about	  it	  (as	  a	  dualist	  perspective	  does),	  but	  also	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  ‘purely	   ideational’	   realm	   (again,	   as	   maintained	   by	   dualism	   and	   idealism).	   While	   the	  dualism/monism	  debate	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  has	  found	  its	  ways	  into	  IR	  (and	  IPE	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent),	   as	   such	   it	   plays	   no	   direct	   role	   in	   PDT	   itself,	   as	   its	   understanding	   goes	   beyond	   these	  persistent	  dichotomies.	  To	  reiterate	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe:	  	  	  	  “The	   main	   consequence	   of	   a	   break	   with	   the	   discursive/extra-­‐discursive	   dichotomy	   is	   the	  abandonment	   of	   the	   thought/reality	   opposition	   […].Rejection	   of	   the	   thought/reality	   dichotomy	  must	   go	   together	   with	   a	   rethinking	   and	   interpretation	   of	   the	   categories	   which	   have	   […]	   been	  considered	  exclusive	  of	  one	  or	  the	  other”	  (Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  2001,	  110).	  	  	  In	   terms	   of	   categories	   and	   concepts	   this	   for	   instance	   means	   that	   while	   in	   IR-­‐literature	   it	   has	  become	   common	   to	   classify	   discourse	   studies	   as	   ‘qualitative’	   and	   ‘interpretive’	   (see	   chapter	  three),	   PDT	   stresses	   that	   in	   fact	   there	   can	   be	   no	   strict	   separation	   between	   ‘meaning’	   and	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‘interpretation’,	   and	   that	   again	   the	   common	   dichotomizations	   between	   ‘the	   natural’	   and	   ‘the	  human’	   sciences	   and	   between	   ‘explaining’	   and	   ’understanding’	   are	   concept-­‐dependent	   as	  well.	  What	   follows	   for	   methodologies	   and	   methods	   is	   that	   the	   latter	   are	   not	   understood	   as	   free	  standing	  ‘tool	  boxes’	  ready	  to	  be	  applied,	  but	  have	  to	  be	  chosen	  or	  developed	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	   theoretical	   and	   philosophical	   premises,	   as	   well	   as	   with	   respect	   to	   whether	   they	   serve	   at	  answering	   ones	   research	   questions	   (chapter	   3.2).	   In	   this	   sense	   the	  whole	   research	   process	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  Logics	  of	  Critical	  Explanation	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  retroductive	  circle,	  where	  the	  ‘case’	  or	   cases	   one	   aims	   to	   study	   are	   constituted	   by	   the	   problematization	   that	   is	   in	   turn	   already	  informed	   by	   the	   theoretical	   lens.	   For	   ‘identity’	   as	   a	   concept	   or	   category	   in	   poststructuralist	  research	  this	  means	  that	  it	  has	  to	  be	  studied	  in	  its	  expressions	  in	  its	  actual	  context	  of	  articulation	  in	  discourse	  –	  not	  only,	  but	  mostly	  through	  language	  in	  its	  different	  forms	  –	  instead	  of	  applying	  it	  as	  a	  pre-­‐fixed	  category	  on	  the	  cases	  to	  be	  analyzed	  (see	  chapters	  1.4	  and	  2.2).	  It	  once	  more	  also	  means	   eschewing	   the	   ‘ideational/material’	   dichotomization	   in	   IR	   and	   IPE	   that	   has	   lead	   to	  ‘identity’	  being	  considered	  as	  located	  on	  the	  ‘ideational’	  side	  of	  the	  presumed	  divide,	  which	  inter	  alia	   has	   led	   to	   issues	   presumably	   pertaining	   to	   the	   ‘material’	   side	   –	   i.e.	   ‘the	   economy’	   –	   being	  exempted	   from	   ‘identity-­‐questions’.	  One	   central	   aim	  of	   this	  dissertation	  has	  been	   to	   show	   that	  this	  is	  clearly	  not	  the	  case,	  but	  as	  the	  analysis	  has	  demonstrated,	  the	  economic	  debates	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  Japan	  and	  China	  cannot	  be	  considered	  only	  in	  ‘pure’	  economic	  terms.	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   understanding	   of	   identity	   as	   (practice	   of)	   identification	   with	   subject	  positions	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  from	  a	  PDT	  perspective	  an	  “abandonment	  of	  the	  thought/reality	  opposition”	  also	  means	   thinking	   ‘beyond	  the	  mind’	   in	   terms	  of	  not	  conceiving	  of	   the	  subject	  as	  fully-­‐conscious,	   self-­‐sustained	   rational	   being	   and	   ‘strategic	   actor’.	   The	   subject	   emerges,	   and	  identity	  as	  identification	  with	  always	  only	  temporary	  subject-­‐positions	  is	  possible	  only	  because	  of	   its	   structural	   lack	   or	   incompleteness	   on	   the	   ontological	   level,	   that	   manifests	   itself	   through	  dislocations	   on	   the	   ontical	   level,	   when	   an	   encounter	   with	   an	   other	   renders	   this	   structural	  dislocation	  visible	  through	  antagonism,	  that	  is	  experienced	  as	  blocking	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  self	  as	  it	   is	   articulated	   according	   to	   the	   hegemonic	   discourse.	   This	   ‘event’	   however	   is	   not	   necessarily	  ‘negative’,	   as	   it	   also	   stands	   for	   the	   productive	   lack	   in	   the	   structure	   that	   enables	   the	   subject	   to	  emerge	  (see	  chapter	  2.2),	  hence	  it	  accounts	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  rearticulation	  of	  identities	  and	  social	  structures,	  ultimately	  enabling	  challenges	  and	  changes	  to	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  experienced	  as	  ‘normal’.	  In	  other	  words,	  dislocation	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  entirely	  political,	  i.e.	  non-­‐foundational	  character	   of	   the	   social	   world.	   The	   question	   of	   how	   to	   deal	   with	   these	   ‘events’,	   is	   ultimately	   a	  social	  and	  political	  matter,	  which	  brings	  me	  back	  to	  the	  cases	  of	  this	  dissertation.	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The	  similarities	  in	  language	  used	  to	  label	  first	  Japan,	  then	  China	  as	  unfair	  and	  as	  a	  ‘problem’	  for	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  and	  beyond,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  their	  bilateral	  relationships	  with	  the	  U.S.	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  different	  historical	  circumstances),	   led	  me	  to	  assume	  that	   in	  both	  cases	  U.S.	  liberal	  identity	  as	  forbearer	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  capitalism	  was	  or	  is	  initially	  dislocated	  through	  being	   economically	   in	   a	   disadvantageous	   position	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   Japan	   and	   China.	   Accordingly	   and	  once	  more,	  I	  assumed	  that	  economic	  performance	  is	  not	  ‘only’	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘numbers’,	  but	  also	  of	  ‘identity’,	   in	   terms	   of	   being	   a	   central	   component	   of	   the	   U.S.	   self-­‐understanding	   rooted	   in	  American	   exceptionalism	   and	   the	   liberal	   theory	   of	   history,	   that	   I	   conceive	   of	   as	   hegemonic	  discourses	  (see	  chapter	  1.3).	  While	  these	  or	  related	  aspects	  have	  to	  some	  extent	  been	  taken	  into	  account	  and	  studied	  in	  the	  Japanese	  case	  (see	  chapter	  1.1),	  and	  they	  are	  at	  times	  briefly	  alluded	  to	  in	  the	  Chinese	  case	  (see	  chapters	  1.2	  and	  1.3),	  so	  far	  no	  comparison	  or	  historical	  perspective	  linking	  these	  two	  cases	   from	  an	   ‘identity-­‐perspective’	   is	   taken	  into	  consideration.	  Furthermore,	  as	   already	   pointed	   to,	   the	   common	   perspectives	   on	   ‘the	   economy’,	   especially	   in	   IPE,	   do	   not	  address	  its	  ‘political’	  character,	  through	  for	  instance	  looking	  at	  the	  role	  identity	  plays	  in	  foreign	  economic	  policy.	  	  Finally,	  contrary	  to	  the	  common	  assertions	  that	  a	  discursive	  understanding	  of	  identity	  –	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  social	  world	  in	  general	  –	  as	  discourse	  would	  amount	  to	  an	  ‘anything	  goes’	  in	  both,	  social	  life	  but	  also	  in	  academia	  and	  politics,	  it	  has	  repeatedly	  been	  argued	  by	  proponents	  of	  this	  approach	   that	   this	   is	   clearly	  not	   the	   case.	   Poststructuralism	   is	   no	   anti-­‐structuralism,	   and	  post-­‐foundationalism	   does	   not	   equal	   the	   absence	   of	   foundations	   (see	   chapter	   2.1).	   Foundations,	  paradigms,	   criteria,	   rules,	   norms	   etc.	   clearly	   do	   exist	   and	   persist,	   and	   in	  most	   cases	   they	   have	  become	   sedimented	   in	   a	   way	   that	   makes	   them	   seem	   ‘natural’.	   However,	   a	   poststructuralist	  understanding	  points	  to	  their	  entirely	  social	  and	  ‘political’	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  non-­‐essential	  or	  non-­‐necessary	  –	  character.	  In	  this	  sense,	  while	  neither	  the	  understanding	  and/or	  conceptualization	  of	  ‘everything	  as	  discourse’,	  nor	  discourse	  as	  practice	  will	  change	  the	  world	  we	  live	  in	  from	  one	  day	  to	  the	  other,	  it	  matters	  not	  only	  whether	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  its	  enabling	  and	  constraining	  powers,	  but	  also	  how	  we	  deal	  with	   this	  awareness.	  As	  maintained	  by	  David	  Howarth	  and	   Jason	  Glynos,	  taking	   an	   ethical	   stance	   amounts	   to	   revealing	   attempts	   aimed	   at	   concealing	   the	   ultimate	  contingency	  of	  our	  social	  and	  political	  practices,	  which	  is	  why	  in	  this	  dissertation	  I	  start	  out	  with	  looking	  at	  how	  dislocations	  (or	  ‘crises’)	  are	  dealt	  with	  on	  a	  public	  level	  in	  elite	  political	  discourse	  (in	  this	  study	  and	  at	  this	  step	  taking	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  as	  an	  example,	  see	  introduction)	  that	  at	  a	  first	  glance	  seems	  to	  be	  obviously	  aimed	  at	  attributing	   ‘internal	  problems’	  to	  an	  external	  other.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  accounts	  only	  for	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  picture,	  in	  terms	  of	  public	  discourse	  in	  general	  and	  its	  role	  in	  trade	  policy	  (once,	  more,	  which	  is	  a	  major	  source	  of	  friction	  between	  the	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U.S.	  and	  Japan	  and	  the	  U.S.	  and	  China)	  in	  particular	  it	  has	  been	  and	  still	  is	  an	  important	  actor	  (see	  introduction).361	  On	  a	  more	  general	   level	  (also	   in	  terms	  of	   future	  research,	  see	   in	  what	  follows)	  one	  of	  the	  main	  questions	  ‘we	  in	  the	  West’	  (but	  also	  elsewhere)	  face,	  is	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  ‘events’	  that	  do	  not	   fit	   into	  our	  preexisting	   frameworks,	   and	   that	   lead	   to	  questioning	  our	  presupposed	  positions	   or	   statuses	   in	   them.	   I	   come	   back	   to	   these	   questions	   in	   the	   outlook	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  conclusion,	   after	   in	   the	   next	   section	   briefly	   discussing	   limitations	   and	   shortcomings	   of	   this	  dissertation,	  in	  connection	  with	  laying	  out	  how	  they	  could	  be	  addressed	  in	  future	  research.	  	  
Limitations	  and	  future	  research	  
	  While	   the	   main	   shortcomings	   and	   criticisms	   of	   discourse	   theory	   and	   analysis,	   as	   well	   as	   of	  poststructuralism	  more	  broadly	  speaking	  were	  addressed	  in	  the	  first	  three	  chapters,	  one	  aspect	  that	  in	  my	  view	  once	  more	  merits	  a	  particular	  focus	  is	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  causality,	  that	  has	  been	  scarcely	  addressed	  by	  poststructuralists	  so	   far,	  while	   it	  accounts	   for	  many	  of	   the	  misunderstandings	   about	   discourse	   analysis	   being	   ‘only	   descriptive’,	   not	   explanatory,	   and	   no	  ‘real	   method’.362	  While	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   poststructuralist	   scholars	   so	   far	   have	   elaborated	   on	  opposing	   a	   linear	   and	  mechanistic	   understanding	   of	   causality,	   and	   in	  most	   cases	   use	   the	   term	  ‘constitutive’	  instead	  of	  causal,	  I	  do	  miss	  a	  thorough	  engagement	  with	  how	  the	  concept	  could	  be	  understood	  in	  different	  ways,	  in	  order	  not	  to	  leave	  this	  field	  alone	  to	  ‘positivists’	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	   critical	   realists	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   (see	   chapter	   1.4).	   This	   could	   also	   help	   getting	  poststructuralist	  research	  out	  of	  the	  ‘dissidents’	  corner’	  it	  is	  still	  often	  seen	  in	  (see	  chapter	  two),	  and	  potentially	  enable	  more	  dialogue	  on	  concepts,	  methodologies	  and	  methods	  among	  different	  approaches.363	  	  	  Before	   concluding	  with	   an	   outlook	   on	  U.S.-­‐China	   (economic)	   relations	   that	   connects	   to	  the	  central	  findings	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  want	  to	  address	  the	  main	  limitations	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  shortcomings	  of	  this	  study,	  that	  first	  and	  foremost	  are	  connected	  to	  its	  scope	  in	  two	  main	  aspects:	  laying	  the	  focus	  ‘only’	  on	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  and	  ‘only’	  on	  the	  articulation	  of	  identity.	  In	  my	  view	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  361	  And	  it	  has	  always	  understood	  how	  to	  use	  its	  leverage	  and	  to	  draw	  public	  attention,	  a	  last	  example	  being	  the	  open	  letter	   written	   by	   the	   Republican	   freshman	   Senator	   Tom	   Cotton	   of	   Arkansas,	   and	   signed	   by	   46	   other	   Republican	  senators,	   to	   the	   Iranian	   leadership	   concerning	   the	   ongoing	   negotiations	   on	   Iran‘s	   nuclear	   program	   (The	  Associated	  Press	  2015).	  	  362	  To	  briefly	  repeat,	  the	  other	  two	  main	  criticisms	  (apart	  from	  the	  misunderstandings	  addressed	  in	  chapter	  3.1)	  are	  an	  extensive	  focus	  on	  ‘the	  other’	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  neccessarily	  adversarial	  relationship	  (see	  chapters	  1.4	  	  and	  two),	  as	  well	  as	  an	  ethical	  deficit	  (see	  chapter	  3.2).	  Both	  in	  my	  view	  are	  however	  not	  ‘inherent’	  to	  PDT	  or	  poststructuralism.	  363	  The	  concept	  of	  causality	  	  is	  for	  example	  taken	  up	  by	  William	  Connolly,	  and	  –	  drawing	  on	  him	  –	  	  for	  instance	  by	  Chris	  Methmann	  and	  Delf	  Rothe	  (so	  far	  only	  in	  a	  presentation	  at	  an	  international	  workshop	  at	  the	  GIGA	  German	  Institute	  for	  Global	   and	   Area	   Studies	   in	   November	   2012:	   	   http://www.giga-­‐hamburg.de/de/veranstaltung/ontology-­‐and-­‐methodology-­‐%E2%80%93-­‐challenges-­‐for-­‐theory-­‐and-­‐practice-­‐in-­‐international,	  last	  accessed	  March	  27,	  2015).	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these	   are	   the	   major	   limitations	   that	   future	   research,	   i.e.	   a	   potential	   future	   expansion	   of	   this	  project,	  could	  and	  should	  overcome.	  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  introduction,	  in	  this	  dissertation	  I	  do	  not	  look	  at	  concrete	  policy	  agendas	  or	  processes	  –	  for	  instance	  certain	  negotiations	  or	  initiatives	  –	   in	   terms	   of	   analyzing	   more	   closely	   what	   role	   ‘identity’	   played	   in	   their	   formulation	   and	  implementation,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  conducting	  ‘case	  studies‘.	  This	  could	  be	  pursued	  in	  a	  next	  step	  (for	  instance	  for	  ‘cases’	  or	  ‘events’	  selected	  from	  the	  three	  factors/fields	  Robert	  Uriu	  has	  mentioned	  relating	  to	  a	  déjà-­‐vu	  of	  the	  ‘Japan	  problem’,	  see	  in	  what	  follows	  in	  the	  outlook),	  which	  would	  also	  include	  broadening	  the	  focus	  beyond	  Congress	  to	  comprise	  the	  executive	  level.	  Furthermore,	  the	  ‘elite	  public	  discourse’	  on	  these	   ‘cases’	  should	  ideally	  also	  include	  the	  media	  (where	  a	  selection	  according	  to	  types	  and	  products	  would	  have	  to	  be	  made),	  while	  the	  inclusion	  of	  think	  tanks	  could	  account	  for	  the	  possible	  interplay	  between	  (academic)	  experts	  and	  policy	  makers	  (see	  outlook).	  Additionally,	  the	  academic	  discourses	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  Japan	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  China	  themselves	  merit	  a	   more	   thorough	   ‘comparative’	   analysis	   than	   it	   has	   been	   the	   case	   in	   this	   dissertation	   (see	  outlook).	  	  A	   desirable	   broadening	   of	   the	   focus	   beyond	   the	   elite	   to	   ‘public	   discourse’	   (see	  introduction)	   more	   generally	   in	   turn	   would	   encompass	   the	   media	   as	   well	   (in	   this	   case	   for	  instance	   popular	   newspapers	   and	   magazines),	   but	   potentially	   also	   opinion	   polls	   and	   surveys.	  Ideally,	   it	  would	  also	   look	  at	   ‘popular	  culture’,	  where	   for	   instance	   images	  of	   Japan	  and	  China	  –	  that	  have	  been	  occasionally	  studied	  individually	  (see	  chapter	  one)	  –	  are	  widely	  disseminated,	  but	  have	  not	  been	  compared	  so	  far.	  This	  would	  also	  mean	  to	  include	  non-­‐textual	  material	  (i.e.	  images)	  into	  the	  analysis.364	  	  While	  this	  dissertation	  focused	  on	  the	  economic	  realm,	  especially	  with	  China	  the	  role	  of	  identity	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  very	  present	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  security	  issues,	  which	  was	  also	  the	  case	  with	   Japan,	  but	   to	  a	  different	  extent,	  as	  addressed	   in	   the	  overviews.	  This	  aspect	  brings	  up	  another	   possibility	   to	   broaden	   the	   focus,	   in	   this	   case	   either	   beyond	   the	   U.S.	   (i.e.	   to	   look	   at	  responses	   to	   Japan’s	   and	   China’s	   rise	   in	   other	   ‘established’	   economies)	   or	   to	   compare	   the	  U.S.	  approach	  to	  China	  to	  that	  to	  other	  (past	  and	  present)	  ‘rising	  powers’.	  365	  However,	   all	   this	   having	   been	   said,	   these	   potential	   augmentations	   bring	   me	   to	   yet	  another	  limitation	  –	  potentially	  also	  for	  future	  research	  –	  which	  is	  the	  limitation	  on	  the	  amount	  of	   sources	   to	   be	   included	   in	   the	   study	   when	   aiming	   at	   conducting	   a	   very	   detailed	   discourse	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  364	  Images	  do	  also	  appear	  in	  the	  ‘elite	  discourse‘,	  for	  instance	  on	  magazine	  covers	  such	  as	  Time,	  Newsweek	  or	  Business	  Week,	   as	  well	   as	   in	   cartoons	   in	   newspapers	   like	   the	   New	   York	   Times.	   Furthermore,	   ‘popular	  media’	   ideally	  would	  include	  for	  instance	  talk	  shows	  and	  TV-­‐news,	  possibly	  also	  series	  and	  movies.	  365	  For	  instance	  Jarod	  Hayes	  in	  his	  book	  Constructing	  National	  Security:	  U.S.	  Relations	  with	  India	  and	  China	  (published	  in	  2013	  by	  Cambridge	  University	  Press)	  looks	  at	  U.S.	  responses	  to	  ‘rising’	  China	  and	  India.	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analysis	   as	   in	   this	   dissertation.	   Of	   course,	   this	   always	   also	   depends	   on	   the	   time	   available	   for	  conducting	   the	   research,	   but	   considering	   the	   input	   of	   time	   needed	   and	   the	   output	   in	   terms	   of	  ‘results’,	  in	  my	  experience	  there	  certainly	  is	  a	  ‘mismatch’.	  It	  could	  potentially	  be	  addressed	  either	  through	  a	  combination	  with	  quantitative	  tools	  for	  textual	  analysis,	  not	  necessarily	  (only)	  in	  terms	  of	   frequencies	   in	   textual	   (or	   textualized)	   material,	   but	   also	   for	   instance	   in	   terms	   of	   co-­‐occurrences,	  and	  in	  a	  step	  ahead	  for	  discerning	  and	  pre-­‐selecting	  the	  documents	  to	  be	  included	  in	   the	   analysis.	   Another	   (additional)	   possibility	   would	   be	   the	   collaboration	   with	   other	  researchers	  in	  a	  larger	  project.	  	  Ultimately,	   I	   maintain	   that	   the	   topic,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   approach	   taken,	   is	   important	   and	  worthwhile	  pursuing	  in	  many	  aspects.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  final	  section	  of	  this	  conclusion	  comes	  back	  to	  the	  central	  findings	  of	  the	  dissertation	  and	  connects	  them	  to	  an	  outlook	  on	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations.	  	  	  
Main	  findings	  and	  outlook	  
	   	  	  In	  1987	  Robert	  Gilpin	  wrote	  on	  the	  ‘Japan	  problem’	  that	  “Western	  liberal	  societies	  find	  Japanese	  economic	   success	   particularly	   threatening	   because	   it	   is	   the	   first	   non-­‐Western	   and	   nonliberal	  society	   to	   outcompete	   them”	   (Gilpin	   1987,	   391),	   and	   also	   Stephen	   Cohen	   et	   al.	   (in	   1996)	  emphasized	  that	  ”[Japan]	  was	  the	  first	  non-­‐Western	  society	  to	  become	  an	  international	  economic	  superpower”	  (Cohen,	  Paul,	  and	  Blecker	  1996,	  176).	  Gilpin	  specified	  his	  statement	  by	  continuing	  that:	   “Whereas	   Western	   economies	   are	   based	   on	   belief	   in	   the	   superior	   efficiency	   of	   the	   free	  market	  and	  individualism,	  the	  market	  and	  the	  individual	  in	  Japan	  are	  not	  relatively	  autonomous	  but	   are	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   a	   powerful	   nonliberal	   culture	   and	   social	   system”	   (ibid.).366	  Taken	  together	   with	   Aaron	   Friedberg’s	   statement	   on	   China,	   that	   “for	   Americans	   the	   success	   of	   a	  mainland	  regime	  that	  blends	  authoritarian	  rule	  with	  market-­‐driven	  economics	  is	  a	  puzzle	  and	  an	  affront.	  Such	  a	  combination	   is	  not	  supposed	   to	  be	  possible,	  at	   least	   in	   the	   long	  run”	  (Friedberg	  2011,	   43),	   these	   assessments	   in	  my	   view	   epitomize	   the	  main	   findings	   of	   this	   dissertation	   (see	  summary	  of	  the	  analysis):	  the	  major	  issue	  at	  stake	  when	  looking	  at	  articulations	  of	  U.S.	  identity	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Japan	  and	  China	  lies	  not	  (only)	  in	  what	  David	  Campbell	  identified	  as	  the	  major	  political	  challenge	   in	   dealing	   with	   the	   subjectivity	   of	   the	   U.S.,	   i.e.	   that	   it	   is	   continually	   dependent	   on	  strategies	  of	   otherness	   (cf.	   Campbell	   1994,	  166),	   and	   that	   some	   scholars	  have	   attributed	   to	   an	  inherent	   ‘intolerance’	   within	   liberalism	   (see	   chapter	   1.3).	   While	   having	   shown	   through	   my	  analysis	   of	   the	   Congressional	   Record	   that	   ‘liberalism’	   –	   in	   this	   study	   in	   the	   form	   of	   American	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  366	  These	  assessments	  obviously	  also	  stand	  for	  a	  quite	  narrow,	  ahistorical	  view.	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exceptionalism	  and	  the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history	  –	  accounts	   for	  both,	  accommodating	  difference	  as	   well	   as	   turning	   it	   into	   ‘otherness’,	   I	   come	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   it	   is	   the	   (sometimes	  paradoxical)	  interplay	  and	  tension	  between	  universalism	  and	  exclusivity	  within	  these	  hegemonic	  discourses,	   that	  accounts	  for	  what	  I	  see	  as	  a	  major	  political	  challenge	  for	  (but	  also	  beyond)	  the	  U.S.:	  overcoming	  the	  dominant	  tendency	  to	  think	  and	  act	  exclusively	  in	  one’s	  own	  categories	  and	  concepts	  –	  which	  implies	  rendering	  other	  ones	  unthinkable	  (cf.	  Laclau	  1988,	  57;	  Marchart	  1998,	  14)	  –	  without	  even	   remotely	   considering	   their	   contestability	  or	   ‘applicability’	  on	  a	   larger	   scale	  	  (cf.	   Mahbubani	   2008,	   4;	   cf.	   Stäheli	   2000b,	   20,22).	   Hence	   –	   coming	   back	   to	   the	   exemplary	  statements	  –	   Japan	  did	  not	   ‘fit’	   into	   the	  hegemonic	  discourses	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  and	  the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  history	  because	   it	  was	  economically	  overtaking	   the	  U.S.	   through	  practices	  that	   were	   regarded	   as	   ‘unfair’	   and	   ‘illiberal’,	   and	   that	   were	   articulated	   into	   stemming	   from	  Japan’s	   ‘cultural	  difference’.	  With	  China,	  the	  initial	  dislocation	  lies	   in	  economic	  competition	  and	  ‘ideological	  difference’	  (albeit	  to	  a	  different	  extent	  than	  with	  Japan)	  as	  well,	  while	  in	  both	  cases	  from	   the	   U.S.	   perspective	   there	   is	   a	   ‘misfit’	   between	   economic,	   and	   societal	   and	   political	  development.	  While	  Japan	  and	  China	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  pursue	  capitalism	  as	  ‘the	  universal	  path	  to	  progress’,	   the	   components	   ‘liberal’	   and	   ‘democratic’	   are	   seen	  as	   lacking	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   they	  become	  articulated	  as	  potential	  obstacles	  to	  the	  other	  becoming	  more	  like	  the	  self	  (see	  summary	  of	  the	  analysis).	  While	  the	   ‘end	  of	  expectations’	  or	   ‘hope	  for	  change’	  with	  Japan	  was	  apparently	  reached	  in	  the	  mid	  1990s	  –	  at	  least	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  essentialized	  view	  of	  Japan	  put	  forward	  by	   the	   revisionists	   succeeded	   in	   filling	   the	  empty	  signifier	   in	   terms	  of	  articulating	   the	  problem	  (Japan’s	   difference)	   and	   the	   solution	   (numerical	   targets)	   –	   the	   route	   is	   still	   open	   ended	   with	  China.	   This	   becomes	   clear	  when	   looking	   at	   the	   congressional	   discourse	   in	   this	   analysis,	  where	  there	   is	   to	  a	  certain	  extent	  more	  ambivalence	   towards	  China	   than	   there	  was	   towards	   Japan.	   In	  this	   sense,	   for	   instance	   the	   2014	   report	   by	   the	   Congressional	   Research	   Service	   on	   China’s	  
Economic	  Rise:	  History,	  Trends,	  Challenges,	  and	  Implications	  for	  the	  United	  States,	   concludes	  with	  the	  assessment	  that	  	  	   	  “China’s	  growing	  economic	  power	  has	  made	  it	  a	  critical	  and	  influential	  player	  on	  the	  global	  stage	  on	   a	  number	  of	   issues	   important	   to	  U.S.	   interests,	   such	   as	   global	   economic	   cooperation,	   climate	  change,	  nuclear	  proliferation,	  and	  North	  Korean	  aggression.	  China	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  help	  advance	  U.S.	  interests	  or	  to	  frustrate	  them.	  China’s	  rising	  economy	  has	  also	  enabled	  it	  to	  boost	  its	  military	  capabilities.	  U.S.	   policy	  makers	   face	   a	   number	   of	   complex	   challenges	   on	   how	   to	   deal	  with	  
these	  issues.”	  	  The	  report	  then	  continues	  and	  ends	  with	  the	  following	  questions:	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“Can	   the	   United	   States	   compel	   better	   behavior	   from	   China	   via	   quiet	   diplomacy	   or	   public	  
confrontation?	  Has	  U.S.	  leverage	  over	  Beijing	  lessened	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  China’s	  economic	  rise,	  
and	  has	  China’s	   leverage	  over	  Washington	   increased?	  Are	  China’s	  new	  leaders	  serious	  about	  undertaking	  comprehensive	  reforms	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  Third	  Plenum?	  Does	  Chinese	  President	  Xi	  Jinping	  have	  the	  power	  to	  implement	  new	  economic	  reforms	  if	  they	  are	  opposed	  by	  other	  factions	  of	  the	  government	  that	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo?	  To	  what	  extent	  will	  the	  Chinese	  government	   be	   willing	   to	   reduce	   or	   eliminate	   preferential	   policies	   (such	   as	   subsidies	   and	  preferential	  bank	   loans)	  given	   to	  SOEs?	  Will	   the	   reforms	   result	   in	   a	   significant	   reduction	   in	  
trade	  and	  investment	  barriers	  against	  U.S.	  firms?”	  (Morrison	  2014,	  38,	  emphases	  added).	  	  	  Obviously,	  the	  U.S.	  (Congress)	  has	  no	  definite	  answers	  to	  these	  exemplary	  questions	  (yet).	  	  	  In	  the	  conclusion	  of	  her	  study	  on	  Japan-­‐Bashing	  Narrelle	  Morris	  states	  that	  China-­‐bashing	  (until	  2011)	   had	   only	   occasionally	   reached	   the	   same	   level	   of	   intensity	   as	   “its	   predecessor”	   Japan-­‐bashing	  (N.	  Morris	  2011,	  141),	  and	  a	  similar	  kind	  of	  assessment	  was	  also	  made	  by	  a	  few	  scholars	  on	   U.S.-­‐Japan	   relations	   in	   conversations	   I	   had	   with	   them	   in	   early	   2014	   (for	   instance	   Brad	  Glossermann	   and	   Len	   Schoppa).	   My	   analysis	   of	   the	   Congressional	   Record	   confirms	   these	  evaluations,	  also	  to	  the	  extent	  that	   in	  contrast	   to	  China,	   the	  allegations	  against	   Japan	  were	  also	  made	   on	   a	   level	   of	   negative	   personal	   characteristics,	   as	   well	   as	   through	   frequent	   allusions	   to	  Japan	  as	   ‘the	  old	  WWII	  enemy’	   (see	  chapters	   four	  and	  seven).	  On	   the	  other	  hand	  however,	   the	  intensified	  articulations	  towards	  China	  on	  the	  ‘regime	  level’	  attribute	  outright	  evilness	  to	  China	  (through	  likening	  it	  to	  Nazi	  Germany,	  see	  chapter	  seven)	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  was	  not	  the	  case	  with	  Japan,	  at	   least	  in	  the	  debates	  analyzed	  in	  this	  study.	  To	  some	  extent	  this	  can	  of	  course	  likely	  be	  explained	   by	   the	   overall	   antipathy	   towards	   communism	   in	   the	   U.S.	   Yet,	   in	   retrospect,	   when	  looking	   back	   at	   the	   Japanese	   case	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   Chinese	   one,	   the	   intensity	   of	   ‘Japan-­‐bashing’	   in	  my	   view	   seems	   even	  more	   puzzling	   and	   in	   a	   sense	   also	   disquieting,	   as	   it	   begs	   the	  question	  where	  the	  situation	  with	  China	  might	  possible	  evolve,	  if	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  close	  ally	  the	   trade	   frictions	   amounted	   to	   turning	   an	   issue	   of	   economic	   competition	   into	   an	   ‘ideological	  struggle’.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  disappointment	  in	  the	  behavior	  of	  an	  ally	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	   the	   intensity,	   while	   in	   the	   case	   with	   ‘communist	   China’	   the	   expectations	   of	   ‘U.S.-­‐conform	  behavior’	  were	  and	  are	  smaller	  from	  the	  first	  instance	  on.	  However,	  there	  exist	  different	  opinions	  on	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   the	   fact	   of	   China	   not	   being	   a	   U.S.	  military	   ally	   is	   an	   alleviating	   or	  aggravating	  factor,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  a	  potential	  spillover	  of	  economic	  frictions	  into	  other	  areas.	  	   Coming	   back	   to	   Robert	   Uriu’s	   assessment	   (in	   2009)	   that	   for	   a	   replay	   of	   the	   U.S.-­‐Japan	  tensions	  of	  the	  1990s	  three	  factors	  in	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  economic	  relations	  would	  have	  to	  change	  –	  i.e.	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Chinese	   investment	   in	   the	  U.S.	  would	  have	   to	   increase,	   China	  would	  have	   to	  be	  perceived	   as	   a	  threat	   to	  American	  high-­‐tech	   industries	  and	  that	   there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  a	  unified	   ‘theory’,	   like	  revisionism	  (Uriu	  2009,	  244),	  one	  could	  ask	  what	  the	  situation	  in	  this	  respect	  looks	  like	  a	  couple	  of	  years	  later?	  	  Looking	   at	   the	   first	   factor,	   in	   August	   2012	   for	   instance	   Curtis	   Milhaupt	   deliberated,	  whether	  Chinese	   investment	   constituted	   a	   case	   of	   déjà-­‐vu	   for	   the	  U.S.	   (Milhaupt	  2012),	   and	   in	  October	  2013	   the	  British	  magazine	  The	  Economist	  wondered,	  whether	  China	  had	  arrived	  at	   its	  Rockefeller	   Center	   moment	   (The	   Economist	   2013)	   –	   referring	   to	   “the	   late	   1980s	   as	   Japan’s	  miracle	   economy	   was	   soaring”	   and	   the	   purchase	   of	   the	   Rockefeller	   Center	   by	   the	   Mitsubishi	  Estate	  Company	  (see	  chapter	  6.1).	  The	  article	  was	  discussing	  the	  increase	  in	  Chinese	  investment	  in	  real	  estate	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  overseas	  direct	  investment	  (ODI)	  in	  general,	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  private	   Chinese	   firms	   –	   such	   as	   Alibaba	   and	   Lenovo	   –	   seeking	   brands	   and	   technology	   (Coblin	  2014).	  In	  the	  same	  year	  the	  announced	  takeover	  of	  the	  U.S.	  pork	  producer	  Smithfield	  by	  China's	  Shuanghui	   stirred	  a	  public	  debate	  about	   foreign	   takeovers	   (see	  also	  chapter	  6.2	  on	   the	  CNOOC	  case	  in	  2005).	  In	  this	  context,	  a	  number	  of	  experts	  have	  been	  calling	  for	  an	  expansion	  of	  foreign	  investment	  reviews	  beyond	  ‘just’	  national	  security	  (see	  overview	  on	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  and	  Japan	  for	   the	   Exon-­‐Florio	   provision),	   to	   include	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   public	   policy	   goals,	   including	   for	  instance	   food	  safety	  or	   labor	  rights	   (Rosen	  and	  Hanemann	  2013).	  According	   to	  a	  survey	  of	   the	  same	   year,	   a	  majority	   of	   Americans	  were	   generally	   suspicious	   of	   Chinese	   investment	   (Holmes	  Report	  2013).	  	  On	   the	   positive	   side,	   the	   U.S.	   and	   China	   have	   been	   negotiating	   a	   Bilateral	   Investment	  Treaty	   (BIT)	   since	   2013	   (Morrison	   2015,	   29),	   pointing	   to	   a	   potentially	   promising	   outcome	   in	  connection	  to	  Uriu’s	  second	  factor,	  the	  ‘threat’	  to	  American	  high-­‐tech	  industries,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  also	  ongoing	  negotiations	  on	  an	  Information	  Technology	  Agreement	  (ITA)	  (L.	  Walker	  2014).	  While	   in	   late	  2013	  negotiations	   to	   expand	   the	  World	  Trade	  Organization’s	   (WTO)	   Information	  Technology	  Agreement	  (ITA)	  had	  collapsed	  over	  China’s	  and	  the	  U.S.’	  conflicting	  demands	  (Tiezzi	  2013),	   a	  breakthrough	  on	   the	  agreement	  was	   reached	  a	  year	   later.	   It	   is	   supposed	   to	   cut	   tariffs	  from	  30	  or	  25	  per	  cent	  to	  zero	  on	  items	  such	  as	  medical	  equipment,	  software	  media,	  GPS	  devices	  and	  semiconductors.	  However,	  negotiations	  across	  the	  entire	  ITA	  membership	  are	  not	  yet	  over	  (Bridges	  2014;	  Needham	  2014),	  while	  also	   the	   talks	  on	   the	  BIT	  are	  ongoing	  (The	  White	  House	  2014),367	  with	  internal	  opposition	  already	  being	  voiced	  against	  them	  (Wessel	  2015).368	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  367	  Furthermore,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  China	  have	  been	  holding	  an	  annual	  “Strategic	  and	  Economic	  Dialogue	  (S&ED)	  since	  2009	  (cf.	   i.e.	  Morrison	  2015,	  29).	  See	  also	  http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/china.aspx	   (last	  accessed	  March	  22,	  2015).	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With	  Uriu’s	   third	   factor	   on	   the	   ‘theory’,	   in	  my	   view	   the	   question	   arises,	  whether	   the	   so-­‐called	  ‘China	   threat	   theory’	   (see	   chapter	   1.2)	   might	   qualify	   as	   a	   ‘new	   revisionism’.	   This	   factor	   is	  important,	  because	  as	  a	  potential	  ‘analytical	  framework’	  or	  lens	  it	  can	  account	  for	  how	  the	  other	  two	  categories	  are	  assessed.	   I	  would	  not	  speak	  of	  a	   ‘China	   threat	   theory’	   in	   itself,	   as	  what	  goes	  under	   this	   label	  mostly	  comes	  down	  to	  power-­‐transition	   theory	  and	  offensive	  realism	   ‘applied’	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relationship.	  However,	  the	  wide	  acceptance	  of	  using	  this	  lens	  for	  viewing	  the	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relationship	  and	  its	  potential	  future	  –	  in	  spite	  of	  criticisms	  (see	  also	  chapter	  1.2)	  –	  in	  combination	   with	   what	   for	   instance	   has	   been	   termed	   the	   ‘assertive	   China	   narrative’	   by	   Björn	  Jerdén	  (2014,	  especially	  76ff.),	  at	  least	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  might	  be	  a	  tendency	  (and	   danger)	   in	   the	   predominantly	   used	   IR	   theories	   to	   view	   U.S.-­‐Chinese	   relations	   in	   a	  deterministic	   and	   potentially	   conflictual	   way	   (cf.	   i.e.	   Ling	   2013).	   Coming	   back	   to	   the	  poststructuralist	  understanding	  of	  ‘theory	  as	  practice’,	  the	  role	  and	  responsibility	  of	  academia	  in	  the	  production	  of	  what	  may	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘social	  facts’	  cannot	  be	  sufficiently	  emphasized,	  in	  spite	   of	   the	  widely	   held	   belief	   that	   there	   exists	   a	   large	   gap	   between	   ‘academic	   theorizing’	   and	  policymaking.	   Jerdén’s	   analysis	   (and	   for	   instance	   also	   the	   work	   by	   Oliver	   Turner	   and	   Pan	  Chengxin	   cited	   earlier,	   see	   chapter	   1.2)	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   points	   to	   an	   interplay	   of	   academic	  scholars,	  the	  media	  and	  policy	  experts	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  discursive	  power	  of	  the	  ‘narrative’.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  coming	  back	  to	  the	  role	  of	   ‘identity’	   in	  this	  dissertation,	  in	  Pan’s	  words:	  “[…]	   what	   China’s	   rise	   means	   cannot	   be	   independently	   assessed	   in	   isolation	   from	   what	   we	  already	  mean	  by	  China’s	  rise	  […]	  [and]	  what	  we	  see	  as	   ‘China’	  cannot	  be	  detached	  from	  various	  discourses	   and	   representations	   of	   it”	   (Pan	   2012,	   vii,	   first	   and	   third	   emphasis	   added).	   As	   the	  discourse	   analysis	   of	   the	   Congressional	   Record	   (chapters	   four	   to	   seven	   and	   summary)	   in	   this	  dissertation	   has	   shown,	  we	   (i.e.	   here	   the	   U.S.	   through	   Congress)	   articulated	   and	   continue	   to	  articulate	  Japan	  and	  China	  always	  in	  connection	  to	  how	  we	  conceive	  of	  ourselves,	  the	  ‘world’	  and	  our	   role	   and	   position	   in	   it,	   and	   importantly,	   according	   to	   our	   expectations	   of	   how	   the	   other	  should	  act	  according	  to	  our	  understandings	  of	  him/her.	  	  In	   his	   article	   on	  The	   formation	  of	  American	  exceptional	   identities	  Taesuh	   Cha	   concludes	  with	  a	  call	  to	  the	  U.S.	  to	  rethink	  the	  history	  of	  its	  relationship	  to	  others,	  as	  well	  as	  	  	  “for	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  exclusivist,	  monologic	  form	  of	  the	  American	  exceptionalist	  identity	  and	  foreign	   policy	   that,	   lacking	   the	   proper	   understanding	   of	   differences,	   is	   obsessed	   with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  368	  For	   instance,	   “the	   methods	   and	   operations”	   of	   Chinese	   firms	   in	   the	   U.S.	   are	   questioned	   in	   following	   (familiar)	  terms:	  	   “Do	   they	   operate	   based	   on	  Western	   profit-­‐making	   principles,	   or	   are	   they	   simply	   advancing	   the	   goals	   of	   the	  People’s	  Republic’s	  12th	  Five	  Year	  Plan	  and	  China’s	  leadership	  goals?”	  (ibid.).	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representation	  of	  “inferior”	  Others	  and	  the	  necessity	  to	  change	  them	  in	  the	  American	  image”	  (Cha	  2015,	  19).	  	  While	  my	  analysis	  showed	  that	  (even)	  an	  exceptionalist	  identity	  can	  accommodate	  difference	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  once	  more	  I	  see	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  universalist	  tendencies	  and	  features,	  that	  still	  rely	   on	   ‘the	   ultimate	   Americanization	   of	   the	   world’	   (see	   chapter	   1.3)	   and	   consider	   this	   a	  ‘universal’	  goal	  everyone	  would	  or	  should	  accept	  as	  worthwhile	  pursuing.	   In	  this	  respect,	   I	   join	  Cha	  in	  his	  call	  not	  to	  forget	  and	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	   ‘history’369,	  here	  to	  the	  history	  of	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  trade	   frictions	   and	   the	   discourse	   on	   ‘the	   Japan	   problem’,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   existing	   critical	  scholarship	   on	   it	   (see	   chapter	   1.1).	   Both,	   the	   similarities	   and	   differences	   to	   the	   situation	  with	  China	   might	   help	   to	   move	   from	   dealing	   with	   the	   ‘Rise	   of	   China’	   as	   a	   ‘historical	   event’	   (cf.	  Lundborg	  2012)	   in	   the	   sense	  of	   already	  having	  an	   ‘established’	  meaning,	   to	   reflecting	  on	  what	  both,	  the	  ‘rise’	  and	  ‘China’	  actually	  mean	  for	  us,	  and	  where	  these	  understandings	  come	  from	  and	  may	  lead	  us	  to.	  	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  369	  An	   example	   of	   ‘forgetfulness‘	   is	   for	   instance	   the	   already	   cited	   remark	   in	   Congress	   concerning	   China	   in	   the	   year	  1994:	  Never	  before	  has	  the	  competition	  among	  the	  world’s	  leading	  powers	  been	  concentrated	  on	  economic,	  as	  opposed	  to	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  370	  The	  sources	  for	  the	  year	  1985	  are	  not	  freely	  accessible	  and	  digitalized	  online,	  but	  the	  original	  bound	  record	  (in	  a	  scanned	   version)	   can	   be	   searched	   through	   the	   Library	   of	   Congress	   database	   on	   site,	   or	   through	   Proquest	  Congressional,	  which	  requires	  an	  account,	  for	  instance	  through	  a	  university	  library	  that	  has	  access	  to	  this	  database.	  I	  included	  the	  links,	  however,	  they	  do	  not	  work	  without	  the	  Proquest	  account	  login.	  	  To	  keep	  the	  chronology	  of	  the	  documents	  as	  they	  were	  inserted	  into	  atlas.ti,	  I	  did	  not	  relocate	  the	  documents	  on	  China	  were	  retrieved	  through	  the	  Japan-­‐keyword	  search.	  This	  is	  indicated	  in	  the	  headlines	  of	  the	  sources	  sections.	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   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   FORTNEY	   PETE	   STARK	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   August	   03,	   1989):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:E03AU9-­‐311:/	  (June	  20,	  2014).	  P87:	  IACOCCA	  INSTITUTE	  -­‐-­‐	  (BY	  LAURENCE	  W.	  HECHT)	  (Extension	  of	  Remarks	  -­‐	  July	  25,	  1989):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:E25JY9-­‐16:/	  (June	  20,	  2014).	  P88:	  THE	  LACK	  OF	  JAPANESE	  CONSUMER	  CULTURE	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  -­‐	  July	  17,	  1989):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:H17JY9-­‐589:/	  (June	  20,	  2014).	  P89:	   MANUFACTURING	   A	   TRADE	   POLICY	   IN	   AN	   ERA	   OF	   CHANGE	   (Senate	   -­‐	   July	   11,	   1989):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:S11JY9-­‐997:/	  (June	  20,	  2014).	  P90:	   AN	   AGENDA	   FOR	   CHANGE	   IN	   COMPETITIVENESS	   POLICY	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   JOHN	   J.	   LAFALCE	  (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   June	   27,	   1989):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:E27JN9-­‐92:/	  (June	  21,	  2014).	  P91:	  U.S.	   INTERESTS	   IN	  THE	  1990'S-­‐-­‐MANAGING	  THE	  GLOBAL	  ECONOMY-­‐	  FINAL	  REPORT	  OF	  THE	   75TH	  AMERICAN	  ASSEMBLY	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   DOUG	  BEREUTER	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	  May	   18,	  1989):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:E18MY9-­‐148:/	  (June	  21,	  2014).	  P92:	  DISAPPROVING	  THE	  EXPORT	  OF	  TECHNOLOGY	  TO	  CODEVELOP	  OR	  COPRODUCE	  THE	  FSX	  AIRCRAFT	   WITH	   JAPAN	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   16,	   1989):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:S16MY9-­‐55:/	  (June	  21,	  2014).	  P93:	  DISAPPROVING	  THE	  EXPORT	  OF	  TECHNOLOGY	  TO	  CODEVELOP	  OR	  COPRODUCE	  THE	  FSX	  AIRCRAFT	   WITH	   JAPAN	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   12,	   1989):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:S12MY9-­‐112:/	  (June	  21,	  2014).	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P94:	  T.	  BOONE	  PICKENS	  AND	  THE	  FOREIGN	  OWNERSHIP	  DISCLOSURE	  ACT	  -­‐-­‐	  [FROM	  THE	  U.S.	  NEWS	   &	   WORLD	   REPORT,	   APR.	   17,	   1989]	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   May	   11,	   1989):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:E11MY9-­‐500:/	  (June	  21,	  2014).	  P95:	  DISAPPROVING	  THE	  EXPORT	  OF	  TECHNOLOGY	  TO	  CODEVELOP	  OR	  COPRODUCE	  THE	  FSX	  AIRCRAFT	   WITH	   JAPAN	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   11,	   1989):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:S11MY9-­‐106:/	  (June	  21,	  2014).	  P96:	   AMERICAN	   BUSINESS	   AND	   THE	   JAPANESE	   PATENT	   SYSTEM	   (Senate	   -­‐	   April	   13,	   1989):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:S13AP9-­‐1312:/	  (June	  21,	  2014).	  P97:	   AMERICA'S	   RELATIONSHIP	   WITH	   JAPAN	   (Senate	   -­‐	   March	   16,	   1989):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:S16MR9-­‐1451:/	  (June	  21,	  2014).	  P98:	   UNITED	   STATES-­‐JAPAN	   SEMICONDUCTOR	  AGREEMENT	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   RICHARD	  A.	   GEPHARDT	  (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   March	   15,	   1989):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:E15MR9-­‐424:/	  (June	  21,	  2014).	  P99:	   ANOTHER	   GIVEAWAY	   TO	   JAPAN	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   March	   14,	   1989):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:H14MR9-­‐21:/	  (June	  22,	  2014).	  P100:	  THE	  INCREASING	  IMPORTANCE	  OF	  THE	  ASIA-­‐PACIFIC	  REGION	  -­‐-­‐	  (BY	  HAYNES	  JOHNSON)	  (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   March	   02,	   1989):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:E02MR9-­‐425:/	  (June	  22,	  2014).	  P101:	   JAPANESE	   FSX	   FIGHTER	   (Senate	   -­‐	   February	   08,	   1989):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:S08FE9-­‐65:/	  (June	  22,	  2014).	  P102:	  THE	  FSX-­‐	  GOOD	  DEAL	  OR	  DOUBLECROSS_	   -­‐-­‐	   (BY	  CLYDE	  V.	  PRESTOWITZ)	   (Extension	  of	  Remarks	  -­‐	  February	  02,	  1989):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:E02FE9-­‐437:/	  (June	  22,	  2014).	  P103:	   JAPAN	   STRIKES	   UNFAIR	   DEAL	  WITH	   UNITED	   STATES	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   GERALD	   B.H.	   SOLOMON	  (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   January	   24,	   1989):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r101:E24JA9-­‐32:/	  (June	  22,	  2014).	  
Japan	  1994	  P104:	   URUGUAY	   ROUND	   AGREEMENTS	   ACT	   -­‐-­‐	   (BY	   EDWARD	   N.	   LUTTWAK)	   (Extension	   of	  Remarks	   -­‐	   December	   20,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:E20DE4-­‐167:/	  (May	  5,	  2014).	  P105:	   URUGUAY	   ROUND	   AGREEMENTS	   ACT	   (Senate	   -­‐	   November	   30,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S30NO4-­‐34:/	  (May	  5,	  2014).	  P106:	   UNITED	   STATES-­‐JAPAN	   RELATIONS.	   A	   STRATEGIC	   FRAMEWORK	   (Senate	   -­‐	   March	   22,	  1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S22MR4-­‐19:/	  (May	  5,	  2014).	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P107:	   UNITED	   STATES-­‐JAPAN	   TRADE	   TALKS	   (Senate	   -­‐	   September	   28,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S28SE4-­‐733:/	  (May	  6,	  2014).	  P108:	  SENDING	  A	  MESSAGE	  OF	  FREE	  TRADE	  TO	  JAPAN	  (CLYDE	  V.	  PRESTOWITZ	  JR.	  AND	  ALAN	  TONELSON)	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   September	   27,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:E27SE4-­‐1:/	  (May	  6,	  2014).	  P109:	   `WE'VE	   MET	   THE	   ECONOMIC	   ENEMY,	   AND	   HE	   IS	   US'	   (Senate	   -­‐	   September	   19,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S19SE4-­‐234:/	  (May	  6,	  2014).	  P110:	   RACE	   RELATIONS	   AND	   AMERICANS	   FROM	   ASIA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   July	   14,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S14JY4-­‐51:/	  (May	  6,	  2014).	  P111:	   U.S.	   COMPETITIVENESS	   CANNOT	   RELY	   ON	   A	   WEAK	   DOLLAR	   -­‐-­‐	   (BY	   JOHN	   F.	   WELCH)	  (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   July	   01,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:E01JY4-­‐120:/	  (May	  7,	  2014).	  P112:	   AMERICA'S	   ROLE	   IN	   THE	  WORLD	   (Senate	   -­‐	   June	   15,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S15JN4-­‐54:/	  (May	  8,	  2014).	  P113:	   THE	   UNITED	   STATES	   AND	   ASIAN-­‐PACIFIC	   AMERICANS.	   A	   BRIDGE	   FOR	   THE	   PACIFIC	  CENTURY	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   May	   26,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:H26MY4-­‐846:/	  (May	  10,	  2014).	  P114:	   CHINA	   THE	   EMERGING	   ECONOMIC	   COLOSSUS	   -­‐-­‐	   (BY	   HON.	   BARBARA	   HACKMAN	  FRANKLIN,	  FORMER	  U.S.	  SECRETARY	  OF	  COMMERCE)	  (Extension	  of	  Remarks	  -­‐	  March	  21,	  1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:E21MR4-­‐2:/	  (May	  13,	  2014).	  P115:	   THE	   BALANCE	   OF	   TRADE	   (Senate	   -­‐	   March	   16,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S16MR4-­‐53:/	  (May	  14,	  2014).	  P116:UNITED	   STATES-­‐JAPAN	  FRAMEWORK	   INSURANCE	  TALKS	   (Senate	   -­‐	   February	   08,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S08FE4-­‐307:/	  (May	  14,	  2014).	  
Japan	  1995	  (+P123-­‐125	  on	  China)	  P117:	   THINK	   ABOUT	   THE	   BAD	   SITUATION	   OF	   THE	   JAPANESE	   ECONOMY	   BEFORE	   DRIVING	  THEM	  OVER	  THE	  CLIFF	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  -­‐	   June	  28,	  1995):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:H28JN5-­‐58:/	  (May	  19,	  2014).	  P118:	   THE	   DEFICIT	   AND	   TRADE	   (Senate	   -­‐	   June	   21,	   1995):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:S21JN5-­‐1205:/	  (May	  19,	  2014).	  P119:	   UNITED	   STATES-­‐JAPAN	   AUTO	   NEGOTIATIONS	   (Senate	   -­‐	   June	   21,	   1995):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:S21JN5-­‐964:/	  (May	  19,	  2014).	  P120:	   TRADE	   WITH	   JAPAN	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   June	   19,	   1995):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:H19JN5-­‐25:/	  (May	  19,	  2014).	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P121:	   UNITED	   STATES	   ACTION	   ON	   JAPAN	   TRADE	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   10,	   1995):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:S10MY5-­‐344:/	  (May	  19,	  2014).	  P122:	  AUTOMOTIVE	  TRADE	  WITH	   JAPAN	   (Senate	   -­‐	  May	   02,	   1995):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:S02MY5-­‐253:/	  (May	  19,	  2014).	  P123:	   THE	  REAL	   CHINESE	   THREAT	   (Senate	   -­‐	   December	   21,	   1995):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:S21DE5-­‐911:/:	  (May	  19,	  2014).	  P124:	   U.S.-­‐SINO	   RELATIONS	   (Senate	   -­‐	   September	   26,	   1995):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:S26SE5-­‐634:/	  (May	  19,	  2014).	  P125:	   CHINA	   POLICY	   ACT	   OF	   1995	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   July	   20,	   1995):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:H20JY5-­‐119:/	  (May	  19,	  2014).	  P126:	   DISAPPROVAL	   OF	   EXTENSION	   OF	   MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	   TREATMENT	   TO	   THE	  PRODUCTS	  OF	  THE	  PEOPLE'S	  REPUBLIC	  OF	  CHINA	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  -­‐	   July	  20,	  1995):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:H20JY5-­‐866:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P127:	  TRADE	  NEGOTIATIONS	  WITH	  JAPAN	  (Senate	  -­‐	  June	  30,	  1995):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:S30JN5-­‐352:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P128:	   THE	   PRESIDENT	   IS	   CORRECT	   REGARDING	   JAPAN	   -­‐-­‐	   (BY	   LAWRENCE	   CHIMERINE	   AND	  JAMES	   FALLOWS)	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   June	   14,	   1995):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:E14JN5-­‐10:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P129:	   KEEP	   PRESSURE	   ON	   JAPAN	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   May	   11,	   1995):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:H11MY5-­‐70:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P130:	   JAPAN	   TAKES	   UNITED	   STATES	   TO	   COURT	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   May	   10,	   1995):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:H10MY5-­‐62:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P131:	   READ	   THE	   TEA	   LEAVES,	   CONGRESS	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   March	   30,	   1995):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r104:H30MR5-­‐34:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  





Japan	  2000/2001(+P136-­‐138	  on	  China)	  P135:	  SENATE	  RESOLUTION	  275-­‐-­‐EXPRESSING	  THE	  SENSE	  OF	  THE	  SENATE	  REGARDING	  FAIR	  ACCESS	  TO	  JAPANESE	  TELECOMMUNICATIONS	  FACILITIES	  AND	  SERVICES	  -­‐-­‐	  (Senate	  -­‐	  March	  20,	  2000):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r106:S20MR0-­‐0040:/	  (June	  11,	  2014).	  P136:	   TO	  AUTHORIZE	   EXTENSION	  OF	  NONDISCRIMINATORY	  TREATMENT	  TO	  THE	   PEOPLE'S	  REPUBLIC	   OF	   CHINA-­‐-­‐Resumed	   -­‐-­‐	   (Senate	   -­‐	   September	   19,	   2000):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r106:S19SE0-­‐0006:/	  (June	  11,	  2014).	  P137:	   AUTHORIZING	   EXTENSION	   OF	   NONDISCRIMINATORY	   TREATMENT	   (NORMAL	   TRADE	  RELATIONS	  TREATMENT)	  TO	  PEOPLE'S	  REPUBLIC	  OF	  CHINA	  -­‐-­‐	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  -­‐	  May	  24,	  2000):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r106:H24MY0-­‐0011:/	  (June	  11,	  2014).	  P138:	  DISAPPROVAL	  OF	  NORMAL	  TRADE	  RELATIONS	  TREATMENT	  TO	  PRODUCTS	  OF	  PEOPLE'S	  REPUBLIC	  OF	   CHINA	   -­‐-­‐	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   July	   19,	   2001):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r107:H19JY1-­‐0012:/	  (June	  11,	  2014).	  P139:	  BUYING	  OUR	  WAY	  INTO	  BANKRUPTCY	  -­‐-­‐	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  -­‐	  February	  07,	  2001):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r107:H07FE1-­‐0010:/	  (June	  11,	  2014).	  
Japan	  2005	  P140:	  WHERE	   IS	   THE	   U.S.	   BEEF	   IN	   JAPAN	   -­‐-­‐	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   October	   19,	   2005):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r109:H19OC5-­‐0054:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P141:	  UNITED	  STATES	  TRADE	  RIGHTS	  ENFORCEMENT	  ACT	  -­‐-­‐	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  -­‐	  July	  27,	  2005):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r109:H27JY5-­‐0048:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P142:	  UNITED	  STATES	  TRADE	  RIGHTS	  ENFORCEMENT	  ACT	  -­‐-­‐	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  -­‐	  July	  26,	  2005):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r109:H26JY5-­‐0041:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P143:	  AMERICA'S	  PLACE	  IN	  THE	  WORLD	  -­‐-­‐	  (Senate	  -­‐	  June	  24,	  2005):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r109:S24JN5-­‐0027:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P144:	   THE	   U.S.	   ECONOMY	   -­‐-­‐	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   May	   04,	   2005):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r109:H04MY5-­‐0088:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  
China	  1994	  P145:	   DISAPPROVING	   MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	   TREATMENT	   FOR	   CHINA	   (House	   of	  Representatives	  -­‐	  August	  09,	  1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:H09AU4-­‐230:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P146:	   UNITED	   STATES-­‐CHINA	   ACT	   OF	   1994	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   August	   09,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:H09AU4-­‐436:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	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P147:	   FOCUSSING	   MFN	   FOR	   CHINA	   ON	   UNITED	   STATES	   INTERESTS	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   DAVID	   DREIER	  (Extension	   of	  Remarks	   -­‐	  May	  26,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:E26MY4-­‐1236:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P148:	   EXTENDING	   MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	   STATUS	   TO	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   25,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S25MY4-­‐92:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P149:	   UNITED	   STATES	   POLICY	   TOWARD	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   19,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S19MY4-­‐12:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P150:	   CHINA'S	   MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	   TRADING	   STATUS	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   18,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S18MY4-­‐32:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P151:	   REMARKS	   OF	   JEFFREY	   E.	   GARTEN,	   UNDERSECRETARY	   OF	   COMMERCE	   FOR	  INTERNATIONAL	   TRADE	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   12,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S12MY4-­‐517:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P152:	   MOVING	   BEYOND	   TIANANMEN	   LEARNING	   THE	   LESSONS	   OF	   CHINA	   POLICY	   (House	   of	  Representatives	   -­‐	   April	   26,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:H26AP4-­‐14:/	  (May	  20,	  2014).	  P153:	  RETHINKING	  UNITED	  STATES	  POLICY	  ON	  CHINA	  -­‐-­‐	  (BY	  STANLEY	  LUBMAN)	  (Extension	  of	  Remarks	   -­‐	   March	   11,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:E11MR4-­‐188:/	   (May	  20,	  2014).	  P154:	   FREEDOM	   AND	   LIBERTY	   FOLLOW	   FREE	   MARKETS	   AND	   CAPITALISM	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   DANA	  ROHRABACHER	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   September	   20,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:E20SE4-­‐343:/	  (May	  21,	  2014).	  P155:	   THE	  AMERICAN	  ECONOMY	  AND	  THE	  REST	  OF	  THE	  WORLD	  TWO	  SIDES	  OF	  THE	   SAME	  COIN	   (Senate	   -­‐	   July	  13,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S13JY4-­‐828:/	   (May	  21,	  2014).	  P156:	   THE	   PROPOSED	   SANCTIONS	   BILL	   ON	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   June	   16,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S16JN4-­‐232:/	  (May	  21,	  2014).	  P157:	   CHINA'S	   MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	   TRADE	   STATUS	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   25,	   1994):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S25MY4-­‐393:/	  (May	  21,	  2014).	  P158:	   SENATOR	   JEPSEN'S	   CASE	   FOR	   RENEWING	   MFN	   FOR	   CHINA	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   JAMES	   A.	   LEACH	  (Extension	   of	  Remarks	   -­‐	  May	  23,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:E23MY4-­‐293:/	  (May	  21,	  2014).	  P159:	   MFN	   STATUS	   FOR	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   19,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S19MY4-­‐21:/	  (May	  22,	  2014).	  P160:	   MFN	   FOR	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   16,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S16MY4-­‐48:/	  (May	  22,	  2014).	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P161:	   MFN	   FOR	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   May	   09,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S09MY4-­‐172:/	  (May	  22,	  2014).	  P162:	   MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	   STATUS	   FOR	   CHINA	   SHOULD	   BE	   DENIED	   (House	   of	  Representatives	   -­‐	   March	   21,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:H21MR4-­‐1536:/	  (May	  22,	  2014).	  P163:	  STANDING	  UP	  TO	  CHINA	  -­‐-­‐	  [FROM	  THE	  NEW	  YORK	  TIMES,	  MARCH	  16,	  1994]	  (Extension	  of	   Remarks	   -­‐	  March	   16,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:E16MR4-­‐2:/	   (May	  22,	  2014).	  P164:	   47.THE	   BALANCE	   OF	   TRADE	   (Senate	   -­‐	   March	   16,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S16MR4-­‐53:/	  (May	  22,	  2014).	  P165:	   MFN	   FOR	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   March	   15,	   1994):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r103:S15MR4-­‐690:/	  (May	  22,	  2014).	  





China1997	  P175:	   COMMUNIST	   CHINA	   SUBSIDY	   REDUCTION	   ACT	   OF	   1997	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	  November	   06,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:H06NO7-­‐576:/	   (May	   26,	  2014).	  P176:	   DISAPPROVAL	   OF	   MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	   TREATMENT	   FOR	   CHINA	   (House	   of	  Representatives	   -­‐	   June	   24,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:H24JN7-­‐154:/	  (May	  26,	  2014).	  P177:	   REMARKS	   ON	   THE	   RENEWAL	   OF	   CHINA'S	   MFN	   TRADE	   STATUS	   WITH	   THE	   UNITED	  STATES	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   June	   24,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:H24JN7-­‐712:/	  (May	  26,	  2014).	  P178:	   MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	   STATUS	   FOR	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   June	   19,	   1997):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:S19JN7-­‐30:/	  (May	  27,	  2014).	  P179:	  MFN	  TRADE	  STATUS	   IS	  OUR	  BEST	  TOOL	  FOR	   IMPROVING	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	   IN	  CHINA	   -­‐-­‐	  (BY	   DAVID	   DREIER)	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   May	   23,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:E23MY7-­‐157:/	  (May	  27,	  2014).	  P180:	   IT	   IS	   IN	   AMERICA'S	   INTEREST	   TO	   REVOKE	   CHINA'S	   MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	   STATUS	  (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   April	   14,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:H14AP7-­‐54:/	  (May	  27,	  2014).	  P181:	   CHINA	   -­‐-­‐	   (BY	   HOLMAN	   W.	   JENKINS	   JR.)	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   October	   30,	   1997):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:E30OC7-­‐40:/	  (May	  27,	  2014).	  P182:	   THE	   CHINA	   SUMMIT	   WHAT	   KIND	   OF	   ENGAGEMENT	   (Senate	   -­‐	   September	   17,	   1997):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:S17SE7-­‐17:/	  (May	  27,	  2014).	  P183:	   TRADE	   WITH	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   July	   28,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:S28JY7-­‐70:/	  (May	  29,	  2014).	  P184:	  WHY	   I	   SUPPORT	   NORMAL	   TRADE	   RELATIONS	   FOR	   CHINA	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   LEE	   H.	   HAMILTON	  (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   July	   08,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:E08JY7-­‐142:/	  (May	  29,	  2014).	  P185:	  DISAPPROVAL	  OF	  MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	  TREATMENT	  FOR	  CHINA	  -­‐-­‐	  HON.	  GEORGE	  R.	  NETHERCUTT,	   JR.	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   June	   27,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:E27JN7-­‐420:/	  (May	  29,	  2014).	  P186:	   COMMUNIST	   CHINA	   AMERICA'S	   MOST	   FAVORED	   NATION	   (Senate	   -­‐	   June	   23,	   1997):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:S23JN7-­‐119:/	  (May	  29,	  2014).	  P187:	   MOST-­‐FAVORED-­‐NATION	   TRADE	   STATUS	   FOR	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   June	   23,	   1997):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:S23JN7-­‐143:/	  (June	  3,	  2014).	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P188:	   UNITED	   STATES-­‐CHINA	   RELATIONS	   THE	   CASE	   FOR	   ENGAGEMENT	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   LEE	   H.	  HAMILTON	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   June	   16,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:E16JN7-­‐9:/	  (June	  3,	  2014).	  P189:	   MFN	   FOR	   CHINA	   AND	   NAFTA	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   June	   03,	   1997):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:H03JN7-­‐392:/	  (June	  3,	  2014).	  P190:	   UNITED	   STATES-­‐CHINA	   RELATIONS	   IN	   THE	   PACIFIC	   CENTURY	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   ENI	   F.H.	  FALEOMAVAEGA	   (Extension	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   May	   23,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:E23MY7-­‐176:/	  (June	  3,	  2014).	  P191:	   AGAINST	   MFN	   FOR	   CHINA	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   April	   23,	   1997):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:H23AP7-­‐495:/	  (June	  6,	  2014).	  P192:	  COSCO	  A	  COMMUNIST	  CHINESE-­‐OWNED	  COMPANY	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  -­‐	  April	  15,	  1997):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:H15AP7-­‐536:/	  (June	  6,	  2014).	  P193:	   RELATIONSHIP	   WITH	   CHINA	   (Senate	   -­‐	   January	   30,	   1997):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r105:S30JA7-­‐69:/	  (June	  6,	  2014).	  
China	  2000	  P194:	   TO	  AUTHORIZE	   EXTENSION	  OF	  NONDISCRIMINATORY	  TREATMENT	  TO	  THE	   PEOPLE'S	  REPUBLIC	   OF	   CHINA-­‐-­‐MOTION	   TO	   PROCEED-­‐-­‐Continued	   -­‐-­‐	   (Senate	   -­‐	   September	   05,	   2000):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r106:S05SE0-­‐0022:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P195:	   AUTHORIZING	   EXTENSION	   OF	   NONDISCRIMINATORY	   TREATMENT	   (NORMAL	   TRADE	  RELATIONS	  TREATMENT)	  TO	  PEOPLE'S	  REPUBLIC	  OF	  CHINA	  -­‐-­‐	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  -­‐	  May	  23,	  2000):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r106:H23MY0-­‐0069:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P196:	   NORMAL	   TRADE	   RELATIONS	   TREATMENT	   FOR	   THE	   PEOPLE'S	   REPUBLIC	   OF	   CHINA-­‐-­‐MESSAGE	   FROM	   THE	   PRESIDENT-­‐-­‐PM	   90	   -­‐-­‐	   (Senate	   -­‐	   March	   08,	   2000):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r106:S08MR0-­‐0063:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P197:	  PERMANENT	  NORMAL	  TRADING	  RELATIONS	  WITH	  CHINA	  -­‐-­‐	  (Senate	  -­‐	  March	  06,	  2000):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r106:S06MR0-­‐0019:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P198:	   THE	   TRADE	   DEFICIT	   -­‐-­‐	   (Senate	   -­‐	   February	   03,	   2000):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r106:S03FE0-­‐0046:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P199:	   THE	   STATE	   OF	   THE	   UNION	   ADDRESS	   BY	   THE	   PRESIDENT	   OF	   THE	   UNITED	   STATES	   -­‐-­‐	  (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   January	   27,	   2000):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r106:H27JA0-­‐0060:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P200:	  DISAPPROVAL	  OF	  NORMAL	  TRADE	  RELATIONS	  TREATMENT	  TO	  PRODUCTS	  OF	  PEOPLE'S	  REPUBLIC	  OF	   CHINA	   -­‐-­‐	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   July	   19,	   2001):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r107:H19JY1-­‐0012:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	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P201:	   THREAT	   OF	   THE	   PEOPLE'S	   REPUBLIC	   OF	   CHINA	   AND	   MASSIVE	   UNCONTROLLED	  IMMIGRATION	   -­‐-­‐	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   June	   14,	   2001):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r107:H14JN1-­‐0051:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P202:	   WAKE	   UP,	   AMERICA	   ENGAGEMENT	   WITH	   CHINA	   HAS	   FAILED	   -­‐-­‐	   (House	   of	  Representatives	   -­‐	  April	  24,	  2001):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r107:H24AP1-­‐0067:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P203:	   COLUMN	   ILLUMINATES	   NEED	   FOR	   CONTINUED	   ENGAGEMENT	   WITH	   THE	   PEOPLE'S	  REPUBLIC	   OF	   CHINA	   -­‐-­‐	   HON.	   DOUG	   BEREUTER	   (Extensions	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   June	   06,	   2001):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r107:E06JN1-­‐0059:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  P204:	   QUALITY	   OF	   AMERICAN	   DEMOCRACY	   -­‐-­‐	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   -­‐	   May	   22,	   2001):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r107:H22MY1-­‐0041:/	  (June	  12,	  2014).	  




China	  2008	  P214:	   STIMULUS	   PACKAGE	   -­‐-­‐	   (Senate	   -­‐	   January	   30,	   2008):	   http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r110:S30JA8-­‐0016:/	  (June	  13,	  2014).	  P215:	   U.S.	   TRADE	   AND	   MANUFACTURING	   POLICY	   -­‐-­‐	   (Senate	   -­‐	   December	   11,	   2008):	  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/z?r110:S11DE8-­‐0038:/	  (June	  13,	  2014).	  P216:	   CALLING	   ON	   CHINA	   TO	   END	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   ABUSES	   PRIOR	   TO	   THE	   OLYMPICS	   -­‐-­‐	  (Extensions	   of	   Remarks	   -­‐	   August	   01,	   2008):	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SUMMARY	  IN	  GERMAN/DEUTSCHSPRACHIGE	  ZUSAMMENFASSUNG	  	  
Einführung	  	  Seit	   den	   1970er	   Jahren	   kreisen	   die	   wirtschaftspolitischen	   Debatten	   in	   den	   USA	   um	   die	   Frage	  eines	   vermeintlichen	   Ausverkaufs	   amerikanischer	   Interessen,	   sowie	   eines	   möglichen	   globalen	  Abstiegs	   oder	   Niedergangs	   der	   USA,	   im	   Angesicht	   von	   steigendem	   Handelsbilanzdefizit	   und	  steigender	   Verschuldung	   gegenüber	   dem	   größten	   wirtschaftlichen	   Konkurrenten	   (Nymalm	  2011).	   In	   den	   1980er	   Jahren	   wurde	   diese	   Debatte	   zum	   Ausgangspunkt	   und	   Katalysator	   des	  Diskurses	   um	   den	   „Aufstieg	   Japans“	   als	   potentielle	   Herausforderung	   der	   liberalen	  Welt(wirtschafts)ordnung	   samt	   ihrem	   Vorreiter,	   den	   USA.	   Der	   Diskurs	   um	   das	   sogenannte	  „Japan-­‐Problem“	  in	  den	  USA	  bis	  Mitte	  der	  1990er	  Jahre	  (vgl.	  Van	  Wolferen	  1986)	  –	  welcher	  eine	  schwere	  Krise	   im	  U.S.-­‐japanischen	  Verhältnis	  verursachte	  –	  weist	  erhebliche	  Ähnlichkeiten	  mit	  den	  Diskursen	  um	  den	  “Aufstieg	  Chinas“	  und	  eine	  mögliche	  chinesische	  Bedrohung	  seit	  Mitte	  der	  1990er	  auf.	  Die	  Hauptcharakteristika	  in	  beiden	  Diskursen	  bestehen	  in	  den	  Vorwürfen	  „unfairer	  Praktiken“	   an	   Japan	   und	   China	   –	   in	   Gestalt	   von	   „Währungsmanipulation“	   und	   „verschlossenen	  Märkten“	   –	   die	   zu	   Wettbewerbsnachteilen	   und	   negativen	   Konsequenzen	   für	   die	   U.S.-­‐	   und	  Weltwirtschaft	  führten	  (Curtis	  2000;	  Evenett	  2010;	  Ge	  2013;	  cf.	  Hummel	  1997,	  38;	  Keidel	  2011;	  Otte	   and	   Grimes	   1993,	   121).	   Besonders	   beachtenswert	   sind	   hierbei	   die	   rhetorischen	  Ähnlichkeiten	   in	   der	   Bezeichnung	   zunächst	   Japans,	   dann	   Chinas	   als	   ‚anders‘	   und	   demzufolge	  feindlich	   und	   bedrohlich;	   dieses	   insbesondere	   vor	   dem	  Hintergrund	   der	  Unterschiedlichkeiten	  zwischen	   dem	   so	   artikulierten	   „demokratischen	   Japan“	   und	   dem	   „kommunistischen	   China“,	  sowie	   in	   ihren	   bilateralen	   Beziehungen	   zu	   den	   USA.	   Die	   zur	   jeweiligen	   Zeit	   omnipräsenten	  Diskurse	  um	  Japans	  bzw.	  Chinas	  Aufstieg,	  in	  beiden	  Fällen	  im	  Zusammenhang	  mit	  gleichzeitigen	  wirtschaftlichen	   Problemen	   der	   USA,	   knüpfen	   an	   die	   Thesen	   um	   einen	   Abstieg	   oder	  Bedeutungsverlust	   der	   USA	   oder	   des	   gesamten	   „Westens“	   an,	   die	   von	   Politik,	   Medien	   und	  Wissenschaft	  in	  verschiedenen	  Formen	  –	  als	  Fragestellung,	  Prognose	  oder	  Diagnose	  –	  diskutiert	  werden.	  	  Während	   sowohl	   Japans	   als	   auch	   Chinas	   wirtschaftlicher	   Aufstieg	   zunächst	   begrüßt	   und	   als	  „wirtschaftliches	  Wunder“	  bezeichnet	  wurden,	  entwickelten	  sich	   in	  beiden	  Fällen	  handels-­‐	  und	  währungspolitische	   Fragen	   zu	   den	   umstrittensten	   Themen	   in	   den	  Wirtschaftsbeziehungen	  mit	  den	  USA.	  Seit	  den	  1980er	  Jahren	  (mit	  Bezug	  auf	  Japan)	  bzw.	  seit	  2000	  (mit	  Bezug	  auf	  China)	  wird	  vor	   allem	   im	   U.S.	   Kongress,	   aber	   auch	   in	   der	   öffentlichen	   politischen	   Diskussion	   und	   in	   den	  Medien	   von	   der	   jeweiligen	   Regierung	   ein	   härteres	   Vorgehen	   gegenüber	   dem	   Konkurrenten	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gefordert,	  während	  diese	  in	  der	  Regel	  generell	  eher	  zurückhaltend	  ist,	  wenn	  es	  um	  den	  Beschluss	  konkreter	  handels-­‐	  oder	  währungspolitischer	  Gegenmaßnahmen	  geht.	  	  In	   den	   innenpolitischen	   Auseinandersetzungen	   kreist	   eine	   zentrale	   Frage	   um	   einen	   der	  Leitgedanken	  der	  U.S.-­‐Außenhandelspolitik:	  den	  transformativen	  Effekt	  liberaler	  Handelspolitik	  nicht	   nur	   auf	   das	   wirtschaftliche,	   sondern	   auch	   und	   gerade	   auf	   das	   politische	   System	   des	  Handelspartners	   –	   ein	   Hauptargument	   der	   Befürworter	   von	   Chinas	   (in	   den	   USA	   heftig	  umstrittenen)	   Betritt	   zur	   WTO	   2001	   (New	   York	   Times	   2000).	   Insbesondere	   der	   damalige	  Präsident	  Clinton	  argumentierte,	  dass	  die	  Öffnung	  der	  chinesischen	  Märkte	  –	  zusätzlich	  zu	  den	  erwarteten	   Vorteilen	   für	   die	   U.S.-­‐Wirtschaft	   –	   die	   Stellung	   der	   Kommunistischen	   Partei	  untergraben	  würde	   (Sanger	  2000).	  Dahingegen	  wurde	  mit	  der	  Zeit	  dieser	  Leitgedanke	  und	  die	  damit	   im	   Einklang	   stehende	   Politik	   zunehmend	   als	   Hauptursache	   des	   wirtschaftspolitischen	  Ungleichgewichts	   zwischen	  China	  und	  den	  USA	   ausgemacht	   und	  kritisiert,	   in	   dessen	  Folge	  das	  Handelsbilanzdefizit	  zum	  „Symbol	  des	  amerikanischen	  Niedergangs,	  welches	  den	  Glauben	  vieler	  Amerikaner	  in	  den	  Freihandel	  vergiftet	  hat“,	  geworden	  ist	  (Lightizer	  2010).	  	  Ebenso	  wie	   der	   Erfolg	   der	   „Freihandelsagenda“	  mit	   Bezug	   auf	   China	   angezweifelt	  wird,	   so	  glaubten	   auch	   die	   sogenannten	   Revisionisten	   im	   Falle	   Japans	   nicht	   an	   ihre	  Wirkung	   (Hummel	  1997,	   35f.).371	  Sie	   argumentierten	   seit	   den	   1980er	   Jahren,	   dass	   Japan	   und	   seine	   Wirtschaft	  „anders,	  verschlossen	  und	  feindlich“	  gegenüber	  den	  USA	  seien,	  und	  Japan	  darum	  auch	  nicht	  –	  wie	  bisher	  allgemein	  angenommen	  –	  den	  von	  den	  USA	  vorgesehenen	  Weg	  der	  marktwirtschaftlichen	  Liberalisierung	   beschreiten	  würde	   (Uriu	   2000,	   214).372	  Die	   Revisionisten	   gewannen	   zu	   Beginn	  der	  Clinton-­‐Regierung	  erheblichen	  politischen	  Einfluss,	  und	  ihre	  Argumente	  leisteten	  schließlich	  dem	  sogenannten	  ergebnisorientierten	  („results	  oriented“)	  Ansatz	  in	  den	  Handelsgesprächen	  mit	  Japan	   Vorschub,	   welcher	   sich	   jedoch	   als	   Fehlschlag	   herausstellen	   sollte	   und	   nach	   einem	  gescheiterten	   Gipfeltreffen	   1994	  wieder	   verworfen	  wurde	   (vgl.	   Hummel	   1997,	   23).	   Zu	   diesem	  Zeitpunkt	   hatten	   der	   Politikwechsel	   und	   die	   damit	   einhergehenden	   Debatten	   um	   Japans	  „Andersartigkeit“	   und	   Unfairness	   in	   den	   USA	   bereits	   erheblich	   zur	   bisher	   schwersten	   Krise	   in	  den	   bilateralen	   Beziehungen	   beigetragen,	   der	   das	   Potential	   beigemessen	  wurde,	   die	   Basis	   der	  Beziehungen	  dauerhaft	  zu	  beschädigen	  (Curtis	  2000,	  19;	  Otte	  and	  Grimes	  1993,	  138).	  Im	  Kontext	  der	   Asien-­‐Krise	   und	   den	   Schwierigkeiten	   der	   japanischen	   Wirtschaft	   verschwand	   das	   „Japan-­‐Problem“	   spätestens	   mit	   dem	   in	   den	   1990er	   Jahren	   beginnenden	   rasanten	   wirtschaftlichen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  371	  Die	   bekanntesten	   Vertreter	   der	   revisionistischen	   Auffassung	   waren	   James	   Fallows,	   Chalmers	   Johnson,	   Clyde	  Prestowitz	  und	  Karel	  van	  Wolferen,	  zu	  ihrer	  Zeit	  auch	  als	  “Gang	  of	  Four”	  bezeichnet.	  Für	  eine	  Selbstcharakterisierung	  (vgl.	   Fallows	   et	   al.	   1990),	   für	   eine	   Zusammenfassung	   ihrer	   wichtigsten	   Positionen	   (Hummel	   1997,	   25ff.;	   Otte	   und	  Grimes	  1993,	  119ff.	  ).	  372	  In	  der	  öffentlichen	  Wahrnehmung	  in	  den	  USA	  galt	  Japans	  wirtschaftliche	  Stärke	  zeitweise	  als	  	  größere	  Bedrohung	  als	  die	  sowjetische	  Militärmacht	  (Campbell	  1994,	  147).	  
319	  
	  
Wachstum	   Chinas	   quasi	   von	   selbst	   von	   der	   Tagesordnung,	   bzw.	   die	   Aufmerksamkeit	   der	   USA	  verlagerte	   sich	   rasch	   von	   Tokio	   nach	   Peking	   (Bob	   2001,	   95;	   Curtis	   2000,	   32;	   Kirshner	   2008,	  247).373	  Während	   bislang	   kein	   derartiger	   „Ausweg“	   aus	   den	   U.S.-­‐chinesischen	   Handels-­‐	   und	  Währungsstreitigkeiten	   in	   Sicht	   ist	   –	   wobei	   sich	   die	   Stimmen,	   die	   eine	   chinesische	   Krise	  befürchten,	  mehren	  –	  kommt	  man	  nicht	  umhin,	  sich	  zu	  fragen,	  was	  der	  historische	  Fall	  Japans	  für	  die	  China-­‐Politik	  der	  USA	  seit	  den	  1990er	  Jahren	  bedeuten	  könnte,	  eine	  Frage,	  die	  bislang	  nahezu	  komplett	  von	  der	  Forschung	  zu	  U.S.-­‐chinesischen	  Beziehungen	  ausgespart	  wurde.	  	  
Ausgangspunkt	  und	  Forschungsfragen	  	  
	  In	   meiner	   Arbeit	   gehe	   ich	   von	   der	   Annahme	   aus,	   dass	   die	   Formulierung	   der	   U.S.-­‐Außenwirtschaftspolitik	   gegenüber	   Japan	   und	   China	   über	   wirtschaftspolitische	   Fragen	   im	  engeren	  Sinne	  hinausgeht,	  und	  Prozesse	  der	  Artikulation	  und	  Konstitution	  kollektiver	  und/oder	  nationaler	  Identität	  im	  Zusammenhang	  wirtschaftlicher	  und	  politischer	  Ordnung	  impliziert	  (vgl.	  Nymalm	   2011b,	   6f.).	   Diese	   Einschätzung	   basiert	   auf	   vor	   allem	   durch	   den	   Poststrukturalismus	  inspirierten	   Theorien,	   die	   davon	   ausgehen,	   dass	   jegliche	   Identität	   nur	   in	   Differenz	   zu	   dem	  besteht,	   was	   sie	   nicht	   ist,	   d.h.	   dass	   sich	   die	   Identität	   des	   ‘Selbst‘	   nur	   über	   den	  ‘Anderen‘	  konstituiert.	  In	  diesem	  Zusammenhang	  problematisiere	  ich	  die	  Diskurse	  in	  den	  USA	  als	  Ausdruck	   einer	   ‘Identitätskrise‘	   –	   in	   Folge	   des	   Aufstiegs	   und	   wirtschaftlichen	   Erfolges	   von	  Ländern,	   die	   sich	   nicht	   nach	   dem	   „liberalen	   Modell“	   der	   USA	   entwickeln	   –	   die	   sich	   in	   der	  Artikulation	   des	   wirtschaftlichen	   Hauptkonkurrenten	   als	   Bedrohung	   äußert,	   und	   nach	  entsprechenden	  politischen	  Maßnahmen	  verlangt.	  	  Nach	   meinem	   Verständnis	   lässt	   sich	   das	   Selbstbild	   oder	   Selbstverständnis374 	  der	   USA	   als	  Vorreiter	   des	   „liberalen	   Modells“	   in	   erster	   Linie	   auf	   die	   Gedankenstränge	   der	   sogenannten	  „liberal	   theory	   of	   history“	   und	   des	   „American	   exceptionalism“	   zurückführen.	   Erstere	   geht	   vom	  unbedingten	   Zusammenhang	   zwischen	   wirtschaftlicher	   und	   politischer	   Liberalisierung	   aus,	  letztere	  von	  der	  Mission	  der	  USA	  als	  Vorreiter	  und	  Wegweiser	  dieser	  Entwicklung	  (vgl.	  Krause	  2008;	  Mandelbaum	  2002,	  6;	  McEvoy-­‐Levy	  2001,	  23ff.;	  Nabers	  und	  Patman	  2008),	  im	  Sinne	  eines	  „Endes	   der	   Geschichte“	   (vgl.	   Fukuyama	   1989).	   In	   den	   Diskursen	   um	   Japans	   und	   Chinas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  373	  Uriu	  diagnostiziert	  darüber	  hinaus	  eine	  “Japan-­‐Müdigkeit”	  in	  der	  Clinton-­‐Administration,	  d.h.	  man	  wollte	  so	  wenig	  mit	  Japan	  zu	  tun	  haben	  wie	  möglich	  –	  was	  in	  Japan	  selbst	  auch	  so	  wahrgenommen	  wurde	  (Uriu	  2009,	  240).	  374	  Die	   Verwendung	   dieses	   Ausdrucks	   geht	   nicht	   mit	   einem	   Verständnis	   des	   Subjekts	   als	   in	   sich	   abgeschlossener,	  rationaler	  und	  strategischer	  Akteur	  einher,	  wie	  am	  Konzept	  der	  ‚Identität‘	  im	  Sinne	  der	  PDT	  deutlich	  gemacht	  wird.	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wirtschaftlichen	  Aufstieg	  werden	   Japan	   und	   China	   als	  Herausforderung	   für	   dieses	  Modell,	   und	  damit	  auch	  für	  die	  Rolle	  und	  das	  Selbstverständnis	  der	  USA,	  artikuliert	  (vgl.	  N.	  Morris	  2010,	  2),	  da	   sie	   wirtschaftliches	   Wachstum	   ohne	   marktwirtschaftliche	   (Japan)	   bzw.	   politische	   (China)	  Liberalisierung375	  nach	   dem	   Vorbild	   der	   USA	   erreichen.	   Demgegenüber	   können	   die	   USA	   ihre	  weltwirtschaftliche	   Vorreiterrolle	   in	   dem	  Maße	   nicht	  mehr	   erfüllen,	   als	   dass	   sie	   zum	  weltweit	  größten	   Schuldner	   zunächst	   gegenüber	   Japan,	   seit	   2008	   gegenüber	   China	   geworden	   sind,	   und	  das	  weltweit	  größte	  bilaterale	  Handelsbilanzdefizit	  zunächst	  mit	  Japan,	  und	  seit	  2000	  mit	  China	  haben.	  Im	  Vokabular	  der	  Politischen	  Diskurstheorie	  gesprochen:	  die	  Identitätskrise	  manifestiert	  sich	  in	  der	  Dislokation	  des	  bisherigen	  hegemonialen	  Diskurses	  der	  „liberal	  theory	  of	  history“	  und	  des	   „American	   exceptionalism“	   in	   ihrer	   Bedeutung	   für	   die	   liberale	   Identität	   der	   USA.	   Dieser	  Herausforderung	  an	  die	  eigene	  Identität	  begegnet	  man	  in	  den	  USA	  mit	  einer	  Externalisierung	  des	  Problems,	  d.h.	  seiner	  Zuschreibung	  an	  äußere	  Gründe	  und	  Akteure,	  was	  überwiegend	   in	  einem	  Bedrohungsdiskurs	  gegenüber	  „dem	  externen	  Anderen“	  mündet	  (Campbell	  1998,	  62).	  	  Mein	  Hauptanliegen	   in	  dieser	  Arbeit	   ist	  es	  demnach,	  den	  Fokus	  auf	  die	  Frage	  zu	   legen,	  wie	  amerikanische	   Identität	   in	   den	   wirtschaftspolitischen	   Auseinandersetzungen	   gegenüber	   Japan	  und	  China	  artikuliert	  wird,	  und	  was	  Unterschiede	  und	  Gemeinsamkeiten	  über	  meine	  Annahmen	  bezüglich	   ihrer	  Herausforderung	  bedeuten.	  Die	  Leitfragen	  bestehen	  demzufolge	  darin,	   	   ob	  und	  wie	   Japan	  und	  China	   im	  Kontext	  der	  handels-­‐	  und	  währungspolitischen	  Auseinandersetzungen	  nicht	   nur	   als	   wirtschaftliche	   Konkurrenten,	   sondern	   als	   Bedrohung	   artikuliert	   wurden,	   was	  dieses	  über	   liberale	  amerikanische	   Identität	  aussagt,	  und	  welche	  Rolle	  der	  Zusammenhang	  zur	  Diskussion	  um	  einen	  möglichen	  Abstieg	  der	  USA/des	  Westens	  spielt.	  Der	   Fokus	   auf	  wirtschaftspolitische	   Fragen	  bietet	   sich	   im	  Hinblick	   auf	   drei	  Gründe	   an:	   der	  Dreh-­‐	   und	   Angelpunkt	   für	   die	   Diskurse	   um	   Japans	   und	   Chinas	   Aufstieg	   liegt	   in	   ihrer	  wirtschaftlichen	  Performanz	  begründet,	  Handels-­‐	  (und	  Währungs)fragen	  gehörten	  und	  gehören	  zu	  den	  wichtigsten	  und	  gleichzeitig	  umstrittensten	  Themen	  in	  den	  bilateralen	  Beziehungen,	  und	  schließlich	   ist	   der	   wirtschaftliche	   Erfolg	   in	   puncto	   Durchsetzung	   des	   liberal-­‐demokratisch-­‐kapitalistischen	  Modells	   eines	  der	  Hauptmerkmale	  wenn	  es	  um	  das	  Selbstverständnis	  der	  USA	  als	  Vorreiter	  dieser	  Entwicklung	  geht.	  Das	  Thema	  berührt	  somit	  die	  Disziplinen	  Internationale	  Beziehungen	  (IB)	  und	  Internationale	  Politische	   Ökonomie	   (IPÖ).	   Gleichzeitig	   weicht	   der	   auf	   poststrukturalistischer	   und	   politischer	  Diskurstheorie	   basierende	   Ansatz	   von	   der	   theoretischen	   und	   methodologischen	  Hauptausrichtung	   der	   Disziplinen	   im	   allgemeinen,	   und	   der	   Forschung	   zu	   U.S.-­‐chinesischen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  375 	  In	   diesem	   Zusammenhang	   stehen	   die	   Diskussionen	   um	   einen	   “Beijing	   Consensus”	   oder	   einen	   autoritären,	  illiberalen,	  oder	  Staatskapitalismus	  (vgl.	  Gat	  2007;	  Halper	  2010;	  Rachman	  2008;	  Wooldridge	  2012).	  
321	  
	  
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen	   im	  speziellen	  ab,	  und	  eröffnet	   somit	   eine	  neue	  Forschungsperspektive	  auf	  ein	  aktuelles	  Thema	  von	  politischer	  Relevanz.	  	  	  
Bisherige	  Forschung	  und	  Relevanz	  des	  Projektes	  	  	  In	   der	   bisherigen	   Forschung	   zu	   den	   U.S.-­‐chinesischen	   Beziehungen	   wird	   eine	   historische	  Perspektive	  mit	  Bezug	  auf	  den	  Japan-­‐Fall	  hinsichtlich	  des	  Diskurses	  um	  den	  Aufstieg	  Chinas	  und	  einen	  ‘Bedeutungsverlust‘	  oder	  gar	  Abstieg	  der	  USA	  weitgehend	  außer	  Acht	  gelassen.	  Es	  gibt	  nur	  sehr	  wenige	  umfangreichere	  Studien	  zu	  U.S.-­‐chinesischen	  Beziehungen	  im	  allgemeinen,	  oder	  zu	  Wirtschaftsbeziehungen	   im	   spezielleren,	   die	   generell	   einen	   post-­‐positivistischen,	   oder	   im	  Einzelnen	   einen	   diskurstheoretischen	   oder	   –analytischen	   Ansatz	   verfolgen.376	  Dies	   ist	   umso	  überraschender,	  da	  es	  im	  Bereich	  U.S.-­‐japanischer	  (Wirtschafts)beziehungen	  durchaus	  Arbeiten	  gibt,	   an	   die	   sich	   anknüpfen	   ließe	   (z.B.	   Campbell	   1994;	   Hummel	   1997,	   2000;	   N.	   Morris	   2010;	  Tuathail	  1993).	  	  Der	  Revisionismus	  wird	  in	  den	  meisten	  Arbeiten	  zu	  U.S.-­‐japanischen	  Beziehungen	  behandelt	  (Curtis	   2000;	   Schoppa	   1997),	   wobei	   die	   Untersuchung	   von	   Robert	   M.	   Uriu	   sich	   am	  detailliertesten	   mit	   dem	   „revisionistischen	   Umschwung“	   der	   U.S.-­‐Politik	   gegenüber	   Japan	  auseinandersetzt	  (Uriu	  2009).	  Dabei	  ist	  sein	  Ansatz	  auch	  charakteristisch	  für	  die	  Thematisierung	  von	  „Ideen“	  in	  den	  IB	  und	  der	  IPÖ.	  In	  seinem	  Analyserahmen	  geht	  es	  darum,	  den	  Einfluss	  „nicht-­‐materieller	   Variablen	   –	   neuer	   Ideen“	   zu	   untersuchen,	   um	   „Wandel	   in	   Interessen	   und	  Entscheidungen“	   zu	   erklären.	   Uriu	   argumentiert	   dabei,	   dass	   es	   die	   „revisionistische	   Idee“	   von	  Japan	   als	   anders,	   feindlich	   und	   verschlossen	  war,	   die	   zu	  Beginn	  der	   Clinton-­‐Administration	   zu	  einem	  Politikwechsel	  gegenüber	  Japan	  geführt	  habe	  (Uriu	  2000,	  214,221,	  2009).	  Im	  Zuge	  seiner	  Konzeptualisierung	  des	  Revisionismus	  als	  „policy	  assumption“	  schreibt	  Uriu	  den	  Einfluss	  dieser	  „nicht-­‐materiellen	   Variable“	   bestimmten	   Akteuren	   zu,	   deren	   entscheidende	   und	   zentrale	   Rolle	  zur	  Durchsetzung	  des	  Revisionismus	  bei	  der	  Clinton-­‐Regierung	  geführt	  habe	  (Uriu	  2009,	  10).377	  Meiner	   Ansicht	   nach	   geht	   er	   damit	   nicht	   weit	   genug,	   da	   er	   sich	   nicht	   mit	   der	   Frage	  auseinandersetzt,	  wie	  diese	  „Annahmen“	  auf	  eine	  Art	  und	  Weise	  artikuliert	  wurden,	  die	  andere	  Auffassungen	  ausschlossen	  bzw.	  widerlegten,	  wie	  also	  der	  Revisionismus	  in	  der	  konkreten	  Praxis	  zu	   einem	   hegemonialen	   Diskurs	   wurde.	   Dieser	   Frage	   lässt	   sich	   mit	   einer	   Diskursanalyse,	   die	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  376	  Nennenswerte	   Ausnahmen	   sind	   beispielsweise	   Goh	   (2005),	   Pan	   (2004,	   2012),	   Blanchard	   (2012),	   und	   Turner	  (2013,	  2014).	  	  377	  Uriu	  definiert	  „policy	  assumptions“	  als	  	  “prior	  accepted	  beliefs	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  policy	  issue	  and	  the	  interests	  involved	   in	   that	   issue”,	   in	  diesem	  Sinne	  als	   “a	  more	  concrete,	   tangible,	   and	  visible	  manifestation	  of	   ideas	  or	  beliefs”	  (Uriu	  2009,	  10).	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weniger	  auf	  die	  ‚Akteure‘,	  als	  auf	  den	  Diskurs	  selbst	  als	  ‚speech	  and	  action‘	  fokussiert,	  Rechnung	  tragen.	  Des	   Weiteren	   lässt	   sich	   der	   Hauptanteil	   an	   Untersuchungen	   zu	   U.S.-­‐chinesischen	  Wirtschaftsbeziehungen,	   insbesondere	   zu	   Handelsfragen,	   als	   themen-­‐	   und	   policy-­‐fokussiert	  charakterisieren,	  d.h.	  ohne	  explizite	  Anbindung/Annahme	  einer	  bestimmten	  (IB-­‐)	  theoretischen	  Perspektive	   (Bergsten	   et	   al.	   2008;	   Hufbauer,	   Wong,	   and	   Sheth	   2006;	   Morrison	   2006).	   Keine	  Untersuchung	   beschäftigt	   sich	   systematisch	   mit	   einer	   über	   die	   klassische	   ökonomische	  Sichtweise	  hinaus	  gehenden	  Bedeutung	  von	  Handels-­‐	  und	  Währungsungleichgewichten,	  obwohl	  es	   im	   Bereich	   der	   Forschungsperspektive	   der	   „cultural	   political	   economy“	   durchaus	   Ansätze	  hierfür	  gibt	   (Abdelal,	  Blyth,	   and	  Parsons	  2010;	  Best	  und	  Paterson	  2010;	  De	  Goede	  2006a).	  Die	  Literatur	   zu	  Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen	   lässt	   sich	  mit	  Bezug	   auf	  diese	  Ansätze	  und	  Aspekte	  generell	  als	  unter-­‐theoretisiert	  charakterisieren	  (vgl.	  Christensen,	  Johnston,	  and	  Ross	  2006,	  390;	  Hummel	   1997,	   9),	   während	   die	   Untersuchungen	   zum	   „American	   exceptionalism“	   oder	   der	  „liberal	   theory	   of	   history“	   nur	   vereinzelt	   den	   Bezug	   zur	   China-­‐,	   und	   noch	   weniger	   der	   Japan-­‐Politik	  der	  USA	  herstellen	  (vgl.	  Chen	  1992;	  Halper	  2010;	  Lampton	  2001;	  Mandelbaum	  2002).	  Es	  bleibt	   also	   eine	   Lücke	   zwischen	   themenorientierter	   Forschung	   (im	   Sinne	   von	   policy	   analysis),	  und	  solcher,	  die	  sich	  mit	  „Ideen“	  und	  „Identität“	  beschäftigt.	  	  Berücksichtigt	   man	   hingegen	   die	   Literatur	   zu	   U.S.-­‐chinesischen	   Beziehungen	   über	   die	  Wirtschaftsbeziehungen	  hinausgehend,	   so	   gibt	   es	   eine	  wachsende	  Anzahl	   von	  Studien,	  die	   sich	  (nicht	  nur	  aus	  IB-­‐konstruktivistischer	  Perspektive)	  mit	  „nicht-­‐materiellen	  Aspekten“	  wie	  Ideen,	  gegenseitigen	  Wahrnehmungen	  und	  Bildern,	  Einstellungen,	  Auffassungen,	  Identitäten,	  Diskursen,	  Meinungen	  etc.	  beschäftigen	  (vgl.	  Fewsmith	  und	  Rosen	  2001;	  Goh	  2005;	  Gries	  2006;	  Alastair	  Ian	  Johnston	  2006;	   Lampton	  2001;	  Wang	  2000).378	  Der	   sogenannte	   „ideational	   turn“	   in	   der	   Sozial-­‐	  bzw.	  Politikwissenschaft	  hat	  zu	  einer	  breiten	  Debatte	  und	  Auseinandersetzung	  darüber	  geführt,	  ob	  und	  warum	  „nicht-­‐materielle	  Aspekte“	  wie	   Ideen	  „materielle	  Aspekte“	  beeinflussen	  und	  wie	  man	  diesen	  Einfluss	  untersuchen	  sollte	  (vgl.	  Gofas	  and	  Hay	  2010;	  J.	  Goldstein	  und	  Keohane	  1993;	  Jackson	   2011;	   Jacobsen	   1995).	   Die	   Hauptströmung	   der	   (konstruktivistischen)	   Ansätze	  untersucht	  den	  Einfluss	  von	  Ideen	  und	  Identität	  als	  Variablen,	  während	  sog.	  radikale	  oder	  post-­‐positivistische	   Konstruktivisten	   Ideen	   im	   Sinne	   von	   Sprache	   und	   Diskursen	   konzeptualisieren	  und	   analysieren	   (vgl.	   Hülsse	   2003,	   214,	   225).	   Obwohl	   es	   in	   der	   breiten	   Literatur	  diskurstheoretischer	  und	  –analytischer	  Ansätze	  verschiedene	  Positionen,	  Argumentationen	  und	  Konzepte	  zum	  Begriff	  Diskurs	  sowie	  zur	  Frage,	  ob	  man	  zwischen	  diskursiv	  und	  nicht-­‐diskursiv	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  378	  Der	  Großteil	  der	   IB-­‐Literatur	  zu	  den	  U.S.-­‐chinesischen	  Beziehungen	  bewegt	  sich	  ansonsten	  (im-­‐	  oder	  explizit)	   im	  Rahmen	   der	  Machttransitionstheorie	   (Power	   Transition	   Theory)	   (vgl.	   Chan	   2008;	   Friedberg	   2005;	   Friedman	   2011;	  Jeffery	  2009;	  Alastair	  I	  Johnston	  and	  Ross	  1999;	  Lemke	  and	  Tammen	  2003;	  Ross	  and	  Zhu	  2008).	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unterteilen	  kann,	  gibt,	  haben	  diese	  Debatten	  die	  IB	  (vgl.	  Dalby	  1988;	  Epstein	  2010b;	  George	  1994;	  Hansen	   2006;	   Milliken	   1999;	   Weldes	   and	   Saco	   1996)	   und	   die	   IPÖ	   (vgl.	   Abdelal,	   Blyth,	   und	  Parsons	  2010;	  Epstein	  2010a;	  De	  Goede	  2006b;	  Maxwell	  2001)	  nur	  in	  begrenztem	  Maße	  erreicht.	  Die	  Hauptausrichtung	  begreift	  Diskurse	  als	  „nicht-­‐materiell“	  und	  als	  von	  „konkreten	  Fakten	  und	  Handlungen“	  zu	  trennendem	  Konzept	  (vgl.	  Schmidt	  2008).	  	  Meiner	   Ansicht	   nach	   sind	   diese	   Debatten	   von	   zwei	   grundlegenden	   Missverständnissen	  geprägt,	   die	   mitunter	   zu	   einem	   „lost	   in	   translation“	   führen,	   und	   die	   beide	   mit	   der	  Vernachlässigung	  ontologischer	  und	  methodologischer	  Aspekte	  auf	  der	  einen	  Seite,	  sowie	  einer	  Methoden-­‐Fixiertheit	  	  auf	  der	  anderen	  Seite,	  zusammenhängen.	  Diese	  Problematik	  wurde	  für	  den	  Bereich	  der	  IB	  zuletzt	  prominent	  von	  Patrick	  T.	   Jackson	  (2011)	  und	  Benjamin	  Herborth	  (2011)	  aufgegriffen,	   und	   beispielsweise	   von	   Warren	   J.	   Samuels	   für	   die	   IPÖ	   (Samuels	   1996).	   Diesen	  Autoren	  zufolge	  beschäftigen	  wir	  uns	  zu	  wenig	  mit	  der	  Frage,	  warum	  wir	  bestimmte	  Phänomene	  –	  und	  nicht	  andere	  –	  untersuchen	  und	  warum	  auf	  eine	  bestimmte	  Art	  und	  Weise	  und	  nicht	  auf	  eine	  andere.	  Für	  den	  Bereich	  U.S.-­‐chinesische	  (Wirtschafts)beziehungen	  bedeutet	  dieses,	  dass	  die	  Kategorien	   „materiell“	   vs.	   „nicht-­‐materiell“	   nicht	   näher	   hinterfragt	   bzw.	   definiert	   werden.	   In	  meinen	   Augen	   liegt	   dies	   v.a.	   an	   drei	   Gründen:	   ihre	   Bedeutung	   wird	   als	   selbstverständlich	  vorausgesetzt,	   diese	   Art	   methodologische	   Überlegungen	   werden	   als	   für	   die	   Empirie	   nicht	  relevante	   „Metatheorie“	   abgetan	   und/oder	   die	   Autoren	   bleiben	   bzw.	   wollen	   den	   größtenteils	  etablierten,	   bzw.	   den	   von	   einer	   neo-­‐positivistisch	   geprägten	   Hauptausrichtung	  „vorgegebenen“	  Methoden	  verhaftet	  bleiben	  (vgl.	  Hülsse	  2003,	  214;	  Jackson	  2011,	  203).379	  Ideen,	  Identitäten	   und	   Diskurse	   werden	   also	   als	   Variablen	   und	   potentielle	   kausale	   Faktoren	   im	  positivistischen	   Sinne	   behandelt	   (vgl.	   Gofas	   und	   Hay	   2010,	   4ff.;	   Gries	   2006,	   311;	   Alastair	   Ian	  Johnston	  2006,	  349ff.;	  Kang	  2007,	  8f.,80ff.;	  Rousseau	  2006;	  Wang	  2000,	  29ff.).	  Dies	  ist	  an	  und	  für	  sich	  weniger	  problematisch,	  allerdings	  birgt	  es	  Gefahren	  für	  die	  Konsistenz	  eines	  Ansatzes,	  wenn	  –	   wie	   im	   überwiegenden	   Falle	   der	   Untersuchungen	   zu	   U.S.-­‐chinesischen	   Beziehungen	   –	   die	  Prämissen	  nicht	  offen	  gelegt	  werden,	  oder	  –	  wie	  im	  Falle	  einer	  Vielzahl	  von	  konstruktivistischen	  Ansätzen	   in	   den	   IB	   generell	   –	   die	   angewandten	   neo-­‐positivistischen	   Methoden	   mit	   den	  ursprünglichen	   Prämissen	   des	   Sozialen	   Konstruktivismus	   im	  Widerspruch	   stehen	   (vgl.	   Hynek	  and	   Teti	   2010;	   Jackson	   2011,	   203f.	   ;	   Zehfuss	   2006). 380 	  Die	   Problematik	   dieser	   Art	   von	  Untersuchungen	  tritt	  zu	  Tage,	  wenn	  sie	  nicht	  in	  der	  Lage	  sind	  bzw.	  es	  versäumen,	  Antworten	  auf	  die	   Standardfragen	   nach	   dem	   „Einfluss	   nicht-­‐materieller	   Faktoren“	   auf	   „die	   (materielle)	  Realität“	   zu	   geben,	   da	   sie	   zu	   der	   postulierten	   Dichotomie	   zwischen	   „materieller	   Realität“	   und	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  379	  Zur	  Definition	  des	  Neo-­‐Positivismus	  siehe	  beispielsweise	  Howard	  (2010,	  400)	  und	  Jackson	  (2011,	  42ff.).	  	  380	  Zur	  Unterscheidung	  zwischen	  Sozialem	  Konstruktivismus	  und	  Konstruktivismus	  in	  den	  IB	  vgl.	  Jackson	  (2011,	  141f.,	  202–204).	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„Ideen“	   keine	   Aussagen	  machen,	   sie	   Aufrecht	   erhalten	   oder	   zumindest	   keine	   Gegenargumente	  liefern	  (vgl.	  Adcock	  2006,	  60;	  vgl.	  Wæver	  2005,	  35;	  z.B.	  Wang	  2000).	  In	   diesem	  Kontext	  möchte	   ich	  mit	  meinem	  Ansatz	   zeigen,	   dass	  man	   zur	   Überwindung	   der	  Lücke	   zwischen	   „Themen	   und	   Ideen“	   nicht	   auf	   (neo-­‐positivistische)	   Methoden	   als	  „Mittelweg“	   rekurrieren	   muss.	   Dazu	   problematisiere	   ich	   die	   Frage	   „Realität	   vs.	   Ideen“	   –	   bzw.	  nach	  meinem	  Ansatz	  Diskurse	  –	  im	  Rahmen	  der	  Politischen	  Diskurstheorie	  und	  Rhetorikanalyse.	  	  	  
Theoretische	  und	  methodologische	  Herangehensweise	  	  Die	  sogenannte	  Politische	  (oder	  auch	  Poststrukturalistische)	  Diskurstheorie	   (PDT)	  geht	  auf	  die	  Essex	   School	   und	   die	   in	   ihrem	   Zentrum	   stehenden	   Arbeiten	   von	   Ernesto	   Laclau	   und	   Chantal	  Mouffe	   zurück.	   Ihren	   Vertretern	   geht	   es	   darum,	   die	   Kontingenz	   und	   Historizität	   jeglicher	  vermeintlichen	   Objektivität	   aufzuzeigen,	   indem	   sie	   der	   Rolle	   von	   Macht	   und	   Politik	   im	  Zusammenhang	   ihrer	   Konstituierung	   nachgehen.	   Der	   Schwerpunkt	   liegt	   auf	   der	   Analyse	   von	  Repräsentationen	   und	   Transformationen	   von	   Ordnungen	   und	   Praktiken,	   die	   für	   unser	  Wissen	  und	   unsere	   Kategorisierungen	   der	   Welt	   stehen,	   indem	   ihr	   „natürlicher“	   oder	   hegemonialer	  Charakter	   problematisiert	   bzw.	   in	   Frage	   gestellt	   wird.	   „Diskurs“	   steht	   für	   eine	   durch	  Bedeutungsgenerierung	  und	   -­‐zuschreibung	  ebendiese	  Kategorisierungen	  produzierende	  Praxis.	  Ziel	   einer	   Diskursanalyse	   ist	   es,	   die	   Prozesse	   der	   Generierung	   und	   Fixierung	   von	   Bedeutung,	  sowie	  ihrer	  „normalisierenden“	  oder	  	  hegemonialen	  Institutionalisierung	  zu	  untersuchen	  (Glynos	  und	  Howarth	  2007,	  5;	  vgl.	  Howarth	  2005,	  317;	  Jørgensen	  und	  Phillips	  2002,	  5f.).	  	  In	  aller	  Kürze	  lässt	  sich	  die	  PDT	  in	  vier	  zentralen	  Punkten	  zum	  Diskursbegriff	  wiedergeben,	  der	  auf	  Ludwig	  Wittgensteins	  „Sprachspiel“	  zurückgeht	  (vgl.	  Glynos	  et	  al.	  2009,	  8f.):	  1.	  Diskurs	   ist	   eine	   sinnhafte	  bzw.	  Sinn	  und	  Bedeutung	  generierende	  Tätigkeit,	  welche	  die	  Welt	  verstehbar	   macht.	   Demnach	   wird	   nicht	   zwischen	   diskursiven	   und	   nicht-­‐diskursiven	  Phänomenen	  	  unterschieden,	  da	  jedes	  Phänomen	  sich	  erst	  im	  und	  durch	  den	  Diskurs	  konstituiert.	  Dieses	   ist	   nicht	   mit	   einer	   Verneinung	   einer	   „externen	   Realität“	   gleichzusetzen,381 	  sondern	  widerspricht	   lediglich	  der	  Auffassung,	   dass	   sich	   ein	  Objekt	   als	  Objekt	   außerhalb	  des	  Diskurses	  konstituieren	   könnte	   (Laclau	   and	   Mouffe	   2001,	   107ff.).	   Wir	   begegnen	   Objekten/Phänomenen	  immer	   schon	  mit	   Bedeutung	   behaftet	   und	   in	   einem	  Kontext,	   aus	   dem	  wir	  weder	   sie	   noch	   uns	  herauslösen	  können	  (Glynos	  and	  Howarth	  2008,	  8).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  381	  Zu	   diesem	   dualistischen	   Verständnis,	   welches	   sich	   v.a.	   auf	   die	   nach	   Richard	   Bernstein	   so	   benannte	   „Cartesian	  anxiety“	   im	  Zusammenhang	  mit	  dem	  „mind-­‐body-­‐dualism“	  nach	  René	  Descartes	   zurückführen	   lässt,	   siehe	  Bernstein	  (1976,	  1983).	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2.	   Diskurs	   ist	   gleichzeitig	   eine	   ontologische	   Kategorie,	   d.h.	   Wirklichkeit	   und	   Gesellschaft	  werden	  als	  diskursives	  Verhältnis	  begriffen,	   im	  Sinne	  eines	  Beziehungsgeflechts	   von	  Akteuren,	  Sprache	   und	   Handlung,	   in	   welchem	   jedes	   Element	   seine	   Bedeutung	   nur	   in	   Beziehung	   und	   in	  Differenz	  zu	  den	  anderen	  Elementen	  erfährt.382	  	  3.	   Die	   Betonung	   von	   Bedeutung	   und	   Sprache	   sowie	   das	   Verständnis	   von	   Diskurs	   als	  Differenzsystem	   soll	   nicht	   alle	   ‚Realität‘	   auf	   Sprache	   oder	   Text	   reduzieren,	   sondern	   aufzeigen,	  dass	  Gesellschaft	  wie	  Sprache	  über	  Differenzen	  strukturiert	  ist	  (Stäheli	  2000,	  8).	  In	  diesem	  Sinne	  betont	  Laclau,	  dass	  Diskurs	   	   “gleichbedeutend	  mit	  dem	  Sozialen	  als	   solchem”	  sei	   (Laclau	  2006,	  106).	  4.	   Diskurse	   als	   Struktur	   des	   Sozialen	   sind	   niemals	   in	   sich	   abgeschlossen	   und	   permanent	  fixiert,	   sondern	   werden	   durch	   andere	   Diskurse	   beeinflusst	   und	   verändert,	   wobei	   ständig	   der	  Versuch	   besteht,	   eine	   bestimmte	   Perspektive	   als	   universalen	   und	   hegemonialen	   Horizont	   zu	  etablieren	  (Stäheli	  2000,	  34).	  Für	  das	  in	  der	  PDT	  zentrale	  Verständnis	  von	  Identität	  bedeutet	  dieses,	  dass	  letztere	  niemals	  prä-­‐diskursiv	   vorhanden	   sein	   kann,	   sondern	   sich	   durch	   Identifikation	   mit	   im	   Diskurs	  artikulierten	   temporären	   Subjektpositionen	   konstituiert.	   Jegliche	   Identität	   ist	   relational	   und	  kontingent,	   die	   Formierung	   individueller	   und	   kollektiver	   Identität	   findet	   im	   Zuge	   diskursiver	  Prozesse	   statt,	   die	   nie	   in	   eine	   komplette	   Abgeschlossenheit	   im	   Sinne	   einer	   Totalisierung	   oder	  ultimativen	  Fixierung	  münden	  (Jørgensen	  und	  Phillips	  2002,	  24ff.;	  Laclau	  und	  Mouffe	  2001,	  111f.)	  Das	  Selbst	  konstituiert	  sich	   immer	  nur	   in	  Differenz	  zum	  Anderen.	   In	  diesem	  Sinne	  gilt	  auch	  für	  Staaten,	   dass	   sie	   “keine	   prä-­‐diskursive,	   stabile	   Identität	   besitzen“,	   in	   den	   Worten	   David	  Campbell’s:	  „No	  state	  is	  free	  from	  the	  tension	  between	  various	  domains	  that	  need	  to	  be	  aligned	  for	   a	   political	   community	   to	   come	   into	   being,	   an	   alignment	   that	   is	   a	   response	   to,	   rather	   than	  constitutive	  of,	  a	  prior	  and	  stable	  identity”	  (Campbell	  1998,	  91).	  Und	  Campbell	  führt	  weiter	  aus:	  “The	   constitution	   of	   identity	   is	   achieved	   through	   the	   inscription	   of	   boundaries	   that	   serve	   to	  demarcate	   an	   ‘inside’	   from	   an	   ‘outside’,	   a	   ‘self’	   from	   an	   ‘other’,	   a	   ‘domestic’	   from	   a	   ‘foreign’”	  (Campbell	   1998,	   9).	   In	   diesem	   Sinne	   lässt	   sich	   ein	   Staat	   als	   Produkt	   hegemonialer	  Auseinandersetzungen	  über	  die	  Verwirklichung	  von	  Gesellschaft	  begreifen	  (Howarth	  2000,	  120).	  Der	  Fokus	  meiner	  Arbeit	  liegt	  auf	  diesen	  hegemonialen	  Auseinandersetzungen	  in	  den	  USA.	  Ein	  hegemonialer	  Diskurs	  wird	  durch	  Entwicklungen	  oder	  Ereignisse	   in	  Frage	  gestellt	  bzw.	  disloziert,	  die	  nicht	   in	  sein	   (Be)deutungsmuster	  passen	  oder	  sich	  nicht	   in	  dieses	   inkorporieren	  lassen	   (Glasze	   2007,	   661;	   Torfing	   2005,	   16).	   Im	   Falle	   einer	   Dislokation	   wird	   „der	  Andere“	   zumeist	   für	   diese	   verantwortlich	   gemacht.	   Diesen	   Antagonismus	   beschreiben	   Laclau	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  382	  Dieses	  Konzept	  geht	  auf	  die	  strukturelle	  Linguistik	  Ferdinand	  de	  Saussures	  zurück.	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und	  Mouffe	  mit	   der	   Logik	   der	   Äquivalenz	   und	  Differenz	   (Laclau	   1990,	   39,	   50;	   vgl.	   Laclau	   und	  Mouffe	  2001,	  132).	  Nach	  der	  Logik	  der	  Äquivalenz	  konstituieren	  sich	  kollektive	   Identitäten	  als	  solche	  immer	  gegenüber	  einem	  Äußeren,	  d.h.	  die	  inneren	  Differenzen	  werden	  nur	  äquivalent	  in	  ihrer	   gemeinsamen	   äußeren	   Differenz	   zum	   Anderen.	   Nach	   der	   Logik	   der	   Differenz	   hingegen	  werden	   die	   (inneren)	   Äquivalenzen	   und	   somit	   der	   Anatgonismus	   zum	   (äußeren)	   Anderen	  abgeschwächt.	  Diese	  beiden	  Logiken	  bedingen	  einander	  und	  funktionieren	  über	  die	  Artikulation	  von	   leeren	   Signifikanten,	   die	   einen	   gemeinsamen	   Referenzpunkt	   im	   Diskurs	   darstellen.383	  Ein	  prominentes	   Beispiel	   von	   Laclau	   für	   einen	   leeren	   Signifikanten	   ist	   „Ordnung“	   im	   Falle	   ihrer	  Ermangelung.	  „Ordnung“	  an	  sich	  hat	  keinen	  bestimmten	  Inhalt	  bzw.	  keine	  fixierte	  Bedeutung,	  der	  Ausdruck	   steht	   lediglich	   für	   sein	   in	   dieser	   Situation	   eigenes	   Nicht-­‐Vorhandensein	   (vgl.	   Laclau	  2007,	   44).	   Im	   Falle	   der	   wirtschaftsspolitischen	   Auseinandersetzungen	   zwischen	   den	   USA	   und	  Japan	  und	  China	   ist	  beispielsweise	  „Fairness“	  ein	   leerer	  Signifikant	  (vgl.	  Nymalm	  2011b,	  8).	   Im	  Diskurs	  geht	  es	  dann	  darum,	  den	  Signifikanten	  zu	  füllen	  bzw.	  eine	  bestimmte	  Umgangsweise	  zur	  Beseitigung	  des	  Fehlens	  von	  Fairness	  zu	  finden	  und	  in	  Form	  konkreter	  politischer	  Maßnahmen	  durchzusetzen.	   In	   diesem	   Zusammenhang	   wird	   der	   Andere	   –	   in	   diesem	   Falle	   das	   „illiberale	  Japan“	  und	  das	  „kommunistische	  China“	  für	  das	  Fehlen	  von	  Fairness	  verantwortlich	  gemacht.	  	  Während	   die	   PDT	   zwar	   keine	   konkrete	   methodische	   Vorgehensweise	   in	   Bezug	   auf	   die	  Diskursanalyse	  vorschreibt,	  so	  lässt	  sich	  „Methode“	  in	  ihrem	  Zusammenhang	  gleichwohl	  nicht	  als	  vom	  Untersuchungsgegenstand	  abgekoppelter,	  beliebig	  einsetzbarer	  Werkzeugkasten	  verstehen.	  Methodische	   Fragen	   stehen	   demnach	   sowohl	   in	   Verbindung	   zu	   den	  philosophischen/theoretischen	   Prämissen	   der	   PDT	   –	   die	   essentialistischen	   Theorien	   von	  Wissensproduktion	  entgegenstehen	  –	  als	  auch	  zur	  konkreten	  Fragestellung	  (Glynos	  und	  Howarth	  2007,	  6;	  Howarth	  2000,	  132,	  2005,	  317).384	  	  Nach	  der	  PDT	  kommt	  der	  Untersuchung	  von	  Rhetorik	  sowohl	  auf	  der	  ontologischen,	  als	  auch	  auf	  der	  ontischen	  Ebene	  eine	  entscheidende	  Rolle	  zu,	  wenn	  es	  darum	  geht,	  Praktiken	  und	  Regime	  der	   Bedeutungsgenerierung	   und	   -­‐fixierung	   zu	   charakterisieren.	   Laclau	   hebt	   nicht	   nur	   die	  zentrale	   Rolle	   der	   Rhetorik	   für	   die	   Strukturierung	   jeglicher	   Bedeutungssysteme	   hervor	   (vgl.	  Laclau	   2006,	   106),	   sondern	   begreift	   das	   Soziale	   als	   „rhetorischen	   Raum“	   und	   rhetorische	  Mechanismen	   als	   „Anatomie	   des	   Sozialen“	   (Laclau	   2000,	   79,	   2005,	   110).	   Es	   geht	   also	   darum,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  383	  Antagonismen	  sind	  allerdings	  nicht	  prädeterminiert,	  d.h.	  es	  gibt	  keine	  ‚natürlichen	  Antagonismen‘(Laclau	  2009,	  319;	  Norval	  2000,	  223;	  Stäheli	  2009,	  239).	  	  384	  Die	   „Logics	   of	   Critical	   Explanation“,	   von	   Jason	   Glynos	   und	   David	   Howarth	   als	   Anwendung	   der	   PDT	   in	   der	  empirischen	  Arbeit	  konzipiert,	  basieren	  demnach	  auf	  einem	  post-­‐positivistischen	  Verständnis	  von	  Wissenschaft,	  dass	  die	   PDT	   als	   erklärende,	   interpretative	   und	   kritische	   Theorie	   begreift,	   die	   in	   ihrer	   Anwendung	   Subsumption,	  Empirismus	  und	  Eklektizismus	  zu	  vermeiden	  sucht	  (Glynos	  und	  Howarth	  2011).	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Rhetorik	   nicht	   als	   bloßen	   Zusatz	   oder	   sogar	   Gegensatz	   von	   Handlungen,	   oder	   als	   rein	  instrumentelles	   und	   strategisches	  Mittel	   der	   Kommunikation	   zu	   begreifen	   (Glynos	   et	   al.	   2009,	  13f.).	  Während	  sich	  die	  Rhetorikanalyse	  auf	  der	  empirischen	  Ebene	  mit	  der	  Strukturierung	  und	  dem	  Funktionieren	  von	  Diskursen	  befasst,	  so	  bedeutet	  dies	  für	  die	  ontologische	  Ebene,	  dass	  die	  untersuchten	   Phänomene	   gleichzeitig	   nicht	   als	   durch	   die	   Sprachpraxis	   repräsentiert,	   sondern	  konstituiert	   betrachtet	  werden	   (Stäheli	   2000,	   13f.).	   Alan	   Finlayson	   argumentiert	   im	   Sinne	   der	  Politischen	   Rhetorikanalyse	   (RPA),	   dass	   wir	   nicht	   „Ideen“	   (wie	   z.B.	   in	   der	   erwähnten	  Untersuchung	   von	   Uriu),	   sondern	   „Argumente“	   untersuchen	   sollten:	   „	   […]	   to	   analyze	   political	  persuasion	   and	   preference	   transformation	   we	   must	   reacquaint	   ourselves	   with	   the	   rhetorical	  tradition.	  […]	  Rhetoric	  draws	  our	  attention	  to	  forms	  of	  argument	  and	  reasoning	  that	  exceed	  the	  strictures	  of	  syllogism	  yet	  manifestly	  operate	  und	  function	   in	  real-­‐world	  contexts	  of	  argument”	  (Finlayson	  2007,	  546,	  553).	  In	  meiner	  Arbeit	  mache	  ich	  für	  die	  Diskursanalyse	  von	  folgenden	  von	  Martin	  Reisigl	   für	  die	  RPA	   entwickelten	   heuristischen	   Kategorien	   Gebrauch	   (vgl.	   Nymalm	   2013) 385 :	   Nomination	  (Benennung	   der	   Akteure),	   Prädikation	   (Zuschreibung	   von	   Eigenschaften),	   Argumentation	  (Begründung/Delegitimierung	   der	   Nominationen	   und	   Prädikationen),	   Perspektivierung	  (Blickwinkel	   der	   Äußerungen)	   und	   Intensivierung	   bzw.	   Abschwächung	   aller	   Kategorien	   (vgl.	  Reisigl	  2008).	  Diese	  Kategorien	  eignen	  sich	  gut	  für	  die	  Übersetzung	  der	  theoretischen	  Kategorien	  von	  Ernesto	  Laclau	  und	  Chantal	  Mouffe	  für	  die	  Diskursanalyse:	  Nach	  den	  Logiken	  der	  Äquivalenz	  und	  Differenz	  konstituieren	  sich	  die	  Akteure	  (in	  meinem	  Fall	  die	  USA	  vs.	  Japan	  bzw.	  die	  USA	  vs.	  China)	   durch	   ihre	   Benennung	   und	   die	   Zuschreibung	   bestimmter	   Eigenschaften	   (z.B.	   „das	  amerikanische	   Volk“	   vs.	   „kommunistisches	   Regime“).	   Damit	   aus	   diesen	   Charakterisierungen	  Äquivalenz-­‐	  und	  Differenzketten	  werden	  können,	  argumentieren	  die	  Sprecher	  mit	  Begründungen	  bzw.	  Delegitimierungen	  der	  Nominationen	  und	  Prädikationen	  (z.B.	  dass	  China	  nur	  erfolgreich	  sei,	  weil	   es	   seine	   Währung	   manipuliere,	   demzufolge	   stünden	   die	   USA	   als	   Opfer	   der	   unfairen	  chinesischen	  Währungspolitik	   da).	   Um	   sich	   vom	  Anderen	   abzugrenzen,	   nehmen	  die	   jeweiligen	  Sprecher	   eine	   bestimmte	   Perspektive	   ein,	   sie	   positionieren	   sich	   gegenüber	   dem	   leeren	  Signifikanten	  (einerseits	  durch	  die	  genannte	  Opferperspektive,	  aber	  andererseits	  wird	  auch	  die	  Einstellung	   geäußert,	   dass	   die	   USA	   wegen	   ihres	   „blinden	   Glaubens	   an	   die	  Freihandelsagenda“	   selbst	   an	   der	   Entwicklung	   Schuld	   seien).	   Die	   Intensivierung	   bzw.	  Abschwächung	   in	   allen	   Kategorien	   befördert	   (bzw.	   schwächt)	   die	   Artikulation	   bzw.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  385 	  Reisigl	   beschäftigt	   sich	   in	   seiner	   Untersuchung	   nationalistischer	   politischer	   Rhetorik	   in	   Österreich	   mit	  Konstruktionen	  und	  Repräsentationen	  sozialer	  und	  kollektiver	  Identitäten,	  z.B.	  Nationen	  (Reisigl	  2007).	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Konstituierung	  des	  Anderen	  als	  Bedrohung	  (z.B.	  China	  als	  „Evil	  Empire“	  gegenüber	  den	  USA	  als	  „Leading	  Nation“).	  	  	  
Quellen	  und	  Zeitrahmen	  der	  Untersuchung	  	  In	   dieser	   Arbeit	   konzentriere	   ich	  mich	   auf	   die	   Analyse	   des	   öffentlichen	   Elitendiskurses	   in	   den	  USA	   am	   Beispiel	   einer	   Diskurs-­‐	   und	   Rhetorikanalyse	   der	   wirtschaftspolitischen	   Debatten	   zu	  Japan	  und	  China	  im	  U.S.-­‐Kongress	  von	  1985	  bis	  2008.	  Als	  Datenmaterial	  liegt	  der	  Congressional	  Record	   zugrunde,	   welcher	   Berichte,	   Anhörungen,	   Abstimmungen	   etc.	   im	   Senat	   und	   im	  Repräsentantenhaus	  umfasst.	  Der	  Kongress	   spielte	   und	   spielt	   eine	  herausragende	  Rolle	   in	  den	  wirtschaftspolitischen	  Auseinandersetzungen	  um	  Japan	  und	  China,	  zum	  einen	  durch	  seine	  in	  der	  Verfassung	   verankerten	   Kompetenzen	   im	   Bereich	   der	   wirtschafts-­‐	   und	   insbesondere	   der	  Handelspolitik,	   zum	   anderen	   durch	   seine	   öffentlichkeitswirksame	   Umsetzung	   dieser	  Kompetenzen	   (Morris	  2010,	  56–63;	   cf.	   i.e.	  Xie	  2009,	  58).	  Was	  den	  Zeitraum	  angeht,	   so	  werden	  die	   1980er,	   insbesondere	  das	   Jahr	   1985	  überwiegend	   als	  Wendepunkt	   in	   den	  U.S.-­‐japanischen	  Beziehungen	  betrachtet,	  da	  in	  dieser	  Zeit	  die	  Handels-­‐	  und	  Währungsstreitigkeiten	  an	  Frequenz	  und	  Intensität	  deutlich	  zunahmen	  (cf.	  i.e.	  Hummel	  2000,	  142,	  188,	  219;	  Mastanduno	  1992,	  240),	  und	  die	  Handelspolitik	  zu	  einem	  sowohl	  überparteilich,	  als	  auch	  zwischen	  dem	  Kongress	  und	  der	  Exekutive	  umstrittenen,	  und	  zu	  einem	  Thema	  im	  Wahlkampf	  wurde	  (Hummel	  2000,	  140;	  Kunkel	  2003,	   52;	   Mastanduno	   1992,	   263).	   Darüber	   hinaus	   manifestierten	   sich	   in	   diesem	   Zeitraum	  negative	  Ansichten	  und	  eine	  harsche	  Rhetorik	  gegenüber	   Japan	   in	  der	  Öffentlichkeit	  (cf.	  Morris	  2010,	  23).	  Um	  das	  Jahr	  1995	  herum	  verlagerte	  sich	  die	  Aufmerksamkeit	  auf	  China,	  was	  mit	  einer	  zunehmenden	  Fokussierung	  auf	   ‚Chinas	  Aufstieg‘	   in	  der	  akademischen	  Literatur	  einhergeht	   (A.	  Goldstein	  1997,	  3).	  	  Der	  analytische	  Fokus	  auf	  ‚Text‘	  in	  Form	  von	  verschriftlichter	  Rede	  bezieht	  sich	  lediglich	  auf	  die	  Form	   der	   Quellen	   und	   bedeutet	   keine	   ‚Reduktion	   von	   Wirklichkeit	   auf	   Sprache‘,	   was	   dem	  Diskursverständnis	   dieser	   Arbeit	   wiedersprechen	  würde	   (vgl.	   Nonhoff	   2011,	   96).	   Im	   Einklang	  hiermit	   ist	  der	  Fokus	  auf	  den	  Elitendiskurs	  als	  rein	  pragmatisch	  und	  analytisch,	  und	  ebenso	  im	  Einklang	  mit	  dem	  Diskursverständnis	  zu	  verstehen	  (vgl.	  Howarth	  and	  Stavrakakis	  2000,	  4).	  In	   dieser	   Arbeit	   fokussiere	   ich	   die	   Diskursanalyse	   auf	   die	   Debatten	   in	   den	   Jahren	  ausgewählter	  Schlüsselereignisse:	  1985	  (Plaza-­‐Abkommen;	  die	  USA	  werden	  zum	  ersten	  Mal	  nach	  dem	  2.	  Weltkrieg	  zum	  Schuldner),	  1989	  (sog.	  „Structural	  Impediments	  Initiative“	  mit	  Japan;	  Ende	  des	   Kalten	   Krieges),	   1994/1995	   (Handelsgespräche	   mit	   Japan;	   Debatten	   um	   Chinas	   „Most	  Favored	   Nation	   (MFN)	   Status“)	   1997	   (Finanzkrise	   in	   Asien),	   2000/2001	   (Chinas	   Beitritt	   zur	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WTO;	  größtes	  Defizit	  der	  USA	  mit	  China),	  2005	  (China	  kündigt	  Ende	  der	  exklusiven	  Anbindung	  seiner	   Währung	   an	   den	   Dollar	   an;	   Debatten	   um	   die	   Übernahme	   einer	   kalifornischen	   Ölfirma	  (Unocal)	   durch	   chinesisches	   Unternehmen	   (CNOOC))	   und	   2008	   (Ausbruch	   der	   globalen	  Finanzkrise;	   China	   wird	   zum	   größten	   Gläubiger	   der	   USA).	   Dabei	   geht	   es	   mir	   nicht	   um	   eine	  Untersuchung	  der	  Ereignisse	  an	  sich,	  sondern	  um	  die	  jeweiligen	  Jahre	  als	  Referenzpunkte	  einer	  Analyse	  von	  Kontinuitäten	  und	  Veränderungen	  in	  der	  Artikulation	  amerikanischer	  Identität	  über	  einen	  längeren	  Zeitraum	  hinweg.386	  	  	  
Überblick	  über	  die	  Kapitel	  der	  Arbeit	  	  	  	  Im	  ersten	  Kapitel	  wird	  das	  Thema	  der	  Dissertation	  anhand	  eines	  Überblicks	  über	  die	  bisherige	  Forschung	   diskutiert.	   Dabei	   konzentriere	   ich	   mich	   zunächst	   auf	   Literatur	   zu	   U.S-­‐japanischen	  (Kapitel	   1.1)	   und	   U.S.-­‐chinesischen	   (Kapitel	   1.2)	   (Wirtschafts-­‐)Beziehungen,	   um	   diese	   dann	   in	  Verbindung	   zunächst	   mit	   der	   Forschung	   zur	   „liberal	   theory	   of	   history“	   und	   „American	  exceptionalism“	  (Kapitel	  1.3),	  und	  schließlich	  zu	  den	  Konzepten	  Identität,	  Ideen	  und	  Diskurse	  in	  der	  IB-­‐	  und	  IPÖ-­‐Literatur	  (Kapitel	  1.4)	  zu	  bringen.	  Im	  zweiten	  Kapitel	  geht	  es	  um	  die	  Politische	  (oder	  auch	  Poststrukturalistische)	  Diskurstheorie	  (PDT),	  zunächst	  in	  Verbindung	  zu	  verwandten	  Strömungen	   in	   den	   IB,	   dann	   über	   diese	   hinausgehend	   mit	   einem	   Fokus	   auf	   die	   zentralen	  Konzepte	  Diskurs,	  Hegemonie	  und	  Identität	  der	  PDT	  (Kapitel	  2.1	  bis	  2.3).	  Der	  Fokus	  von	  Kapitel	  drei	   liegt	   auf	  methodologischen	   und	  methodischen	   Aspekten,	   zunächst	   in	   der	   Einordnung	   der	  Debatten	  um	  Diskursanalyse	  als	  Methode	  in	  den	  IB	  (Kapitel	  3.1),	  gefolgt	  von	  einer	  Diskussion	  der	  „Logics	  of	  Critical	  Explanataion“	   (Kapitel	  3.2)	  und	  der	  Rhetorikanalyse	   (Kapitel	  3.3),	  welche	  an	  die	   im	   ersten	  Kapitel	   aufgeworfenen	   Fragen	   anknüpft.	   Schließlich	   geht	   es	   um	  die	   analytischen	  Kategorien	   der	   PDT	   in	  Verbindung	  mit	   dem	  politisch-­‐linguistischen	  Ansatz	   von	  Martin	  Reisigl,	  sowie	   um	   die	   Organisation	   und	   Strukturierung	   der	   Quellen	   und	   der	   Analyse	   anhand	   dieses	  Vorgehens	  (Kapitel	  3.4).	  	  Die	   Kapitel	   vier	   bis	   sieben	   bilden	   den	   diskursanalytischen	   Teil	   der	   Arbeit,	   strukturiert	  anhand	  der	  analytischen	  und	  theoretischen	  Kategorien	  und	  der	  Hauptthemen	  der	  Diskurse:	  dem	  Handelsbilanzdefizit	   und	   der	   Frage	   nach	   seinen	   Konsequenzen	   für	   die	   globale	   Rolle	   und	  Vormachstellung	   der	   USA.	   Die	   Zusammenfassung	   der	   Analyse	   präsentiert	   die	   wichtigsten	  Ergebnisse,	   während	   das	   Fazit	   diese	   in	   Verbindung	   mit	   dem	   Forschungsansatz	   und	   seiner	  Einordung	   in	   den	   IB	   und	   der	   IPÖ	   wie	   in	   den	   ersten	   drei	   Kapiteln	   diskutiert	   bringt.	   Darüber	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  386	  Die	  Suchbegriffe	  für	  die	   jeweiligen	  Jahre	  im	  Congressional	  Record,	  „Japan	  economy“	  und	  „China	  economy“,	  waren	  demnach	  möglichst	  breit	  gehalten.	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hinaus	   gehe	   ich	   auf	   Grenzen	   der	   Dissertation,	   sowie	   in	   diesem	   Zusammenhang	   auf	   zukünftige	  Forschung	   ein,	   und	   gebe	   einen	   Ausblick	   auf	   die	   U.S.-­‐chinesischen	   Beziehungen	   im	   Lichte	   der	  Ergebnisse	  dieser	  Arbeit.	  	  
	  
Zusammenfassung	  der	  wichtigsten	  Ergebnisse	  
	  Die	   Diskursanalyse	   der	   wirtschaftspolitischen	   Auseinandersetzungen	   um	   den	   Aufstieg	   Japans	  und	   Chinas	   im	  U.S.-­‐Kongress	   zeigt	   in	   erster	   Linie,	   dass	   die	   liberale	   Identität	   der	  USA	   in	   ihrem	  Universalismus	   herausgefordert	   wird,	   welcher	   sich	   im	   „American	   exceptionalism“	   und	   der	  „liberal	   theory	   of	   history“	   kristallisiert.	   Nach	   diesem	   Selbstverständnis	   sind	   sowohl	   die	  menschliche	  Natur	  als	  auch	  die	  amerikanischen	  (politischen)	  Werte	  universell,	  sie	  beinhalten	  die	  notwendige	  Verknüpfung	  von	  wirtschaftlichem	  und	  politischem	  Liberalismus,	  und	  stehen	  für	  ein	  allgemeingültiges	   (und	   demnach	   allgemein	   erstrebenswertes)	   Fortschrittsmuster	  mit	   den	   USA	  als	   Vorreiter	   und	  Vorbild	   für	   das	   liberaldemokratische	   kapitalistische	  Modell.	   In	   diesem	   Sinne	  steht	  Freihandel	  für	  den	  Internationalismus	  der	  U.S.-­‐Außenpolitik	  und	  den	  Aufstieg	  der	  USA	  zur	  globalen	   Supermacht	   (cf.	   Kunkel	   2003,	   24).	   Nach	   dem	   Ende	   des	   Kalten	   Krieges	   schienen	   die	  Prinzipien	   des	   freien	   Handels	   und	   des	   liberalen	   Wirtschaftsmodells	   ihre	   Versprechungen	   im	  Sinne	   der	   „liberal	   theory	   of	   history“	   erfüllt	   zu	   haben,	   ihre	   in	   Frage	   Stellung	   durch	   Japan	   nach	  Meinung	  der	  Revisionisten	  setzte	  sich	  erst	  Mitte	  der	  1990er	  Jahre	  temporär	  durch.	  Freier	  Handel	  und	   (politische)	   Freiheit	   wurden	   und	   werden	   weiterhin	   als	   dem	   universellen	   Gemeinwohl	  zuträglich	   betrachtet,	   unabhängig	   von	   sozialem	   und	   historischem	   Kontext.	   In	   diesem	   Sinne	  können	   sie	   in	   den	  USA	   als	   hegemoniale	   Diskurse	   begriffen	  werden,	   die	  wiederholt	   –	   zunächst	  durch	  das	   ‚Japan	  Problem‘	   –	   und	   seit	   den	  1990ern	  durch	  das	   ‚kommunistische‘	   China	   in	   Frage	  gestellt	  werden.	  Der	  „American	  exceptionalism“	  spielt	  eine	  entscheidende	  Rolle	  in	  beiden	  Fällen,	  da	  er	   für	  das	  zentrale	  Charakteristikum	  des	  Selbstverständnisses	  der	  USA	  als	  außergewöhnlich	  und	  überlegen	  steht.	  	  In	   beiden	   Fällen	   manifestiert	   sich	   die	   Dislokation	   (auf	   der	   ontischen	   Ebene;	   auf	   der	  ontologischen	  Ebene	   ist	   Identität	  permanent,	   im	  Sinne	  von	  strukturell,	  disloziert)	  der	   liberalen	  Identität	  der	  USA	  vor	  allem	  durch	  die	  Hauptfaktoren	  des	  größten	  Handelsbilanzdefizits,	  und	  den	  USA	  als	  weltweit	  größtem	  Schuldner	  zunächst	  gegenüber	  Japan	  und	  dann	  China.	  Beide	  Faktoren	  widersprechen	  sowohl	  dem	  „American	  exceptionalism“	  als	  auch	  der	   „liberal	   theory	  of	  history“,	  und	   in	   beiden	   Fällen	   führt	   diese	   unvorteilhafte	   Stellung	   der	   USA	   gegenüber	   ihrem	   größten	  wirtschaftlichen	  Konkurrenten	  zur	  Frage	  nach	  der	  Bedeutung	  und	  den	  möglichen	  Folgen	  für	  ihre	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globale	  Stellung.	  Darüber	  hinaus	  entsprechen	  Japan	  und	  China	  mit	  ihrer,	  wie	  in	  den	  Debatten	  in	  unterschiedlichen	   Nuancen	   artikuliert,	   ‚andersartigen‘	   Wirtschaft	   und	   Gesellschaft	   nicht	   dem	  universellen	   Fortschrittsmodell	  mit	   den	  USA	   als	   Vorreiter.	   In	   diesem	   Zusammenhang	  wird	   ihr	  wirtschaftlicher	  Erfolg	  als	  zusätzlicher	  ‚Affront‘	  artikuliert.	  	  Indessen	   ist	   aber	   der	   Umgang	   mit	   der	   Dislokation	   weder	   durch	   den	   „American	  exceptionalism“,	   noch	   durch	   die	   „liberal	   theory	   of	   history“	   prädeterminiert,	   im	   Sinne	   von	  notwendiger	  Weise	  zu	  einem	  Antagonismus	  in	  Form	  einer	  Konfrontation	  führend.	  Wie	  durch	  die	  Analyse	   deutlich	   wird,	   haben	   beide	   Gedankenstränge	   das	   Potential	   für	   die	   Artikulation	   einer	  inklusiven,	   als	   auch	   einer	   exklusiven	   Identität.	   Das	   zeigen	   die	   Logiken	   der	   Äquivalenz	   und	  Differenz	  in	  den	  Diskursen,	  die	  sich	  zum	  Teil	  auch	  anhand	  interner	  Grenzziehungen	  abspielen.	  So	  werden	  beispielsweise	  interne	  Äquivalenzketten	  artikuliert,	  denen	  zufolge	  die	  eigene	  Regierung	  für	   die	   unvorteilhafte	   wirtschaftliche	   Situation	   der	   USA	   verantwortlich	   gemacht	   wird.	   Ein	  weiteres	   Beispiel	   für	   interne	   Äquivalenzen	   sind	   die	   intensivierten	   Äußerungen,	   die	   China	  mit	  Nazi-­‐Deutschland	   und	   die	   Befürworter	   einer	   Politik	   der	   wirtschaftlichen	   Zusammenarbeit	   mit	  der	   Appeasement-­‐Politik	   Großbritanniens	   vor	   dem	   Zweiten	   Weltkrieg	   gleichsetzen.	  Demgegenüber	   stehen	   Ketten	   der	   Differenz,	   in	   denen	   beispielsweise	   die	   „liberal	   theory	   of	  history“	   als	   inklusiver	   gemeinsamer	   Nenner	   artikuliert	   wird,	   der	   sowohl	   den	   wirtschaftlichen	  Interessen,	  als	  auch	  den	  Werten	  der	  USA	  (i.e.	  Demokratie	  und	  Menschenrechten)	  Rechnung	  trage.	  Die	  Grenze	   der	   Inklusivität	   von	   liberaler	   Identität387	  scheint	   allerdings	   erreicht,	  wenn	   es	   keine	  Aussicht	   mehr	   auf	   eine	   Veränderung	   des	   Anderen	   im	   Sinne	   des	   ‚Modells‘	   oder	   Vorbildes	   des	  Selbst	  gibt,	  welches	  im	  Falle	  Japans	  nach	  den	  Argumenten	  der	  Revisionisten	  der	  Fall	  war,	  und	  im	  Falle	  Chinas	  größtenteils	  aber	  noch	  als	  offen	  gesehen	  wird	   (vgl.	  Morrison	  2015).	   Insbesondere	  die	  Vertreter	  der	  „liberal	  theory	  of	  history“	  setzten	  weiter	  auf	  den	  transformativen	  Effekt	  einer	  wirtschaftlichen	  Einbindung	  Chinas	  durch	  die	  USA.	  	  	  Mit	   Hinblick	   auf	   zukünftige	   Entwicklungen	   gibt	   es	   in	   einigen	   wirtschaftspolitischen	   Feldern	   –	  beispielsweise	   im	   Bereich	   von	   Direktinvestitionen,	   welche	   im	   Verhältnis	   mit	   Japan	   zu	   den	  umstrittensten	   Themen	   gehörten	   –	   Fortschritte	   im	   Sinne	   von	   geplanten	   Abkommen,	   die	   eine	  Kooperation	   zwischen	   den	   USA	   und	   China	   ermöglichen	   sollen	   (vgl.	   Morrison	   2015).	   Im	  Allgemeinen	  und	  über	  spezifische	  Politikfelder	  hinausgehend,	  wird	  aber	  vieles	  davon	  abhängen,	  in	   wie	   fern	   die	   USA	   und	   ‚der	   Westen‘	   generell	   dazu	   in	   der	   Lage	   sind,	   auch	   außerhalb	   ihres	  eigenen	   Referenzrahmens	   zu	   denken.	   Für	   das	   akademische	   Feld	   bedeutet	   dieses	   als	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